Pragmatic Argument for God's existense

[devolved]

I've been re-formulating the argument for a while, but it goes:

1) There's no viable means around Agrippa's Trilemma as means to justify our justifications apart from three possible scenarios.

We either:
a) Go into regression of justifying the justifications
b) Resort to circularity
c) Take an axiomatic exit and presuppose baseline justifications

I would add the fourth one... "I don't know", which isn't really useful in most pragmatic scopes of human existence where we depend on some baseline assumptions.

2) When we deconstruct our individual beliefs on the subject of origins we end up with some basic questions about reality, of which I would frame as two possible baseline categories of assumptions:

A) Either the reality is arbitrary, in a sense that there is no inherent meaning in variables that allow such reality for what we would recognize as intelligent processes and be intelligible. It's merely incidental with existence of such reality. There's no inherent meaning apart from what we would contextually project to be meaningfull.

Or

B) The reality was arranged to be intelligent and intelligible by a being which by extension would be necessarily both intelligent and intelligible in a way which exceeds the complexity of the reality that such being would arrange.

3) If we choose option A as an axiom, it would follow that there is no inherent meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Since our brain is a "meaning-seaking mechanism", it would follow that it's engaging in ultimately absurd enterprise of inventing contextual meaning where there is none.

Inherently, there are no justifications for science, logic and reason, and morality apart from consensus that merely agrees on some subjective models that our brains project on reality with rather absurd implications.

4) If we choose option B as an axiom, the implication would be that there is meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Thus, our brain operates in it's proper scope of operation of finding the intended meaning of reality where meaning is not arbitrary projection and contexts of reality are not accidental.

Thus there are justifications for enterprise of science, logic and reason in context that our brain operates for its intended purpose of finding meaning where there is meaning.

Thus, God concept in the very least is a pragmatic necessity for having a coherent model that doesn't devolve into absurdity after baseline presuppositions are made.

 

[HereIStand]

Nicely stated. Sadly, it seems some select option B without realizing it. Recently, I read one writer argue that she was happy to pass through life, knowing that her experiences would be shared by future humans as part of a super-humanity. That doesn't seem to be much to live for.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

Some minor criticism: Agrippa actually had 5 points as recorded by Sextus Empiricus. It is called a trilemma today, through confusion with other later formulations of radical scepticism, but had more than 3.

1) There's no viable means around Agrippa's Trilemma as means to justify our justifications apart from three possible scenarios.

We either:
a) Go into regression of justifying the justifications
b) Resort to circularity
c) Take an axiomatic exit and presuppose baseline justifications

I would add the fourth one... "I don't know", which isn't really useful in most pragmatic scopes of human existence where we depend on some baseline assumptions.

All four of these are present amongst Agrippa's points: Infinite Regression, Circularity, Assumption of axioms, and confusion where nothing of certainty can be said.

A) Either the reality is arbitrary, in a sense that there is no inherent meaning in variables that allow such reality for what we would recognize as intelligent processes and be intelligible. It's merely incidental with existence of such reality. There's no inherent meaning apart from what we would contextually project to be meaningfull.

This was his fifth point, where meaning is only ascribed relationally.

Or

B) The reality was arranged to be intelligent and intelligible by a being which by extension would be necessarily both intelligent and intelligible in a way which exceeds the complexity of the reality that such being would arrange.

Agrippa would reply that this is again just a form of assumption of axioms.

3) If we choose option A as an axiom, it would follow that there is no inherent meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Since our brain is a "meaning-seaking mechanism", it would follow that it's engaging in ultimately absurd enterprise of inventing contextual meaning where there is none.

Inherently, there are no justifications for science, logic and reason, and morality apart from consensus that merely agrees on some subjective models that our brains project on reality with rather absurd implications.

4) If we choose option B as an axiom, the implication would be that there is meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Thus, our brain operates in it's proper scope of operation of finding the intended meaning of reality where meaning is not arbitrary projection and contexts of reality are not accidental.

Thus there are justifications for enterprise of science, logic and reason in context that our brain operates for its intended purpose of finding meaning where there is meaning.

Thus, God concept in the very least is a pragmatic necessity for having a coherent model that doesn't devolve into absurdity after baseline presuppositions are made.

Beyond the fact that you restated the five points of Agrippa, I concur with you, though all theist positions still fall within radical Pyrrhonian scepticism.

Without making an assumption of the existence of God, all collapses largely into incoherence - especcially logic and Science, which assumes that we have an ordered world and that somehow our conclusions must be valid or veridical. Materialism certainly cannot give you that.
However an assumption of God needs to be made, which is of course Faith. Without it, we cannot know anything, which is why Christ said He was Truth (as that is the only way to get anything that can really be called by that term), and God is Being itself (a fount of existence upon which all else is predicated - I AM that I AM).

