Objective standards

[GrowingSmaller]

Would you assert that the statement "this piece of music is beautiful" is necessarily (implicitly) appealing to an objective aesthetic standard?

Not in the normal sense of the term. But insofar as the music causes a object (brain) to light up in a certain fashion, and the brains of others light up in a similar fashion when having an "aesthetic experience" then we can refer to the brain as an object with properties relavant to the experience. And we may also find that there are a family of external objects (art music etc) that stochastically (probablistically) cause such neural activity across groups of people, and other objects (dog dirt etc) which cause altogether different responses. And this is to do with objective wiring of the brain, even though such is experienced subjectively.

Would you therefore assert that everyone behaves as though objective aesthetic standards exist?

No.

Would you therefore conclude that objective aesthetic standards must and do exist?

See above.

(Of course, this question is primarily for those who argue that way when it comes to moral statements.)

See above.

ETA: Let´s for purposes of this thread use the definition for "objective" that has frequently been presented in this context: "independent of human perception".

Sorry too late. I think that human perception is vitally important in what we normally call aesthetic experience, leaving aside whether butterflies have it etc. Then again the object is important too.

 

[quatona]

Not in the normal sense of the term. But insofar as the music causes a object (brain) to light up in a certain fashion, and the brains of others light up in a similar fashion when having an "aesthetic experience" then we can refer to the brain as an object with properties relavant to the experience. And we may also find that there are a family of external objects (art music etc) that stochastically (probablistically) cause such neural activity across groups of people, and other objects (dog dirt etc) which cause altogether different responses. And this is to do with objective wiring of the brain, even though such is experienced subjectively.

Thanks for your response, GrowingSmaller. I basically agree.
Do you think that it´s reasonable to derive normative conclusions from stochastical observations?

Sorry too late. I think that human perception is vitally important in what we normally call aesthetic experience, leaving aside whether butterflies have it etc. Then again the object is important too.

Well, as you probably have noticed, the reason for asking my questions is a different one: I am trying to find out whether and why people find the same line of reasoning a compelling argument when it comes to moral values but not when it comes to aesthetic values. IOW: I would like to find out about the hidden premise in the reasoning for an "objective morality" (in the given definition).

Anyway, I think you make a good point. Actually, the fact that a value exists somewhere outside human perception would not really be a good reason for humans to adopt it - quite the opposite.

 

[KCfromNC]

if ethical subjectivism is so self-evidently correct then you should not have a problem showing us why it is.

Can you do that with a syllogism?

Why do it with a syllogism when one can just look at moral standards changing over time and between various cultures? Evidence from reality trumps math word puzzles every time.

 

[quatona]

Why do it with a syllogism when one can just look at moral standards changing over time and between various cultures? Evidence from reality trumps math word puzzles every time.

That´s another tactic the WLC school tries to establish as sound reasoning:
Make an exceptional claim, and if asked to substantiate it, give some wobbly inductive reasoning, demand acceptance of your idea as truth with reference to "more probable than the alternatives", just to immediately turn around and demand deductive proof for a position the person opposite hasn´t even taken...

I´m wondering if this school hands out a handbook in which these tactics are explicitly described, or if this stuff comes naturally to all his epigones.

 

[juvenissun]

I think I get what you are saying:
There is an objectively (measurable) distribution of subjectively held standards?
Or do I misunderstand you here?

I don't like to call such thing a standard. It is a feature, a consequence.
From this point of view, your thinking is upside down.

 

[quatona]

I don't like to call such thing a standard. It is a feature, a consequence.

I am afraid I don´t understand.
When I replace the term "standards" by - as you suggest - "features"/"consequences" I get:

There is an objectively (measurable) distribution of subjectively held features.
And:
There is an objectively (measurable) distribution of subjectively held consequences.

Both sentences don´t seem to make much sense to me.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Thanks for your response, GrowingSmaller. I basically agree.
Do you think that it´s reasonable to derive normative conclusions from stochastical observations?

