The Problem of Universals: The Nature of Abstract Objects

[Lucretius]

I was perusing infidels.org, reading some essays by Michael Martin. I decided I would wikipedia him, and, reading through the description I saw:

"Martin is a pluralist naturalist, as opposed to a physicalistic naturalist. He believes in non-physical abstract objects, as to explain logical necessity."

This got me interested in thinking about a question that I had put to the back of my mind for some time: what is the nature of abstract objects? These things do not exist in the physical (perhaps some other realm, as a realist would claim, but this doesn't seem very parsimonious.)

Though all views seem to have their holes I'm leaning towards the view taken by the nominalists: that abstract concepts are merely words describing physical similarities. We take in physical data from the outside world via our senses; these are interpreted in our brain — the qualities we assign these objects are merely words that are associated with these physical senses it would seem. The notion of "redness", for instance is associated with a certain visible wavelength of light, but the abstract concept of "redness" is not anything that exists 'out there somewhere in another realm'.

Anyways; this is my view: what about the rest of you?

 

[David Gould]

Abstract concepts refer to real things. For example, when we think of 'justice' we do not think of some kind of thing sitting out in a different realm - we think about actions we consider just and actions that we consider unjust.

In other words, we only experience the physical world and so everything we think about is referenced by the physical world. Unicorns are horses with horns, for example.

 

[quatona]

This got me interested in thinking about a question that I had put to the back of my mind for some time: what is the nature of abstract objects?

I have problems with the term "abstract objects".

Though all views seem to have their holes I'm leaning towards the view taken by the nominalists: that abstract concepts are merely words describing physical similarities.

I think it is necessary to distinguish between concepts and the words we use to describe them.

We take in physical data from the outside world via our senses; these are interpreted in our brain — the qualities we assign these objects are merely words that are associated with these physical senses it would seem. The notion of "redness", for instance is associated with a certain visible wavelength of light, but the abstract concept of "redness" is not anything that exists 'out there somewhere in another realm'.

Of course they don´t.
Our concepts allow conclusions on our categories, priorities, expectations rather than on anything outside our mind.

 

[Lucretius]

Yes, but what is the nature of concepts? What is this concept, for instance, of "redness"? I don't see how it can be anything but a word for describing what happens when photons of a certain wavelength contact the eye and send a message down the optic nerve to be processed in the brain — the end result being this "redness". I'd say that nothing exists outside of the physical realm, being the materialist that I am.

 

[DailyBlessings]

Yes, but what is the nature of concepts? What is this concept, for instance, of "redness"? I don't see how it can be anything but a word for describing what happens when photons of a certain wavelength contact the eye and send a message down the optic nerve to be processed in the brain — the end result being this "redness". I'd say that nothing exists outside of the physical realm, being the materialist that I am.

The concept of redness isn't used solely in reference to the color, I note- "Redness" can be a way of describing an emotion or mood as well, or in reference to warfare, or to heat, etc. All of these notions above are sometimes associated with the physical color, of course, but the concept of "redness" is now used to cognitively frame many situations where the color is not actually present. The range of physical concepts described by the abstract term links together a number of concepts not necessarily directly linked in reality.

 

[Lucretius]

The concept of redness isn't used solely in reference to the color, I note- "Redness" can be a way of describing an emotion or mood as well, or in reference to warfare, or to heat, etc. All of these notions above are sometimes associated with the physical color, of course, but the concept of "redness" is now used to cognitively frame many situations where the color is not actually present. The range of physical concepts described by the abstract term links together a number of concepts not necessarily directly linked in reality.

Yes, and likewise being "green" can mean you are feeling sick. But in this case too, I would say this doesn't nullify my idea. When people are mad, for instance, their face will often get red. When people get sick, the same sort of association can be made with the color green. While the link is not as obvious, the notion of "greenness" is still just a word used to describe a feeling of sickness. I still see nominalism as the best approach to the problem.

 

[quatona]

Was that in response to me, Lucretius?

Yes, but what is the nature of concepts?

I don´t know how to answer this question. I don´t even know what you are actually asking for. What is the nature of thoughts, what is the nature of emotions?

What is this concept, for instance, of "redness"?

"Red" is an attribute, the description of a property we perceive. "Redness" is one of those nouns that suggest that there must be a noun or object for every adjective or attribute. I think it´s called "reification" or "nominalisation" in English.

I don't see how it can be anything but a word for describing what happens when photons of a certain wavelength contact the eye and send a message down the optic nerve to be processed in the brain — the end result being this "redness".

"red" is a perception, yes.

I'd say that nothing exists outside of the physical realm, being the materialist that I am.

Another way of looking at it would be: Nothing (not even anything physical) exists outside our perception.

 

[Lifesaver]

Thanks for bringing an interesting discussion topic, Lucretius.

On the question of universals I lean towards a very moderate realism, which is the position originally developed by St. Thomas Aquinas based on Aristotle, though by no means completed even today. And even within this particular branch there are many variants.
Despite its name, I'm convinced it is a perfect middle point between realism and nominalism.

When we speak of redness, are we speaking of something that exists, or is it just a mental construction of ours?
My reply is that redness exists in reality. But not separated from red objects. Redness exists on red things, and can never exist apart from them, except abstractly in our minds.

The abstract entity redness which exists in our minds therefore, is something that exists in reality, but not as a floating idea, but as the actual property of some objects.

Come to think of it, Aquinas's position is very simple, almost common-sense; but it is seldom held by philosophers.

 

[The Nihilist]

Thanks for bringing an interesting discussion topic, Lucretius.

On the question of universals I lean towards a very moderate realism, which is the position originally developed by St. Thomas Aquinas based on Aristotle, though by no means completed even today. And even within this particular branch there are many variants.
Despite its name, I'm convinced it is a perfect middle point between realism and nominalism.

When we speak of redness, are we speaking of something that exists, or is it just a mental construction of ours?
My reply is that redness exists in reality. But not separated from red objects. Redness exists on red things, and can never exist apart from them, except abstractly in our minds.

The abstract entity redness which exists in our minds therefore, is something that exists in reality, but not as a floating idea, but as the actual property of some objects.

Come to think of it, Aquinas's position is very simple, almost common-sense; but it is seldom held by philosophers.

That a thing appears to be red is a mere quirk of our perception. A red box is not in itself red, but merely has the trait that it absorbs all wavelengths of visible light, except for the range that we see as red.
Is this the common trait among red things that you mean by redness when you say that "Redness exists on red things, and can never exist apart from them, except abstractly in our minds?" It seems to me that the color red exists exclusively in our minds, as do other abstract concepts, such as, say, justice.

 

[David Gould]

It seems to me that the color red exists exclusively in our minds, as do other abstract concepts, such as, say, justice.

I guess I agree. I would however say that 'red' and 'justice' are symbols that reference the world. When we see 'red', we are seeing the reflection of a particular wavelength of light; when we think of 'justice' we are thinking of particular kinds of behaviour. Et cetera.

The symbols are in our minds only.

 

[Eudaimonist]

My reply is that redness exists in reality. But not separated from red objects. Redness exists on red things, and can never exist apart from them, except abstractly in our minds.

Are you advancing naive realism as your position? Do you think the color red actually exists in red things, or is it your position only that certain things, under certain lighting conditions, reflect or emit photons within the spectrum we perceive as "red"?

I would however say that 'red' and 'justice' are symbols that reference the world. When we see 'red', we are seeing the reflection of a particular wavelength of light; when we think of 'justice' we are thinking of particular kinds of behaviour. Et cetera.

The symbols are in our minds only.

This is my view as well.


eudaimonia,

Mark