Properly Basic Beliefs

[2PhiloVoid]

There is a solution. It is to find a reasonable theory of noninferential justification for basic beliefs, and to describe what sense of basicality is more probable (DB or EB). So far, no one has taken up this task specifically, except to say noninferential justification is incorrigible or self-evident, when this seems to not be the case and when pressed further for an explanation none was given. Of course that doesn't mean foundationalism is false, just more so that it is seemingly untenable.

Another solution is to just drop any idea of basic beliefs, which I am not sure what the results would be, yet I highly doubt it would be so overwhelming for our epistemological understanding that the result would divert from a sound structure of knowledge. We could go with coherentism, which almost seems like more of a suitable option to me.

...and I think you will be a wiser man for it, elopez. Furthermore, I think the main problem with Foundationalism's idea of Basicality is that we are tempted to skip questioning the whole notion of any "gravity" that, figuratively speaking, holds down the entire Foundation of possible axioms in the first place, being prior to and underlying whatever 'truths' we think the axioms themselves represent within the overall framework.

Now...where are we with all of this?

2PhiloVoid

 

[elopez]

I think the main problem with Foundationalism's idea of Basicality is that we are tempted to skip questioning the whole notion of any "gravity" that, figuratively speaking, holds down the entire Foundation of possible axioms in the first place, being prior to and underlying whatever 'truths' we think the axioms themselves represent within the overall framework.

This is an issue I think is prominent in foundationalism, the idea of basicality. Specifically, a logical concept of noninferential justification for basic beliefs. So in that sense, basic beliefs are and can be justified by something else, so long as it is not another belief or proposition.

So far posters want to attach notions like "incorrigible" and "self evident" to a noninferential theory, yet as I have thought out this would mean we cannot have many or maybe even no basic beliefs about the world of which we do such as the "universe had a beginning."

 

[2PhiloVoid]

This is an issue I think is prominent in foundationalism, the idea of basicality. Specifically, a logical concept of noninferential justification for basic beliefs. So in that sense, basic beliefs are and can be justified by something else, so long as it is not another belief or proposition.

So far posters want to attach notions like "incorrigible" and "self evident" to a noninferential theory, yet as I have thought out this would mean we cannot have many or maybe even no basic beliefs about the world of which we do such as the "universe had a beginning."

Sure. And that is a good point, elopez. But what I'm attempting to point out here is that despite the 'logic structures' we can attempt to build by way of choosing one epistemological framework or another, underlying the whole attempt is the fact that it is our 'minds' which are doing the organization of thought, using logic, and building the epistemological superstructure (in order to supposedly reach some certain conclusion, in the case of Foundationalism.)

I think the analogy reflected by the Foundational framework itself is 'needy' in that it doesn't account for the role of the human mind in the whole process. Sure, Descartes "thought" he was accounting for the rational power of the mind in the 'correct' way, but I think there is also a 'gravity' in the analogy that he didn't account for, mainly because he wasn't living in an era where psychology was yet a science. We had to wait for Hume and Kant for this to begin to become a more serious consideration.

2PhiloVoid

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I'm in the middle of a chain reacion. As for my first memories, I dont know. Thats my pov, any "basic beliefs" would have to be in the infants consciousess. Its no good saying "I am 65 years old and dont know where my founding beliefs are". They are apart of developmental psychology, epistemology naturalised.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalized_epistemology

 

[elopez]

I think the analogy reflected by the Foundational framework itself is 'needy'

Do you appeal to the"Web" analogy put forth by coherentism?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Do you appeal to the"Web" analogy put forth by coherentism?

Hi elopez,

Good question! The answer will depend...upon what we conceive of as a coherent "Web." If by 'web' we mean something tangible and necessarily anchored down at various points, analogous to say, a spider-web, then no. But, if we instead mean something more abstract, or less directly tangible, like say, a Neural Network (i.e. Human Brain Function), along with the accompanying processes that go with this kind of analogy, then I'd say, 'yes.' [I like to think of the human brain as an epistemological model because, well, despite claims of logic existing exterior to the mind, it is the human mind wherein logical connections (as well as synaptic ones) are made, ~ala Kant.]

Let me just note for the record here that I am aware of 'how' many philosophers approach Coherentism--with a gibe and a dash of condescension, as an entity of thought that has become passe from already having been successfully shot-down or dismantled by the establishment. And maybe in some respects they're right since it does lack a more robust epistemological structure; or to put it another way, it doesn't provide us with the assurance we so desperately seek. But even then, I think it is somewhat salvageable and serviceable.

Good talking to you!

