The moral justification for the preemptive use of mortal force

[durangodawood]

....The mere physicality of the act is insufficient to determine the object of the act. For instance, sexual intercourse is a human act. Between married couples of the opposite sex the act is, in its object, good. If the intent of the actors is propagation or pleasure then the intent is good. If the circumstance is to perform the act in public, say in a pornographic movie studio, then the circumstance is evil which defect renders the act evil.

That judgement there, that the circumstance is evil..... thats the crux of it. In what way does that judgement deserve to be called "objective" (if it does)?

 

[o_mlly]

That judgement there, that the circumstance is evil..... thats the crux of it. In what way does that judgement deserve to be called "objective" (if it does)?

The circumstance, things that "circum" surround the act, are not "the crux" in the sense that the circumstances always render an act immoral. The circumstantial font is not more important than the object of the act, or the actor's intent in determining the morality of the act. In the example, that particular circumstance does render that act, intercourse between a married couple of the opposite sex, to be an evil human act.

If the human act of intercourse is performed in the circumstance of a public venue or filmed for public consumption, regardless of actor, intent, or any other circumstance then that act is objectively immoral. That is, that human act cannot be moral for anyone, at any place, at any time.

In the topic of this thread, one may say that a proportionate act of self-defense against an unjust aggressor is a moral act. I have offered three circumstances which I think justify a preemptive act of self-defense. The first two circumstances are the acts of the threatening state that strip it of its presumed innocence and allow the target of its aggression to judge the threatening state as unjust aggressors. What say you?

 

[partinobodycular]

Summing up the progress so far:

Well there's one thing that we've definitely learned. The best response to a fool...is silence.

 

[o_mlly]

Well there's one thing that we've definitely learned. The best response to a fool...is silence.

No, the fool despises instruction (Proverbs 12:1).

It appears the fool in this thread still thinks slavery is OK and the Nazis at Nuremberg should have been acquitted. Can I get an upgrade here to your "Ignore" list (Proverbs 15:12).

 

[Moral Orel]

There is no such thing. How can I attempt to craft something that doesn't exist? You completely misread my first post on this matter and you seem to be perpetuating that error.

I thought I had for a moment there so I asked if I was mistaken, and you replied there's no objective morality, but then went right back into "it is wrong...".

A lot of folk think some form of quasi-objective morality can be created if we just accept some basis for it, like the promotion of human well-being. It still sounds like that's what you were trying to accomplish.

All dogs have four legs. That animal has four legs, so is it a dog?

Just because a negative outcome is something I'd prefer not happen (I'd not like it), it doesn't mean that everything I don't like is a negative outcome. In other words, you can't transpose the two terms and have the same meaning.

Give me an example of an outcome you dislike that is not a "negative" outcome.

 

[zippy2006]

I thought I had for a moment there so I asked if I was mistaken, and you replied there's no objective morality, but then went right back into "it is wrong...".

I don't see anything inconsistent in @Bradskii's account.

The burglar robbed your house. He was happy, you were mad. Your house being robbed is something that he wanted to happen. So calling it "something we don't want to happen" doesn't fit.

This was answered in an earlier post to you:

It'll be relative to the person making the call. But a positive outcome is generally one which will result in a preferential outcome to the person making that call. So if someone burgles my house and gets away with a chunk of money then it's a positive outcome for him and a negative outcome for me.

A lot of folk think some form of quasi-objective morality can be created if we just accept some basis for it, like the promotion of human well-being. It still sounds like that's what you were trying to accomplish.

There are two components to what he is saying. First he is explaining what "wrong" means:

"X is wrong" = "I believe X will result in a negative outcome"

The second is a form of utilitarianism/consequentialism, where the moral opinions of groups of people are collected and weighted according to the degree of consensus (or something like that). It is a moral system based on personal opinions and collections of personal opinions. It is not an attempt at an objective or even a binding morality.

 

[Moral Orel]

The second is a form of utilitarianism/consequentialism, where the moral opinions of groups of people are collected and weighted according to the degree of consensus (or something like that). It is a moral system based on personal opinions and collections of personal opinions. It is not an attempt at an objective or even a binding morality.

Ahh, but folks like to equivocate on the word "opinion". Now if it was a purely subjective opinion, it would be akin to taste. "It is my opinion that chocolate ice cream is delicious". Correct?

