Reasonable Faith

[Received]

No, I'm down with the best method for determining truth from falsehood (in the real world).

In that case, you can't say that empirical evidence is the primary or exclusive standard, given that it fails (doesn't work) in validating itself. You can use empirical evidence as one of the standards, and arguably it's the most rigorous, but unless you accept another standard that validates empiricism itself, you're left with self-negations. This other standard is intuition, given that the philosophical underpinnings of empiricism are ascertained through this, such as uniformity in nature, the existence of the external world, etc. You can't reason these things to conclusions. You sense them.

Hypotheticals aren't necessary for this argument.

Is there a pyschological study which evidences that it is better for an individual to believe things that are false instead of things that are true?

Well, if we assume that God doesn't exist, I think that's precisely what studies on the psychological value of religion prove. In some points, compared to nonbelievers believers have an advantage, e.g. (and don't hold me to this), with group cohesion or sense of belonging, or a sense of transcendent meaning.

 

[Received]

Really? The fact that it objectively works better than other methods isn't something you'd apply to judging a given standard?

It objectively works better at getting to truth, you say. I say: that presupposes the standard is valid with regard to veracity, which is exactly what we've been discussing. You're begging the question with semantic substitutions.

 

[DogmaHunter]

In what sense are they unsupported? If the premises are previous conclusions that are invalid, then yes.

You said:

Being reasonable can involve all sorts of blind faith propositions, which aren't (because they're based in blind faith) falsifiable in any way. Reason works with premises, which are assumptions.


These premises you speak of aren't supported - since they rely on blind faith. An argument that uses premises that are unsupported are not reasonable arguments. They can be valid arguments in the sense that they are internally consistent, but those are irrelevant as they are infinite in number.

Nobody is supporting this, though. If the premises are unsound, or their soundness or veracity is unknown, they can perfectly be made to reach valid conclusions and be consequentially reasonable.

No. Not reasonable. Arguments that have unsupported premises are never reasonable arguments. Because using unsupported premises to form a conclusion is not reasonable.

 

[DogmaHunter]

It objectively works better at getting to truth, you say. I say: that presupposes the standard is valid with regard to veracity, which is exactly what we've been discussing. You're begging the question with semantic substitutions.

We assess the validity of a method by its results.

Clearly, the empirical method works great.
Planes fly. Robots land on Mars. Computers boot. Cars drive.

All those things were accomplished using an empirical method.
Can you name another method that does a better job?

 

[Received]

You said:

Being reasonable can involve all sorts of blind faith propositions, which aren't (because they're based in blind faith) falsifiable in any way. Reason works with premises, which are assumptions.


These premises you speak of aren't supported - since they rely on blind faith. An argument that uses premises that are unsupported are not reasonable arguments. They can be valid arguments in the sense that they are internally consistent, but those are irrelevant as they are infinite in number.

No, an argument that uses premises that are unsupported is neither reasonable nor unreasonable until you follow through to the conclusion. Look up any logic textbook: premises are by definition assumptions, and these assumptions can be kinda sorta assumptions based on previous empirical data, or completely out there unsupported assumptions. What makes an argument reasonable isn't soundness, but how the premises follow to the conclusion. You can totally have (and plenty of people have) premises that are true or supported that are put together badly leading to invalid conclusions. You're conflating soundness with reasoning, when soundness is only the most rigorous form of reasoning.

 

[Received]

We assess the validity of a method by its results.

Then you're all about what works, and not what's true. If that's the case, the argument can be made that in certain aspects of life religion works best because it gives people the highest likelihood of deep, consistent meaning and group cohesion.

 

[bhsmte]

Then you're all about what works, and not what's true. If that's the case, the argument can be made that in certain aspects of life religion works best because it gives people the highest likelihood of deep, consistent meaning and group cohesion.

I would agree, religious faith is just the thing for some people, depending on their individual needs and psyche.

For others, it just doesn't make their life any better or is something they just can't convince themselves has much truth to it. Again, this is likely a result of their personal psyche.

Some use religion is a positive way and some use it as a weapon and or shield, it depends on the person.

 

[Received]

I would agree, religious faith is just the thing for some people, depending on their individual needs and psyche.

For others, it just doesn't make their life any better or is something they just can't convince themselves has much truth to it. Again, this is likely a result of their personal psyche.

Some use religion is a positive way and some use it as a weapon and or shield, it depends on the person.

Right. I tend to think that "religion" is just as vague and variable as "culture". IOW, you can't speak of religion without specifying which religion you're referring to. And with this in mind, I think there's a religion that ideally fits and magnifies every psyche, assuming it doesn't have philosophical biases against it (e.g., scientism).

I know I'd definitely be much closer to atheism if it wasn't for Kierkegaard, for example.

 

[Usus Vox Tractus]

Right. I tend to think that "religion" is just as vague and variable as "culture". IOW, you can't speak of religion without specifying which religion you're referring to. And with this in mind, I think there's a religion that ideally fits and magnifies every psyche, assuming it doesn't have philosophical biases against it (e.g., scientism).

I know I'd definitely be much closer to atheism if it wasn't for Kierkegaard, for example.

I find it helpful to return to the root meanings of words when the world has successfully muddied all the waters. What do you know of the etymology of the word "religion"?