Yeah sure. If 9 times out of ten I enjoy philosophising, then I ought to philsophise as a rule if I want to enjoy myself. If listening to vivaldi makes me feel inspired, and I need a lift, then vivaldis for me even if it does not press my i-button 100% of the time.

Well, as you probably have noticed, the reason for asking my questions is a different one: I am trying to find out whether and why people find the same line of reasoning a compelling argument when it comes to moral values but not when it comes to aesthetic values. IOW: I would like to find out about the hidden premise in the reasoning for an "objective morality" (in the given definition).

I believe experience pertains to miorality and although it is epistemically subjective (ie experienced personally by a mind) it is ontologically objective (ie it is a fact that I experience, not a fantasy, and there can be an objective science of experience, in the form of psychologies. Therefore that part (or whole) of experience which pertains to morality can be objectivised, and there is no "private opinion" which will allow me to escape from this predicament).

Anyway, I think you make a good point. Actually, the fact that a value exists somewhere outside human perception would not really be a good reason for humans to adopt it - quite the opposite.

I would argue morality is relative to interests, and interests are relative to subjects, but subjects exist objectively. Just as there are rules for engineering reliable bridges, so there are rules for good lives.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Why do it with a syllogism when one can just look at moral standards changing over time and between various cultures? Evidence from reality trumps math word puzzles every time.

Are you saying then because genes evolve over time then evolution is subjective too?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

i would think the above was someone's opinion not a fact. so no.

Ok so hypothetically its an opinion that the music is beautiful. not a fact. I would argue that it is both. The music is beautiful (to them, relatively speaking) and that is a fact, and the fact was what caused their opinion (alongside leaning the reasonable use of the term "beauty" etc). It is not a stand alone fact but one which emerges with the interaction of the music and the person. A bit like color perception, colours are subjective qualie (phenomenal appearances) but they are caused by the addition of a person and a flower for example. If I say the rose is red that's an opinion and a fact. The same goes for beautiful music, even if someone else doesnt like it, its just not beautiful to them, and thats a fact for them, or in the rose case someone else is color blind or has spectral inversion than their individual experiences are facts for them etc.

If I say the rose is qualitatively red thats a fact abot the rose, even if colour perception involve what Locke would call "secondary qualities". The qualitative redness of the rose is a concrete aspect of my rose experience, and an abstract feature of the object: the rose (it is qualitatively red as an extrinsic property, a relational property, in relation to my perceptionn of it. Yet that red appearance is grounded in intrinsic properties of the rose, ie its chemical vibrations which filter out all but a certain wavelength of reflected light). So althought there is only one rose in a primary sense, it can have conflicting relational or relative properties (red to me, grey to her, beautiful to me, ugly to her) at one and the same time - just as a potato can be nutritious food to a pig and not so to a tuna fish... fact, objective but relative.

 

[quatona]

Yeah sure. If 9 times out of ten I enjoy philosophising, then I ought to philsophise as a rule if I want to enjoy myself. If listening to vivaldi makes me feel inspired, and I need a lift, then vivaldis for me even if it does not press my i-button 100% of the time.

Well, yes.
Sometimes I am wondering why it takes so many philosophical effort to establish that which is actually not much more than tautologically true:
If people want to enjoy themselves they should do that which they enjoy.

Transferred to morality this means:
People who want to act morally should do that which they consider morally good.

I think that this was never in question, never disputed by anyone. It´s just a tautology.

I believe experience pertains to miorality and although it is epistemically subjective (ie experienced personally by a mind) it is ontologically objective (ie it is a fact that I experience, not a fantasy, and there can be an objective science of experience, in the form of psychologies. Therefore that part (or whole) of experience which pertains to morality can be objectivised, and there is no "private opinion" which will allow me to escape from this predicament).

Is "believe experience" (in the beginning of this paragraph) referring to a person´s individual experiences (and your conclusions refer to individual strategies, as well), or are you presupposing that there is a way people should experience?

I would argue morality is relative to interests, and interests are relative to subjects, but subjects exist objectively. Just as there are rules for engineering reliable bridges, so there are rules for good lives.

