No, actually I don't. Whether or not Mary's thoughts belong to physical reality (they do, we can measure them in a brain scanner) has nothing to do with any hypothetical idealized state of physics.
I think that you're "resolving" the problem by denying it and/or confusing it with the so-called "easy" problem of consciousness.
What we are talking about is the "hard" problem of consciousness (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness#Formulation_of_the_problem )
"It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does."
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Humans, after all, are not zombies. We do not march through life in a mechanical
predeterministic way. As Steven Harnard points out (see
http://cogprints.org/1601/6/harnad95.zombies.html )
"Quarks, like consciousness, cannot be observed directly, but there are many things that follow from quarks' existing or not existing, and those things can be observed. Does anything follow from the existence of consciousness, that would not follow just as readily if we were all Zombies who merely acted exactly as if they were conscious?...
"So we will assume, instead, that consciousness is not an autonomous force, but some property or aspect of the ordinary physical forces we already know. If so, then it is incumbent on anyone who thinks he can tell the Zombie from the real thing that he
be able to say what this property is. This is a notoriously difficult thing to do; in fact, I'm willing to bet it's impossible, and will even say why:
"
(1) How could you ever determine whether that supposition -- that that's the property that distinguishes conscious things from unconscious ones -- was correct? That's the other-minds problem again.
But now let's suppose that the supposition -- that that's the property that distinguishes conscious things from unconscious ones -- was, miraculously, true, even though there was no way we could know it was true:
(2) In what, specifically, would its truth consist? What is it that something would lack if it lacked consciousness yet had the property you picked out? For if you pick anything other than consciousness itself as the thing it would lack if it lacked that property that was supposed to be the determinant of consciousness (which would be a bit circular), then one can always say: why can't it have that property without the consciousness? And
no one has even the faintest inkling of what could count as a satisfactory answer to that question."
(emphasis added)