But what I've found is that folks refuse to compare it to taste (Bradskii explicitly said as much). But rather, they treat opinion like it's a guess about an objective fact. "In my opinion, 911 was an inside job". Either it was or was not an inside job, that is dealing in objective facts. Maybe I am correct, maybe I am incorrect (we'll never really know, amirite?). A truly subjective opinion can neither be correct nor incorrect.

So when he says that robbing a house is wrong, he isn't merely saying "I hate robbery" (although I'm sure he does hate it) he's saying that "I think that robbery is an incorrect choice to make" which makes it objective.

 

[zippy2006]

Ahh, but folks like to equivocate on the word "opinion". Now if it was a purely subjective opinion, it would be akin to taste. "It is my opinion that chocolate ice cream is delicious". Correct?

But what I've found is that folks refuse to compare it to taste (Bradskii explicitly said as much). But rather, they treat opinion like it's a guess about an objective fact. "In my opinion, 911 was an inside job". Either it was or was not an inside job, that is dealing in objective facts. Maybe I am correct, maybe I am incorrect (we'll never really know, amirite?).

He is right to deny the comparison to taste. The difference between Bradskii’s moral opinion and an ice cream opinion is the intentionality. When you say, “I like ice cream,” you are saying something private and subjective in the sense of unfalsifiable. You have direct access to the truth of the statement, and it is not verifiable apart from your private taste. You are not claiming to make an assertion about external reality.

So when he says that robbing a house is wrong, he isn't merely saying "I hate robbery" (although I'm sure he does hate it) he's saying that "I think that robbery is an incorrect choice to make" which makes it objective.

No, he has told you what he means. He means, “I believe this results in a negative outcome.” When used in the imperative sense such moral opinions are predictions, and are therefore falsifiable. The speaker merely needs to flesh out what they mean by a negative outcome in order for the objectivity of the claim to be established. For example, “I believe stealing that car is wrong; If you steal that car there will be a negative outcome, namely, you will go to jail.” We can take the set of negative outcomes indicated by a given locution and determine whether they come to be caused by the moral act in question.

A truly subjective opinion can neither be correct nor incorrect.

And that is why Bradskii’s moral opinion is not “truly subjective.” If the only negative outcome he has in mind is jail, and the thief does not go to jail, then Bradskii’s assertion would be shown to be incorrect.

 

[o_mlly]

And that is why Bradskii’s moral opinion is not “truly subjective.” If the only negative outcome he has in mind is jail, and the thief does not go to jail, then Bradskii’s assertion would be shown to be incorrect.

Well, I would go a step further and assert his position is not even instructive. As noted earlier, we always choose the apparent good. We cannot do otherwise.

If the potential car thief has as an end-in-view that is jail-time then he does not steal the car. Only if his end-in-view is apparently good (to him) does he act. Subjectively, we agree: he desires to possess the car that belongs to another. Is that apparent desire really a good desire? That is the objective moral question. Adler explains the difference:

That the good is the desirable and the desirable is the good cannot be denied. But we can note a certain duplicity in the meaning of "desirable." When we speak of something as desirable, we may mean, on the one hand, that it is in fact desired and, on the other hand, that it ought to be desired, whether or not it is. ... With this duplicity in mind, we can ask the following critical question: Do we regard something as good simply because we in fact desire it, or ought we to desire something because it is in fact good? In both cases, the good remains the desirable, but in one case the goodness is attributed to the object only because it is desired, while in the other the object ought to be desired only because it is good (Six Great Ideas, Adler, 1997).​

 

[zippy2006]

Well, I would go a step further and assert his position is not even instructive. As noted earlier, we always choose the apparent good. We cannot do otherwise.

If the potential car thief has as an end-in-view that is jail-time then he does not steal the car. Only if his end-in-view is apparently good (to him) does he act. Subjectively, we agree: he desires to possess the car that belongs to another. Is that apparent desire really a good desire? That is the objective moral question. Adler explains the difference:

That the good is the desirable and the desirable is the good cannot be denied. But we can note a certain duplicity in the meaning of "desirable." When we speak of something as desirable, we may mean, on the one hand, that it is in fact desired and, on the other hand, that it ought to be desired, whether or not it is. ... With this duplicity in mind, we can ask the following critical question: Do we regard something as good simply because we in fact desire it, or ought we to desire something because it is in fact good? In both cases, the good remains the desirable, but in one case the goodness is attributed to the object only because it is desired, while in the other the object ought to be desired only because it is good (Six Great Ideas, Adler, 1997).​

I would say that this is the reason why his view is instructive. Orel is claiming that "wrong" can only exist as desire in Adler's former sense, whereas Bradskii is claiming that "wrong" more properly refers to desire in Adler's latter sense. Orel thinks it comes down to mere dislike; Bradskii says it is based on "oughts" derived from judgments about outcomes.

