Psychoactives and materialism

[Ripheus27]

It seems to me that the strong correlation between certain chemicals and altered states of consciousness is very good evidence that consciousness might be a function of matter. If alcohol can blot out my awareness at times, or if DMT can trigger "transcendent" states of mind, then doesn't it seem like the mind is not mystically independent on the body?

 

[Crandaddy]

The correlation suggests that the human mind has a very close causal relationship with the physical human brain, but this is not a point that non-physicalists of mind contest. It's been known for a very long time that brain damage affects consciousness and cognition.

 

[Eudaimonist]

If alcohol can blot out my awareness at times, or if DMT can trigger "transcendent" states of mind, then doesn't it seem like the mind is not mystically independent on the body?

Yep.

It seems that mind and body are very tightly interrelated, though I resist the temptation to monistically collapse one onto the other. I lean towards a form of dual-aspect theory that preserves the distinction between mind and body, but regards a single entity (or process), the human individual, as having the properties of both.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Gadarene]

Yeah, I'd agree.

alternatively, stick a pickaxe up your nose and tell me that's not mind-altering

I'll be the first to admit I don't know much about it, but from what I have encountered of it, dualism is incredibly tedious. Some-other-substance-that-definitely-ISN'T-matter-oh-no of the gaps if ever I saw it.

 

[jayem]

The out-of-body experience was experimentally reproduced in a patient by stimulating part of the right temporal cortex. Only a certain type of stimulus produced the effect. And PET scanning during the experience confirmed activation of specific areas of the right temporoparietal and other brain regions. Further evidence that seemingly inexplicable mental phenomena can be produced within the brain.

Here's the landmark NEJM article.

 

[Ripheus27]

Here's an argument I was sorta thinking of when I wrote the OP:

1. If the form of consciousness can be altered by matter, then consciousness is not formally immaterial.
2. The form of consciousness can be altered by (some forms of) matter.
C. Therefore, consciousness is not formally immaterial.
4. Whatever is not formally x is not essentially x.
C2. Therefore, consciousness is not essentially immaterial (the essence of consciousness is not an immaterial substance).​

First objection: consciousness is layered, so while some layers of consciousness are clearly enough affected by psychoactives (for instance), the deeper layers, up (down?) to and including "bare awareness in itself" if you will, remain invariant across all psychoactive episodes. That is, the fact that a psychoactive episode is a conscious episode is a constant, wherefore there is at least one state of mind that use of psychoactives doesn't change. However, if this is such a bare state, its own vacuity occludes its value in reference to metaphysical judgment about the nature of this vacuum, perhaps.

 

[KCfromNC]

Here's an argument I was sorta thinking of when I wrote the OP:

1. If the form of consciousness can be altered by matter, then consciousness is not formally immaterial.
2. The form of consciousness can be altered by (some forms of) matter.
C. Therefore, consciousness is not formally immaterial.
4. Whatever is not formally x is not essentially x.
C2. Therefore, consciousness is not essentially immaterial (the essence of consciousness is not an immaterial substance).​

First objection: consciousness is layered, so while some layers of consciousness are clearly enough affected by psychoactives (for instance), the deeper layers, up (down?) to and including "bare awareness in itself" if you will, remain invariant across all psychoactive episodes.

Nah, the previous example of a physical pick-axe through the physical brain would certainly alter one's ability to have basic awareness of one's surroundings.