 

[bhsmte]

I find it helpful to return to the root meanings of words when the world has successfully muddied all the waters. What do you know of the etymology of the word "religion"?

Root meanings of words can be a good thing, as long as the words written are valid to begin with.

 

[Usus Vox Tractus]

Root meanings of words can be a good thing, as long as the words written are valid to begin with.

Gotta use all three semiological tools: semantics, syntactics, and especially pragmatics. Too many people forget that last one.

 

[Received]

I find it helpful to return to the root meanings of words when the world has successfully muddied all the waters. What do you know of the etymology of the word "religion"?

Online Etymology Dictionary

Eh?

 

[Received]

Root meanings of words can be a good thing, as long as the words written are valid to begin with.

That's a whole discussion in itself. Some would say that semantic validity is a matter of how the original work jives with successive uses.

 

[Usus Vox Tractus]

Online Etymology Dictionary

Eh?

So now you know what a yoke of light is, yes?

 

[Gladius]

In that case, you can't say that empirical evidence is the primary or exclusive standard, given that it fails (doesn't work) in validating itself. You can use empirical evidence as one of the standards, and arguably it's the most rigorous, but unless you accept another standard that validates empiricism itself, you're left with self-negations. This other standard is intuition, given that the philosophical underpinnings of empiricism are ascertained through this, such as uniformity in nature, the existence of the external world, etc. You can't reason these things to conclusions. You sense them.

I didn't say it was the objective primary or exclusive method. I said it was currently the most accurate method, and certainly more accurate (whether it can use itself to validate itself or not) than intuition (or "gut feel").

Want an example? Humanity's intuition used to be that the earth was flat.

Using more empirical methods, we determined it isn't.

Well, if we assume that God doesn't exist, I think that's precisely what studies on the psychological value of religion prove. In some points, compared to nonbelievers believers have an advantage, e.g. (and don't hold me to this), with group cohesion or sense of belonging, or a sense of transcendent meaning.

So people who believe false things (assuming God does not exist) are happier than those who do not? So we should all believe anything false that makes us happier?

The problem with the truth is that sometimes it is not as rosey as we'd like. That doesn't doesn't mean that rational people should stop seeking it because ignorance is bliss.

And before you go arguing that anyone else's personal false beliefs can't hurt me, tell that to the families of those killed in 9/11.

 

[quatona]

Okay, so this means you're down with what's best or what works.

What if someone was to say the same about religion, dropping a stack full of studies on its psychological benefits?

I´d readily acknowledge that religion had psychological benefits - there would be plenty of evidence for it, after all. I´d readily acknowledge that, for someone who defines "works" as "having psychological benefits" (which, of course, wasn´t the way "works" was used initially), religion works.

Apparently you missed or ignored the part where the poster said:

And no, it does not determine philosophical absolute truth, but nothing does (not even philosophy).

 

[quatona]

Well, if we assume that God doesn't exist, I think that's precisely what studies on the psychological value of religion prove. In some points, compared to nonbelievers believers have an advantage, e.g. (and don't hold me to this), with group cohesion or sense of belonging, or a sense of transcendent meaning.

I bolded that for you. What about the other points?

 

[DogmaHunter]

No, an argument that uses premises that are unsupported is neither reasonable nor unreasonable until you follow through to the conclusion. Look up any logic textbook: premises are by definition assumptions, and these assumptions can be kinda sorta assumptions based on previous empirical data, or completely out there unsupported assumptions. What makes an argument reasonable isn't soundness, but how the premises follow to the conclusion. You can totally have (and plenty of people have) premises that are true or supported that are put together badly leading to invalid conclusions. You're conflating soundness with reasoning, when soundness is only the most rigorous form of reasoning.

This to me seems to be just some semantics from philosphy or abstract, conceptual formal logic thingies. I think such things are pretty useless. It's bickering about definitions without actually addressing the point of arguments in the first place: coming up with decent answers to problems.

Here's an argument with unsubstantiated assumptions:

- Pixies make grass grow
- The grass in my garden grows
- Therefor, pixies visit my garden at least sometimes.

Nobody would call this a "reasonable" argument.

 

[DogmaHunter]

Then you're all about what works, and not what's true.

Do you have a better alternative?
How do you find out what's true if not by testing if it works?

If that's the case, the argument can be made that in certain aspects of life religion works best because it gives people the highest likelihood of deep, consistent meaning and group cohesion.

That was pretty sneaky. You're conflating things here.
I'm talking about "what works" in tems of methodologies to distinguish truth from fiction ("truth" with a small "t").

Not in terms of what makes humans feel a certain way. Not to mention that the empirical data tells us that things like "meaning" and "social engagement" are not at all exclusive to religion. And most certainly not to just one religion.


The main point is my question in the beginning of this post... How do you find out what's true, if not by testing if it works as an explanation?

 

[KCfromNC]

It objectively works better at getting to truth, you say. I say: that presupposes the standard is valid with regard to veracity

Nope. We've tested a bunch of different ones and concluded that science is found to be the best at gaining knowledge about realty.

If you want to argue that it is better to pick a method which is known to be inferior, that's cool - but I doubt many people will be convinced.