Questions about Predestination

[tanelornpete]

...and then asks us to trust him in spite of all this...


IF such a god existed, IF these were the issues of Calvinism, IF this was the argument that Calvinists posit, the argument would still be moot, because IF this were the only god in existence, you’d either have to worship or suffer.


Because the ‘all this’ in review isn’t Calvinism, it’s hard to find a way to address this. Might as well address the charge that all Calvinists are hobbits that refuse to eat a 7th meal.

 

[Ignatios]

...you claim that it would be more just because man’s condemnation would be the result of his own will! His condemnation would not be the will of Gods'. How do you know this? Where do you get your definition of justice? Is there an external category of ‘justice’ to which God must adhere? If so, is it eternal and more powerful than God?

The definition of justice is given by God himself. He commands throughout his revelation that we judge with equity and uprightness. We are to judge mercifully, with purity and without hypocrisy. This should be obvious. The question is whether God meets his own criteria. Certainly, we can't investigate all the mysterious ways in which God works, so let's not even go there. The question is whether God's absolute predestination of every predisposition, will, and action of every person, whether wicked or righteous, as part of his good plan, is able to be interpreted at all on the basis of his revealed definition of justice. That is to say, if God's will is manifest in everything in creation, and he gives Man laws on tablets of stone and hearts, then how are we to interpret any events or human actions as good or evil? How does God uprightly preordain all things to a good end and then still differentiate between good and evil parts of his own perfect plan?

You write: "It would be more just because man's condemnation would be a result solely of his own will…" I am confused. In all my study of the history of the world I have yet to find any system of justice where the accused is the judge – especially at his own trial. Yet you write that it is more just that man condemn himself willingly! Now this would make sense coming from an unbeliever: no one I would want to condemn themselves, and the cry "I want to judge myself’ would at least be expected – if not a bit childish. Now I know this is not what you are trying to say: you are attempting to argue for a humanity that is not dependent upon God for its moral judgment. But I always argue that a point needs to be made as clearly as possible and open to further definition until there is logically no escape from the conclusion reached.

To rephrase my statement: "It would be just because man's condemnation would be the result of his own actions, not God's will/action/energy alone before the foundation of the world."

The God posited here is not the God Calvinists worship. Having said that, I’d also like to point out that if this deity were the only one that existed, like it or not, this would be the true one to worship and any other god would be a false one. 'Worthy' of worship or not, if such a deity existed, worship would be required by this deity. So the idea that such a thing is ‘worthy of worship’ or not is a completely irrelevant notion. Instead, what the author of this post means is ‘I would not want to worship this deity’ and is building a universal, generalized position for all other human beings based upon that particular opinion. Much politics and theology are based upon such erroneous notions. In the realm of truth, opinion matters very little. Truth trumps opinion to the extent that opinion is meaningless and a waste of time.

Despite numerous claims that the Calvinist view is being misrepresented, only one poster has given an example to the contrary, citing an infralapsarian statement from the Synod of Dordt. Please show me where I'm going wrong in my interpretation. As I've shown above, the issue is not whether I like what God is doing. It's whether God is consistent with his own revelation of himself at any point. Does God truly mean for us to judge mercifully according to the example we see in his love for us in Christ, or do both our good and bad judgements proceed from his predestined will for us?

The implication is this: The Calvinists believe that God is controlled by a psychological internal rage that is bursting to get out. He thought up a list of flies to pull wings off of to help assuage this anger. The reality: God chose to reveal Himself to His created beings. His nature is Holy, and it is evident to us rational creatures (creatures that can ponder a concept and build a series of related, valid propositions and true conclusions off of this concept) as a division of creation into vessels created to highlight justice and vessels to demonstrate mercy. What we experience is defined as love and wrath.

That isn't my implication. My implication has been that, as you've shown in your last sentence here, there is no discernable difference between God's will as love toward the elect and God's wrath toward the reprobate, or the difference between God predestining persons to sin and, on the other hand, God predestining persons to sin and then simply telling them not to sin. The monergism of Calvinism's view of God is uncannily reminiscent of a gnostic monad.

 

[BenjaminRandall]

Originally Posted by BenjaminRandall
The claim that something which God ordained is inherently "necessary," as someone claimed above, is a highly Platonic view of God and ends up implying that God has no free will, but is himself determined.

God had (!) to decree the Fall? God had to decree the substitutionary death of his Son?

I don't buy it. Rather, I think God gave his only begotten Son not because he had to and had no other choice, but because he loved the world so much that he freely, freely gave him.


To which, Bradfordl writes:

So we may then presume that you assert that there are other possible realities that would equally or even better declare the glory of God?

This is a nice, compelling argument--at least from a Platonic worldview.

But not from a Semitic worldview which portrays God as interacting with humanity as a person, personally, with an influence-response model, rather than the altogether overly logical determinism as surmised by Plato.

