The Hiddenness Argument for Atheism

[Uber Genius]

OK, I'm nitpicking, but some things bother me. Like the triple negative in that proposition.

Expository writing should be lucid. Thoughts should be expressed simply, coherently, and above all, in an easily comprehensible manner. I can't believe any editor would allow such an awkwardly phrased sentence to be published.

Schellenberg, like his peers in philosophy have a syntax that sacrifices readability for precision and analysis.

But you are free to describe "non-resistant" as "genuine seeker" and "nonbelief" as "atheist."

If a loving God exists the only atheists would be those that are resisting the idea because they have reasons other than rational ones: they want to buck societal norms and live hedonistic lives (Huxley), or they hate the idea that they have to bow the knee to God (Dawkins et. al.)

Again, he is suggesting that if God existed he might not bother giving chaps like Dawkins or Huxley additional warrant for believing he existed since it wouldn't change the outcome a bit, but the average seeker, well if he or she got a little more warrant it would seem that it would make a difference.

 

[Apologetic_Warrior]

Schellenberg, like his peers in philosophy have a syntax that sacrifices readability for precision and analysis.

But you are free to describe "non-resistant" as "genuine seeker" and "nonbelief" as "atheist."

If a loving God exists the only atheists would be those that are resisting the idea because they have reasons other than rational ones: they want to buck societal norms and live hedonistic lives (Huxley), or they hate the idea that they have to bow the knee to God (Dawkins et. al.)

Again, he is suggesting that if God existed he might not bother giving chaps like Dawkins or Huxley additional warrant for believing he existed since it wouldn't change the outcome a bit, but the average seeker, well if he or she got a little more warrant it would seem that it would make a difference.

What is love apart from Christ? They have to borrow from Christianity and twist it to even have a concept of love to argue against it. Unconditional love is contrary to human nature, it is antithetical to the nature of man in his default state. What can be difficult for us to accept is, God is under no obligation to love all sinners equally or at all. But we have to first be brought to an understanding our own nature to reach this conclusion. They assume if God is all loving, then God is obligated to either save a.) everyone or b.) nobody, which is a false dilemma.

 

[Silmarien]

Yep.

People are arguing based on assumptions about whats on the other side of a wall we currently cant look over.

Technically, the assumption that the universe is intelligible at all is on the other side of a wall we'll never be able to look over. There are certain assumptions that would take down all of empirical science with them if they ever failed, so I think it's more than reasonable to argue based on them.

(That a negative ordered sequence of events is impossible is probably not a necessary assumption, but I think people are perfectly entitled to try to wield logic to prove that this is in fact the case.)

 

[durangodawood]

Technically, the assumption that the universe is intelligible at all is on the other side of a wall we'll never be able to look over. There are certain assumptions that would take down all of empirical science with them if they ever failed, so I think it's more than reasonable to argue based on them.....

Empirical science fares just fine so long as its valid within our universe. If certain necessary assumptions are invalid 'beyond', thats no reason to throw out the periodic table or molecular biology where we live.

 

[Silmarien]

Empirical science fares just fine so long as its valid within our universe. If certain necessary assumptions are invalid 'beyond', thats no reason to throw out the periodic table or molecular biology where we live.

This is not really true. If we accept a Humean account of causality and say that effects merely follow causes in time but are not actually the result of said causes, then empirical science is in trouble. If we accept the Kantian notion that our minds are merely imposing categories of thought upon a reality that is unintelligible, then we have no real access to knowledge even within our own universe.

There are also genuine concerns about why things would be valid even within our universe if there were not deeper metaphysical principles at play. I dislike the Kalam, but if we toss out the Principle of Sufficient Reason and say that contingent things can come about uncaused, then why would this not be the case within our universe as well? If it's just by chance that our universe appears to exhibit regularities, then it could just as easily cease to exhibit them. We do need to take some principles deeper than our universe or they don't even work within our universe.

(Don't read this as an argument for God. We 13th century throwbacks do things very differently and it doesn't really match up very well.)

