The spectrum of religious belief

[Diamond72]

With that attitude, why do you even bother to read It?

Why? Because God gave me the Holy Spirit to help me understand.
So I do not need man to explain the word of God to me.

What part of HE WILL TEACH YOU ALL do you have a problem understanding?

John 14:26, where Jesus says, "But the Helper, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, He will teach you all things and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you."

Jeremiah 31:33-34, the prophet speaks about the New Covenant that God will establish with His people:

"But this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, declares the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it on their hearts. And I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each one teach his neighbor and teach his brother, saying, 'Know the Lord,' for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, declares the Lord. For I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more."

For what purpose?

Reading the original Hebrew of the Bible offers several benefits and insights:

1. Accuracy: Translations can sometimes lose the nuance, depth, and subtlety of the original text. By reading in Hebrew, one can gain a more precise understanding of the language and the meanings intended by the authors.
2. Cultural Context: The Hebrew language is deeply embedded in the culture and history of ancient Israel. Understanding the original language allows readers to appreciate the cultural and historical context that shaped the biblical texts.
3. Literary Devices: Hebrew literature often employs wordplay, poetic structures, and other literary devices that might not fully translate into other languages. Reading the original text reveals these elements and enhances the literary appreciation of the Bible.
4. Theological Insights: Certain theological concepts and terms are best understood in their original language. The Hebrew Bible contains rich theological ideas that can be more deeply explored when read in the original language.
5. Personal Enrichment: Learning Hebrew connection to the text and a more personal engagement with the scriptures.

While translations are valuable and make the Bible accessible to a wider audience, reading the original Hebrew provides a unique and profound way to engage with the sacred texts.

The more you read and study It, the plainer It gets.

Are you admitting that you do not understand the Bible? I can understand why that is the case. Because you are reading a translation and not the original. I am a related to a well-known Bible translator.

• Bible Translator: Rogers played a significant role in the translation of the Bible into English. He edited and compiled the Matthew Bible, which was published in 1537 under the pseudonym "Thomas Matthew" to protect his identity. This Bible combined William Tyndale's translation of the Old Testament with Miles Coverdale's translation of the remaining books.
• Martyr: John Rogers is known as the first Protestant martyr under the reign of Queen Mary I, also known as "Bloody Mary" due to her persecution of Protestants. He was executed by burning at the stake on February 4, 1555, for his religious beliefs.
• Legacy: Rogers' work on the Matthew Bible influenced later English translations, including the Great Bible and the King James Version

The original King James Version (KJV) of the Bible involved 47 translators. These translators were organized into six companies, with two companies meeting at Oxford, two at Cambridge, and two at Westminster1. The project was overseen by Archbishop Richard Bancroft, and each company was responsible for translating different parts of the Bible.

Usually people do not start to have kaniptions until we start to talk about the oral traditions.

 

[AV1611VET]

Why? Because God gave me the Holy Spirit to help me understand.
So I do not need man to explain the word of God to me.

Okay ... I'm not going to say something here and get moderated.

But does your "Holy Spirit I do not need man to explain the word of God to me understanding" include Baptism and the Lord's Table as sacraments?

And let's just consider this question rhetorical and drop the matter, shall we?

 

[AveChristusRex]

Well .. then not everything is worthy of our time, and not everything we can test is what we can think .. (practically speaking).

I actually read this during my Summa study today before I had classes! Though it doesn't say it in the official Summa (I was reading from my Summa of the Summa), but in relation to such point, Aquinas teaches that human intellect is capable of knowing universal truths (such as the principles of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics) that cannot be directly observed through the senses: "...we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial." Not everything we can't test is not worth our time, because in testing we can acquire some knowledge of things we can't, indeed, test, and thus are able to perceive the immaterial, though even that is non-testable outside of our own consciousness.

Just a thought!

 

[AveChristusRex]

My question is, where are the 144,000 we read about in Revelation?

In the most cheeky way to answer this, about the 4th verse of the 7th chapter, you can find them in press-type

Because you are reading a translation and not the original.

Oh man! This is not the time for my cool-guy 'Douay-Rheims #1' glasses to be in the shop!

 

[SelfSim]

I actually read this during my Summa study today before I had classes! Though it doesn't say it in the official Summa (I was reading from my Summa of the Summa), but in relation to such point, Aquinas teaches that human intellect is capable of knowing universal truths (such as the principles of logic, mathematics, and metaphysics) that cannot be directly observed through the senses: "...we must needs say that our intellect understands material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial." Not everything we can't test is not worth our time, because in testing we can acquire some knowledge of things we can't, indeed, test, and thus are able to perceive the immaterial, though even that is non-testable outside of our own consciousness.

