- Nov 9, 2013
- 7,640
- 3,846
- Country
- United States
- Gender
- Male
- Faith
- Catholic
- Marital Status
- Single
This thread will be something of a sequel to the thread found here and especially the main artery of that thread mapped out here. Needless to say, it properly belongs in the philosophy forum, but is placed here due to the (temporary?) closure of philosophy.
We hear a lot about the essential falsifiability found in modern science, and it is implied that theology's failure to adhere to this standard is proof of its vacuity. I hope to argue in this post that deviation from scientific falsifiability is not a problem in general, and then later to argue that the deviation is especially not a problem for theology. Let's begin by setting out two different kinds of falsifiability, a falsifiability of modern scientific experiment (Fmse), and a counterfactual falsifiability (Fcf):
Fmse is characteristic of the modern hard sciences. For example, a predictive theory is proposed and newly discovered data is expected to be reliably predicted by the theory. There is a real temporal possibility that at some point in the future data will be discovered which contradicts the predictions of this theory, at which point the theory will be discarded or refined.
If something is Fmse then it is also Fcf, but the fact that something is Fcf does not necessarily mean it is Fmse. This is because if something is falsifiable via future observations, it must also be able to imagined to be false, but a proposition could be imagined to be false without there being any possibility of its being falsified in time--in the future. Something which is solely Fcf (and not Fmse) has a kind of infallibility about it which cannot be disproven by modern scientific experiment, but which at the same time could have been different than it in fact was. One example of a proposition that is Fcf but not Fmse involves qualia:
Therefore not all knowledge need adhere to scientific falsifiability, Fmse. Qualia, well-established past events, and basic axioms such as the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, and the importance of Fcf itself are a few examples that come to mind. Indeed some of these basic axioms may not even be accountable to Fcf.
In my next post I will move to a consideration of theology itself.
We hear a lot about the essential falsifiability found in modern science, and it is implied that theology's failure to adhere to this standard is proof of its vacuity. I hope to argue in this post that deviation from scientific falsifiability is not a problem in general, and then later to argue that the deviation is especially not a problem for theology. Let's begin by setting out two different kinds of falsifiability, a falsifiability of modern scientific experiment (Fmse), and a counterfactual falsifiability (Fcf):
Fmse: something is falsifiable if and only if it is vulnerable to falsification via future scientific experiments or new data.
Fcf: something is falsifiable if and only if I can imagine a different state of affairs in which it is false.
Fcf: something is falsifiable if and only if I can imagine a different state of affairs in which it is false.
Fmse is characteristic of the modern hard sciences. For example, a predictive theory is proposed and newly discovered data is expected to be reliably predicted by the theory. There is a real temporal possibility that at some point in the future data will be discovered which contradicts the predictions of this theory, at which point the theory will be discarded or refined.
If something is Fmse then it is also Fcf, but the fact that something is Fcf does not necessarily mean it is Fmse. This is because if something is falsifiable via future observations, it must also be able to imagined to be false, but a proposition could be imagined to be false without there being any possibility of its being falsified in time--in the future. Something which is solely Fcf (and not Fmse) has a kind of infallibility about it which cannot be disproven by modern scientific experiment, but which at the same time could have been different than it in fact was. One example of a proposition that is Fcf but not Fmse involves qualia:
P1: Joe perceived red yesterday.
This simple perception of a color is a past event which is bound to a subject. There is no future observation that could disprove this knowledge which has a kind of infallibility. Yet at the same time it is Fcf, for we can imagine a different state of affairs in which it is false. Imagine, for example, the possibility that Joe saw green instead of red. Thus Fcf does involve knowledge and is closely tied to the Principle of Sufficient Reason. Note too that P1 is neither fallible nor inductive--the two reasons given earlier to account for the falsifiability of the modern hard sciences.
Therefore not all knowledge need adhere to scientific falsifiability, Fmse. Qualia, well-established past events, and basic axioms such as the principle of non-contradiction, the principle of sufficient reason, and the importance of Fcf itself are a few examples that come to mind. Indeed some of these basic axioms may not even be accountable to Fcf.
In my next post I will move to a consideration of theology itself.