 

[durangodawood]

This is not really true. If we accept a Humean account of causality and say that effects merely follow causes in time but are not actually the result of said causes, then empirical science is in trouble. If we accept the Kantian notion that our minds are merely imposing categories of thought upon a reality that is unintelligible, then we have no real access to knowledge even within our own universe.

There are also genuine concerns about why things would be valid even within our universe if there were not deeper metaphysical principles at play. I dislike the Kalam, but if we toss out the Principle of Sufficient Reason and say that contingent things can come about uncaused, then why would this not be the case within our universe as well? If it's just by chance that our universe appears to exhibit regularities, then it could just as easily cease to exhibit them. We do need to take some principles deeper than our universe or they don't even work within our universe.

(Don't read this as an argument for God. We 13th century throwbacks do things very differently and it doesn't really match up very well.)

I'm afraid I disagree with pretty much all of it. The very best reason to declare 'the beyond' as intelligible is because we'd prefer it. There's no actual rule anyone can point to saying that intelligibility to our minds must be a property of all possible realms. We can only make claims for what we can access, even if only indirectly. All the rest may as well be rabbit-hole for all we can know - and I'm guessing it is, given how utterly conditioned we are to time and space.

But hey, there's a gold piece nailed to the mast for whoever sees over the wall first and can say one word about it.

 

[Silmarien]

I'm afraid I disagree with pretty much all of it. The very best reason to declare 'the beyond' as intelligible is because we'd prefer it. There's no actual rule anyone can point to saying that intelligibility (to our minds) must be a property of all possible realms. We can only make claims for what we can access, even if only indirectly. All the rest may as well be rabbit-hole for all we can know - and I'm guessing it is, given how utterly conditioned we are to time and space.

Well, people declared reality to be intelligible on religious grounds, so it was based in revelation rather than in preference. That is how scholasticism and then modern science developed. I am glad this happened, since I kind of like science, but it didn't have to.

I also agree that reality doesn't have to be intelligible. But if it isn't, then I think we need to accept what that means in its entirety--we cannot make claims about anything, because we have access to nothing. Empirical science is little more than a convenient fiction, a misguided attempt at making some sense of the inexplicable. We can't even measure the probability of the universe blinking out of existence from one second to the next, because even probability is just another human concept. I don't know how you can get around any of that except by special pleading.

I don't find this very compelling, since I think the success of empirical science is a good justification for believing that reality is intelligible. I'm also not convinced that we're utterly conditioned to time and space--our ability to grasp abstract concepts is kind of interesting. The jury's still out on basically everything related to theory of mind.

 

[durangodawood]

Well, people declared reality to be intelligible on religious grounds, so it was based in revelation rather than in preference. That is how scholasticism and then modern science developed. I am glad this happened, since I kind of like science, but it didn't have to.

I also agree that reality doesn't have to be intelligible. But if it isn't, then I think we need to accept what that means in its entirety--we cannot make claims about anything, because we have access to nothing. Empirical science is little more than a convenient fiction, a misguided attempt at making some sense of the inexplicable. We can't even measure the probability of the universe blinking out of existence from one second to the next, because even probability is just another human concept. I don't know how you can get around any of that except by special pleading.

I don't find this very compelling, since I think the success of empirical science is a good justification for believing that reality is intelligible. I'm also not convinced that we're utterly conditioned to time and space--our ability to grasp abstract concepts is kind of interesting. The jury's still out on basically everything related to theory of mind.

I think people declared our reality to be intelligible because it disclosed consistencies to our intelligence. Surely this happened way in advance of anything approaching religious reasoning.

You keep talking about reality as if its one consistent thing both within our time/space universe and across any possible without. I'm struggling to imagine how anyone could possibly know this.

Also, you deploy the idea of intelligibility as if its a one way street. As if intelligent minds can encounter any potentially intelligible thing and make some sense of it. I dont think so. I think only a tuned mind can meet the reality its tuned-to and make sense of it. Clearly we're attuned to time/space as presented in our realm. But even the theologians and mystics probing the divine reach a point where they encounter non-intelligibility. They label that "mystery". Nor does that dose of mystery ruin the whole scientific-understanding project for them. Why should it for you?

 

[Uber Genius]

Empirical science fares just fine so long as its valid within our universe. If certain necessary assumptions are invalid 'beyond', thats no reason to throw out the periodic table or molecular biology where we live.

