Subjectivity

[David Gould]

Every decision we make and every opinion we hold is a subjective one by definition.

If we assume that there is in fact an objective morality what path do we have to reach it but through subjectivity? In other words, if I am presented with the objective moral code in all its glory all I have to decide whether it is in fact the objective moral code is my subjective reasoning.

So we are left in subjectivity.

To my mind, this deals a savage blow to the argument that without an objective moral code we are trapped in subjectivity and hence moral nihilism, as even with an objective moral code we end up in the same place.

 

[ischus]

I agree that everything human is subjective. I also believe in objective morality. Christianity suggests that We can get close enough to the moral objectivity that God desires. In the spectrum of truth, some will be closer to objectivity than others. God doesn't expect us to arrive at objectivity. He expects that within the communication process between God and man there will be enough understanding for us to get close to his general principles.

Analogy: Mother tells her son to clean his room and go to bed afterward. Is there room for subjectivity and miscommunication? Yes. Can the son arrive at an interpretation which is close to what the mother intended for him to understand? Yes.

Btw, you first have to accept that God presents objective truth by way of the Bible and the Holy Spirit.

 

[Dragar]

If we assume that there is in fact an objective morality what path do we have to reach it but through subjectivity? In other words, if I am presented with the objective moral code in all its glory all I have to decide whether it is in fact the objective moral code is my subjective reasoning.

It also neglects to explain why we 'should' follow this objective moral code. Were we to stumble across one which says 'homosexuality is immoral', how many of us would care what the objective morality says? I wouldn't.

Of course, you could define 'objective morality' as 'that which is wanted to be followed' or 'the code which 'should' be done'. But the what 'should' be done changes from person to person. All they've done is re-defined the word 'objective' to mean 'objective'.

 

[an7222]

It also neglects to explain why we 'should' follow this objective moral code. Were we to stumble across one which says 'homosexuality is immoral', how many of us would care what the objective morality says? I wouldn't.

Of course, you could define 'objective morality' as 'that which is wanted to be followed' or 'the code which 'should' be done'. But the what 'should' be done changes from person to person. All they've done is re-defined the word 'objective' to mean 'objective'.

I agree. But the difference now is that, with an objective morality I can say somebody is objectively wrong, and not just "I think he is wrong". With an objective morality, everybody will continue to be able to do whatever they want, but they will know when what they did was right or wrong.

 

[Western Deity]

"Objective morality" is nonsensical ...

 

[UMP]

Every decision we make and every opinion we hold is a subjective one by definition.

If we assume that there is in fact an objective morality what path do we have to reach it but through subjectivity? In other words, if I am presented with the objective moral code in all its glory all I have to decide whether it is in fact the objective moral code is my subjective reasoning.

So we are left in subjectivity.

To my mind, this deals a savage blow to the argument that without an objective moral code we are trapped in subjectivity and hence moral nihilism, as even with an objective moral code we end up in the same place.

Yes,
The will does not determine itself.

The will is not "self-determining." If the will be determined, it is absurd to say it determined itself, for this would be like saying anything is the cause of itself, and for anything to be the cause of itself, would involve the absurdity of a thing existing before it existed.

Whatever exists, be it matter or mind, physical or moral acts, it is certain there was and is a cause for it.

So for every choice of the mind, or volition, there must be a cause. Whatever a man’s choice may be, there is a cause for it. The power to act either in body or mind, is of the Lord, as men could not move the body only as their lives are sustained by the Lord. So neither can they will anything, or reject anything but as they are upheld by the Lord.

But we must distinguish between the power by which men will, and the reason why they will any particular thing, why the choice embraces one thing in preference to another.

The cause of a body’s moving may be one thing, and that which determines its motion in one direction rather than another, may be a different thing. Edwards says: "It is that motive which as it stands in the view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the will." I think this is correct. In our inquiry as to why any man’s choice is what it is, we must consider, first, the state or nature of that man; and second, his environment. A place of sin would look pleasing to one man and repulsive to another, and so it would please a man at one time, and displease him at another time. Affinity is an important element in every act of choosing.