Just a thought!

' and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things' Errr .. whaaat?

'in testing we can acquire some knowledge of things we can't, indeed, test' .. You mean like when we apply the objectively testable definition of 'a belief', we can see lots of 'em .. everywhere .. to the extent we then realise there so many of them they're of no practical value whatsoever (eg: such as the belief in the existence of 'the immaterial'?) Yep .. I'm right with you there on that one, brotha!

 

[2PhiloVoid]

' and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things' Errr .. whaaat?

'in testing we can acquire some knowledge of things we can't, indeed, test' .. You mean like when we apply the objectively testable definition of 'a belief', we can see lots of 'em .. everywhere .. to the extent we then realise there so many of them they're of no practical value whatsoever (eg: such as the belief in the existence of 'the immaterial'?) Yep .. I'm right with you there on that one, brotha!

I think all that's happening here is you're proving Wittgenstein's later views on philosophy as more or less correct, brotha!

 

[AveChristusRex]

' and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of immaterial things' Errr .. whaaat?

'in testing we can acquire some knowledge of things we can't, indeed, test' .. You mean like when we apply the objectively testable definition of 'a belief', we can see lots of 'em .. everywhere .. to the extent we then realise there so many of them they're of no practical value whatsoever (eg: such as the belief in the existence of 'the immaterial'?) Yep .. I'm right with you there on that one, brotha!

Knowledge begins with material things, but reason allows us to infer immaterial realities, just as science infers unobservable causes from observable effects (e.g. the Big Bang). Take for example black holes, or dark matter, or subatomic particles, none of these [at first] were directly observed, but their existence was inferred based on their measurable interactions in the material world. Also, you say they have no value whatsoever, but that is just a non sequitur and not true at all; to quote: "The multiplicity of beliefs render not belief meaningless—on the contrary, the task of reason is to discern which beliefs are grounded in truth." Thus, to reject beliefs simply because there are a lot is unreasonable.

Also, you misunderstood my material-immaterial knowledge citation. Though the intellect is dependent on sensory experience, it/we can abstract universal truths from particular material things through reason. Again, to reject beliefs because there are a lot of them is incredibly unreasonable...

 

[dlamberth]

Okay ... I'm not going to say something here and get moderated.

But does your "Holy Spirit I do not need man to explain the word of God to me understanding" include Baptism and the Lord's Table as sacraments?

And let's just consider this question rhetorical and drop the matter, shall we?

Are we into a "My Holy Spirit" is better than "Your Holy Spirit" clash?

 

[SelfSim]

Knowledge begins with material things, but reason allows us to infer immaterial realities, just as science infers unobservable causes from observable effects (e.g. the Big Bang). Take for example black holes, or dark matter, or subatomic particles, none of these [at first] were directly observed, but their existence was inferred based on their measurable interactions in the material world. Also, you say they have no value whatsoever, but that is just a non sequitur and not true at all; to quote: "The multiplicity of beliefs render not belief meaningless—on the contrary, the task of reason is to discern which beliefs are grounded in truth." Thus, to reject beliefs simply because there are a lot is unreasonable.

Man, ok .. so I observe that we are in Physical Sciences forum, on a thread that shouldn't even be here because its not about science. So, I make a reference to an operationally testable definition of the concept of 'belief'. That definition which works in scientific thinking, (which I have demonstrated using the simple version of the scientific method countless times here at CFs in the past), is:
'A belief is any notion held as being true out of preference, that does not follow from objective tests, and is not beholden to the rules of logic. (Objective tests followed by the application of logic rules, is a necessary condition).'

So, both of black holes and subatomic particles were formed as testable models (from well tested scientific theories) before any of them became part of science's objective reality. Neither passes the above test for being taken as being beliefs. Dark matter is a hypothetical model which means its testable. That means its a testable belief and therefore it doesn't pass the test as being a pure belief. At this stage of testing, its not necessarily part of science's objective reality .. aka: it is not yet considered as necessarily being part of science objective reality but its clearly on science's radar as a leading candidate model. Please consider that paragraph carefully, as everything I said there is demonstrably consistent with scientific principles and there is plenty of objective evidence supporting it.