The God of Israel is portrayed by Israelites as someone who may change his mind about things, in response to the appeal of people: Abraham's tedious (!) appeal to God on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah; Cain's lament; Nineveh's repetance; Hezekiah's prayer; Jacob's wrestling with the angel; Moses' intercession over Israel at Sinai;

or, in the New Testament: the invitation to ask, seek and knock; the persistent widow; the persistent Phonecian woman; the explanation that such demons don't come out without prayer [and fasting]; Jesus' universal call to all who are weary and burdened to find rest for their souls....

Of course, this has implications for how we do ministry. Do we pray for our lost loved ones? Do we pray for missionaries? Do we even bother sending missionaries? Does it really make a difference with God if we pray?

All this is baffling within a Calvinistic framework of immutability. But when Calvinists are confronted with these issues, they cry "Foul!" and claim that this is not true Calvinism, and then, as Ignatius has suggested, they switch portraits of God, depicting him as being non-deterministic and asserting that prayer and evangelistic efforts do make a difference--until they start feeling pressed again.

Ultimately, it ends up being difficult to find the God of Calvinism simply because the description keeps getting flopped back and forth.

 

[heymikey80]

The definition of justice is given by God himself. He commands throughout his revelation that we judge with equity and uprightness. We are to judge mercifully, with purity and without hypocrisy. This should be obvious. The question is whether God meets his own criteria. Certainly, we can't investigate all the mysterious ways in which God works, so let's not even go there. The question is whether God's absolute predestination of every predisposition, will, and action of every person, whether wicked or righteous, as part of his good plan, is able to be interpreted at all on the basis of his revealed definition of justice. That is to say, if God's will is manifest in everything in creation, and he gives Man laws on tablets of stone and hearts, then how are we to interpret any events or human actions as good or evil? How does God uprightly preordain all things to a good end and then still differentiate between good and evil parts of his own perfect plan?

That issue recurs at the point of Creation. All it takes is God's responsibility for creation and God's knowledge (omniscience) that evil would result.

That's the theodicy question. Predestination and determinism has always an answer, that (1) responsibility is not single and ultimate in the same way that it's shared, mediate or immediate, and that (2) events are not themselves good or evil, but so according to the intents and thoughts of personal hearts.

Despite numerous claims that the Calvinist view is being misrepresented, only one poster has given an example to the contrary, citing an infralapsarian statement from the Synod of Dordt. Please show me where I'm going wrong in my interpretation.

By attributing responsibility in an egalitarian way, spreading it among everything in the cause train, it muddles the argument.

By attributing good and evil to events instead of persons, it doesn't place good and evil where it belongs, among wills and hearts. No wall of water is itself evil. Boxing Day or the Red Sea.

I didn't take Dordt as demanding infralapsarianism. Even if I did these were infralapsarian determinists, who thought God knew what would happen before the Fall and intentionally arranged Creation to happen that way. They weren't granting humans nondeterminism before the Fall, either.

Why should not His [God's] infinite righteousness vindicate Him, and hold Him separate from a participation in the guilt of evil-doing men? Only let readers cursorily observe what I am now about to subjoin. Nay, let them carefully read the whole of that part of my " Institutes" where I am discoursing on the Providence of God, and he will, in a moment, see all thy cloudy-minded objections discussed, exposed, answered and refuted.
Let readers consider also, if they please, what I have written in my Commentary on the Second Chapter of the Acts of the Apostles. Men (I have there shown), when they commit theft or murder, sin against God because they are thieves and murderers, and because, in their theft and in their murder, there is wicked design. But God, who makes sovereign use of their wickedness, stands in an infinitely different, and in an all-high position above all men, and acts, and things. And the objects and ends of God are infinitely different from, and higher than, those of men. God's purpose is, by the wicked acts of men, to chastise some and to exercise the patience of others. Hence, in all these His uses of the evil doings of men, God never deviates in the remotest degree from His own nature; that is, from His own infinitely perfect rectitude. If, then, an evil deed is thus to be estimated according to its end and object, it is fully manifest that God is not, nor can be, the author of sin. Calvin, "Secret Providence", p. 303
​

 

[bradfordl]

This is a nice, compelling argument--at least from a Platonic worldview......
.....Ultimately, it ends up being difficult to find the God of Calvinism simply because the description keeps getting flopped back and forth.

Blah, blah, blah... as usual BR is dancing around actually answering a direct question with all sorts of prattle, again invoking his beloved accusation of platonism, and of course painting a clownish caricature of calvinism that he knows full well is false. So once more I'll rephrase the question so as to relieve him of the temptation to practice more intellectual dishonesty:

BR, do you believe there is anything that God could have done differently that would have as sufficiently declared His glory as what He has done?

Show us the grand courage of your convictions, BR. Just answer that simple question with a yes or no. Anything more will be guile.

 

[mlqurgw]

In response to Ron's emphasis on the importance of the extent of the atonement which was proffered in response to my refutation of the Double Payment argument....

Yes, I would agree that the extent of the atonement is crucial; union with Christ doesn't assert otherwise.