 

[Apologetic_Warrior]

I've been re-formulating the argument for a while, but it goes:

1) There's no viable means around Agrippa's Trilemma as means to justify our justifications apart from three possible scenarios.

We either:
a) Go into regression of justifying the justifications
b) Resort to circularity
c) Take an axiomatic exit and presuppose baseline justifications

I would add the fourth one... "I don't know", which isn't really useful in most pragmatic scopes of human existence where we depend on some baseline assumptions.

2) When we deconstruct our individual beliefs on the subject of origins we end up with some basic questions about reality, of which I would frame as two possible baseline categories of assumptions:

A) Either the reality is arbitrary, in a sense that there is no inherent meaning in variables that allow such reality for what we would recognize as intelligent processes and be intelligible. It's merely incidental with existence of such reality. There's no inherent meaning apart from what we would contextually project to be meaningfull.

Or

B) The reality was arranged to be intelligent and intelligible by a being which by extension would be necessarily both intelligent and intelligible in a way which exceeds the complexity of the reality that such being would arrange.

3) If we choose option A as an axiom, it would follow that there is no inherent meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Since our brain is a "meaning-seaking mechanism", it would follow that it's engaging in ultimately absurd enterprise of inventing contextual meaning where there is none.

Inherently, there are no justifications for science, logic and reason, and morality apart from consensus that merely agrees on some subjective models that our brains project on reality with rather absurd implications.

4) If we choose option B as an axiom, the implication would be that there is meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Thus, our brain operates in it's proper scope of operation of finding the intended meaning of reality where meaning is not arbitrary projection and contexts of reality are not accidental.

Thus there are justifications for enterprise of science, logic and reason in context that our brain operates for its intended purpose of finding meaning where there is meaning.

Thus, God concept in the very least is a pragmatic necessity for having a coherent model that doesn't devolve into absurdity after baseline presuppositions are made.

Nice work, cheers!

 

[ananda]

Thus, God concept in the very least is a pragmatic necessity for having a coherent model that doesn't devolve into absurdity after baseline presuppositions are made.

Why try to prove anything (and so, why require baseline presuppositions)?

 

[Apologetic_Warrior]

Why try to prove anything (and so, why require baseline presuppositions)?

How would a person know whether they have entered Nirvana or not? Distinctions, distinctions, you Westerners.

 

[ananda]

How would a person know whether they have entered Nirvana or not? Distinctions, distinctions, you Westerners.

Note that I was speaking about "proving" - that is, providing irrefutable evidence for others.

I was not speaking about "knowing" - that is, knowing for one's self.

Two completely different subjects altogether.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

Note that I was speaking about "proving" - that is, providing irrefutable evidence for others.

I was not speaking about "knowing" - that is, knowing for one's self.

Two completely different subjects altogether.

Not really. In what way? Intersubjectivity is always an unprovable value without a metaphysical superstructure, so knowing for oneself or assuming something to be known, are fairly indistinguishable.

 

[ananda]

Not really. In what way? Intersubjectivity is always an unprovable value without a metaphysical superstructure, so knowing for oneself or assuming something to be known, are fairly indistinguishable.

IMO, that which is personally experienced on the phenomenological level can be said to be known by one's self - even if I cannot prove that phenomenological experience to others.

 

[devolved]

IMO, that which is personally experienced on the phenomenological level can be said to be known by one's self - even if I cannot prove that phenomenological experience to others.

Again, a per previous objection... what you say that you "know" is indistinguishable from what you are assuming to be known. You can label that concept however you like, but when you trace the process from sensory inputs to perception, knowledge is merely a form of "internal conceptual coherence".

 

[ananda]

Again, a per previous objection... what you say that you "know" is indistinguishable from what you are assuming to be known. You can label that concept however you like, but when you trace the process from sensory inputs to perception, knowledge is merely a form of "internal conceptual coherence".

I don't disagree with that.

 

[bhsmte]

Note that I was speaking about "proving" - that is, providing irrefutable evidence for others.

I was not speaking about "knowing" - that is, knowing for one's self.

Two completely different subjects altogether.

How would you verify, what you claim to know, is likely true. Or, is that not important?

 

[ananda]

How would you verify, what you claim to know, is likely true. Or, is that not important?

On the phenomenological level, is verification even necessary?

 

[gaara4158]

3) If we choose option A as an axiom, it would follow that there is no inherent meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Since our brain is a "meaning-seaking mechanism", it would follow that it's engaging in ultimately absurd enterprise of inventing contextual meaning where there is none.