Ok, so moving onto 'truth'. Science doesn't rely on merely posited truths or on logical imperatives. Science tests and doesn't proceed with mere posits of 'truths existing'. (There's plenty of evidence supporting that conclusion). The closest science ever gets to using a truth-like concept, (more of a analogy I'm drawing here), is never better than its last best tested theory (which also has heaps of test supportingly tested evidence).

For my part in my value judgement claims, I am entitled to make them, just as anyone else is entitled to make theirs. At least I recognise them for what they are, when I'm making them. I can conclude that I do not consider myself a robot .. I pass CAPTCHA tests all the time with passing colours. I can also conclude that I am of the human species based on other well-tested evidence/data.

Also, you misunderstood my material-immaterial knowledge citation. Though the intellect is dependent on sensory experience, it/we can abstract universal truths from particular material things through reason. Again, to reject beliefs because there are a lot of them is incredibly unreasonable...

Science, demosntrably isn't about 'extracting universal truths' posited as already existing. If it were, it wouldn't be science. That's just what some (many?) people like to believe and when they do, that belief is also demonstrably a model .. (an untestable one).

To reject what is demonstrably a belief can be done without evidence, once its demonstrated as being based on a 'truth' .. for the sake of a consistency purpose.

 

[Hans Blaster]

Man, ok .. so I observe that we are in Physical Sciences forum, on a thread that shouldn't even be here because its not about science. So, I make a reference to an operationally testable definition of the concept of 'belief'. That definition which works in scientific thinking, (which I have demonstrated using the simple version of the scientific method countless times here at CFs in the past), is:
'A belief is any notion held as being true out of preference, that does not follow from objective tests, and is not beholden to the rules of logic. (Objective tests followed by the application of logic rules, is a necessary condition).'

If we took the Pew groupings and the survey that went with it and accepted sociology as roughly a branch of life sciences (there is no "social sciences" section and the "history" page seems rather unsuited to "discussion and debate" as it is under 'hobbies and interests', there certainly could be an appropriate thread on that. (And hopefully a bit less contentious than the similar threads based on that survey that have appeared in places like "news" or "American politics".)

 

[AV1611VET]

Are we into a "My Holy Spirit" is better than "Your Holy Spirit" clash?

No.

 

[SelfSim]

I think all that's happening here is you're proving Wittgenstein's later views on philosophy as more or less correct, brotha!

Y'know @2PhiloVoid, I don't react strongly to most of your posts because I often, quietly, resonate with them.

I also feel for you somewhat because most of your supporting arguments trace back to philsophers, who themselves, never came to fully understand what science is doing in our modern-day society and how it distinguishes itself from philosophies. Part of the philosophers' lack of that understanding is historical. The other major part is that they clearly dug in so hard on their own beliefs, they couldn't rise to the level of actually seeing those as being nothing more than beliefs, that they could never progress beyond them, so they kind of spread out .. all over the place.

I often feel for you if/when, you, yourself, can't see that .. (I'm not at all saying that you don't see that, also .. I respect your intellect, al-be-that my own grudging type of respect). I have a feeling that you might even accept my observations in the above paragraph, but then sort of steam-roller ahead, ignoring that you accept them for what they are .. aka: observations .. and not pure opinions.

Peace brother .. I'm trying hard not to set off sort sort nasty mud-slinging battle here .. rather, I'm just trying to make my point which is based on what I observe about philosophers and how you invoke their opinions.

Oh and FWIW, in my case, there is no void to fill, @2PhiloVoid .. I'm just similar to other human minds, with some variations .. cheers, @SelfSim.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Y'know @2PhiloVoid, I don't react strongly to most of your posts because I often, quietly, resonate with them.

I also feel for you somewhat because most of your supporting arguments trace back to philsophers, who themselves, never came to fully understand what science is doing in our modern-day society and how it distinguishes itself from philosophies. Part of the philosophers' lack of that understanding is historical. The other major part is that they clearly dug in so hard on their own beliefs, they couldn't rise to the level of actually seeing those as being nothing more than beliefs, that they could never progress beyond them, so they kind of spread out .. all over the place.

I often feel for you if/when, you, yourself, can't see that .. (I'm not at all saying that you don't see that, also .. I respect your intellect, al-be-that my own grudging type of respect). I have a feeling that you might even accept my observations in the above paragraph, but then sort of steam-roller ahead, ignoring that you accept them for what they are .. aka: observations .. and not pure opinions.