But the Double Payment argument begins with the assumption of universal atonement and tries to prove a logical inconsistency built upon that assumption.

Since both sides of the issue asserts that union with Christ is necessary for the atonement to be effective (!), the real issue, then, is whether Union with Christ is automatic or conditional.

I'm not trying to refute Calvinism in saying all this. I'm just trying to centre the debate on the real issue.

It assumes universal atonement because that is the Arminian stance. Are you denying that Arminians don't hold to universal atonement? The argument that Christ died in order to save all and that His atonement is only applied to those who believe and are united to Christ at the point of belief is universal atonement. He, therefore, made an atonement that doesn't actually atone until the sinner makes it efficacious by belief. Argue against it all you wish it isn't an atonement. You may seek to use a red herring to deny the facts by focusing on union with Christ but it is of no merit because until we understand what atonement actually does union with Christ is pointless. The atonement is what makes union with Christ important. Being united with an atonement that has no real value is deceit.

 

[tanelornpete]

That isn't my implication. My implication has been that, as you've shown in your last sentence here, there is no discernable difference between God's will as love toward the elect and God's wrath toward the reprobate, or the difference between God predestining persons to sin and, on the other hand, God predestining persons to sin and then simply telling them not to sin. The monergism of Calvinism's view of God is uncannily reminiscent of a gnostic monad.

I would ask again for clarity here: of course there’s no discernable difference between God’s will as love and God’s will as wrath – that’s because will is neither love nor wrath. It is an entirely different aspect of a being.

And the difference between God predestining persons to sin and, on the other hand, God predestining persons to sin and then simply telling them not to sin. In the one instance God has not communicated, in the other He has. You even noted the distinction by listing two separate clauses.
My last sentence there tried to point out that from a human viewpoint (hence temporal) God’s actions are viewed differently than they would be from an eternal, unchanging viewpoint. “In Him is no shadow of turning.” God does not change.

Despite numerous claims that the Calvinist view is being misrepresented, only one poster has given an example to the contrary, citing an infralapsarian statement from the Synod of Dordt. Please show me where I'm going wrong in my interpretation. As I've shown above, the issue is not whether I like what God is doing. It's whether God is consistent with his own revelation of himself at any point. Does God truly mean for us to judge mercifully according to the example we see in his love for us in Christ, or do both our good and bad judgements proceed from his predestined will for us?

Again, I would argue that Calvinism is being misrepresented – however, the difficulty is in explaining concepts that are going to be filtered through a predefined set of rules, so that the conclusions reached differ from what the Classical Christian argument is trying to make. God tells us to judge mercifully according to principles found throughout scripture. This is a command to the creature. The Creator created the universe in such a way that His will is accomplished. Or, ‘the cosmos works together for the good of those who love God.’ This is an all inclusive statement that covers evil as well as good, Mars and Alpha Centauri as well as my CPU speed.

The definition of justice is given by God himself. He commands throughout his revelation that we judge with equity and uprightness. We are to judge mercifully, with purity and without hypocrisy. This should be obvious. The question is whether God meets his own criteria.

What is God’s criteria for Himself? How can the creature – fallen and sinful – have the ability to judge correctly on how God operates? If man were omniscient and knew the end form the beginning, rather than sitting in a small portion of the center, I’d say he’d be in a position to make absolute judgments on God’s actions. Why does fire hurt when you plunge your hand into it? How do you know, with certainty, that what appears to be painful now won’t have marvelous consequences ten thousand years from now? The Scriptures are given to us for our salvation and as a guide to good works. They are not given to God as a guide for how to treat His creation.

The question is whether God's absolute predestination of every predisposition, will, and action of every person, whether wicked or righteous, as part of his good plan, is able to be interpreted at all on the basis of his revealed definition of justice. That is to say, if God's will is manifest in everything in creation, and he gives Man laws on tablets of stone and hearts, then how are we to interpret any events or human actions as good or evil? How does God uprightly preordain all things to a good end and then still differentiate between good and evil parts of his own perfect plan?

As I tried to point out earlier, there is no category of Good that stands above God and to which He must comply. I deny Platonist idealism and the Kantian categories. What that leaves is God as the criteria. What God does is good, even if for a time it seems evil to us. I’d go into analogy or metaphor here, but I believe you are intelligent enough to make that unnecessary. We live inside of time, God is eternal. Between humans, things are evil – and God calls them so. But this does not mean that they occur in spite of God’s best efforts. You could even list passages of Scripture that show God punishing evil with evil – and even what seems to be evil occurring in our lives to strengthen our faith.

It seems that your argument is that ‘it isn’t “Just” for God to create a being designed to demonstrate His definition of sin. Hence your definition of Justice involves the idea that a Judge is not just unless the accused had a choice NOT to commit the crime. I’d love to see that syllogism. My definition of Justice differs: Justice is treating the crime with the punishment it deserves. If you wish to induce the idea of motive into the mix, then may I ask if you consider it impossible for God to create creatures who WANT to do what they do? It that is impossible, please explain why. If it is not possible, yet you deny that God would do such a thing, then I’d respectfully ask or the Scriptural argument that says God did NOT create creatures to want to do what they were created to do.

