My only problem with hard determinism

[TeddyKGB]

See my coin flip example. Change perhaps for no reason since the original choice was based on whim and no reason. Plus in cases where I decided based on a reason for that decision, there may have been reasons for making a different choice and the second time I might chose those reasons as more important, particularly if the reasons came close to balancing each other out and the original choice was more or less a coin flip between the choices, both of which or all of which had equaly good reasons to act on.

So you choose which reasons to use when making a choice? And you don't see the huge chasm labeled "circular reasoning" directly in front of you?

 

[TeddyKGB]

No I am not just a placeholder for that which choses. I am that which choses. How is that circular?

Choice is made by "I." "I" am that which chooses.

Hello?

 

[quatona]

From what I can tell, we believe the same thing. From my perspective, my actions are of my own choosing. From an outside perspective I am merely reacting to stimulus in the only way I can. I understand that objectively, there is no choice, because I could have only possibly made one choice.

If I'm still not making sense, I will try again later.

Thanks for explaining - I think I understand better where you are coming from, and, yes, we seem to be in agreement, by and large.
The only point I am not really convinced of is the "my actions are of my own choosing" part. I am wondering how I could arrive at that conclusion - actually I am wondering how I could even conceptualize this distinction, since I don´t seem to have any criteria for telling one from the other.
The question "How does it feel to be determined vs. how does it feel to choose?" doesn´t seem to have been answered, so far.

 

[elman]

So you choose which reasons to use when making a choice? And you don't see the huge chasm labeled "circular reasoning" directly in front of you?

No explain why it is circular reasoning to say I have different reasons for making different choices and I chose which reasons are controling.

 

[elman]

Choice is made by "I." "I" am that which chooses.

Hello?

Yes it is not you who makes my choices. How is that circular?

 

[elman]

The exact same situation can't be repeated. I don't mean if you pick heads or tails after the 1st flip was head and the 2nd flip was tales. I mean if the whole of existences was in the exact same state. You were in the exact same mood, every electron in your brain in the same place as it was. Every atom in the universe in the same exact place, etc.

The end idea here is that for you to make a different choice, something has to be different. If I could account for every possible variable and repeat the same exact coin flip 50 times, I should get the same result 50 times. For me to get a different result would require some difference. Reality is too complex to be able to recreate the same exact situation, so a given situation can happen only once, and in that once, you made a choice, and the only choice you could in that situation.

Perhaps the difference is I chose a different whim. You assume the electons in my brain control me. I don't think so. I think I control the electrons in my brain. They fire based on my choice. If I am not firing my electrons, who is doing it? What is your theory on that? I agree it is impossible to test this concept because no action can be repeated with everything the same, but I don't agree that means I have to always decide the same way.

 

[TeddyKGB]

No explain why it is circular reasoning to say I have different reasons for making different choices and I chose which reasons are controling.

A choice is based on reasons which are chosen... how?

 

[elman]

A choice is based on reasons which are chosen... how?

How are the reasons chosen? With reason and whim and a little bias mixed in.

 

[TeddyKGB]

How are the reasons chosen? With reason and whim and a little bias mixed in.

Reasons to choose are chosen using other reasons?

Can we start talking sense now?

 

[elman]

Reasons to choose are chosen using other reasons?

Can we start talking sense now?

I don't see it as unreasonable that I observe different reasons for making a decision and I decide based on reason which is the best reason and which will produce the most desirable consequences-or in some cases I simply decide that way because I want to and hang the consequences. Please explain to me why something is not my decision because I had a reason to decide the way I did.

 

[FishFace]

Perhaps the difference is I chose a different whim. You assume the electons in my brain control me. I don't think so. I think I control the electrons in my brain. They fire based on my choice. If I am not firing my electrons, who is doing it?

OK, electrons don't fire; neurons do. But neurons firing supervenes on electrons moving.

Anyway, that's beside the point. Let us take for granted that something or things causes the electrons to move. We are ignoring quantum effects here, but we could say that we take it for granted that something determines the chance of an electron moving in a particular way - makes no difference.
So we need to decide what makes the electron move. You, I believe, are proposing that the mind causes it to move. I and other physicalists are proposing that something purely physical causes it to move. We take it that the mind, if it exists, is non-physical, and we take physical to mean "fully explainable in terms of things we usually call physical." A loose definition, but hopefully sufficient.
Now, I hope you'll agree that we know that physical things cause electrons to move. I also think you'll agree that, setting aside the mind for later, we know of nothing that isn't physical which can cause electrons to move, or even do anything.
So you are proposing something which is completely unlike anything we've ever observed - something non-physical causing something physical (electrons moving) without even grounds for believing that it is possible, never mind that it actually happens.

The normal principles of reasoning dictate that we go with the explanation requiring the fewest unnecessary entities - i.e. physicalism.

 

[FishFace]

I don't see it as unreasonable that I observe different reasons for making a decision and I decide based on reason which is the best reason and which will produce the most desirable consequences-or in some cases I simply decide that way because I want to and hang the consequences. Please explain to me why something is not my decision because I had a reason to decide the way I did.