If the carnal mind of man be "enmity against God," then the element of affinity would be lacking, and there could be no choice. Let me explain a little on the last words, "There could be no choice." Ordinarily when we say a man "cannot" do a thing we suppose he may try to do so, or make an effort to do so, or desire to do so, and is hindered, but in this case he is not supposed to desire to love God, for the desire to love Him would be to love Him. We cannot conceive of an effort to love Him, for there would be nothing in him to create the effort to love Him.

The clear rays of the sun are hurtful to the eye, and nothing would cause the sun’s rays to be agreeable to the eye, but the change of the nature of the eye, and so the doctrine of regeneration is the basis upon which men choose the Lord. Without being born again, God and his service is not agreeable to men, and so we may say they can not choose the Lord and his service, and we do not use the words "can not" to intimate that men may desire to do so, and are hindered.

It is safe to say that men will choose that which is most agreeable to them. Men are ever choosing that which is worthless instead of that which is good. Some men, and most men, prefer the house of sin to the house of prayer, but this is because it is to them most pleasing, and agreeable.

Put before a man a penny and twenty dollar gold piece, and let him understand the value of each, and he could not prefer the penny, because there is more in the gold to please than in the penny. Men do ever choose that which to them, at the time of the choice, is most agreeable to them. To say otherwise is to say a man can choose what he does not prefer.

Ordinarily, when we say a man "can do anything," we mean he can, notwithstanding all opposition, and in spite of all difficulties, but when we say a man can choose that which is pleasing to him we do not use the word "can" in that sense, because there is nothing to hinder a man from choosing or wishing. Such a thing as a forced choice cannot be imagined. The body can be forced in this way or that, but not so the desires. It was from this consideration that Gill said, "The will can not but be free." W e know no way to hinder one’s will or desires. Men may be slaves in body and serfs. The body may be laid in chains, but not so the will or desires. No chain or prison can interfere with the voluntary motions of the will.

In the way of argument, &c., we may seek to change the will or choice of men, but if we be successful in our arguments or persuasions, we do not in this interfere with the voluntariness of the will, but where the choice is transferred from one thing to another it is still the choice embracing that which at the time of choice is most desirable. Such a thing as a forced choice is absolutely inconceivable. We can understand how the body may be forced but not the desires. The choice forever embraces that which is most pleasing at the time of the choice.

The choice or will cannot deal with matters not perceived by the mind. Perception is essential to choice. If men in nature cannot perceive divine or spiritual things, there could be no choice of them nor desires after them.

As the fish in the water could not choose the life and liberty of the bird, for the reason: first, it knows nothing of it; and second, it is content with its own home, it has all the liberty it desires. So in order that we choose divine things we must perceive them and have some knowledge of their value, and also we must be so changed as to have affinity for them. But still when thus changed and enlightened, we still choose that which is most desirable and pleasing.

The notion that the will, or choice, is capable of embracing that which, at the time, is hateful, and rejecting that which is pleasing, has no foundation in sound reason. One may choose to have a tooth pulled, or to take a bitter medicine, or to submit to a painful surgical operation, and he may do so most voluntarily, but in these cases ease and health are laid in the scale with the suffering, and the disease and cause of trouble is put in the other end, and so the mind is not simply choosing between the painful operation and the refraining from it, but from the painful operation and life on one side, and the refraining from the painful operation, and death, on the other side.

I am satisfied that no one can conceive or imagine a circumstance in which the choice is forced or compelled.

We sometimes speak of arguments being such as to compel assent and approval, but the word "compel" is not used here as it is used when we speak of an army being compelled to submit. Our brethren who are printing books and papers expect to determine the wills of those who read them, if they do not it is hard to tell why they print them; but they do not expect to compel them any other way than by putting truth before the mind so as the mind will see more to please and benefit in their views than elsewhere, and thus choose their views and ways because they are most agreeable to them.