David

 

[mlqurgw]

Originally Posted by BenjaminRandall
The claim that something which God ordained is inherently "necessary," as someone claimed above, is a highly Platonic view of God and ends up implying that God has no free will, but is himself determined.

God had (!) to decree the Fall? God had to decree the substitutionary death of his Son?

I don't buy it. Rather, I think God gave his only begotten Son not because he had to and had no other choice, but because he loved the world so much that he freely, freely gave him.


To which, Bradfordl writes:


This is a nice, compelling argument--at least from a Platonic worldview.

But not from a Semitic worldview which portrays God as interacting with humanity as a person, personally, with an influence-response model, rather than the altogether overly logical determinism as surmised by Plato.

The God of Israel is portrayed by Israelites as someone who may change his mind about things, in response to the appeal of people: Abraham's tedious (!) appeal to God on behalf of Sodom and Gomorrah; Cain's lament; Nineveh's repetance; Hezekiah's prayer; Jacob's wrestling with the angel; Moses' intercession over Israel at Sinai;

or, in the New Testament: the invitation to ask, seek and knock; the persistent widow; the persistent Phonecian woman; the explanation that such demons don't come out without prayer [and fasting]; Jesus' universal call to all who are weary and burdened to find rest for their souls....

Of course, this has implications for how we do ministry. Do we pray for our lost loved ones? Do we pray for missionaries? Do we even bother sending missionaries? Does it really make a difference with God if we pray?

All this is baffling within a Calvinistic framework of immutability. But when Calvinists are confronted with these issues, they cry "Foul!" and claim that this is not true Calvinism, and then, as Ignatius has suggested, they switch portraits of God, depicting him as being non-deterministic and asserting that prayer and evangelistic efforts do make a difference--until they start feeling pressed again.

Ultimately, it ends up being difficult to find the God of Calvinism simply because the description keeps getting flopped back and forth.

Does it make a difference with God if we pray? Not when we understand that God will do as He pleases and that He pleases that we ask. Ezek. 36:36,37. All of the examples you have given only strengthen the stance that God doesn't change His mind but that we pray that God will do as he promised. 2Sam. 7:27 Prayer isn't seeking to make God do something He wasn't inclined to do in the first place but seeking that He will do as He promised that He would. No prayer in the Scriptures is trying to get God to change His mind but a reminder, not to God but to ourselves, that He has made promises that can be relied upon. Neither Abraham nor Hezekiah was asking God to do something He didn't intend or had not promised to do. You seem to misunderstand prayer altogether.

 

[tanelornpete]

But not from a Semitic worldview which portrays God as interacting with humanity as a person, personally, with an influence-response model, rather than the altogether overly logical determinism as surmised by Plato.

Someone needs to study their Plato! And, determinism! Calvinism is diametrically opposed to Platonism, which cannot be said of Pelagianism, Semi-Pelagianism, or Arminianism. Moreover, things viewed from a Semetic worldview are false unless they conform to a Christian worldview.

The God of Israel is portrayed by Israelites as someone who may change his mind about things...etc...

Scripture is written anthropomorphically - it also tells us that God has wings and arms. Do you really believe these things are literally true? Why do you then seek contradiction of plain terms of Scripture - such as the idea that God cannot change (and this is not a psychological or physical limitation - it is a logical limitation, much as it is impossible for you to be the planet Mars, no matter how hard you try.) If Scripture indicates a change in how God relates to humanity, it is an indication that a predetermined portion of Gods continually revealed plan has taken form not that God has changed.

I would like to point out that if you sincerely believe that God changes, then there is you have no assurance that even if your current view of the reward of heaven is correct, that it will be tomorrow. Maybe tomorrow the believing in Christ will be replaced by a set of mantras. You cannot be assured of anything - not justice, not mercy, not even the most important aspect of Arminian life, free will!

Of course, this has implications for how we do ministry. Do we pray for our lost loved ones? Do we pray for missionaries? Do we even bother sending missionaries? Does it really make a difference with God if we pray?

Yes, as a Calvinist I pray for lost loved ones. I pray for missionaries. I support missions, we are commanded to go into all the world to preach the gospel.

Why the equivocation in the last question (Does it really make a difference with God if we pray?)? The others were straight-forward and honest. The last one was misleading and indirect. God commands us to pray. If we do not we sin. Hence, yes, it makes a difference.

Does it change God? No. There is no shadow of turning with God. He is not a prisoner of fate, there is no higher power (chance, or luck) that hinders or changes his mind. He knows all things simultaneously, and dwells outside of time! There IS NO POINT at which He learns something new, or has to redraw His plans. There is no place, time or situation where fate overwhelms Him.

Prayer serves a completely different purpose. Prayer changes us. It is designed to make us turn to God, to dwell on His plans, to get to know Him. It is not designed to, nor can it change God.

