"The Greatest Conceivable Being"

[Chesterton]

What - in your terminology - is the apparently significant semantic difference between a conception "existing" and a conception "being real"?

It's the difference between the conception being real and the object of the conception being real.

 

[variant]

The argument includes the word "being". That is critical.

And what key difference separates beings and islands so as to make the arguments non paralell?

 

[variant]

It's the difference between the conception being real and the object of the conception being real.

Well if you understand that difference, why on earth would you think this argument makes sense?

 

[quatona]

It's the difference between the conception being real and the object of the conception being real.

Exactly. You have found your basic mistake: You are comparing conceptions to objects, semantically pretending they were of the same category.
Now, maybe you want to rephrase your question in the very precise wording you have finally come to use here, and you will notice it won´t work once you let go off the semantics trickery.
As I said before: in the latter case you aren´t referring to my conception but to something else...(an externally existing object?)

 

[Chesterton]

And what key difference separates beings and islands so as to make the arguments non paralell?

A being is greater than an island. An island with a brain would be greater than a regular old island.

Well if you understand that difference, why on earth would you think this argument makes sense?

Doesn't the argument hinge on that difference?

 

[Chesterton]

Exactly. You have found your basic mistake: You are comparing conceptions to objects, semantically pretending they were of the same category.
Now, maybe you want to rephrase your question in the very precise wording you have finally come to use here, and you will notice it won´t work once you let go off the semantics trickery.
As I said before: in the latter case you aren´t referring to my conception but to something else...(an externally existing object?)

What was my question?

 

[variant]

A being is greater than an island. An island with a brain would be greater than a regular old island.

We're talking about islands though and it is possible to conceive of the greatest of them without turning it into a being.

Doesn't the argument hinge on that difference?

The difference between great conceptions and great things is indeed the hinge of this argument.

The problem of course is conceiving of a great being doesn't mean anything to it's actually existing.

 

[quatona]

What was my question?

You forgot what you had asked a couple of minutes ago?

Would your conception be greater or lesser if it actually existed?

(post #73),
and funnily enough - when I first called you upon the semantics problem in your question - you answered "I asked what I asked" in post #84 - immediately before you suddenly forgot what you had asked.

 

[The Cadet]

So, just out of curiosity, does the greatest conceivable hot dog exist?

Just follow the same logic as the ontological argument:

1. We conceive of Awesome Dog as a hot dog than which no greater hot dog can be conceived.
2. This hot dog than which no greater can be conceived either exists in the mind alone or both in the mind and in reality.
3. Assume that this hot dog than which no greater can be conceived exists in the mind alone.
   1. Existing both in the mind and in reality is greater than existing solely in the mind.
   2. This being, existing in the mind alone, can also be conceived to exist in reality.
   3. This hot dog existing in the mind alone is not therefore the hot dog than which no greater can be conceived. (See statement 1 above.)
4. Therefore, this hot dog than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality as well as exists in the mind.

The replacement of the term "being" makes absolutely no difference to the argument. The subdivision from "entity" to "class of entity" does not change anything about the structure of the argument - the greatest conceivable hot dog must, according to the logical syllogism, exist. After all, if it didn't, it would not be the greatest conceivable hot dog.

So does the greatest conceivable hot dog exist? The greatest conceivable dust mite? The greatest conceivable planet? The greatest conceivable person?

The argument fails. A few problems:

1. There's no reason to believe that such a "greatest conceivable being" is great enough to merit existence in reality, or that we can conceive of a being so great that it must necessarily also exist in reality.
2. Treating existence as a quality may be fundamentally flawed in the first place, as something that does not exist cannot have qualities.
3. The argument implies a greatest conceivable anything, and implies that we can literally imagine it, and it must necessarily exist, somewhere or somehow. This is an absurd conclusion.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Small thought: If a god doesn't exist, maybe the definition that God is the being greater than which cannot be conceived is wrong.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

So, just out of curiosity, does the greatest conceivable hot dog exist?

Just follow the same logic as the ontological argument:

1. We conceive of Awesome Dog as a hot dog than which no greater hot dog can be conceived.
2. This hot dog than which no greater can be conceived either exists in the mind alone or both in the mind and in reality.
3. Assume that this hot dog than which no greater can be conceived exists in the mind alone.
   1. Existing both in the mind and in reality is greater than existing solely in the mind.
   2. This being, existing in the mind alone, can also be conceived to exist in reality.
   3. This hot dog existing in the mind alone is not therefore the hot dog than which no greater can be conceived. (See statement 1 above.)
4. Therefore, this hot dog than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality as well as exists in the mind.

