Philosophical arguments against the existence of God

anonymous person said:

Please read this article and share with me your thoughts:

winteryknight.com/2015/08/12/can-evolution-empathy-and-well-being-account-for-the-existence-of-moral-facts/

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anonymous person said:

How many of your claims and beliefs are backed up by robust testable evidence presented in falsifiable hypotheses?

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anonymous person said:

One does not have to be religious to affirm that objective moral values and duties are more plausibly grounded in a transcendent moral law giver as opposed to some sort of mundane ground. There are atheists that would make the claim and in fact have.

You do know that right?

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anonymous person said:

One does not have to be religious to affirm that objective moral values and duties are more plausibly grounded in a transcendent moral law giver as opposed to some sort of mundane ground. There are atheists that would make the claim and in fact have.

You do know that right?

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anonymous person said:

I have. I asked you to read the article.

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anonymous person said:

I have. I asked you to read the article.

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anonymous person said:

Of course humans exist and can be empathetic. That does nothing to show that empathy is a grounds for objective moral values and duties.

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You either affirm or deny the existence of objective moral value and duty. If you deny it then fine.

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If you affirm they exist, then you have to affirm they are grounded in something.

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anonymous person said:

How many of your claims and beliefs are backed up by robust testable evidence presented in falsifiable hypotheses?

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anonymous person said: ↑
One does not have to be religious to affirm that objective moral values and duties are more plausibly grounded in a transcendent moral law giver as opposed to some sort of mundane ground. There are atheists that would make the claim and in fact have.

You do know that right?

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Loudmouth said:

How do you know that the laws given by this transcendental law giver are moral? Just because the deity says so? Just because other humans say so?

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anonymous person said: ↑
One does not have to be religious to affirm that objective moral values and duties are more plausibly grounded in a transcendent moral law giver as opposed to some sort of mundane ground. There are atheists that would make the claim and in fact have.

You do know that right?

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bhsmte said:

Who do atheists claim this moral law giver is?

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anonymous person said:

You could tell me you thoughts on the article. It explains my view very accurately.

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anonymous person said:

God

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anonymous person said:

Some people knock eyewitness testimony when it comes to God stuff but are quick to rely on it when in a court of law, such testimony benefits them in some way.

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anonymous person said:

Please read this article and share with me your thoughts:

winteryknight.com/2015/08/12/can-evolution-empathy-and-well-being-account-for-the-existence-of-moral-facts/

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anonymous person said:

Your belief that belief is not a conscious choice is not falsifiable.

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