Yes, this is exactly right. Here is what Aquinas says:
"Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act."
Does Aquinas also destroy the logic that if a thing descends causally from first cause, that it is, regardless of arguments as to responsibility, nonetheless caused by first cause?
I find also, I must remark, that Aquinas argument changes none, if he only uses the term, 'will', instead of 'free-will'.
In the same article:
"Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will."
But within this argument by Aquinas, perhaps a resolution to our differences can be found, in that his description of the necessity of "will" ("free-will", he says) for responsibility, and for value to such things as counsels and rewards etc, is based on the difference between brute instinct and reason. The truth is, that [at least some] animals have reason, to some degree, and not just brute instinct; and so, I wonder within myself, if God sees, in comparison to himself, a similar difference concerning our ability to reason, (i.e. not just in degree of knowledge and understanding of data), as Aquinas sees between humans and animals.
Also in this argument of Aquinas', responsibility in terms of morality, he attempts to imply, by the difference in ability to reason. I honestly do not see God thinking that way. True, I will admit, the thoughts of the mind ("heart") by which God judges the deeds, have everything to do with the degree of right and wrong, so the degree of ability to reason also has implications into the judgement God makes. But I'm not at all sure the mere ability is the difference between the moral responsibility (and by implication, 'moral agency') of humans vs the innocence of animals.
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Your adversion to per accidens causality is beside the point. Sure, that the cue ball caused the 9-ball to drop into the pocket does not preclude the pool cue from causing the 9-ball to drop into the pocket. This is irrelevant to the argument durangoda gave. He is talking about immediate efficient causality of the sort that responsibility is attached to. For example, if Andy is the father of Opie then Barney cannot be the father.
I'm not sure '
per accidens' is the right term there, unless only '
contingent' is meant. But even
'contingent' I don't like, except to describe something as over against
'necessary'. Both '
contingent' and
'per accidens' are very human concepts, and assume that "otherwise could have happened". We don't know whether or not "otherwise could have happened". We only know that "otherwise" did
not happen, (and in fact, that "otherwise" never has happened); (and, of course, we know that
"necessary" has always happened). Abstract thought, besides the will, is one of the marks of rational beings. But abstractions are far from
"necessary".
Not meaning anything against such as Aquinas —after all, all sides of the free-will debate think they prove things by use of very human assumptions, even to the point of using merely human points of view to do so— but even 3 of "The 5 Ways" argue on the basis of "we say", as though the logical extrapolation of what we say (or think) has any bearing on the facts of what we are attempting to treat. In other words, his conclusions are only trustworthy, (if they are even logical), as conclusions concerning how we should or must think or speak concerning those assumptions we make.
It is one of the more ironic facts, concerning human thought, that being made in the image of God is visible in our (perhaps) trust in our words to be somehow possessing of substance.
All that, to say, WE are the ones deciding here, of our own judgement, to what to attach
'responsibility', (and we also assume that 'responsibility' swings both ways —that wherever one is responsible for good things, then that one is also responsible for bad things, (and vice versa), regardless of who the person is upon whom we wish to attach the responsibility, and regardless of their relationship to the event. This assumption of ours also has not been shown valid.)
Here's an argument:
- A free act is self-caused by an agent. {Premise}
- If an event is self-caused by an agent then the agent decides whether to bring it about, and they are also able prevent the event from occurring by refraining from action. {From the definition of 'self-caused'}
- Therefore, Events which are freely caused by an agent are not infallible or inevitable. {From 1 & 2}
- Therefore, If an event is infallibly caused by God, then it is not freely caused by Jones. {From 3}
In other words, "We find we must think so." (Not, "it is so")
But notice in your argument, #2 translates (thus making a further assumption not spelled out as such) that "event" is equivalent to #1's, "free act". This has not been shown.
Not only that, but regardless of the value of the argument, the implication you appear to attempt to be making (granted, you appear
to me, to be attempting to make) is that not only is 'freely caused by an agent' mutually exclusive to 'infallibly caused by God', but also that 'freely caused' (whatever is meant by that) is necessary for human responsibility, which is not at all shown here.