Ok, but you have still not answered my question:
Does what you say about morality also to aesthetics and vice versa?
If not, why not? What´s the difference that prompts you to treat them philosophically differently?

 

[quatona]

Are you saying then because genes evolve over time then evolution is subjective too?

I have no idea how to meaningfully interprete the statement "evolution is subjective", in the first place.

 

[juvenissun]

I am afraid I don´t understand.
When I replace the term "standards" by - as you suggest - "features"/"consequences" I get:

There is an objectively (measurable) distribution of subjectively held features.
And:
There is an objectively (measurable) distribution of subjectively held consequences.

Both sentences don´t seem to make much sense to me.

This is because you do not understand why is it a consequence. A consequence of what? What is the cause of this feature?

For example, most babies like sweet. You do not call that a standard of anything. It is a consequence of something.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

qutona thanks for the patience Ill try to be succinct.

experiencing subjects are objctively real. I think if you ask what is moral for them, then you have to understand their interests as creatures which experience a valenced life and life-world.

If you ask the question of a group then group interests will be calculted, albeit as eudaimonist might say inuctively rather than with practical certainty. eg there is fallibility and uncertainty in guaging what is good for us, left, right, up or down.

I accept that theres no "moral truth" in vaccuum, it exists in reationship to subjects. But that does not make things mere opinion, because interests (like nutritious food consumption) can be scientifically extablised to some degree, and intelligent control of cnsequences is far from arbitrary as with any rule bound system. Is that ok? Do you think there are objective standards in nutritional science?

As for art I think that art is partly in the eye of the beholder, but A that is due to the objective wiring of the eye ad brain, and B it exists in relation to objective properties of the "aesthtic object". For example as a rule a vandalised Picasso will be involved in a diferent aeshetic experience than a unspoilt one (to the curator of the museum at least).

So as nutritional science is possible, so is an aesthetic and moral science possible with objective measures involved in all three (although that may be different to a concept of free floating "objective standards" just are there is no "objectively nutritious objects" without a relatoinship to a metabolic lifeform with dietary interests and needs. If "steak is tasty" is mere opinion, then is "steak is nutritious" mere opinion? No to both, there are objective facts relevant to the opinion, facts about bodies and related facts about experiencing subjects - thats my view.).

Steak IS tasty, to me.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I have no idea how to meaningfully interprete the statement "evolution is subjective", in the first place.

They (genes) belong to subjects? I dont know! I was just saying that because opinions about x change it does not mean that x is necessarily subjective, just as for another example opinions about cosmologcal models have changed from religious to scientific, but that dos not make the topic 'subjective'.

 

[quatona]

qutona thanks for the patience Ill try to be succinct.

Thank you!

I see that you basically approach morality and ethics in the same way and don´t involve those double standards that I meant to ask about in this thread. So, as far as my question is concerned, you have answered it. Thank you.

On the other hand, while I appreciate the consistency in your model(s), I disagree with them altogether (which shouldn´t come as a surprise to you. )
And since you have put so much effort in elaborating on them, I will respond even though my actual question is satisfactorily answered.

experiencing subjects are objctiely real. I think if you ask what is moral for them, then you have to understand their interests ascreatures which experience a valenced life and life-world.

Agreed. I´d also concede that (ideally) if we know the interest (and also know pretty much everything about the universe - which we don´t, but we can put that problem aside for purposes of this conversation) we can detemine the best way to pursue this interest.

First problem, however:
A person does not have only one interest, they have many different - and partly conflicting - ones, and they don´t have a clear priority chart
(40% X, 35% Y...). On top, there are a lot of parameters involved that escape quantification by their very nature.

Second problem:
Morality(as the term is commonly understood)is not only about judging which is the best way from interest to fulfilled interest. Au contraire, morality is rather concerned with judging which interests are justifiable and which are not. Thus - this again comparably banal - objectivity of "How to get best from A to B" is not really morality´s topic.