Peace brother .. I'm trying hard not to set off sort sort nasty mud-slinging battle here .. rather, I'm just trying to make my point which is based on what I observe about philosophers and how you invoke their opinions.

Oh and FWIW, in my case, there is no void to fill, @2PhiloVoid .. I'm just similar to other human minds, with some variations .. cheers, @SelfSim.

I appreciate your sympathy for my apparent existential predicament. In my recognition of your observations, I'm not going to steam-roller over them since that's not really the way I operate. I can consider your constructive criticism while, at the same time, remaining reflective upon what you've shared here and as to how accurate it may or may not be.

In the middle of this, however, I will say that I often wonder about the ways which other people perceive my own psychological and rational development and as to where they think it may be lacking. It's always interesting to hear appraisals of what I already fully realize is my own admittedly limited education which contours my own thinking.

I guess what I really need is for someone to come along and disabuse me of all of my apparent philosophical assumptions by thoroughly and roundly engaging my sources --- as various and interdisciplinary as they are --- and showing me where they are wrong in no uncertain terms.

Anyway, thanks for the words of encouragement. That's not for nothing.

 

[AveChristusRex]

'A belief is any notion held as being true out of preference, that does not follow from objective tests, and is not beholden to the rules of logic. (Objective tests followed by the application of logic rules, is a necessary condition).'

Well, that assumes that all beliefs are based on preference, and excludes a priori knowledge (e.g., mathematical principles) that are held because they are not derived from empirical tests but are still universally valid and rationally necessary. From my Thomistic reading, belief (fides) and knowledge (scientia) are distinct but not in opposition to one another, which I feel is being assumed here.

So, both of black holes and subatomic particles were formed as testable models (from well tested scientific theories) before any of them became part of science's objective reality. Neither passes the above test for being taken as being beliefs. Dark matter is a hypothetical model which means its testable. That means its a testable belief and therefore it doesn't pass the test as being a pure belief. At this stage of testing, its not necessarily part of science's objective reality .. aka: it is not yet considered as necessarily being part of science objective reality but its clearly on science's radar as a leading candidate model. Please consider that paragraph carefully, as everything I said there is demonstrably consistent with scientific principles and there is plenty of objective evidence supporting it.

Does science not base itself on untestable principles? Such as the reliability of induction or the principle of causality? Also, black holes were mathematically deduced before being empirically confirmed, what then?

Ok, so moving onto 'truth'. Science doesn't rely on merely posited truths or on logical imperatives. Science tests and doesn't proceed with mere posits of 'truths existing'. (There's plenty of evidence supporting that conclusion). The closest science ever gets to using a truth-like concept, (more of a analogy I'm drawing here), is never better than its last best tested theory (which also has heaps of test supportingly tested evidence).

This is a self-refuting claim. The principle of causality and the law of noncontradiction are logical principles of science, and science can't exist without them (...right?), which Aquinas talks about, that being that first principles are known by reason and are the foundation of all further inquiry (I think Summa I, Q. 1 A. 1 or 2 in my Summa of the Summa).

 

[SelfSim]

Well, that assumes that all beliefs are based on preference, and excludes a priori knowledge (e.g., mathematical principles) that are held because they are not derived from empirical tests but are still universally valid and rationally necessary. From my Thomistic reading, belief (fides) and knowledge (scientia) are distinct but not in opposition to one another, which I feel is being assumed here.

Its deliberately designed to be an operationally testable definition in order to facilitate testing via the scientific method. Thus far its worked well for that purpose and has produced an abundance of results (here at CFs and elsewhere in my travels). In other words: its a specification which clarifies by effectively distinguishing what I mean by the beliefs science has no interesting in and which is in no way, an assumption.

On your other point there (about math principles), I recently made a post in the 'Einstein Philosophy' thread here which speaks to the treatment of the metaphysical concept of Infinity in science, which you may find relevant .. if not then, perhaps interesting.

Does science not base itself on untestable principles? Such as the reliability of induction or the principle of causality? Also, black holes were mathematically deduced before being empirically confirmed, what then?

(See the posted linked in my above paragraph about methaphysics treatment in science).
Unlike in Philosophy, causality is not treated lightly in science. Conclusions of casuality demand the hard work of research to be done beforehand.

This is a self-refuting claim. The principle of causality and the law of noncontradiction are logical principles of science, and science can't exist without them (...right?), which Aquinas talks about, that being that first principles are known by reason and are the foundation of all further inquiry (I think Summa I, Q. 1 A. 1 or 2 in my Summa of the Summa).