Bradskii's view is important because it acknowledges that morality is not reducible to feelings, as is so commonly believed today.

 

[o_mlly]

Bradskii's view is important because it acknowledges that morality is not reducible to feelings, as is so commonly believed today. ... Bradskii says it is based on "oughts" derived from judgments about outcomes.

I suppose one may consider the movement from "anything that I feel is good is good" to "anything I feel will in the end be overall good" is an improvement. The former is purely one of personal taste; the latter relies on one's personal ability to precisely predict future effects. The difference is minimal as one cannot argue about the taste preferences in the former or the guesswork involved in predicting future effects in the latter.

If future effects (consequentialism) can justify any act in the moment based solely on the impossible calculation of the totality of future effects then any act can be justified. Consequentialism may instruct the particular actor and make him feel good about his decision to act even if that act is to directly kill and innocent human but it is no more than that.

 

[zippy2006]

I suppose one may consider the movement from "anything that I feel is good is good" to "anything I feel will in the end be overall good" is an improvement. The former is purely one of personal taste; the latter relies on one's personal ability to precisely predict future effects.

I think the difference is better expressed this way:

• Something is wrong if it gives rise to disagreeable feelings in me.
• Something is wrong if it leads to negative outcomes.

The difference is minimal as one cannot argue about the taste preferences in the former or the guesswork involved in predicting future effects in the latter.

I think you can argue about whether something will produce negative outcomes, and I gave some reasons why in post #468.

If future effects (consequentialism) can justify any act in the moment based solely on the impossible calculation of the totality of future effects then any act can be justified.

Making causal inferences or inferences about the future is not impossible. Science concerns itself entirely with one aspect of such inferential reasoning.

 

[o_mlly]

I think you can argue about whether something will produce negative outcomes, and I gave some reasons why in post #468.

Making causal inferences or inferences about the future is not impossible. Science concerns itself entirely with one aspect of such inferential reasoning.

Yes, and that is precisely my point. Determinations that are arguable or probabilistic are not instructive.

 

[Kyrani]

For something to be objective it must not be influenced by personal feelings or opinions when considering the evidence seen.
Morality is a system of principles about right and wrong.
I believe there definitely is objective morality.
The evidence is in
1. the existence of empathy and the fact that there is such a thing as a conscience. Without a conscience one cannot have empathy.
and
2. how that empathy/ conscience is destroyed when a person choses to become inhumane.

God made each conscious being / soul with love. Love is really a spiritual connectivity because it allows us to feel for others, to be aware of their status whether happy or sad, healthy or suffering. Empathy is based on this love. Those who are humane have empathy. That means that they feel for others and want to reach out and help them where they see the other in some danger or alleviate their suffering if possible. This is observable fact. There are countless cases to be seen where even a stranger may endanger their own life to help another person in need.

This condition of empathy can be destroyed.
I have been told, and I have also seen evidence myself, that a person who choses to become inhumane first destroys their conscience and that really entails destroying the spiritual connection with others, so they have no empathy. My late husband came out of the closet several years before he passed away and told me that he was inhumane or in his exact word "evil".

In answering some of my questions he revealed that to become inhumane a person must do harm to others, both animal and human in order to go through a process of, what he saw as, "development". He said at first one does harm and feels indifferent. But the person needs to continue to do harm until they get pleasure from seeing the pain and suffering of the other. Then, he said, the process is complete. And I have seen that once a person goes through this process and becomes inhumane there is no turning back. They have crossed an abyss from whence there is no return. I strongly suspect that this is creating a disconnect between them and others spiritually. So there is no more love. They only hate.

Thus having a conscience and empathy is evidence that there is objective morality

 

[o_mlly]

For something to be objective it must not be influenced by personal feelings or opinions when considering the evidence seen.
Morality is a system of principles about right and wrong.
I believe there definitely is objective morality.
The evidence is in
1. the existence of empathy and the fact that there is such a thing as a conscience. Without a conscience one cannot have empathy.
and
2. how that empathy/ conscience is destroyed when a person choses to become inhumane.

God made each conscious being / soul with love. Love is really a spiritual connectivity because it allows us to feel for others, to be aware of their status whether happy or sad, healthy or suffering. Empathy is based on this love. Those who are humane have empathy. That means that they feel for others and want to reach out and help them where they see the other in some danger or alleviate their suffering if possible. This is observable fact. There are countless cases to be seen where even a stranger may endanger their own life to help another person in need.

