Starting today August 7th, 2024, in order to post in the Married Couples, Courting Couples, or Singles forums, you will not be allowed to post if you have your Marital status designated as private. Announcements will be made in the respective forums as well but please note that if yours is currently listed as Private, you will need to submit a ticket in the Support Area to have yours changed.
So pretty much everything God creates has evil in it, and since there is evil in heaven or Earth, God's will is not done...Actually there was evil in heaven which is why it was cast out to the earth by God. God is also casting out evil from earth and bringing His heavenly Kingdom to earth. When Gods will is done, there will be no evil in heaven or earth.
The problem of evil remains - an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God cannot knowingly create or be responsible for evil, directly or indirectly. An omniscient God would know when an action would directly or indirectly lead to evil.The only place evil has never existed is in God Himself, which of course makes perfect sense
So pretty much everything God creates has evil in it, and since there is evil in heaven or Earth, God's will is not done...
The problem of evil remains - an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God cannot knowingly create or be responsible for evil, directly or indirectly. An omniscient God would know when an action would directly or indirectly lead to evil.
That's what the priests taught me at school. I naturally assumed they ought to know...
If God existed and created evil, then He would not be omnibenevolent, but why a God would create evil is a horrible mystery to me.
It's the traditional problem of evil that remains unanswered. By definition, an omnibenevolent entity is all good, not least in action; such an entity cannot condone or be responsible for evil through its own action or inaction. This world is rife with natural (and moral) evils. Therefore this world cannot be the result of the action of an omnibenevolent entity, and such an entity would, if able, act to prevent those evils. An omnipotent omnibenevolent entity would be able to so act.
If God can produce free willed beings who cannot do evil by removing evil from His creation, why didn't He remove the evil at the outset (or create it without evil) and prevent all that suffering (particularly of the innocent) ?There is no longer evil in heaven because it has been cast out. Now God is casting out evil from earth.
God's creation has the potential to do evil because God created free willed beings and since evil has been done by free willed beings, God is removing it(evil/sin) from His creation, which results in new free willed beings who cannot do evil because evil has been removed by God(this is yet to happen in all creation, but will happen because it's God's will).
Nope; omnibenevolence means no evil at all. This is source of the Problem of Evil.If the omnibenevolent omnipotent God knows the end result is good then He most certainly can and should indirectly allow temporary evil in order to achieve his good will.
If God can produce free willed beings who cannot do evil by removing evil from His creation, why didn't He remove the evil at the outset (or create it without evil) and prevent all that suffering (particularly of the innocent) ?
Nope; omnibenevolence means no evil at all. This is source of the Problem of Evil.
In addition, you've made it clear that evil is actually unnecessary, since He can create free willed beings who cannot do evil. Notwithstanding that, an omnibenevolent, omnipotent God would not permit natural evils either (although He might allow natural weevils).
What difference would that make?And I think you were right to assume that. Unfortunately they probably didn't give any reasons or scripture to support that view.
Only for Religious Instruction.In addition I sympathize with you because you were educated by priests
I'm no more averse to Christianity than any other religion; if anything, less so, it being more familiar.I can understand more clearly now why you have the aversion you do to Christianity.
What has that to do with everyday humans?Needless to say, there is no scriptural support for thinking heaven is the ultimate objective for human beings. I would say a much more modest claim is supported, namely that to be where Jesus is and to experience unbroken and intimate fellowship with Him is what makes heaven the joy of the saints.
OK; that seems to be a variation of the narrow philosophical concept of evil (i.e. the most morally despicable sorts of actions), whereas I was using the more common broad concept of evil, which divides into moral and natural evils - morally despicable actions, and suffering that is not caused by moral actors, respectively (and seems to be the concept more frequently discussed in theology).I was asking you why you think evil is something that exists as something which was created as opposed to the traditional conceptualization of it as something which is a privation or a lack of something good. Cold is not something that God created, nor is dark. Evil is to be seen the same way. Cold is the absence or lack of heat, dark is the absence of light, evil is the lack or privation of good in a free moral agent. These things have no existence or ontological status as a concrete entity enduring through time and space.
Yes, I can see that sidesteps the problem of evil.Your question assumes God made evil like He made the earth or the stars. I see no reason to think that.
Not all philosophers have abandoned it. I don't agree with the premise that there is no explicit incompatibility between an omnibenevolent entity and evil. I think there is, but it may be the case that the concept of God used in the refutation is not truly omnibenevolent in the sense of eschewing evil under all circumstances. I'm also not comfortable with the idea than an omnibenevolent entity can have morally sufficient reasons to allow evil, if this entity has the option of not allowing evil at all, as an omnipotent creator has - I haven't seen the argument that establishes that there can be a morally sufficient reason to allow evil when evil is not necessary. But, of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one.You're referring to the logical problem of evil. It is an argument which attempts to prove that there is a logical inconsistency or incompatibility with the existence of our world and God.
Are you aware that this version is no longer defended by philosophers and why it's not?
That wasn't my point - you said that God can produce "free willed beings who cannot do evil because evil has been removed by God". I'm asking why he didn't do that in the first place and save a lot of evil and suffering?So a perfect God should not create beings who are free to listen to him(good) or not(evil) and thereby prevent all evil? This would render this God the most selfish God imaginable because only he would exist forever, no one else.
Why? why would an omnipotent, omniscient entity want company? it would already know every last detail of the results of creating others, free will and all. Deja-vu would be the least of its annoyances...Rather than this God only existing by himself forever.
What difference would that make?
Only for Religious Instruction.
I'm no more averse to Christianity than any other religion; if anything, less so, it being more familiar.
What has that to do with everyday humans?