Science's objective models never rely on posited truths or logical imperatives. If they did, it they wouldn't be testable models and therefore it wouldn't be science. More than likely it would be philosophy. Science doesn't use truths .. it tests. Science makes use of logic for tracking consistencies between its models but it never uses logic (or any posits) to establish them.

Oh .. and, (an aside, fyi), science would never rely on 'justified true belief' as its definition of knowledge (or knowing). That's just not of any practical use in science .. it just doesn't work in practice. An operational definition is called for.

An operational definition of 'knowing' is:
'The odds a person would give on being right (like, "95% certain"), where the odds can be deemed as correct, if over many instances, the person making the odds ends up breaking even. (If they tend to not break even, they need to reassess their sense of what they know)'.

Note this means we would generally never assess our odds as 100% (not if we wish to break even in the long run), so we do not use the notorious standard that to 'know' something, it must always end up being 'true'. (Philosophers arrived at 'justified true belief' as their attempt at a definition they can use in philosophy, but to me that's a classic example of what they'd like to mean rather than what they really mean .. it's a definition that would force us to either lie to ourselves, or never use the word at all.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Its deliberately designed to be an operationally testable definition in order to facilitate testing via the scientific method. Thus far its worked well for that purpose and has produced an abundance of results (here at CFs and elsewhere in my travels). In other words: its a specification which clarifies by effectively distinguishing what I mean by the beliefs science has no interesting in and which is in no way, an assumption.

On your other point there (about math principles), I recently made a post in the 'Einstein Philosophy' thread here which speaks to the treatment of the metaphysical concept of Infinity in science, which you may find relevant .. if not then, perhaps interesting.

(See the posted linked in my above paragraph about methaphysics treatment in science).
Unlike in Philosophy, causality is not treated lightly in science. Conclusions of casuality demand the hard work of research to be done beforehand.

Science's objective models never rely on posited truths or logical imperatives. If they did, it they wouldn't be testable models and therefore it wouldn't be science. More than likely it would be philosophy. Science doesn't use truths .. it tests. Science makes use of logic for tracking consistencies between its models but it never uses logic (or any posits) to establish them.

Oh .. and, (an aside, fyi), science would never rely on 'justified true belief' as its definition of knowledge (or knowing). That's just not of any practical use in science .. it just doesn't work in practice. An operational definition is called for.

And not all philosophers rely on, or merely upon, "justified true belief." Some not only do what you do in critiquing the notion, but also posit Naturalized Epistemology as an alternative. Then again, some philosophers posit that Thomistic Epistemology and Metaphysics should be the mediating qualifier for notions of truth and reality, and for justification.

I'm willing to listen to both of these alternatives to either Logical Positivism or Empirical Positivism.

An operational definition of 'knowing' is:
'The odds a person would give on being right (like, "95% certain"), where the odds can be deemed as correct, if over many instances, the person making the odds ends up breaking even. (If they tend to not break even, they need to reassess their sense of what they know)'.

Note this means we would generally never assess our odds as 100% (not if we wish to break even in the long run), so we do not use the notorious standard that to 'know' something, it must always end up being 'true'. (Philosophers arrived at 'justified true belief' as their attempt at a definition they can use in philosophy, but to me that's a classic example of what they'd like to mean rather than what they really mean .. it's a definition that would force us to either lie to ourselves, or never use the word at all.

You need to get out of the stereotyping of philosophers as if they're all thinking in identical terms. Surely you don't think that any more than you think that the term "science" indicates one and only one way of thinking and doing.

 

[SelfSim]

And not all philosophers rely on, or merely upon, "justified true belief." Some not only do what you do in critiquing the notion, but also posit Naturalized Epistemology as an alternative. Then again, some philosophers posit that Thomistic Epistemology and Metaphysics should be the mediating qualifier for notions of truth and reality, and for justification.

I'm willing to listen to both of these alternatives to either Logical Positivism or Empirical Positivism.

Sure .. ok .. (I'll leave that up to you), but when I see signs of truths showing up masquerading as being science, you'll also likely see me magically appearing.

You need to get out of the stereotyping of philosophers as if they're all thinking in identical terms. Surely you don't think that any more than you think that the term "science" indicates one and only one way of thinking and doing.

Science is defined by its method .. that's it .. there's no more to it than that.

I see philosophers as wishing they could just simply ignore objective realities as they barrel forward with their various dissertations.