No. Actually it doesn't.

For one example see:

God and the ‘Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics’ | Reasonable Faith

The point is not the periodic table, the point is how is man able to comprehend his world in such a way as to be able to do science or create a periodic chart.

Comprehensive world designed on a mathematical blueprint>philosophy>philosophy of science>predicting future findings of structure use of universe based on math>leads to "Is it possible that we just discovered the design aspect of the universe, namely that it was built on a mathematical blueprint?

Newton had other justification the Eugene Wigner (above), Other philosophers have similar intuitions about the uncanny ability of humans to understand the nature of the universe. It is a worthy area of study which I have t shared as it is much more complex that the stuff people struggle with at CF. But it keeps my cosmologist and chemistry prof. Cigar-smoking buddies up at night.

 

[durangodawood]

.....the uncanny ability of humans to understand the nature of the universe.......

As I was saying, all of that is completely valid.... within the universe. We have no business stepping out and making claims about the intelligibility of any possible "beyond".

See my post #108 for a bit more elaboration, mainly my last paragraph re mystery.

(Whats an "emissary professor"?)

 

[Uber Genius]

As I was saying, all of that is completely valid.... within the universe. We have no business stepping out and making claims about the intelligibility of any possible "beyond".

See my post #108 for a bit more elaboration, mainly my last paragraph re mystery.

(Whats an "emissary professor"?)

Your claim which I quoted was "empirical science fares just fine as long as it is valid inside the universe." So my post was in reply to that statement. Which gets at the inference that we shopulent expect that to be true.

"Chemistry" prof.

My iPad can't keep pace with the speed of my typing and misses a letter or two then auto-corrects into words that make no sense.

 

[durangodawood]

Your claim which I quoted was "empirical science fares just fine as long as it is valid inside the universe." So my post was in reply to that statement. Which gets at the inference that we shouldnt expect that to be true...

Wait what? How do you get that when I claim X, the inference you should get from that is that X isnt true?

I make the claim because I think the claim is true.

(Or maybe this universe is in fact a bit less intelligible than I'd thought.)

...I'm an adjunct perfessor in a business school. Which means I have a day job as a cunsultant and teach classes from time to time. Never heard of an emissary professor and it just means someone in admin is having some fun perhaps.

Ohhh. You changed emissary prof to chemistry prof.

I was thinking maybe you have friends in the BYU missionary studies dept or something.

 

[durangodawood]

....shopulent....

I sympathize with your autocorrect issues and did fix that for you in my reply. But I want to thank you for it anyway. Best neologism in quite a while.

 

[Uber Genius]

This is not really true. If we accept a Humean account of causality and say that effects merely follow causes in time but are not actually the result of said causes, then empirical science is in trouble. If we accept the Kantian notion that our minds are merely imposing categories of thought upon a reality that is unintelligible, then we have no real access to knowledge even within our own universe.

There are also genuine concerns about why things would be valid even within our universe if there were not deeper metaphysical principles at play. I dislike the Kalam, but if we toss out the Principle of Sufficient Reason and say that contingent things can come about uncaused, then why would this not be the case within our universe as well? If it's just by chance that our universe appears to exhibit regularities, then it could just as easily cease to exhibit them. We do need to take some principles deeper than our universe or they don't even work within our universe.

(Don't read this as an argument for God. We 13th century throwbacks do things very differently and it doesn't really match up very well.)

Great point. Though clearly someone reading this post has yet to take their first philosophy class and thinks your points "funny."

However,
Contingency sans PSR

Stephen Davis adopts a version of the argument from contingency that eliminates the need of anything like PSR.

So Leibniz's 17th century construction of that premise is excluded.

1) Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause [A version of PSR].
2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3) The universe exists.
4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1, 3)
5) Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God (from 2, 4)

No PSR problem.

Leibniz's question,"Why is there something rather than nothing, can not be claimed to be a brute fact since we have a reason to believe that "Out of nothing nothing comes." So once we have a proper understanding of our universe coming from no space, no matter, no energy, no laws of physics, no time, we know there is no causal entity that can cause this phenomenon. We have knowledge that there is no case of nothing causing something.