Inherently, there are no justifications for science, logic and reason, and morality apart from consensus that merely agrees on some subjective models that our brains project on reality with rather absurd implications.

4) If we choose option B as an axiom, the implication would be that there is meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Thus, our brain operates in it's proper scope of operation of finding the intended meaning of reality where meaning is not arbitrary projection and contexts of reality are not accidental.

Thus there are justifications for enterprise of science, logic and reason in context that our brain operates for its intended purpose of finding meaning where there is meaning.

Thus, God concept in the very least is a pragmatic necessity for having a coherent model that doesn't devolve into absurdity after baseline presuppositions are made.

It's not very pragmatic, in the Pierceian sense, to use synthetic propositions like options A or B as axioms. A pragmatist is more likely to cite his incorrigible subjective experience as sufficient basis for the intelligibility of reality. It goes 1) My experience is intelligible 2) Reality, for all practical purposes, is the whole of that which I experience 3) Therefore, reality is intelligible. Science, logic, and reason work not because they're necessarily grounded by some ethereal, incomprehensible, intelligent super-being, but simply because the subjective reality in which we operate behaves exactly as though science, logic, and reason are justified. It could be "wrong," but in that person's experience it makes absolutely no difference, so for all practical purposes it's correct. This route might be labeled a form of faith, but it makes fewer assumptions than B and successfully avoids the inescapable confusion of option A. It's a little solipsistic, but it allows for intersubjectivity in the same way that it allows for science, logic, and reason.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

It's not very pragmatic, in the Pierceian sense, to use synthetic propositions like options A or B as axioms. A pragmatist is more likely to cite his incorrigible subjective experience as sufficient basis for the intelligibility of reality. It goes 1) My experience is intelligible 2) Reality, for all practical purposes, is the whole of that which I experience 3) Therefore, reality is intelligible. Science, logic, and reason work not because they're necessarily grounded by some ethereal, incomprehensible, intelligent super-being, but simply because the subjective reality in which we operate behaves exactly as though science, logic, and reason are justified. It could be "wrong," but in that person's experience it makes absolutely no difference, so for all practical purposes it's correct. This route might be labeled a form of faith, but it makes fewer assumptions than B and successfully avoids the inescapable confusion of option A. It's a little solipsistic, but it allows for intersubjectivity in the same way that it allows for science, logic, and reason.

You are saying that my intelligible experience is reality, and therefore reality is intelligible? Um, this is a circular argument, so covered by the options above.

 

[devolved]

It's not very pragmatic, in the Pierceian sense, to use synthetic propositions like options A or B as axioms.

I'm not framing it in the scope of philosophical pragmatism. I'm framing it in the scope of the practical (pragmatic) necessity for us to adopt a model that is semantically coherent.

It goes 1) My experience is intelligible 2) Reality, for all practical purposes, is the whole of that which I experience 3) Therefore, reality is intelligible.... subjective reality in which we operate behaves exactly as though science, logic, and reason are justified.

Intelligibility is a reductionist concept. We use "understanding" colloquially, but our understanding is very focused, and that's why we reduce the reality into chunks, and then analyze it as such. It's not arbitrary function as such. It's likely not because we have inherent ability to understand the whole universe, but instead choose to focus on chunks instead. That's how our brains seem to perceive and analyze the reality - in chunks.

Hence, the inherent problem with the above is reification of "aggregate concepts" as though these are understood and perceived as aggregate. These are not .

When we say that we "understand physics", it translates to very specific contextual understanding in reality at the moment of our understanding of a very narrow chunk of it. We may record it, but we can only understand and analyze in chunks. Such goes for entirety of our understanding.

Hence when you say :

Reality, for all practical purposes, is the whole of that which I experience. Therefore, reality is intelligible....

... it doesn't take into account limits of our understanding and perception. So, because I can lift a small rock, and then I can lift two rocks, and three... doesn't mean I can lift a million, or entire Universe of Rocks. That's not what I would consider pragmatic approach, hence it devolves into absurdity fairly fast.

Likewise, the idea here is:

subjective reality in which we operate behaves exactly as though science, logic, and reason are justified.

Certainly, we can say that, among many other things that we can say, but that's not really what I mean by pragmatic, because you seem to ignore the conceptual continuum as you first label aggregate experience, and then resort to circularity to justify individual chunks of it. We certainly can do that, and say it works, because it works, because it works... until it doesn't work. We do that all the time.

But that's not what I'm talking about.