It is plain to me that the will or choice is not "self-determining," and also it is plain that the will follows the strongest motive. I will conclude by a quotation from Buck’s dictionary. While Buck was not sound in practice he has ever been regarded as sound in doctrine. "Free agency" is the power of following one’s inclination; or whatever the soul does with full bent of preference and desire.

"Many * * * have been the disputes on this subject; not that man has been denied to be a ‘free agent,’ but the dispute has been in what it consists. A distinction is made by writers between free agency and what is called the Arminian notion of free agency."

The Arminian notion referred to was that the will is "self determining." Buck continues,

and correctly, too, "The one consists in the power of following our prevailing inclination, the other in a supposed power of acting contrary to it, or at least of changing it." Buck and Gill and Calvin and all sound thinkers held that the choice or will follows the strongest motive, while Arminians held then, as they do now, and as they must hold, to sustain their doctrine, that the will may change itself, or that it may leave a stronger motive, and embrace a weaker one. Buck goes on, "The one predicates freedom of the man, the other of a faculty in man."

Gill held that man is capable of choosing that which is agreeable to him, and all Calvinists, so far as I know; and So held that man is a free agent in this sense, while Arminians held that the will is free in the sense that the will can act independently of motives, that the will may choose what it pleases. But there is no sense in saying the will may choose what it pleases, as Edwards and Locke have shown, and I will mention this in a future chapter. Buck continues, "The one goes merely to render us accountable beings, the other arrogantly claims a part, yea the very turning point of salvation; according to the latter we need only certain helps * * * to enable us to choose the path of life, but according to the former * * * we need an almighty and invincible power to renew us."

According to this Buck and other clear thinkers contended for such a freedom of will as would render men accountable, and so make a distinction between men and animals; while the Arminians contended for such a freedom of will as would make the will, or choice, independent of all motives, and as would give to the will the "turning point" in the matter of salvation.

On p. 646 Hassell’s history: "If there be not free grace in God how can he save the world, and if there be not free will in men, how can the world by God be judged?"

This last question is worthy of a serious consideration. Hassell then quotes Bernard: "Abolish free will, and there is nothing to be saved. Abolish free grace and there is nothing wherewithal to save." We must take such a view of "free will" as will make man an accountable being, and Buck clearly shows that all sound thinkers of his times contended for such liberty of will as was agreeable to the accountableness of man, and the final punishment of the wicked, and not for such a liberty of will as would make the will independent of all motives and capable of deciding the turning point in the matter of salvation.

James Oliphant circa 1920

 

[Dragar]

I agree. But the difference now is that, with an objective morality I can say somebody is objectively wrong, and not just "I think he is wrong". With an objective morality, everybody will continue to be able to do whatever they want, but they will know when what they did was right or wrong.

But they won't care. Which is rather The Point Of the Thing, wouldn't you say?

 

[Metacrock]

Every decision we make and every opinion we hold is a subjective one by definition.

If we assume that there is in fact an objective morality what path do we have to reach it but through subjectivity? In other words, if I am presented with the objective moral code in all its glory all I have to decide whether it is in fact the objective moral code is my subjective reasoning.

So we are left in subjectivity.

To my mind, this deals a savage blow to the argument that without an objective moral code we are trapped in subjectivity and hence moral nihilism, as even with an objective moral code we end up in the same place.

Yea but see this is so totaly ironic, because you will turn right around and say we have to have only objective evdience in dealing with ontological reality! You seem to do ok coping with subjectvity in the moral realm, why can't you cope with it ontologically???


BTW we don't derive objective moral codes from our own objectivity, but from revelation. So God is the objective observer who is givning us the moral code; of course there is always our own subjective interp. But hey I'm not a fundie so that's ok!

 

[an7222]

But they won't care. Which is rather The Point Of the Thing, wouldn't you say?

Maybe they won't care, but I think the majority will care. Nobody likes to do wrong. Most of the time they do wrong because they didn't know if or why it was wrong. If you convince them, I believe many will stop doing wrong.

 

[Dragar]

Maybe they won't care, but I think the majority will care. Nobody likes to do wrong.