I pray for lost loved ones, and the change that occurs, occurs in me. I notice them, witness to them, care more about them.

I pray for missionaries and I remember them, think about them, act like them. The change occurs in me.

All this is baffling within a Calvinistic framework of immutability. But when Calvinists are confronted with these issues, they cry "Foul!" and claim that this is not true Calvinism, and then, as Ignatius has suggested, they switch portraits of God, depicting him as being non-deterministic and asserting that prayer and evangelistic efforts do make a difference--until they start feeling pressed again.

As always, the filter of a mind that is not willing to examine the claims of Calvinism without first asserting that whatever is spoken is wrong shines through. I've found that Calvinists claim 'foul' because of three reasons: 1) the Calvinist you are debating is not sure of how to answer you (either through personal ignorance, or a lack of clarity in the question asked) or 2) The claims made are straw men (the implied answer does not relate to Calvinism, and involve informal logical fallacies.

None of this is baffling from a Calvinistic framework - for a Calvinist. It certainly baffles a human-centered thought framework. It baffles the mind that holds the sovereignty of man over and against the sovereignty of God.

The Calvinist is certain that God is supreme, omniscient and immutable. GOD does not change, we do. Prayer is given to us to conform us to the mind of God, not the other way around, which is the essence of the opposition, regardless of attempts to deny this.

David

 

[BenjaminRandall]

Quote:
Originally Posted by BenjaminRandall

In response to Ron's emphasis on the importance of the extent of the atonement which was proffered in response to my refutation of the Double Payment argument....

Yes, I would agree that the extent of the atonement is crucial; union with Christ doesn't assert otherwise.

But the Double Payment argument begins with the assumption of universal atonement and tries to prove a logical inconsistency built upon that assumption.

Since both sides of the issue asserts that union with Christ is necessary for the atonement to be effective (!), the real issue, then, is whether Union with Christ is automatic or conditional.

I'm not trying to refute Calvinism in saying all this. I'm just trying to centre the debate on the real issue.

To which Ron reponds,

The argument that Christ died in order to save all and that His atonement is only applied to those who believe and are united to Christ at the point of belief is universal atonement. He, therefore, made an atonement that doesn't actually atone until the sinner makes it efficacious by belief. Argue against it all you wish it isn't an atonement. You may seek to use a red herring to deny the facts by focusing on union with Christ but it is of no merit because until we understand what atonement actually does union with Christ is pointless. The atonement is what makes union with Christ important. Being united with an atonement that has no real value is deceit.

But, conversely, any Calvinist worth his salt (e.g., the great Calvinistic systematic theologians) also argue that atonement is not applied until the individual is united with Christ.

So again, the issue is whether the union is effected on the condition of faith, or is effected by divine decree at the appointed time.

Consequently, in order to be precise, Calvinists must say, Christ's death paid the sin debt but it does not automatically save the sinner. It's potential(!) to save the sinner is not realized until the person is united with Christ.

By the way, this precise statement of Calvinistic soteriology can be found in any number of the great Calvinistic systematic theologies. But perhaps a biblical argument would be helpful....

If the atonement saves apart from union with Christ, then none of us elect would have been born as sons of wrath, under condemnation. It is only after we put our faith in him (Calvinistically or Arminianly understood) that we are united with Christ and therefore have our sin-debt canceled. To be sure, atonement had been provided for, but it doesn't get applied until union with Christ--whether from an Arminian perspective or a Calvinistic perspective.

Some of you folks are acting as if you've never heard this theology before, even though it is at the heart of Calvinistic soteriology.

So, since we must (!) agree that atonement is provided for but not yet applied except through union with Christ by faith, let's move on then to the real issue of whether or not faith is automatically effected in the elect by the decree of God, or if God enables a person to believe and makes union with Christ conditional upon his faith.

If you good Calvinists can grasp your own theology as I have correctly articulated it above, then a discussion of this central issue can become productive.

 

[BenjaminRandall]

Bradfordl writes in responsive to my thoughtful, sensitive survey of biblical data to support my understanding of God's interaction with humanity:

Blah, blah, blah... as usual BR is dancing around actually answering a direct question with all sorts of prattle, again invoking his beloved accusation of platonism, and of course painting a clownish caricature of calvinism that he knows full well is false. So once more I'll rephrase the question so as to relieve him of the temptation to practice more intellectual dishonesty:

BR, do you believe there is anything that God could have done differently that would have as sufficiently declared His glory as what He has done?

I'm beginning to think, Bradfordl, that your modus operandi is to be insulting, as opposed to carefully digesting what other people post, and to completely dismiss any nuanced argument which you can't neatly pigeonhole into your pre-set little category, and to charge your opponenet as being intentionally deceitful.

It might work well for you in scoring debate points, but I'm not interested in investing my energy into this game.

So, from now on, here is my modus operandi. The moment I see this game in any of your posts, I'll immediately skip it. I'll not be interested in your thoughts, and I won't be troubled if you don't care about mine.