Just because some cycle is repeatable, doesn't mean that it is semantically coherent or inherently meaningful. And since our brain is such sycle, then it's purely arbitrary in its function. Of course, we can look at things as though they are inherently meaningful... but then you are merely adopting a framework of meaning that I'm appealing to.

And inherent meaning only works in context of intended meaning. I hope it makes sense.

I know that you were only trying to point out the difference between what I'm proposing and philosophical pragmatism. I'm trying to clarify with the above.

 

[devolved]

It's a little solipsistic, but it allows for intersubjectivity in the same way that it allows for science, logic, and reason.

Perhaps I can be more laconic in my response.

If we have two propositions:

1) Intelligent being created our reality
2) Reality exists as an arbitrary function

Proposition 2 wouldn't even be able to justify pragmatism. It would be a cycle of "we do, because we do, because we do". The moment you look outside of the cycle... there are no reasons to keep doing it anymore... especially if doing it is painful, difficult and taxing. I'm not saying that's all it is, but in context of life... it is largely becomes a cycle of rather painful fight of keeping something intact for no other reason than doing something (if we inevitably reduce it to a pragmatic concept).

Thus, from unsupported pragmatic perspective... why do anything at all? Why have children that will suffer and die? Why build technology that merely gives us more to do. It's an existential problem, and many people who really get confronted with this problem fall into depression, which you have to find more things to do as a distraction, or alter brain chemistry to give you more dopamine to keep going through the cycle.

Thus reality devolves into meaningless absurdity. Yes you can act and pretend as though it has inherent meaning, but eventually you have to ask... does it really?

And if it doesn't have inherent meaning... why would you care to give it any meaning?

 

[DogmaHunter]

I've been re-formulating the argument for a while, but it goes:

1) There's no viable means around Agrippa's Trilemma as means to justify our justifications apart from three possible scenarios.

We either:
a) Go into regression of justifying the justifications
b) Resort to circularity
c) Take an axiomatic exit and presuppose baseline justifications

I would add the fourth one... "I don't know", which isn't really useful in most pragmatic scopes of human existence where we depend on some baseline assumptions.

2) When we deconstruct our individual beliefs on the subject of origins we end up with some basic questions about reality, of which I would frame as two possible baseline categories of assumptions:

A) Either the reality is arbitrary, in a sense that there is no inherent meaning in variables that allow such reality for what we would recognize as intelligent processes and be intelligible. It's merely incidental with existence of such reality. There's no inherent meaning apart from what we would contextually project to be meaningfull.

Or

B) The reality was arranged to be intelligent and intelligible by a being which by extension would be necessarily both intelligent and intelligible in a way which exceeds the complexity of the reality that such being would arrange.

3) If we choose option A as an axiom, it would follow that there is no inherent meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Since our brain is a "meaning-seaking mechanism", it would follow that it's engaging in ultimately absurd enterprise of inventing contextual meaning where there is none.

Inherently, there are no justifications for science, logic and reason, and morality apart from consensus that merely agrees on some subjective models that our brains project on reality with rather absurd implications.

4) If we choose option B as an axiom, the implication would be that there is meaning to reality beyond our subjective perception. Thus, our brain operates in it's proper scope of operation of finding the intended meaning of reality where meaning is not arbitrary projection and contexts of reality are not accidental.

Thus there are justifications for enterprise of science, logic and reason in context that our brain operates for its intended purpose of finding meaning where there is meaning.

Thus, God concept in the very least is a pragmatic necessity for having a coherent model that doesn't devolve into absurdity after baseline presuppositions are made.

Sounds like a rather elaborate way to just end up in an argument from ignorance / incredulity and/or some emotional reasoning.

Positing some faith-based god, does not result in some "ultimate justification". It rather just results in a show-stopping assertion and a gap-filler. An excuse to stop thinking about it. Or an excuse to simply acknowledge ignorance.

The universe doesn't owe you any meaning or purpose. No matter how much you demand that such is present.

 

[gaara4158]

You are saying that my intelligible experience is reality, and therefore reality is intelligible? Um, this is a circular argument, so covered by the options above.

It’s no more circular than using a proposed deity to justify the use of logic and the use of logic to justify a proposed deity. It just assumes less.

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

It’s no more circular than using a proposed deity to justify the use of logic and the use of logic to justify a proposed deity. It just assumes less.

I agree that would be very circular indeed. As I said in my initial post though, all theistic arguments inevitably fall within some form of Pyrrhonian scepticism too.

The usual form of Christianity is to assume God as an axiom, ie have Faith, and then logic et al. follows from it. The base isn't logic justifying God to justify itself, as such. Though it still falls in Agrippa's almost irresistable categories, it certainly does not assume more, in my opinion, nor is it a petitio principii as such.