Well, that's the thing, isn't it? What would happen if we found an 'objective moral code' that said 'homosexuality is wrong'? I imagine there would still be a good number of homosexuals who continued to quite enjoying doing wrong.

If it said 'sex before marriage is wrong', same argument.

Most of the time they do wrong because they didn't know if or why it was wrong.

But you're saying that it's wrong because that's the way it is. It's objective, it's written in the stars, it's a property of the deeds or the objects.

But why would we care, if we found something was 'wrong'?

If you convince them, I believe many will stop doing wrong.

If you convince them that it's objectively wrong, what good will it do if they turn around and say, "Yes? And?"

 

[bluetrinity]

Every decision we make and every opinion we hold is a subjective one by definition.

If we assume that there is in fact an objective morality what path do we have to reach it but through subjectivity? In other words, if I am presented with the objective moral code in all its glory all I have to decide whether it is in fact the objective moral code is my subjective reasoning.

So we are left in subjectivity.

To my mind, this deals a savage blow to the argument that without an objective moral code we are trapped in subjectivity and hence moral nihilism, as even with an objective moral code we end up in the same place.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that moral absolutes become relative because we judge them to be absolute, right? This would be true unless, of course, there ARE in fact moral absolutes that are independent of us and our judgement on them. Does the color red become somehow blue just because I judge red to be blue? No. Red is red, regardless of my judgement.

 

[an7222]

Well, that's the thing, isn't it? What would happen if we found an 'objective moral code' that said 'homosexuality is wrong'? I imagine there would still be a good number of homosexuals who continued to quite enjoying doing wrong.

If it said 'sex before marriage is wrong', same argument.


But you're saying that it's wrong because that's the way it is. It's objective, it's written in the stars, it's a property of the deeds or the objects.


But why would we care, if we found something was 'wrong'?

Yes, some will continue to do wrong, but many will stop it. The same with people that thought the earth was plat. Many people believed the earth was flat, until somebody convinced them that the earth was round. But there are some still today that believe the earth is flat.

If you convince them that it's objectively wrong, what good will it do if they turn around and say, "Yes? And?"

If I convince you that 2 + 2 = 4, will you continue to say 2 + 2 = 5?

 

[Dragar]

Yes, some will continue to do wrong, but many will stop it.

Why?

If I convince you that 2 + 2 = 4, will you continue to say 2 + 2 = 5?

No, but if I convinced you that eating chocolate was objectively wrong (not for any reasons - it was 'just wrong') would you stop?

The problem is you're assuming that just because something has this 'wrongness' property attributed to it, once we realise it does we'll all go 'Gosh, it's wrong! We should stop!'. I don't see why this would happen. Who cares what the properties of this something are? Not me.

 

[Prometheus_ash]

I think I have an analogy that may help explain Dragars point. (If I am wrong, Dragar please correct me).

Imagine you are walking on the beach. You are weaing you fancy new clothing that is very expensive. Why you are on the beach with them is not so important, but you do not want to get these cloths dirty, or wet, or ruined in any way because of their hefty price tag.

Now say you see a child drwoing in the water. Most of us would say that you are morally obligated to save this childs life, even it means ruining your new cloths.

Now lets say you are further away, say above the beach. Most of us would say you should still go down and help the kid. Lets say no one lse is doing anything, and you are far away, but still know about it. Most of us would say you are still obligated to do something about this childs life to save it, even if you are far away or even if you have to ruin your expensive cloths. The distence does not change you moral obligation, you could say.

Apply this same thing to the starving kids in Africa. About 500 children die everyday of starvation related issues. We all know about this probelm, and most of us dont do anythign about it. We still go to the movies, still buy expensive cloths, pleasure items and things we want.

Why, becuase to be honest, most of us dont care. Even though many would say you have a moral obligation to do something about it, (same as with the drowning child) we don't. We may think it is sad, but nothing is done by the overwhelming larger amount of the population.

Nothing is done even thoguh there is an overwhelming belief (in this case) of an "objective moral standard" that people should follow.

