I'm wondering why you think it does.
But, IMV, "ought" simply has to do with the choice-worthiness of alternatives that allow one to rank them in order of desirability, and thus say which alternatives are preferable to which other alternatives. If alternative A > B > C, one can then say that one ought to do A in preference to B or C. So, if the three little pigs want to avoid the Big Bad Wolf, they ought to build their homes out of brick instead of straw or sticks, given the availability of these materials.
While one could try to ground oughts in some sort of divine plan, one doesn't need to appeal to divine plans in order to make such a ranking. One could use human well-being as an ultimate criterion, and understand this purely in naturalistic terms (no God required). One could also speak simply in terms of hypothetical imperatives, such as with the pigs above, where one simply assumes that avoiding the Big Bad Wolf is desirable.
You simply seem to assume that a divine plan is the only way to speak in terms of oughts. In the history of philosophy, that is clearly not the case.
You must not read people's posts.
Let me clarify something for the purposes of this thread. When I call the Old Testament God "evil", I mean from a human perspective and for the purpose of human decision-making. Earthquakes are "evil" in a similar sense. Cthulhu, a god-like being who has little sympathy or interest in humanity, would be "evil" in that sense, even if Cthulhu is a "good" Cthulhu from his own perspective and nature. Likewise, if you step on an anthill, you might be an evil to the ants, but still a good human being.
So, I'm not insisting that God is a "bad" God from his own perspective. He might very well be a "good" God as far as Gods go because they aren't human beings, and could legitimately choose to step on the Earth as if on an anthill. The question is really how
we should evaluate such beings. Do we have obligations toward anthill stompers when we are the ants?
eudaimonia,
Mark