Relativism

[Paradoxum]

So if I understand you correctly you use the word for a description of both: the world out there and our relationship to it.
I find that semantically a little careless, mainly because it disables us to make a distinction that may not be significant to you but to someone else. E.g. I have no doubt whatsoever that there´s objective truth(1)[i.e. that the world is the way it is], but I am utterly skeptical towards the idea that there is a possibility for objective truth(2) [that our relationship to the world can be objective, or even only should be objective].

You're right, it is careless of me.

What do you mean by objective truth? 100% sure knowledge of something?

Thanks for trying to clarify, but sorry: didn´t help.
Maybe you can help me by answering this question: You used the expression "experiencing experience".
Is there a difference between "experiencing" and "experiencing experience", in your use of language?
[Or can we take it even further and talk about the experience of experiencing experience?

Probably the better way of phrasing it is to say that we experience qualia. Some people don't know what that word means, so that is why I used the word experience again instead. I don't know if that helps.

(You know, I am unexperienced in the experience of experiencing experience ).]

The word 'experience' is starting to look strange.

 

[quatona]

You're right, it is careless of me.

What do you mean by objective truth? 100% sure knowledge of something?

I´m just trying to find out what you mean when saying "truth exists".

Probably the better way of phrasing it is to say that we experience qualia. Some people don't know what that word means, so that is why I used the word experience again instead. I don't know if that helps.

Ah, ok. How do truth and qualia relate, in your terminology?



The word 'experience' is starting to look strange. [/quote]

 

[32k]

Partly, but mostly I meant that on the one hand you have statements that have a static subject and object, and which describe objective variables - as a (better) example, "this is a red fountain pen" (well, as objective as colour can be, anyway).

On the other hand, you have statements where the subject and object are dynamic (e.g. they depend on who is saying them, the context, etc.) or which describe subjective variables.

I'm not sure if this is actually defensible as a solid philosophical point, or whether it's going to collapse like a house of cards the minute someone questions it.

I've wondered about this myself.

In the end, I find myself stuck with the philosophical question of the tree falling in the forest.

"If a tree falls in a forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?"

Essentially, can something exist without being perceived?

What also comes to mind is the story of Hui-neng's Flag:

"Two monks were arguing about the temple flag waving in the wind. One said, "The flag moves." The other said, "The wind moves." They argued back and forth but could not agree.
The Sixth Ancestor said, "Gentlemen! It is not the wind that moves; it is not the flag that moves; it is your mind that moves." The two monks were struck with awe."
- The Mumonkan Case 29, translation by Robert Aitken

 

[Paradoxum]

I´m just trying to find out what you mean when saying "truth exists".

I'm not sure.

Facts are out there and we can have a decent probability of knowing them.

Ah, ok. How do truth and qualia relate, in your terminology?

If I am experience qualia then I can be 100% certain that at that moment I am experiencing those qualia. Certain truth.

 

[quatona]

I'm not sure.

Facts are out there and we can have a decent probability of knowing them.

I´ll try to repeat my request for clarification:
When you say "truth", does this word signify the facts out there or our knowledge of the facts? Sorry to insist, but I think that´s an important distinction.

If I am experience qualia then I can be 100% certain that at that moment I am experiencing those qualia. Certain truth.

...but not (necessarily) a truth about the facts out there. Since qualia escape intersubjectivity, I am particularly interested how you are getting from qualia (facts about your inner world) to the above mentioned "facts out there" and to our "decent probability of knowing them". In fact, I am wondering why when explaining your use of "truth" (facts out there or our knowledge of these facts) you have brought up qualia at all.

Let´s for example take a person who experiences synaesthetic qualia and a person who doesn´t. Both can be 100% certain that they are experiencing what they experience ("truth" about their inner world). Now, how do we get from there to "truth" (facts) about the world out there"?

 

[Paradoxum]

I´ll try to repeat my request for clarification:
When you say "truth", does this word signify the facts out there or our knowledge of the facts? Sorry to insist, but I think that´s an important distinction.

The facts. I think. But I would be willing to change my definition after hearing a good argument to change it, or if I think about it more.

...but not (necessarily) a truth about the facts out there. Since qualia escape intersubjectivity, I am particularly interested how you are getting from qualia (facts about your inner world) to the above mentioned "facts out there" and to our "decent probability of knowing them". In fact, I am wondering why when explaining your use of "truth" (facts out there or our knowledge of these facts) you have brought up qualia at all.

Let´s for example take a person who experiences synaesthetic qualia and a person who doesn´t. Both can be 100% certain that they are experiencing what they experience ("truth" about their inner world). Now, how do we get from there to "truth" (facts) about the world out there"?

I guess we have to make some assumptions, such as, what we experience is represents the truth in some significant way.

 

[quatona]

The facts. I think. But I would be willing to change my definition after hearing a good argument to change it, or if I think about it more.

Thanks!

(I hate it when a persons changes her definitions in the midst of an argument. It renders the entire previous discussion obsolete. Please don´t do that to me. )

So when you said "truth exists" you meant "facts exist out there".
I would agree with that completely.

I guess we have to make some assumptions, such as, what we experience is represents the truth in some significant way.

So, firstly, determining the relation between our qualia and the truth is at its core based on assumptions. What are these assumptions themselves based upon?

Secondly, when you talk about our experiences (qualia) "representing the truth in some significant way" - what exactly do you mean by "significant", and significant to whom or what? Is this significance determined by the facts or rather by our qualia, needs, capabilities?

Thirdly: As I said, qualia are usually not intersubjectively sharable. If you experience red in the way I experience blue we will never find out about it (we both have always learned to be "blue" and "red" to be the terms that match our experiences). That´s why I picked synaesthetics: This is a case in which we do find out that different people differ greatly in their qualia. What assumptions do you propose for deciding whose experience (qualia) represents the facts (truth) better/more significantly?

 

[Paradoxum]

Thanks!

(I hate it when a persons changes her definitions in the midst of an argument. It renders the entire previous discussion obsolete. Please don´t do that to me. )

So when you said "truth exists" you meant "facts exist out there".
I would agree with that completely.

Good.

So, firstly, determining the relation between our qualia and the truth is at its core based on assumptions. What are these assumptions themselves based upon?

I'm not sure if I understanding what you are asking. Which assumptions?

Secondly, when you talk about our experiences (qualia) "representing the truth in some significant way" - what exactly do you mean by "significant", and significant to whom or what? Is this significance determined by the facts or rather by our qualia, needs, capabilities?

I'd like to change what I said: I think we have to assume that what we experience comes from an objective world outside our minds.

Thirdly: As I said, qualia are usually not intersubjectively sharable. If you experience red in the way I experience blue we will never find out about it (we both have always learned to be "blue" and "red" to be the terms that match our experiences). That´s why I picked synaesthetics: This is a case in which we do find out that different people differ greatly in their qualia. What assumptions do you propose for deciding whose experience (qualia) represents the facts (truth) better/more significantly?

Science.