Some of your posts can be insightful and worthy of discussion. These are the things I'd like to see from you.

I'm curious to see if you continue such antics if you choose to reply to this post.

 

[bradfordl]

Some of your posts can be insightful and worthy of discussion. These are the things I'd like to see from you.

Your opinion of my posts could not possibly be less important to me, and what you would like to see is entirely immaterial. What I would like to see is you honestly answering simple questions. As long as I see you practicing further obfuscation, I will not ignore it, I will point it out, and again ask that you refrain from such dishonest behavior and request an answer. You can do with that what you want, but you must realize that each time you prattle around a simple, honest, straightforward answer you are indicting your own integrity.

The question, again, is:

BR, do you believe there is anything that God could have done differently that would have as sufficiently declared His glory as what He has done?

 

[mlqurgw]

Quote:
Originally Posted by BenjaminRandall


To which Ron reponds,

But, conversely, any Calvinist worth his salt (e.g., the great Calvinistic systematic theologians) also argue that atonement is not applied until the individual is united with Christ.

Not quite true. There are some of us who are called Calvinists who hold to eternal justification. John Gill would be the systematic theologian who taught it, along with others. He was definitely worth his salt. I told you before that this was my stance.

So again, the issue is whether the union is effected on the condition of faith, or is effected by divine decree at the appointed time

No the issue remains the atonement.

Consequently, in order to be precise, Calvinists must say, Christ's death paid the sin debt but it does not automatically save the sinner. It's potential(!) to save the sinner is not realized until the person is united with Christ.

Which is a false dilemma considering that not all Calvinists agree on this.

By the way, this precise statement of Calvinistic soteriology can be found in any number of the great Calvinistic systematic theologies. But perhaps a biblical argument would be helpful....

If the atonement saves apart from union with Christ, then none of us elect would have been born as sons of wrath, under condemnation. It is only after we put our faith in him (Calvinistically or Arminianly understood) that we are united with Christ and therefore have our sin-debt canceled. To be sure, atonement had been provided for, but it doesn't get applied until union with Christ--whether from an Arminian perspective or a Calvinistic perspective.

The Biblical statement is by nature children of wrath even as others not that we where children of wrath. You still do not give the true Calvinist stance on the atonement as none that I know of believe that the atonement was provided for but that it was made and whether it is applied when a person believes doesn't make it only a provisional atonement. You are attempting to twist in order to make your stance more reasonable.

Some of you folks are acting as if you've never heard this theology before, even though it is at the heart of Calvinistic soteriology.

Again a misstatement. You may claim to understand Calvinism all you want but clearly you don't as evidenced by such statements.

So, since we must (!) agree that atonement is provided for but not yet applied except through union with Christ by faith, let's move on then to the real issue of whether or not faith is automatically effected in the elect by the decree of God, or if God enables a person to believe and makes union with Christ conditional upon his faith.

If you good Calvinists can grasp your own theology as I have correctly articulated it above, then a discussion of this central issue can become productive.

We do not have to agree with semantic word games. The issue is still whether the atonement is an actual atonement or not.

 

[BenjaminRandall]

If God were to say that atonement is provisional on the condition of grace, would it be any less of an atonement?

The notion of an atonement being provided first and then applied second is perfectly logical, and I think I can demonstrate that this is ultimately the position of the great Calvinist theologians of the 19th century who carefully speak to this subject. Gill might think otherwise, but he's hardly in the top 10 of the Calvinist giants in the last two centuries.

 

[orthedoxy]

Is God responsible for our regeneration, all the good we do and our whole salvation? Why should we believe that God does everything in salvation? Should we believe in the Reformed understanding of God's Providence so as to give him all the glory in our salvation because he predestined it and controls it from start to finish? If he gets all the glory for our salvation, then why doesn't he get the shame of our damnation from start to finish, since he predestined it? Is there any distinction between God's relationship to the saved and the damned in his predestination?

I want to hear an answer to Ignatios question(above Quote)

 

[heymikey80]

Is God responsible for our regeneration, all the good we do and our whole salvation?

He's ultimately responsible for everything, so yes.

Why should we believe that God does everything in salvation?

Um, being ultimately responsible doesn't mean God is proximately responsible in the same way as humans are for what we do; although God is proximately involved in everything.

Should we believe in the Reformed understanding of God's Providence so as to give him all the glory in our salvation because he predestined it and controls it from start to finish?

No, because God's Providence is not His work of creation through the Gospel.

If he gets all the glory for our salvation, then why doesn't he get the shame of our damnation from start to finish, since he predestined it?

Because His work in the Gospel is a special act of grace which differs from His general providence. When God performs a distinct action of grace He is specially and particularly responsible for its result in a way in which He is not, when He is not performing a distinct action.

Is there any distinction between God's relationship to the saved and the damned in his predestination?

Yes. The special relationship of His grace in the Gospel is quite distinct from God's relationship through His creation of the world.

