Like it or not, what you label "illegitimate" science here is, in my opinion, commonly written into the fabric of law, medical code, educational precept, and popular culture.
That doesn't make it legitimate and it does provide a basis for objection to such writings. The point is that the objection should not be directed at the scientific theory, but at the incorrect anti-supernaturalist extensions of it in such non-scientific materials. That is a point that carries weight. For example, it carried the day when objections were raised to an anti-supernaturalist definition of evolution by the National Biology Teachers Institute. Some good work both by Christian theologians and even by some scientists who are themselves atheist, got the offensive language eliminated.
But if the opposition to anti-supernaturalist descriptive language had been tied to opposition of the science per se, it would never have got off the ground.
It is sometimes a difficult line to draw, but it is still essential to try and draw it.
So the question that confronts a Christian is this: is it the science itself that is wrong? Do I have reason to believe the observations and logical inferences from the evidence really lead to a different scientific conclusion?
Or is it that some people with agendas are promoting an objectionable metaphysical point of view using the science illegitimately for that purpose?
Depending on which it is, the strategy behind educating both the Christian and non-Christian public needs to be different.
Empirical epistemology may temporarily engage in ignoring other ways of knowing as in a game played by certain contractual rules, but at some points to make scientifically or empirically based conclusions that may affect law, business investment, educational practice, media reporting and so on that fails to consider relevant truth known in supra-empirical fashion becomes socially irresponsible.
I am reading an interesting book right now that deals with this issue. It is called Apocalypse Soon? and the author is Stephen F. Haller. Basically he explores the minefield of policy and decision-making in a time of threatened catastrophe when the knowledge base is uncertain using four case studies: the limits of growth scenario of the 1970s, the nuclear winter predictions of the 1980s, the thinning of the ozone layer (the only one on which serious international action was taken via the Montreal Protocol banning production of CFCs) and the current global warming crisis.
In the last few chapters he has been analyzing some epistemological theories which call for a re-evaluation of epistemological criteria to include more than empirical science and consider other aspects relevant to decision-making such as values and ethical concerns.
He is coming down against this view, not because he thinks such values and perspectives are irrelevant, but because he thinks the promoters of such views are confusing two different issues.
The first issue is "What is the case?" Ethics, he thinks, should not enter into a determination of what is the case. That is where empirical observation should hold sway.
But, he also points out that knowing what is the case does not address the second question: "What are we to do?" People who have the same information and agree on the facts of the matter, can still disagree profoundly on the implications for policy making and legislative action (e.g. should we or should we not set legal limits on greenhouse gas emissions?)
I think in a somewhat modified form we are dealing with a similar issue here. Too much controversy about scientific theories is actually not about science at all, but about theology.
The question "What is the case?" is, in principle, empirically determinable.
The question "What shall we do?" is not. That calls for a different set of parameters based more on values and ethics than on science.
Similarly, the question of "relevant truth known in a supra-empirical fashion" is by nature not a question that can be resolved on the basis of scientifically empirical investigation. It is not about science, it is about theology.
I agree, that it can be socially irresponsible to neglect such knowledge when applying science in other fields such as law, business, education and so on.
But when we as Christians object to such social irresponsibility, we need to connect it to the fact that we are speaking from a theological standpoint. We are not asking that scientific theory be rewritten, but that it be discussed appropriately--that is, as not in opposition to matters of faith, as not logically supporting non-belief. We should not be presenting our stance as an alternative science. It is not alternative science. It is an alternative view of what science means in a theological framework.
The media, the education system, popular culture, today takes for granted that science and faith are in an oppositional stance. That is the mainstream view we need to deal with.
But since Christians are also imbued in popular culture, many Christians also take for granted that science and faith are in an oppositional stance. And that's an in-house issue we need to deal with--providing better theological education to our own constituency. We need Christian educators who can show Christians how theories like the Big Bang glorify God--just as Paul said of all creation.
When Christians are convinced that the empirical knowledge produced by scientific study glorifies God, they can speak with conviction to the secular world in the same vein and cut the apparent tie of science to atheism.
