="elopez, post: 68601494, member: 270546"]Is this to say that there are related, relevant, beliefs "neighboring" one another? For example, on coherentism, a set of beliefs A, B, C, and D are considered coherent if all those beliefs are relevant to one another. So if A is my dog is happy, B is my dog loves me, C is my dog knows me, and D is there are too many rocks in my front yard, these set of beliefs are not coherent as D is irrelevant to the rest.
I think this is a good, basic description you've given, elopez; however, the coherency of the system could be affected by lower level considerations that are rationally present but not empirically present, such as perhaps your supposing E) that your dog thinks you like rocks [something you probably couldn't prove as a stand alone premise, but yet seems to cohere as a rational possibility]. Although we would be tempted to say that D seems incoherent on an empirical level, we could claim that it is coherent at a lower level, if a rational supposition is present in the system, because in a system of Coherence the relationships between beliefs can be acknowledged as also having a "degree" of Coherence (Baergen, p. 68). Some beliefs will cohere at high levels, some at lower levels. If we think some idea or proposition has nothing to commend it and or contextualize it, then it is very likely "incoherent."
Reference
Baergen, Ralph. (1995).
Contemporary Epistemology. Harcourt Brace College Publishers: Fort Worth, TX.
Well so far you haven't explained how justification could be external, only how it is internal. Even appealing to appealing to knowledge as coming from mentally formulated categories of mindsets is strictly an internalist view. Though this was something I was thinking as well, that it may be a matter of false dichotomy when we seem to use both.
I think in the case of Coherence, the external aspects comes into play if a person has within the system some data taken from the outside world and accompanying propositions that explain the coherence. However, I don't think one's personal system of Coherence requires that the system be fully convincing to another person.
If "knowledge emerges from our mentally formulated (and evolving) categories of mental understanding", then the justification for a claim of knowledge of this sort just seems to mean it is the mental states of the individual. A type of 'mental internalism'. Refering to this mental internalism is why I was asking if justification is based on mere evidence, for if it is not, then of course that begs the question of what justification exactly may be, yet it also suggests that justification is mere evidence as it is the mere mental states one has that constitute as justification.
No, I think Coherence would require at the least some data connections in the system that another person could perceive have some kind of ontological presence, whether sensed or not. (This may sound contradictory to what I've said above, but I don't think it's context is the same.)
And so, which did you take?
That would depend on whether or not you think I'm color blind.

I assume, otherwise, that it was the the Red Pill I consumed when it was offered to me. And do you think we can trust Morpheus?
2PhiloVoid