 

[tanelornpete]

Is God responsible for our regeneration, all the good we do and our whole salvation? Why should we believe that God does everything in salvation? Should we believe in the Reformed understanding of God's Providence so as to give him all the glory in our salvation because he predestined it and controls it from start to finish? If he gets all the glory for our salvation, then why doesn't he get the shame of our damnation from start to finish, since he predestined it? Is there any distinction between God's relationship to the saved and the damned in his predestination?

I want to hear an answer to Ignatios question (above Quote)

‘For in him we live and move and have our being.' As some of your own poets have said, 'We are his offspring.'

Therefore, my dear friends, as you have always obeyed—not only in my presence, but now much more in my absence—continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose.

For we are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus to do good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do.
​

Is God responsible for our regeneration, all the good we do and our whole salvation?

[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]Yes.
[/FONT]

Why should we believe that God does everything in salvation?

[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]But because of his great love for us, God, who is rich in mercy, made us alive with Christ even when we were dead in transgressions—it is by grace you have been saved.[/FONT]
​

[FONT=&quot]Grace is an intellectual activity in which a superior being treats an inferior in a positive way that is not deserved. We are saved from an eternity outsider of God’s presence by God’s work. That work was the perfect life of Christ, whereby the entire law was kept; the substitutionary death of Christ, in which the expiation for all of the sins of those for whom He died was accomplished (‘it is finished…’ and the resurrection and ascension of Christ. No other human being was present in these things. I, for one, was not even born at the time. I was not crucified, nor did I live that perfect life.
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God— not by works, so that no one can boast.[/FONT]
​

[FONT=&quot]Faith is volitional assent to an understood proposition. When we are made alive we begin to believe the words of the gospel. Not before. All humanity is spiritually dead and cannot become alive at its own willing. Life must be given. No corpse can breathe simply because it wants to, or because it has been told it can. Life must be given to it. A believer is one who is spiritually alive – that life has been given by the One who can accomplish these things. An unbeliever can no more start to believe on his own than a corpse can start to breath on its own.
[/FONT]

[FONT="]
[/FONT] [FONT="]Should we believe in the Reformed understanding of God's Providence so as to give him all the glory in our salvation because he predestined it and controls it from start to finish?[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]You need to believe the words of the Gospel. Believing in anything else is evidence of damnation. Reformation theology - more than that, Classical Christian theology, attempts to stay as close to Scripture (and consequently away from worldly philosophies) as much as it is able, given the presence of sin in the world. [/FONT]

If he gets all the glory for our salvation, then why doesn't he get the shame of our damnation from start to finish, since he predestined it?

[FONT=&quot]Complex question (logical fallicy). There is no shame in damning a sinful creature. But Reformed theology is not addressing issues from the viewpoint of sinful men, who want to run the universe to their benefit. It looks at theology (as much as it can) from the God’s viewpoint:
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]But who are you, O man, to talk back to God? "Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, 'Why did you make me like this?' " Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use? What if God, choosing to show his wrath and make his power known, bore with great patience the objects of his wrath—prepared for destruction? What if he did this to make the riches of his glory known to the objects of his mercy, whom he prepared in advance for glory— even us, whom he also called, not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles?[/FONT]
​

[FONT=&quot]So what if God decided to make a vase out of a lump of clay, and a toilet out of the same lump. At what point did it become ‘wrong’ to do so? I am really confused on this: how can it be wrong for God to create things the way He wants to? Of course, I am not hindered by the Platonic notion if Ideas, nor Kantian notion of Categories, so perhaps that may lead to my confusion.

[/FONT] So God decided to create some beings that would be objects to demonstrate the opposite of what He designed other beings to demonstrate. I have no problem with that – as far as I am concerned, God can do what He wants. He never needs my permission.

However, the question: [FONT=&quot]If he gets all the glory for our salvation, then why doesn't he get the shame of our damnation from start to finish, since he predestined it? also includes a buried equivocation – to the extent that it is almost impossible to answer. It would be really nice to have statements laid out in clear, systematic form rather than buried in innuendo, conjecture, and obfuscation.

[/FONT] Giving God glory, from our viewpoint, means to live a life to honor God, as much as we can. From God’s viewpoint (as clearly as I can state it) it means that what He wills comes to pass the way He willed it.

[FONT=&quot]In essence all that ‘question’ is saying is that if salvation is a good and gives God brownie points on some eternal chalkboard that measures success, then surely creating creatures for the specific purpose of damnation should remove those check marks. This indicates that Ignatios worships an (as yet) unknown God who will check the chalkboard and then judge the demi-urge we refer to as God in some distant future.

[/FONT]

Is there any distinction between God's relationship to the saved and the damned in his predestination?

[FONT=&quot]I believe this is clear, even from Ignatios’ obscure questions. Of course there is:
[/FONT]

Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use?​

 

[BenjaminRandall]

Heymikey, your last three comments seem interesting, but I'm not sure I get what you're saying (I might even agree with you!)

 

[orthedoxy]

‘For in him we live and move and have our being.' As some of your own poets have said, 'We are his offspring.'