But as long as Christians assume the popular culture view that the science-atheism tie is legitimate, they will end up futilely opposing "what is the case" instead of effectively exposing "why atheism is an illegitimate extrapolation from the scientific evidence."
Basically this is an area where Christians need to be consciously counter-cultural.
It is one thing to claim the limits of empirical knowledge, another to mislead by silence or by declaring supra-empirical knowledge as marginalized from society's relevant groups and power centers. Yet I contend such marginalization is common, at least in the US (and I think, Canada and Europe and Australia).
Sure, I agree. As I said, this is an area where Christians need to be consciously counter-cultural. But not muddy the waters by being counter-science or counter-intellectual.
Otherwise worded, who said theology (for example) can have no say in knowledge scientifically derived?
I am not sure what you are implying here. Certainly, theology can comment on knowledge scientifically derived. The theologian can always show how new knowledge of God's world provides us with even more awe and amazement to God's glory.
But theology is not a basis for discovering scientific knowledge or re-shaping scientific knowledge. It is a basis for the proper appreciation of scientific knowledge, and in some instances for the proper use of scientific knowledge. Science can tell us how to split the atom and turn that knowledge into an effective weapon. Theology (at least Christian theology) should remind us why we ought never to use such a weapon. Or any weapon of mass destruction.
If a thing is true, why marginalize such truth because its source is non-empirical?
Again, it depends on the context. If the point is to determine empirically what is the case, then a non-empirical source of truth is irrelevant. It simply can't provide the basis for the kind of knowledge sought.
But if the point is to develop a metaphysics or to determine a course of action to which the science contributes, then, definitely, a non-empirical (supernatural?) source of truth has a definite place, because we need more than empirical knowledge for these purposes.
Or if you are subtly implying the dangers of religious sectarianism and church-state and private jurisdiction incursions, you may have a point, but that could lead to a lengthy digression.
Yes, that is what I am getting at. There are things I believe to be true because of my faith (that God is, that God creates, that God sustains and redeems the world, that God upholds values of truth, justice and mercy, etc.) which cannot be stated as "known" truth in a secular context. Not because they are untrue, but because we cannot impose one form of faith on co-citizens who practice a different faith.
We cannot ask a public institution to promote our beliefs in preference to those of others.
Parents who want their children to learn science in a Christian context need to look to their churches and/or Christian schools to provide that. I do think churches and theological schools have a responsibility (which many have abdicated) to provide the resources for just such an education. We should not be leaving Christian families with no resources to deal with the popular secularization children are exposed to in the media, and often, in the public educational system.
At the same time both the principles of justice and fairness, and the law, require the public sphere to be theologically neutral. I believe we need to support that too.
How might scientific experiments on the origins of mass/energy or of the mass/energy of the actual universe be falsifiable on experimental and testable, i.e. empirical grounds? Can the event of mass/energy origins even be repeated in order to be experimented on?
Of course not. But not all science is experimental. Astronomers can't study stars experimentally and geologists can't rerun the formation of a limestone cliff. They still have an abundance of observations to support their theories.
Granted physicists may have fun (no kidding or sarcasm meant) extrapolating from astronomical observations, high energy particle collisions, and math that is above my head to theorize about a possible first ten-to-the-minus whatever second of "Big Bang" material existence, but in my view empiricists ought to curb the confidence of their conclusions and speculations when it comes to the origins of the universe--as some no doubt do even when humility does not make headlines and earn (esp. tax money funded) research grants.
I don't know why people keep implying that scientists are overconfident of their conclusions. I think it is a mistaken popular view. Almost every scientific paper is full of caveats about the level of uncertainty of their conclusions. All scientific conclusions, in principle, are tentative (though of course, there are degrees of tentativeness) and most scientists I have listened to are quite open about what is not yet known or known very imperfectly.
But there seems to be an ideology about the "arrogance" of science in some quarters that is impervious to the actual reticence and nuance of many scientific claims.
So I suspect I agree with you here, but I am not sure I understand you.
Well, I hope I have been a little more clear now.