Other types of them even vehemently defend the use of logical imperatives, posits, imperatives, syllogisms, etc, as their basis for supporting science's claims on objective reality. I don't care for their support of science at all, in those cases.

All philosophies I've seen, (which won't, by far, be as many as you have), all posit the existence of truths .. which then distinguishes them as philosophers in my book. I'm open to being re-educated, by way of case-by-case experiences, on that perspective.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Sure .. ok .. (I'll leave that up to you), but when I see signs of truths showing up masquerading as being science, you'll also likely see me magically appearing.

I tend to side more with the sort of view that either Malcolm Jeeves has of science. He's probably toward the top of my list, among a dozen or so.

Science is defined by its method .. that's it .. there's no more to it than that.

Yes. On a very basic level, science's operations are defined by method, but method doesn't sit in an objective vacuum. So, because of that, I have to consider everything I've ever heard from various scientists and academics before assuming too much.

I see philosophers as wishing they could just simply ignore objective realities as they barrel forward with their various dissertations.

As in other topics, whether or not any one philosopher ignores what you define as "objective realities" will depend on which philosopher we're talking about. They're not all the same and have never all been the same. There's several reasons why this has historically been the case.

Other types of them even vehemently defend the use of logical imperatives, posits, imperatives, syllogisms, etc, as their basis for supporting science's claims on objective reality. I don't care for their support of science at all, in those cases.

Well, that's fine. But I've read all kinds of different philosophers, some of whom have reflected the sort of position you have, even if not identically. (Case in point----I've read and studied A.J. Ayer. He just comes up naturally when a person studies for a Philosophy degree).

All philosophies I've seen, (which won't, by far, be as many as you have), all posit the existence of truths .. which then distinguishes them as philosophers in my book. I'm open to being re-educated on that perspective.

It all depends on which theorists we choose to adopt and allow to contour how we express our perceptions of the world around us and in which we are naturally a part of and embedded within.

 

[SelfSim]

Yes. On a very basic level, science's operations are defined by method, but method doesn't sit in an objective vacuum. So, because of that, I have to consider everything I've ever heard from various scientists and academics before assuming too much.

Ahh .. but how you listen to them, is a function of the perception filters you use.
Responding to your considerations as we seek visible evidence pertaining to those filters, is up to scientific thinkers.
And yes .. scientists and academics aren't always scientific thinkers! (This can be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis, using the method).

As in other topics, whether or not any one philosopher ignores what you define as "objective realities" will depend on which philosopher we're talking about. They're not all the same and have never all been the same. There's several reasons why this has historically been the case.

Sure but when they're arguing from posited truths, there's automatically a conflict in their respective facades.

Well, that's fine. But I've read all kinds of different philosophers, some of whom have reflected the sort of position you have, even if not identically. (Case in point----I've read and studied A.J. Ayer. He just comes up naturally when a person studies for a Philosophy degree).

(Then I'd suggest steering clear of studying for a Philosophy degree!)

It all depends on which theorists we choose to adopt and allow to contour how we express our perceptions of the world around us and in which we are naturally a part of and embedded within.

'Theorists', eh? Hmm .. I think I might have a different meaning for that term, there(?) Hmm ...(?)
Also, I choose to not 'adopt' any none of 'em, too .. hmm ...(?)
More like: 'Don't care' is the returned logical output condition set.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Ahh .. but how you listen to them, is a function of the perception filters you use.
Responding to your considerations as we seek visible evidence pertaining to those filters, is up to scientific thinkers.
And yes .. scientists and academics aren't always scientific thinkers! (This can be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis, using the method).

You mean, using the methods, plural. (Or am I making too much of a 'truth claim' in saying plural rather than affirming the singular?)

Do you have a truth claim you'd like to justify in this matter, one way or another?

Moreover, if you're the only one on this planet with your own personal definitions of "operative" and "method," then I guess you're not asserting a truth claim.

Sure but when they're arguing from posited truths, there's automatically a conflict in their respective facades.

And they you can use your method to determine the truth value of their respective facades, one by one, right?

(Then I'd suggest steering clear of studying for a Philosophy degree!)

It's too late for me on that count. Of course, you already knew that.

'Theorists', eh? Hmm .. I think I might have a different meaning for that term, there(?) Hmm ...(?)
Also, I choose to not 'adopt' any none of 'em, too .. hmm ...(?)
More like: 'Don't care' is the returned logical output condition set.

If you "don't care," then I guess there's no need for me to spend much time addressing anything you have to say. OR is there?