The Impossible

[Davian]

I don't see the problem. I realize you have no information about what it *is*, but you do have information about what it *isn't*. For example, as you noted, it is not expressed in English. I can give you more information about what it isn't. As I understand your argument, at some point that allows you to determine it is impossible. So, another clue. It isn't a house.

Still, Durango's example might be better than mine.

His was better? His example failed.

What of the balance of my post?

 

[durangodawood]

Non-liquid liquid is possible? How so?

Ice. Ice is water, isnt it?

 

[Resha Caner]

His was better? His example failed.

If you think my example better refutes your claim, I'm OK with that.

What of the balance of my post?

If you're not requesting a discussion on the immaterial, I don't see the need for any effort on my part. Whether you read the thread is your choice.

It does when used as an adjective for 'consciousness'. If consciousness is an emergent property of a brain (or silicon, in some future AI), doing away with the matter that constitutes that brain is going to be a problem.

It seemed to me you just refuted your own argument. It seems you acknowledged consciousness has not yet been realized by AI. If so, the only example of consciousness known to science is that due to human biology. Even though it is the only example, you allow that consciousness may not be dependent on the matter of human biology.

Therefore, other types of consciousness are possible.

 

[Davian]

Ice. Ice is water, isnt it?

No. Ice is a solid. Water is a liquid.

Bad analogy anyway.

Wetness is an emergent property of water.

Try: non-liquid wetness.

Possible?

 

[Davian]

If you think my example better refutes your claim, I'm OK with that.

His failed. You said, "Still, Durango's example might be better than mine."

You will need to be better than failure.

If you're not requesting a discussion on the immaterial, I don't see the need for any effort on my part. Whether you read the thread is your choice.

I read through it. I did not see a coherent definition of 'immaterial' that I might apply to this discussion.

I ask again, where? Which post?

It seemed to me you just refuted your own argument. It seems you acknowledged consciousness has not yet been realized by AI. If so, the only example of consciousness known to science is that due to human biology. Even though it is the only example, you allow that consciousness may not be dependent on the matter of human biology.

Therefore, other types of consciousness are possible.

I did not say that consciousness may not be dependent on matter.

Do you only want to argue with the words that you put in my mouth?

 

[durangodawood]

No. Ice is a solid. Water is a liquid.

Bad analogy anyway.

Wetness is an emergent property of water.

Try: non-liquid wetness.

Possible?

No. By definition.

Perhaps wikipedia is wrong when it says

Water appears in nature in all three common states of matter (solid, liquid, and gas) and may take many different forms on Earth: water vapor and clouds in the sky, seawater in the oceans, icebergs in the polar oceans, glaciers and rivers in the mountains, and the liquid in aquifers in the ground.

Anyway, I was trying to imagine that "non-liquid water" would not qualify as a positive ontology for someone who's never experienced ice. (leaving aside steam, if we can for the thought experiment).

 

[Resha Caner]

I did not say that consciousness may not be dependent on matter.

Do you only want to argue with the words that you put in my mouth?

If you're going to accuse me of this, you should be more careful not to do similar things yourself. I never claimed you said "consciousness may not be dependent on matter". You truncated part of my phrase.

I inferred from what you said that you think "consciousness may not be dependent on the matter of human biology." (the bolded words being the ones you omitted). If you disagree with that statement, just say so and we can clarify that my inference was wrong. No need for accusations.

 

[Resha Caner]

Perhaps wikipedia is wrong when it says [water has a solid state]

I thought it was pretty obvious what you meant. But, when someone refuses to concede under any conditions they begin to dissemble.

 

[Davian]

If you're going to accuse me of this, you should be more careful not to do similar things yourself. I never claimed you said "consciousness may not be dependent on matter". You truncated part of my phrase.

I inferred from what you said that you think "consciousness may not be dependent on the matter of human biology." (the bolded words being the ones you omitted). If you disagree with that statement, just say so and we can clarify that my inference was wrong. No need for accusations.

That was not the line I took issue with.

The subject at hand is "immaterial consciousness". When you declared that, based on what what I had said, "Therefore, other types of consciousness are possible" do you include "immaterial" as one of those "other" types, or not?

And what of the balance of my post?

 

[Davian]

No. By definition.

And so it goes with "immaterial consciousness".

Perhaps wikipedia is wrong when it says

Anyway, I was trying to imagine that "non-liquid water" would not qualify as a positive ontology for someone who's never experienced ice. (leaving aside steam, if we can for the thought experiment).

I could see where you were going with this, which I why I clarified it.

As you are saying, water, in the coloquial sense, does have different states, but can we ascertain the properties of ice by examining liquid water?

 

[Davian]

I thought it was pretty obvious what you meant. But, when someone refuses to concede under any conditions they begin to dissemble.

Indeed. Just look at how elusive that definition of yours has been.

 

[durangodawood]

And so it goes with "immaterial consciousness".....