If you ask the question of a group then group interests will be calculted.

Ok.

But with this, the above mentioned problems even cumulate, and some additional ones arise. We have even more conflicting interests (not only those various ones within each person, but also those various ones that the group has, and also those interests that clash between individuals of the group. Seeing that each person can be considered member of countless groups, interests grow exponentially. Not to mention the moral question whether not individuals and groups should consider the interests of other individuals and groups they don´t belong to.

Thus, even when conceding that - in a hypothetical ideal case - the way from A to B (interest of an individual to its fulfilment; interest of a system to its fulfilment) can objectively be determined, we have neither even touched that what morality actually is concerned with (except maybe in radical hedonism) nor have we determined any means how an individual is to weigh the almost infinite amount of various interests within himself and outside himself.

Theres no "moral truth" in vaccuum, it exists in reationship to subjects. But that does not make things mere opinion, because interests (like nutritious food consumption) can be scientifically extablised to some degree, and are far from arbitrary as with any rule bound system. Isthat ok? Do youthink there are objective standards in nutritional science?

Yes, there are objective standards in nutrition for the way from A to B. But even when it comes to nutrition: How do we objectively determine A (justifiable vs. non-justifiable interests)? A person who wants to starve certainly needs a different diet than a person to whom eating is his first and foremost interest.

Plus: the problem with conflicting A´s within the person (conflicting in the way that they objectively suggest irreconcilable B´s) exists here also.

What, however, renders the comparison nutrition/morality apples and oranges altogether: Nutrition concerns only the respective person, while morality, as you yourself state above, is about relationships.

As for art I think that art is in the eye of the beholder, but A that is due to the objective wiring of the eye ad brain, and B it exists in relation to objective properties of the "aesthtic object". For example as a rule a vandalised Picasso will be involved in a diferent aeshetic experience than a unspoilt one.

If memory serves, you and I have discussed that already quite some time ago. If you don´t mind, I´ll let this one unaddressed for the time being.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Ok do you think that human reason insofar as it is used to pursue interests is viable evolutionarily? Is intellect redundant? If you are so skeptical about knowledge relating to interests then what evolutionary function does thinking, planning, judging, evluating etc serve? Are these brain features random fluctuations with no use?

I accept weare not omniscient but neiter are we intellectually completely redundant. We have it hard, but perhaps clarifiying ethical anthropology (who and what we are ethically) might help. After all half the world is "demon haunted" as Carl Sagan put it (mixed up with so many potentially crazy religious ideas and ideologies). The old label of the IIDB (internet infides discussion board) was 'a drop of reason in an ocean of confusion'.....

 

[quatona]

Ok do you think that human reason insofar as it is used to pursue interests is viable evolutionarily? Is intellect redundant? If you are so skeptical about knowledge relating to interests then what evolutionary function does thinking, planning, judging, evluating etc serve? Are these brain features random fluctuations with no use?

I accept weare not omniscient but neiter are we intellectually completely redundant. We have it hard, but perhaps clarifiying ethical anthropology (who and what we are ethically) might help. After all half the world is "demon haunted" as Carl Sagan put it (mixed up with so many potentially crazy religious ideas and ideologies). The old label of the IIDB (internet infides discussion board) was 'a drop of reason in an ocean of confusion'.....

Huh?
Where did that come from?
Why is it that of all the points I made in my post you address only the one that I haven´t made? I must be communicating very poorly.

I value intellect very (very!!) high, and exactly for the reason that it helps us to fulfill our interests in that it allows us to improve our predictions as to what is the way to have our interests fulfilled. I mentioned the fact that since we still haven´t perfect knowledge of everything we still aren´t perfect in our predictions was just a sidenote and not meant to take away from valuing that it can do what it can do (I even explicitly said we can ignore the imperfection because it´s not crucial to the points and objections I was going to raise).

I hope this misunderstanding is out of the way now.

Now, what about the arguments I actually made?