I assume you referred to 'Kalam' by mistake and meant Contingency.

Wait what? How do you get that when I claim X, the inference you should get from that is that X isnt true?

I make the claim because I think the claim is true.

(Or maybe this universe is in fact a bit less intelligible than I'd thought.)


Ohhh. You changed emissary prof to chemistry prof.

I was thinking maybe you have friends in the BYU missionary studies dept or something.

lol. No BYU missionary professors. Just typing too quickly for keypad.

As to your inference about claims around empiricism let me try and clear up what I'm taking about.

My claim is one that is more foundational. It has nothing to do with empiricism per se but that it is inexplicable why we can understand our world at all, in order to a examine and collect data of a particular type, and b create inferences that possibly explain those data. We need an orderly world that is understandable to the senses and rationality. The atheist says of it "it is a brute fact and a happy accident."

The theist says it is designed to be perceived by human faculties.

So we would agree on empiricism but the story of why it is an accurate method would be grounded very differently.

Namely the problem is best described in the evolutionary argument against naturalism by Plantinga.

 

[durangodawood]

....We need an orderly world that is understandable to the senses and rationality. The atheist says of it "it is a brute fact and a happy accident."

The theist says it is designed to be perceived by human faculties...

My take is... we dont know.

The only people who do know, know through faith.... (if we can be loose with the idea of "knowledge" here.)

 

[Uber Genius]

the modern introduction of comprehendability of our universe arguments pointing to God is the atheist turned deist Albert Einstein.


On the Rational Order of the World: a Letter to Maurice Solovine

Albert Einstein
1952
March 30, 1952

Dear Solovine,


Now I come to the most interesting point in your letter. You find it strange that I consider the comprehensibility of the world (to the extent that we are authorized to speak of such a comprehensibility) as a miracle or as an eternal mystery. Well, a priori one should expect a chaotic world which cannot be grasped by the mind in any way. One could (yes one should) expect the world to be subjected to law only to the extent that we order it through our intelligence. Ordering of this kind would be like the alphabetical ordering of the words of a language. By contrast, the kind of order created by Newton’s theory of gravitation, for instance, is wholly different. Even if the axioms of the theory are proposed by man, the success of such a project presupposes a high degree of ordering of the objective world, and this could not be expected a priori. That is the “miracle” which is being constantly reinforced as our knowledge expands.

There lies the weakness of positivists and professional atheists who are elated because they feel that they have not only successfully rid the world of gods but “bared the miracles”. Oddly enough, we must be satisfied to acknowledge the “miracle” without there being any legitimate way for us to approach it.


Your A. E.

But this deserves a thread of its own.
And since I have so much basic logic work to do with simpler arguments such as the Kalam or fine tuning argument I am hesitant to bring it up

 

[Silmarien]

I think people declared our reality to be intelligible because it disclosed consistencies to our intelligence. Surely this happened way in advance of anything approaching religious reasoning.

Not really. I mean, there are plenty of cultures that don't really consider the universe to be intelligible in any sense that we would understand. The Vedic tradition insists that our reality is actually an illusion, so its intelligibility is certainly not a cultural given.

Now, the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions declare reality to be intelligible, though there were competing trends in the Greek world that went the other direction. Catholicism eventually really went all out with intelligibility, but the opposite happened with Islam. What wins out might be due to historical facts and key personalities (Aquinas vs. al-Ghazali), but we didn't really have a full cultural paradigm in favor of the intelligibility of reality before 2nd millennium Catholicism.

You keep talking about reality as if its one consistent thing both within our time/space universe and across any possible without. I'm struggling to imagine how anyone could possibly know this.

I think aspects of it are. This is the difference between contingent facts (things that could be different in different possible worlds) and necessary facts. Is there a possible world where 1+1 could equal 3? Where the law of identity does not hold true? Modal logic is powerful stuff and we ought to think about it carefully before tossing it out and embracing irrationalism. (Which doesn't mean that irrationalism is wrong, but we ought to pay close attention to the alternatives first.)