Therefore, my dear friends, as you have always obeyed—not only in my presence, but now much more in my absence—continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose.

For we are God's workmanship, created in Christ Jesus to do good works, which God prepared in advance for us to do.
​

[FONT=&quot]
[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]Yes.
[/FONT][FONT=&quot]
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]But because of his great love for us, God, who is rich in mercy, made us alive with Christ even when we were dead in transgressions—it is by grace you have been saved.[/FONT]
​

[FONT=&quot]Grace is an intellectual activity in which a superior being treats an inferior in a positive way that is not deserved. We are saved from an eternity outsider of God’s presence by God’s work. That work was the perfect life of Christ, whereby the entire law was kept; the substitutionary death of Christ, in which the expiation for all of the sins of those for whom He died was accomplished (‘it is finished…’); and the resurrection and ascension of Christ. No other human being was present in these things. I, for one, was not even born at the time. I was not crucified, nor did I live that perfect life.
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]For it is by grace you have been saved, through faith—and this not from yourselves, it is the gift of God— not by works, so that no one can boast.[/FONT]
​

[FONT=&quot]Faith is volitional assent to an understood proposition. When we are made alive we begin to believe the words of the gospel. Not before. All humanity is spiritually dead and cannot become alive at its own willing. Life must be given. No corpse can breathe simply because it wants to, or because it has been told it can. Life must be given to it. A believer is one who is spiritually alive – that life has been given by the One who can accomplish these things. An unbeliever can no more start to believe on his own than a corpse can start to breath on its own.
[/FONT][FONT=&quot]You need to believe the words of the Gospel. Believing in anything else is evidence of damnation. Reformation theology - more than that, Classical Christian theology, attempts to stay as close to Scripture (and consequently away from worldly philosophies) as much as it is able, given the presence of sin in the world. [/FONT]
[FONT=&quot]Complex question (logical fallicy). There is no shame in damning a sinful creature. But Reformed theology is not addressing issues from the viewpoint of sinful men, who want to run the universe to their benefit. It looks at theology (as much as it can) from the God’s viewpoint:
[/FONT]

[FONT=&quot]But who are you, O man, to talk back to God? "Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, 'Why did you make me like this?' " Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use? What if God, choosing to show his wrath and make his power known, bore with great patience the objects of his wrath—prepared for destruction? What if he did this to make the riches of his glory known to the objects of his mercy, whom he prepared in advance for glory— even us, whom he also called, not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles?[/FONT]
​

[FONT=&quot]So what if God decided to make a vase out of a lump of clay, and a toilet out of the same lump. At what point did it become ‘wrong’ to do so? I am really confused on this: how can it be wrong for God to create things the way He wants to? Of course, I am not hindered by the Platonic notion if Ideas, nor Kantian notion of Categories, so perhaps that may lead to my confusion.

[/FONT] So God decided to create some beings that would be objects to demonstrate the opposite of what He designed other beings to demonstrate. I have no problem with that – as far as I am concerned, God can do what He wants. He never needs my permission.

However, the question: [FONT=&quot]If he gets all the glory for our salvation, then why doesn't he get the shame of our damnation from start to finish, since he predestined it? also includes a buried equivocation – to the extent that it is almost impossible to answer. It would be really nice to have statements laid out in clear, systematic form rather than buried in innuendo, conjecture, and obfuscation.

[/FONT] Giving God glory, from our viewpoint, means to live a life to honor God, as much as we can. From God’s viewpoint (as clearly as I can state it) it means that what He wills comes to pass the way He willed it.

[FONT=&quot]In essence all that ‘question’ is saying is that if salvation is a good and gives God brownie points on some eternal chalkboard that measures success, then surely creating creatures for the specific purpose of damnation should remove those check marks. This indicates that Ignatios worships an (as yet) unknown God who will check the chalkboard and then judge the demi-urge we refer to as God in some distant future.

[/FONT] [FONT=&quot]I believe this is clear, even from Ignatios’ obscure questions. Of course there is:
[/FONT]

Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use?​

Would you say God is a savior and a child molester?

Who are you, O man, to talk back to God? "Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, 'Why did you make me like this?

Are you telling us we can't question you because of this verse?

Heymike
We believe. God doesn't believe for us so why is he doing the saving? The same way if it's God that causes us to commit evil why can't you say God is a liar or child molester?
Who are you to talk back to God and say he isn't a child molester?
The verses Calvinists quote prove That God is the one that does the evil.
" Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use?"
Give god the glory and say God is a child molester, liar and a thief.

 

[tanelornpete]

Would you say God is a savior and a child molester?

No, for a number of reasons - one obvious one: God is not a physical being, therefore cannot 'molest'...

Who are you, O man, to talk back to God? "Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, 'Why did you make me like this?

Are you telling us we can't question you because of this verse?

Only if I was God. I am not. Nor does the verse say we cannot ask the question of God. The inference is that the question is irrelevant, whether you want to ask it or not.