OK; that seems to be a variation of the narrow philosophical concept of evil (i.e. the most morally despicable sorts of actions), whereas I was using the more common broad concept of evil, which divides into moral and natural evils - morally despicable actions, and suffering that is not caused by moral actors, respectively (and seems to be the concept more frequently discussed in theology).
Yes, I can see that sidesteps the problem of evil.
Not all philosophers have abandoned it. I don't agree with the premise that there is no explicit incompatibility between an omnibenevolent entity and evil. I think there is, but it may be the case that the concept of God used in the refutation is not truly omnibenevolent in the sense of eschewing evil under all circumstances. I'm also not comfortable with the idea than an omnibenevolent entity can have morally sufficient reasons to allow evil, if this entity has the option of not allowing evil at all, as an omnipotent creator has - I haven't seen the argument that establishes that there can be a morally sufficient reason to allow evil when evil is not necessary. But, of course, that doesn't mean there isn't one.
As for the probabilistic version, the idea that we are not in a position to establish whether God has a morally sufficient reason to allow evil, because God may have reasons we can't fathom from our limited perspective, amounts to skeptical theism, and begs the question in its own way - if we allow that an actor who does or permits evil may have a morally sufficient reason that observers are unaware of, we would be unable to make any moral judgements; to restrict this dispensation to an omniscient God is special pleading and makes the argument dependent on the very entity who's existence is in question. But it also makes theism unfalsifiable (and so, irrational); because no matter how bad an evil is, we can say God has a reason for it, and so no evil could ever count as evidence against God's existence. But if no evidence can count against a hypothesis, it's a good indication the hypothesis is irrational.
If you're going to quote me, please quote what I actually said - copy & paste is easiest. In this case, the meaning is the same, but a quote should be just that.I think you are uncomfortable with the idea of a God who allows free moral agents to commit evil. Your use of the phrase "I am uncomfortable with" indicates this.
Again, you may think so, but I - and many others - don't. I find such tragedies horrific because I can empathise with those who suffer as a result. An earthquake is simply a natural phenomenon, a movement of the ground; there's nothing intrinsically right or wrong about it. I am more emotionally inclined to blame those responsible for shoddy construction, where that contributed, although I'm aware that to do so is irrational.There is something in us that recoils at such tragedies, and rightfully so. But this very fact should be a clue to you that points to the existence of God, not away from it. For to recoil at such tragedies indicates to us that we have this unshakeable intuition and sense that things aren't right.
Yes....But why define God as one who cannot allow evil to occur?
...
Maybe your issue is with the concept of omnibenevolence?
It seems to me not so much a matter of preference as obligation. If an omnibenevolent entity has the choice between a creation where evil will occur (and an omniscient entity would know) and a creation where evil will not occur, it must choose the latter.Maybe you assume such a being would necessarily prefer a world without evil as opposed to a world with one. All that need to be said in response to render this argument invalid is to highlight that such an assumption is not necessarily true.
That wasn't my point - you said that God can produce "free willed beings who cannot do evil because evil has been removed by God". I'm asking why he didn't do that in the first place and save a lot of evil and suffering?
Why? why would an omnipotent, omniscient entity want company?
it would already know every last detail of the results of creating others, free will and all.
Deja-vu would be the least of its annoyances...
Yes.
It seems to me not so much a matter of preference as obligation. If an omnibenevolent entity has the choice between a creation where evil will occur (and an omniscient entity would know) and a creation where evil will not occur, it must choose the latter.
Unless, of course, there is a utilitarian-style of omnibenevolence, where any amount of evil is tolerable as long as the outcome produces the greatest good for the greatest number?
I'm saying there can be no morally sufficient reason for an omnibenevolent entity to allow evil if it has an alternative.Why think that is necessarily true? This is the crucial premise of the argument for you and what you have to understand is that such an assumption is not necessarily true. As long as it is logically possible that God has a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil, then the argument fails.
Can you say that again in English?...The fact remains that of these implicit premises must be necessarily true of the logical version of the argument is to go through and their not.
I'm saying there can be no morally sufficient reason for an omnibenevolent entity to allow evil if it has an alternative.
An omnibenevolent entity is all-good or morally perfect, so evil is incompatible with its essential moral perfection; therefore given the choice between an action or actions that will result in evil or an action or actions that will not, the latter must be chosen. IOW for an omnibenevolent entity, evil is anathema. Seem to me that's what omnibenevolence means, which is why I wondered whether you might have a different understanding of omnibenevolence - but you were non-committal.Ok listen, all you are doing is stating the premise. You aren't giving reasons why this premise is necessarily true.
Ok listen, all you are doing is stating the premise. You aren't giving reasons why this premise is necessarily true.
Do you understand?
If you ask me, "Jeremy, why do you think God and evil are logically compatible?" and I reply by saying "God and evil are logically compatible." you would say and rightly so, that I haven't proven anything, I've just restated the premise.
Do you understand?
An omnibenevolent entity is all-good or morally perfect, so evil is incompatible with its essential moral perfection; therefore given the choice between an action or actions that will result in evil or an action or actions that will not, the latter must be chosen. IOW for an omnibenevolent entity, evil is anathema. Seem to me that's what omnibenevolence means, which is why I wondered whether you might have a different understanding of omnibenevolence - but you were non-committal.
An omnibenevolent entity is all-good or morally perfect, so evil is incompatible with its essential moral perfection; therefore given the choice between an action or actions that will result in evil or an action or actions that will not, the latter must be chosen. IOW for an omnibenevolent entity, evil is anathema. Seem to me that's what omnibenevolence means, which is why I wondered whether you might have a different understanding of omnibenevolence - but you were non-committal.
You're arguing moral perfection makes it logically impossible for God to create free moral agents who He knew would commit evil but have given no reason to think that that is true.
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?