-Ash

 

[Dragar]

Ash, I think it's more to do with the fact that people in Africa don't seem 'real' to us. It bothers me to admit it, but it's true.

But my point wasn't really that...

My point was that an7222 seems to think there are 'objective moral codes' which exists, and if we knew everything, would know it.

The problem is, he's given us no reason to follow such a moral code, even if we found it. That was my poorly worded point.

To my way of thinking, his only recourse is to say 'But that's the thing about a moral code! We all want to follow it!'

In short, defining 'objective moral code' to mean 'that which everyone wants to follow'.

But there isn't anything like this. Everyone has different ideas about what is 'good' and what is not, and not merely because they're mistaken. We don't 'deduce' things are moral or not, we feel them. It's an experience, rather than a deduction based on preception.

 

[A. believer]

Every decision we make and every opinion we hold is a subjective one by definition.

If we assume that there is in fact an objective morality what path do we have to reach it but through subjectivity? In other words, if I am presented with the objective moral code in all its glory all I have to decide whether it is in fact the objective moral code is my subjective reasoning.

So we are left in subjectivity.

What the Christian worldview rejects is not the notion of human subjectivity, but of human autonomy. Obviously we cannot escape the subjectivity of our own reasoning. Christian faith, though, involves repenting of the presumption of our own autonomy and recognizing our dependence upon God's revelation for right reasoning.

To my mind, this deals a savage blow to the argument that without an objective moral code we are trapped in subjectivity and hence moral nihilism, as even with an objective moral code we end up in the same place.

The rejection of the notion of an objective moral code leads to philosophically unintelligible moral theories. We must presuppose an objective moral law to even speak meaningfully of morality and we must presuppose a moral lawgiver to speak meaningfully of a moral law.

 

[cabbitgrrrl]

Yea but see this is so totaly ironic, because you will turn right around and say we have to have only objective evdience in dealing with ontological reality! You seem to do ok coping with subjectvity in the moral realm, why can't you cope with it ontologically???


BTW we don't derive objective moral codes from our own objectivity, but from revelation. So God is the objective observer who is givning us the moral code; of course there is always our own subjective interp. But hey I'm not a fundie so that's ok!

speak for yourself, there is no book on how to behave from the Goddess (in my religion), she will present you with a lesson and your expected to figure it out on your own and learn from it

 

[funyun]

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that moral absolutes become relative because we judge them to be absolute, right? This would be true unless, of course, there ARE in fact moral absolutes that are independent of us and our judgement on them. Does the color red become somehow blue just because I judge red to be blue? No. Red is red, regardless of my judgement.

Funny you should mention colors, considering colors are exactly the type of thing that are completely subjective.

 

[brotherChristian]

I find myself liking Dragar's comments on the objective moral code. It is absolutely true that, inasmuch as there IS an objective moral code, its revelation does not presuppose a need to follow it by anyone. Why not? Is it because we can interpret moral codes in any way we want based upon out experiences and environment? That would make morality subjective. It would also mean that every act of amorality becomes universal law and is assimilated into a moral code. 'It's OK to cheat on your taxes because everyone does it.' (I'm not intentionally invoking Kant here, it just happened.) But everyone does not cheat on their taxes. In fact, most people do not. Because morality is objective; it is the free will to choose to act in a moral way which is being misconstrued as subjectivity. As Dragar said, you can convice someone of objective morality and he may still say, "Yea? So?" The only thing is, I think Dragar is underestimating the drive to "do the right thing" that we humans have inside us. As a cop I see more than my fair share people who will kill you the second your back is turned; but I also see the best in people come out in dire situations. In my experience, the drive to do good I see in the majority far, far overshadows the amoral acts of a few.

 

[Metacrock]

speak for yourself, there is no book on how to behave from the Goddess (in my religion), she will present you with a lesson and your expected to figure it out on your own and learn from it

I dind't say anything about following a book.I would think your views would be much more supported by a subjectivst view point. His objectivity would rule out your goddess as quickly as it will rule out my God.