Not so. Nothing in the definition of consciousness requires a material matrix for it. Perhaps its functionally necessary. Or necessary by some other implication. But its not a contradiction by definition like like a square-circle

 

[Davian]

Not so. Nothing in the definition of consciousness requires a material matrix for it.

I was working from where I said "If consciousness is an emergent property of a brain..."

Perhaps its functionally necessary. Or necessary by some other implication. But its not a contradiction by definition like like a square-circle

Do you have a scientific definition of consciousness, where that "consciousness" does not require a "material matrix"?

 

[Upisoft]

I was working from where I said "If consciousness is an emergent property of a brain..."

Do you have a scientific definition of consciousness, where that "consciousness" does not require a "material matrix"?

Emergent property... You mean like being able to watch TV is emergent property of your TV-set...

I would call that "function".

 

[durangodawood]

I was working from where I said "If consciousness is an emergent property of a brain..."

Do you have a scientific definition of consciousness, where that "consciousness" does not require a "material matrix"?

I like the basic wiki definition: Consciousness is the quality or state of being aware of an external object or something within oneself.

I would agree that our current understanding of the world requires a material matrix (brain, computer, ???) in which a "oneself" comes into being. BUT that's a requirement by implication, NOT by the definition of the word "consciousness".

I can fathom the idea of an immaterial consciousness, although I have no idea how it would work. It would be from a realm alien to my thought and experience.

(By contrast, I cannot fathom the idea of a square circle. The two words together just result in nonsense.)

 

[Resha Caner]

The subject at hand is "immaterial consciousness". When you declared that, based on what what I had said, "Therefore, other types of consciousness are possible" do you include "immaterial" as one of those "other" types, or not?

Would I include it? Yes. But I'm quite sure you do not. So, to avoid putting words in your mouth, I was simply noting that you accept the possibility of consciousness appearing in a form that is not yet demonstrable. I was noting an interesting similarity in our positions, but I also realize there are significant differences.

The discussion with Durango has brought out some of the same points I was heading toward, so I'll just bump his post.

I like the basic wiki definition: Consciousness is the quality or state of being aware of an external object or something within oneself.

I would agree that our current understanding of the world requires a material matrix (brain, computer, ???) in which a "oneself" comes into being. BUT that's a requirement by implication, NOT by the definition of the word "consciousness".

I can fathom the idea of an immaterial consciousness, although I have no idea how it would work. It would be from a realm alien to my thought and experience.

(By contrast, I cannot fathom the idea of a square circle. The two words together just result in nonsense.)

 

[Davian]

I like the basic wiki definition: Consciousness is the quality or state of being aware of an external object or something within oneself.

I would agree that our current understanding of the world requires a material matrix (brain, computer, ???) in which a "oneself" comes into being. BUT that's a requirement by implication, NOT by the definition of the word "consciousness".

The definition you just quoted says "within oneself", so you have lost me there.

I can fathom the idea of an immaterial consciousness, although I have no idea how it would work. It would be from a realm alien to my thought and experience.

(By contrast, I cannot fathom the idea of a square circle. The two words together just result in nonsense.)

Well, if there is something "immaterial" (whatever that means), and we don't know how it works, that we cannot fathom, and is alien to our thought and experience, on what grounds can we justify applying the label of "consciousness" to it?

 

[Davian]

Would I include it? Yes. But I'm quite sure you do not. So, to avoid putting words in your mouth, I was simply noting that you accept the possibility of consciousness appearing in a form that is not yet demonstrable. I was noting an interesting similarity in our positions, but I also realize there are significant differences.

How are these word games working out for you, Resha?

How can I accept the possibility of consciousness appearing in a form that lacks a positive ontology, unless you care to provide a definition of "immaterial consciousness" that might qualify it as "another form"?

The discussion with Durango has brought out some of the same points I was heading toward, so I'll just bump his post.

Were you heading toward providing a definition for the terms in question, like Durango did?

 

[durangodawood]

The definition you just quoted says "within oneself", so you have lost me there.

Well, if there is something "immaterial" (whatever that means), and we don't know how it works, that we cannot fathom, and is alien to our thought and experience, on what grounds can we justify applying the label of "consciousness" to it?

Yeah. "Withing oneself" is solipsistic, as if you could not apply the term to an other. Other than that, the definition is pretty helpful, I think.

The grounds for applying the label "consciousness" to something immaterial would have to be some variety of "I know when I see it"... Well, not exactly SEE it, obviously, but experience it. Which of course raises all the good questions skeptics raise about the "spiritual realm", especially: how could anything immaterial interact with and affect the material realm? Excellent question.

But the point is: people have been imagining this realm forever. People CANNOT imagine a square-circle, etc. The spirit realm may not exist. But its not nonsense.

 

[Davian]

Emergent property... You mean like being able to watch TV is emergent property of your TV-set...

I would call that "function".

Or "process". Works for me.