I think we're in trouble if there's no reason that these sorts of logical principles need apply to our universe. Because if they don't need to, then there's really no reason to expect that they would.

Also, you deploy the idea of intelligibility as if its a one way street. As if intelligent minds can encounter any potentially intelligible thing and make some sense of it. I dont think so. I think only a tuned mind can meet the reality its tuned-to and make sense of it. Clearly we're attuned to time/space as presented in our realm. But even the theologians and mystics probing the divine reach a point where they encounter non-intelligibility. They label that "mystery". Nor does that dose of mystery ruin the whole scientific-understanding project for them. Why should it for you?

Dionysius the Areopagite forever. I am actually a serious proponent of negative theology and having a healthy respect for the notion of mystery. So I agree with you to an extent, but I don't think empirical science is a very good place to draw the line between what we can and cannot speak about. That type of empiricism tends to collapse into incoherence, which is a problem not just for me but for philosophers of science at large.

As for mystics and science... I mean, some definitely do reject it as an inefficient vehicle for discovering anything at all. Theologians are usually more committed to rational inquiry, but mystics can go either way on it.

 

[Silmarien]

Great point. Though clearly someone reading this post has yet to take their first philosophy class and thinks your points "funny."

Oh, I'm pretty sure it was the comment about being a 13th century throwback that drew the "funny" rating.

However,
Contingency sans PSR

Stephen Davis adopts a version of the argument from contingency that eliminates the need of anything like PSR.

So Leibniz's 17th century construction of that premise is excluded.

1) Anything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own nature or in an external cause [A version of PSR].
2) If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
3) The universe exists.
4) Therefore, the universe has an explanation of its existence (from 1, 3)
5) Therefore, the explanation of the existence of the universe is God (from 2, 4)

No PSR problem.

Leibniz's question,"Why is there something rather than nothing, can not be claimed to be a brute fact since we have a reason to believe that "Out of nothing nothing comes." So once we have a proper understanding of our universe coming from no space, no matter, no energy, no laws of physics, no time, we know there is no causal entity that can cause this phenomenon. We have knowledge that there is no case of nothing causing something.

I assume you referred to 'Kalam' by mistake and meant Contingency.

No, it's the Kalam I don't like. I have serious sympathies for idealism, so "the universe exists" is a problematic premise for me. Any argument that relies upon the reality of space, time, and matter isn't going to strike me as compelling.

I am quite fond of the PSR, though. It was actually a response to Inwagen that finally dispelled the last of my agnosticism, so I have no problem even with the strong version.

the modern introduction of comprehendability of our universe arguments pointing to God is the atheist turned deist Albert Einstein.

I would definitely say pantheist rather than deist, but it's a lovely quote all the same.

 

[durangodawood]

I am quite fond of the PSR....

Right on.
I'm going to take it right now.
This is what you meant, right?

Primitive Survival Rating

 

[2PhiloVoid]

I'm afraid I disagree with pretty much all of it. The very best reason to declare 'the beyond' as intelligible is because we'd prefer it. There's no actual rule anyone can point to saying that intelligibility to our minds must be a property of all possible realms. We can only make claims for what we can access, even if only indirectly. All the rest may as well be rabbit-hole for all we can know - and I'm guessing it is, given how utterly conditioned we are to time and space.

But hey, there's a gold piece nailed to the mast for whoever sees over the wall first and can say one word about it.

I hate be a party-pooper about your "gold piece" offer, but epistemologically speaking, if I may be permitted to do so on behalf of the Christian point of view, I'm going to have to interject that if getting the 'gold' is what motivates a person to see over the wall at all in any capacity, whether she's first, second or last in that endeavor, then she probably won't in actuality get the necessary opportunity to see over the wall and thus have anything of real substance to share with the rest of us. It's a Bummer, I know, but I'm sure we're all going to be catapulted over the Wall in due time regardless, so we really don't need any upstart volunteers ....

My take is... we dont know.

The only people who do know, know through faith.... (if we can be loose with the idea of "knowledge" here.)

...oh my! If I hear another person refer to or allude to faith as a form of epistemology, I think I'll go ballistic! And I know you don't want me to go all Gimli on you? That wouldn't be a pretty sight!