This condition of empathy can be destroyed.
I have been told, and I have also seen evidence myself, that a person who choses to become inhumane first destroys their conscience and that really entails destroying the spiritual connection with others, so they have no empathy. My late husband came out of the closet several years before he passed away and told me that he was inhumane or in his exact word "evil".

In answering some of my questions he revealed that to become inhumane a person must do harm to others, both animal and human in order to go through a process of, what he saw as, "development". He said at first one does harm and feels indifferent. But the person needs to continue to do harm until they get pleasure from seeing the pain and suffering of the other. Then, he said, the process is complete. And I have seen that once a person goes through this process and becomes inhumane there is no turning back. They have crossed an abyss from whence there is no return. I strongly suspect that this is creating a disconnect between them and others spiritually. So there is no more love. They only hate.

Thus having a conscience and empathy is evidence that there is objective morality

Conscience is evidence of an objective morality. And, yes the voice of conscience can be muted by continued acts of inhumanity or for that matter repeated immoral acts of any kind.

The passions are un-willed but arise in us spontaneously. As such they are neither good nor evil in themselves but become so when the movement causes us to act. By habitually acting on passions that move us to do good and suppressing passions which move us to do evil we develop to be habitually in God's grace. If we do the opposite then we become, as you write, inhumane.

 

[zippy2006]

For something to be objective it must not be influenced by personal feelings or opinions when considering the evidence seen.

Morality is a system of principles about right and wrong.

I believe there definitely is objective morality.

Hi Kryani. It seems like you are trying to respond to a different thread: Is there Objective Morality?

Maybe copy and paste your post there? If you click "edit" you can copy the original text and formatting of your post.

 

[zippy2006]

Yes, and that is precisely my point.

I don't think we are in agreement. You said, "...one cannot argue about [...] the guesswork involved in predicting future effects..." I think we can argue about it.

Determinations that are arguable or probabilistic are not instructive.

Why not?

This thread revolves around just war theory, which has been argued over for centuries. That doesn't make just war theory uninstructive.

 

[o_mlly]

I don't think we are in agreement. You said, "...one cannot argue about [...] the guesswork involved in predicting future effects..." I think we can argue about it.

No, I don't think we are.

If a person declares a moral determination as matter of taste for him then he is infallibly correct and there is no purpose in arguing. If a person declares a moral determination as matter of truth then there is purpose in arguing, iff there is agreement on the truths or source of truths that underlie the determination.

If a person declares that in his opinion the net goodness in the totality of future effects justifies an act as moral and that his opinion is as logically unassailable as any other opinion then there us no purpose in argumentation.

Moral arguments are necessarily an appeal to authority. For those who only recognize themselves as an authority, its an endless thread.

 

[o_mlly]

This thread revolves around just war theory, which has been argued over for centuries. That doesn't make just war theory uninstructive.

The arguments on just war theory appeal to the principle of self-defense as to justifying going to war and appeal to the principle of lethal restraint in self-defense in conducting the war.

The arguments regarding the object of the state's act to go to war and its intent in doing so are never argued. Circumstances, such as proposed in this thread, are arguable as justifiable or not.

 

[zippy2006]

If a person declares a moral determination as matter of taste for him then he is infallibly correct and there is no purpose in arguing. If a person declares a moral determination as matter of truth then there is purpose in arguing, iff there is agreement on the truths or source of truths that underlie the determination.

Okay, I agree.

If a person declares that in his opinion the net goodness in the totality of future effects justifies an act as moral and that his opinion is as logically unassailable as any other opinion then there us no purpose in argumentation.

I agree, but I don't think one would hold that their opinion "is as logically unassailable as any other opinion."

For those who only recognize themselves as an authority, its an endless thread.

Here is what you said above (emphasis mine):

If a person declares a moral determination as matter of truth then there is purpose in arguing, iff there is agreement on the truths or source of truths that underlie the determination.

I would say it comes down to these principles or premises, not to authorities. People who hold in common the principle of self-defense can argue over just war theory. People who don't hold to the principle of self-defense would see no sense in arguing over just war theory. As long as they hold common principles or premises they can engage in argument.

I think non-believers can argue about which consequences of a moral act will obtain and which will not, for they hold to at least some common principles about what is good and bad. For example, being fined or going to jail are generally considered bad.