Peace
2PhiloVoid

 

[dms1972]

The hat is blue

Is this a belief at all?

Is it not a statement, and as such either correspondences to a real state of affairs, or does not?

Sometimes people argue over the colour of something, but it usually can be decided who is right, can it not?

 

[elopez]

Is this a belief at all?

I think so.

Is it not a statement, and as such either correspondences to a real state of affairs, or does not?

It is indeed a statement. However, epistemology deals with knowledge about statements. Such as, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for one to know a statement they utter? It is a matter of justification and what it is for a statement to be justified.

Sometimes people argue over the colour of something, but it usually can be decided who is right, can it not?

Sure. Though, this is about more than colours. This is about how we know what a colour of something is, for example. Such provoking questions like, is that justification external or internal, or, what are the sources of justification.

 

[elopez]

If by 'web' we mean something tangible and necessarily anchored down at various points, analogous to say, a spider-web, then no.

The analogy of the web I thought was more to explain a structure of knowledge, in that not there are no such things basic beliefs, rather beliefs that are related to one another, and are justified from other beliefs in that "epistemic neighborhood."

But, if we instead mean something more abstract, or less directly tangible, like say, a Neural Network (i.e. Human Brain Function), along with the accompanying processes that go with this kind of analogy, then I'd say, 'yes.'

So how does this relate to a structure of knowledge?

[I like to think of the human brain as an epistemological model because, well, despite claims of logic existing exterior to the mind, it is the human mind wherein logical connections (as well as synaptic ones) are made, ~ala Kant.]

All this seems to say is that justification is after all internal, not so much about the structure of knowledge. This would suggest our justification is based on mere evidence and not the realibility of the source of evidence itself. If this is the case (justification based on mere evidence), our account for justification may be at risk, since it can be shown that one who is radically deceived is mislead about what is actually the case, yet not about what he is justified in believing.

What was Kant's response to this? Or yours, for that matter?

 

[elopez]

I'm in the middle of a chain reacion. As for my first memories, I dont know. Thats my pov, any "basic beliefs" would have to be in the infants consciousess. Its no good saying "I am 65 years old and dont know where my founding beliefs are". They are apart of developmental psychology, epistemology naturalised.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naturalized_epistemology

This could be interesting.

So to you, the traditional manner in which going about epistemology is wholly misleading? Or, do you go with a more moderate approach?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Yes its misleading, partially at least. Philosophers sitting in armchairs, with thousands of beliefs already, and complex cognitive skills based on functional language etc saying "Um, ah, what should I base my beliefs on?"

Sounds daft.

Its like a bird in the sky wondering how it should fly.

Rather we can look at fledgeling beliefs so to speak. How infants acquire belief systems, and what the first emergent "mental switches" are likely to be in the developing brain. Now, they would really be basic beliefs, on which others are based.

Of course, there space for traditional epistemology too, as in "what sort of epistemological principles ought we expand our theories of the world upon", I suppose. Bu the term "basic" is open to interpretation ..

I think the most "basic" (in the developmental sense) would be somatosensory - thats my idea. Feeling comfortable, needing to move etc.

MAybe hearing is basic:

 

[SkyWriting]

If both hat and blue are precisely defined, then this is a statement of a fact. You do not need something like "believe" in this example. It simply IS. I think that should be the nature of "basic believe", if this term is needed.

Another simple example is: I am happy. In this case, the "believe" is not basic at all. Because the "happy" can not be defined.

Not correct. While not colorblind, I do not perceive colors like most do. "Blue" for me is "if you say so."
I must "believe" in the color blue because it's not something I can remember very well.
As for "hat", again, I may doubt that it's a hat.

 

[elopez]

Yes its misleading, partially at least.

How so? Can you elaborate further?

Philosophers sitting in armchairs, with thousands of beliefs already, and complex cognitive skills based on functional language etc saying "Um, ah, what should I base my beliefs on?"

Sounds daft.

Well we are thinking of how to structure our knowledge, and trying to determine in what sense we know things, if they are justified or not, what justification is, etc. Is that not at least in part of what natural epistemology attempts to accomplish as well?

Its like a bird in the sky wondering how it should fly.

Is there something inherently wrong about that? If the wind picks up the bird may have to change how he flies than hiw he was flying before it did.

Rather we can look at fledgeling beliefs so to speak. How infants acquire belief systems, and what the first emergent "mental switches" are likely to be in the developing brain. Now, they would really be basic beliefs, on which others are based.

Every child learns differently and at their own rate. They don't really seem to base their beliefs on some internal justification rather they take us at our word. Of course they learn other ways too such as visually.