 

[quatona]

They (genes) belong to subjects? I dont know! I was just saying that because opinions about x change it does not mean that x is necessarily subjective, just as for another example opinions about cosmologcal models have changed from religious to scientific, but that dos not make the topic 'subjective'.

Well, a fatal category error is implied in your comparison "evolution - morality".
Evolution is what happens, morality is the abilitiy to contemplate on what we should do.

Whether evolution or not takes place is an objectively determinable issue, and so is the question whether we have the ability to contemplate on what we should do. The existence of both is a question of objectivity. No disagreement there, and I suspect we both say yes to both.

Saying that morality is subjective means that what we should do (the result of our contemplations) is a matter of subjective opinion.
Whereas I have no idea what "the result of evolution is matter of subjective opinion" could possibly mean, unless you are in the business of telling evolution where to go, or something.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

First problem, however:

A person does not have only one interest, they have many different - and partly conflicting - ones, and they don´t have a clear priority chart
(40% X, 35% Y...). On top, there are a lot of parameters involved that escape quantification by their very nature.

OK a person has many interests, granted, you seem to imply form this a radical skepticism about pursuit of interests. He likes sex, entertainment and food, but which ought he pursue? Obviously to me if he is in danger of starving it is in his interests to eat. Also if he is unhealthily lonely he ought to try and socialise etc.

I grant that deciding between stuff like a chocolate bar or a biscuit can at times be rationally incalculable, but on a more basic level oughts can be inferred.

Second problem:

Morality(as the term is commonly understood)is not only about judging which is the best way from interest to fulfilled interest. Au contraire, morality is rather concerned with judging which interests are justifiable and which are not. Thus - this again comparably banal - objectivity of "How to get best from A to B" is not really morality´s topic.

Thats a good point and one I cannot really answer, except to say that you seem to want to jeapordise the whole project of morality by looking for complications. As if (by analogy) hearth surgery ought to be abandoned because of complications which may arise.

I think that psychologists can assess people's quality of life and adaptation strengths and weaknesses. Its not a case of being sooooo complicated that pursuit of the "good life" is rationally absurd. A good psychologist, and perhaps in the future a brain scientist, might be able to assess and offer advice better than (at present) a priest or friend, or one's instincts and gut feelings, might offer. IMO normative ethics will be part of psychology to some degree (overlap), insofar as psychology can promote flourishing in a scientific fashion.

 

[poolerboy0077]

Would you assert that the statement "this piece of music is beautiful" is necessarily (implicitly) appealing to an objective aesthetic standard?
Would you therefore assert that everyone behaves as though objective aesthetic standards exist?
Would you therefore conclude that objective aesthetic standards must and do exist?

(Of course, this question is primarily for those who argue that way when it comes to moral statements.)

ETA: Let´s for purposes of this thread use the definition for "objective" that has frequently been presented in this context: "independent of human perception".

I would actually quarrel with your use of that definition. The philospher John Searle can be very instructive here. Something can be dependent on human perception and still be an "objective" fact about us. Individual phenomena, like for example having tinnitus and hearing a ringing in your ear, is experienced subjectively. But it is ontologically subjective, that is, it is a first-person experience. You cannot experience someone else's ringing, even while you may have the condition yourself. This ontologically subjective fact, however, can be communicated to dispassionate, neutral third-parties. Indeed this is how much of the sciences of the mind work.

I bring this up because it can be the case that something is not merely an epistemically subjective experience; that is to say, biased, merely personal, etc. It can be a feature that not only is dependent on one's neurobiology but perhaps even be a feature that is common among homo sapiens. Given that we are, for the most part, composed very similarly, it should not be at all surprising that many aesthetic evaluations are objectively true about being human. There have actually been scientific studies that have determined most humans (regardless of cultural influence, epoch, etc.) generally regard blue as the most beautiful color. Is that a non-anthropocentric truth independent of human experience such that it would be true regardless of thinking minds evaluating the color? Of course not. Such a thing would be absurd, as aesthetic evaluations are dependent on thinking minds. That doesn't mean that there cannot be an objective "truth" about beauty.