The replacement of the term "being" makes absolutely no difference to the argument. The subdivision from "entity" to "class of entity" does not change anything about the structure of the argument - the greatest conceivable hot dog must, according to the logical syllogism, exist. After all, if it didn't, it would not be the greatest conceivable hot dog.

So does the greatest conceivable hot dog exist? The greatest conceivable dust mite? The greatest conceivable planet? The greatest conceivable person?

The argument fails. A few problems:

1. There's no reason to believe that such a "greatest conceivable being" is great enough to merit existence in reality, or that we can conceive of a being so great that it must necessarily also exist in reality.
2. Treating existence as a quality may be fundamentally flawed in the first place, as something that does not exist cannot have qualities.
3. The argument implies a greatest conceivable anything, and implies that we can literally imagine it, and it must necessarily exist, somewhere or somehow. This is an absurd conclusion.

It's an attempt to define something into existence. The Messianic Manic has a good analogy for it: Consider a Realicorn; it's like a unicorn, except that it is defined as existing. Existence simply goes along with the definition of a Realicorn. Because its existence is built into the definition of the thing, if you agree with the definition, you must believe that a Realicorn is real.

 

[DogmaHunter]

Exactly.

Atheists are all of a sudden clueless as to what the word "great" means.

That's ok though. We know you guys are just pulling our leg.

That's the thing that you are unwilling to understand.

What is "great" to me, might not be "great" to you and vice versa.
There is no objective measure of "greatness". Therefor, when using the word in the context of claims as the one discussed in this thread, the word "great" is meaningless. Because it doesn't add anything of value to the claims at hand.

It seems to me that only intellectual honesty would stand in the way of comprehending that.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

It is strange at least that if God is the greatest conceivable being, theres no sign of Him in a direct fashion.

 

[KCfromNC]

I disagree that a specific definition is necessary to consider the ontological argument.

Yep, there are bigger problems with the argument. The main one being that our ability to imagine something doesn't make it pop into existence.

 

[variant]

Small thought: If a god doesn't exist, maybe the definition that God is the being greater than which cannot be conceived is wrong.

 

[ToddNotTodd]

ROFL!

You've effectively removed yourself from this conversation.

My point, which anyone who actually thought about it for a second would understand, is that the word "great" in this context should be meaningless to everyone. It's not quantifiable, so calling anything "great" is nothing more than personal preference. Without an objective measure, saying that the greatest conceivable being would be good holds the same weight as saying the greatest conceivable being would be evil.

 

[zippy2006]

So I thought I´d create this thread for constructive ideas regarding this issue.

Here's a few things, and here's St. Anselm's argument for reference.

1. It isn´t descriptive. It merely provides an unspecific value judgement, and on top of that it doesn´t provide any standards or criteria for determining "greatness".

The argument only requires that one believe that something which exists is greater than something which does not exist, which is not so onerous in my opinion.

2. "Conceivable" - by whom?

Human beings, of course.

 

[anonymous person]

My point, which anyone who actually thought about it for a second would understand, is that the word "great" in this context should be meaningless to everyone. It's not quantifiable, so calling anything "great" is nothing more than personal preference. Without an objective measure, saying that the greatest conceivable being would be good holds the same weight as saying the greatest conceivable being would be evil.

Since when did an utterance become meaningless just because it is an expression of someone's personal preference?

If that is the case, everything you just said is meaningless. Its not quantifiable.

"Meaningless".

 

[anonymous person]

It is strange at least that if God is the greatest conceivable being, theres no sign of Him in a direct fashion.

According to some here, what you just said is meaningless because it is not quantifiable and is just your opinion.

What would you say to such a person?

 

[quatona]

Here's a few things, and here's St. Anselm's argument for reference.

This thread is not about the ontological argument.

The argument only requires that one believe that something which exists is greater than something which does not exist, which is not so onerous in my opinion.

Except that "something that doesn´t exist" isn´t something, to begin with.

Human beings, of course.

That´s me. I can conceive of greater beings than the ones described in the monotheists´ Holy Books.
According to the ontological argument, these beings a. exist, and b. aren´t the ones described in those books.