Of course, there space for traditional epistemology too, as in "what sort of epistemological principles ought we expand our theories of the world upon", I suppose. Bu the term "basic" is open to interpretation ..

So do you leave room for a traditional understanding. It seems more reasonable to suggest this instead, using both a traditional and empirical way of knowing things, rather than claiming to replace it all together. The term basic I have specifically outlined earlier in the thread. That is how foundationalism gives an account for basic beliefs. It is my thought that defined in eiither sense we cannot really have many or nearly any basic beliefs.

 

[juvenissun]

Not correct. While not colorblind, I do not perceive colors like most do. "Blue" for me is "if you say so."
I must "believe" in the color blue because it's not something I can remember very well.

This one is easier. I can tell you a number (wavelength) which represents blue color. That should be very clear.
As far as a hat, I don't know what to say.

 

[Archaeopteryx]

This one is easier. I can tell you a number (wavelength) which represents blue color. That should be very clear.
As far as a hat, I don't know what to say.

 

[SkyWriting]

This one is easier. I can tell you a number (wavelength) which represents blue color. That should be very clear.
As far as a hat, I don't know what to say.

It's not. I can't remember colors. I can see them, but not remember them well.

 

[dms1972]

Thomas Reid: (Essays and Inquiries) On seeing - That colour is a Quality of Bodies, Not a Sensation of the Mind.

"By colour, all men, who have not been tutored by modern philosophy, understand, not a sensation of the mind, which can have no existence when it is not perceived, but a quality or modification of bodies, which continues to be the same whether it is seen or not." Thomas Reid

What colour is the quote?

I'd say his statement "That colour is a quality of bodies, not a sensation of the mind" is a candidate for a properly basic belief.

I'd agree the statement "the hat is blue" can be a belief, for if someone asks you to go an buy them a blue hat. One looks down the hats, till one sees what appears to be a blue one - it is on the belief that it is blue that one picks it out and buys it. Belief here understood as "readiness to act as if something were so". However thats not all there is to belief.

 

[elopez]

I'd say his statement "That colour is a quality of bodies, not a sensation of the mind" is a candidate for a properly basic belief.

I will recall the definitons of basic beliefs. They are defined in two senses, giving distinct implications on justification.

Doxastic Basicality (DB)
S's justified belief that p is basic if and only if S's belief that p is justified without owing its justification to any of S's other beliefs.

Epistemic Basicality (EB)
S's justified belief that p is basic if and only if S's justification for believing that p does not depend on any justification S possesses for believing a further proposition, q

The question is, in what sense is the bolded statement (say C), a basic belief? Is it on DB or EB? To me it seems as if it is neither.

 

[juvenissun]

It's not. I can't remember colors. I can see them, but not remember them well.

Write down the number. It can not be wrong. Don't trust yourself. Trust the number. That is BASIC.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

The analogy of the web I thought was more to explain a structure of knowledge, in that not there are no such things basic beliefs, rather beliefs that are related to one another, and are justified from other beliefs in that "epistemic neighborhood."

...and you are correct. A 'web' is the generic analogy used to illustrate the structure for Coherence...

So how does this relate to a structure of knowledge?

Basically in that the neural net is a living, growing, processing of information, a set of dynamics which I think should be considered as being included in the whole scheme of justification. In other words, justification should be more than 'just' the recognition of what seem to be logical connections of data.

All this seems to say is that justification is after all internal, not so much about the structure of knowledge. This would suggest our justification is based on mere evidence and not the realibility of the source of evidence itself. If this is the case (justification based on mere evidence), our account for justification may be at risk, since it can be shown that one who is radically deceived is mislead about what is actually the case, yet not about what he is justified in believing.

No, I wouldn't say that justification is 'based' on 'mere' evidence; especially since evidence is a multi-faceted concept and rather difficult to pin down at an ontological level. No, I think that knowledge emerges from our mentally formulated (and evolving) categories of mental understanding, as Kant might put it.

As far as self-deception is concerned, I agree that there is a risk if justification is all internal, which I don't think Coherence has to be. In fact, I think part of the problem is to think of justification as dichotomous between Internal or External, when in fact the actual dynamics of human learning (and resulting bodies of knowledge) are likely involved with a bit of both.

But going back to your previous inquiry, I would affirm that a 'web' is a nice, but generic and abstract, model for human knowledge. But even with that, there is always going to be a risk that we can be deceived, if not by our own selves, then by an externally malevolent Cartesian Deceiver who has captured the power of our brains...etc. In the end, it will all depend on whether we decide to take the Red Pill or the Blue Pill.

2PhiloVoid