The problem is that you are saying that you choose based on your reasons, and that you choose those reasons as well. But that choice must either be based on other reasons, or be determined by something else.
If, at some step in this chain, the choice is determined externally, then your choice isn't "free" in the sense that we usually use (although we can arguably shift the meaning with justification) but the chain can't just stretch of into infinity.

 

[elman]

OK, electrons don't fire; neurons do. But neurons firing supervenes on electrons moving.

Anyway, that's beside the point. Let us take for granted that something or things causes the electrons to move. We are ignoring quantum effects here, but we could say that we take it for granted that something determines the chance of an electron moving in a particular way - makes no difference.
So we need to decide what makes the electron move. You, I believe, are proposing that the mind causes it to move. I and other physicalists are proposing that something purely physical causes it to move. We take it that the mind, if it exists, is non-physical, and we take physical to mean "fully explainable in terms of things we usually call physical." A loose definition, but hopefully sufficient.
Now, I hope you'll agree that we know that physical things cause electrons to move. I also think you'll agree that, setting aside the mind for later, we know of nothing that isn't physical which can cause electrons to move, or even do anything.
So you are proposing something which is completely unlike anything we've ever observed - something non-physical causing something physical (electrons moving) without even grounds for believing that it is possible, never mind that it actually happens.

The normal principles of reasoning dictate that we go with the explanation requiring the fewest unnecessary entities - i.e. physicalism.

Have you really observed consciousness or have your observed the effects of consciousness? I am not impressed with the argument that my decisions must be determined by forces other than me because you are unable to observe what is making the eletrons or neurons do their thing.

 

[elman]

The problem is that you are saying that you choose based on your reasons, and that you choose those reasons as well. But that choice must either be based on other reasons, or be determined by something else.
If, at some step in this chain, the choice is determined externally, then your choice isn't "free" in the sense that we usually use (although we can arguably shift the meaning with justification) but the chain can't just stretch of into infinity.

Where is the evidence that any of my choices are determined externally by something other than me?

 

[FishFace]

Have you really observed consciousness or have your observed the effects of consciousness?

In myself or in other people? In other people, it is only possible to observe the effects of consciousness if consciousness is not just some emergent property of the physical attributes of the brain.

I am not impressed with the argument that my decisions must be determined by forces other than me because you are unable to observe what is making the eletrons or neurons do their thing.

That's not the argument. This argument is just a particular instance of the well-known causal argument for mental-physicalism. The argument goes like this:

1. Mental states cause physical effects
2. Physical effects are always caused by something physical.
3. Mental states are physical.

Now, there's a bit of beating around the bush we can do re overdetermination and quantum mechanics, but if they come up, we'll deal with them then.
You certainly agree with the first premise, but disagree with the conclusion. The argument looks valid so presumably you disagree with premise 2. What reason do I have for arguing premise 2? This is what I was saying - empirical evidence points solely to physical effects have physical causes. If you want to argue otherwise, then you must have a good reason.

 

[FishFace]

Where is the evidence that any of my choices are determined externally by something other than me?

Take a choice that you make. Now take the reason for making that choice. Either that reason was internal or it was external. Now take the reason for the reason, and the reason for that, and so on. It can't be internal forever - A) that's infinite regress and B) you haven't existed forever.
So at some point we must step outside your own self and you must be determined by something external. This isn't evidence it's reasoning.

Your only possibility is to appeal to some way of reasons to just pop into existence without any reason themselves. Taking reasons as being the same as cause, here, this is just the same as saying that our choices are merely the product of randomness, which doesn't seem free either.

 

[elman]

In myself or in other people? In other people, it is only possible to observe the effects of consciousness if consciousness is not just some emergent property of the physical attributes of the brain.



That's not the argument. This argument is just a particular instance of the well-known causal argument for mental-physicalism. The argument goes like this:

1. Mental states cause physical effects
2. Physical effects are always caused by something physical.
3. Mental states are physical.

Now, there's a bit of beating around the bush we can do re overdetermination and quantum mechanics, but if they come up, we'll deal with them then.
You certainly agree with the first premise, but disagree with the conclusion. The argument looks valid so presumably you disagree with premise 2. What reason do I have for arguing premise 2? This is what I was saying - empirical evidence points solely to physical effects have physical causes. If you want to argue otherwise, then you must have a good reason.

So consciousness is physical? Am I my consciousness? If so my consciousness is making decisions---therefore I am making decisions.

 

[elman]

Take a choice that you make. Now take the reason for making that choice. Either that reason was internal or it was external. Now take the reason for the reason, and the reason for that, and so on. It can't be internal forever - A) that's infinite regress and B) you haven't existed forever.
So at some point we must step outside your own self and you must be determined by something external. This isn't evidence it's reasoning.

Your only possibility is to appeal to some way of reasons to just pop into existence without any reason themselves. Taking reasons as being the same as cause, here, this is just the same as saying that our choices are merely the product of randomness, which doesn't seem free either.

No there is another possiblity. My reasons for my choice is not what made the choice. I made the choice. I could have made it against all reasons and have done that. I have made choices that all reasons would have said don't do it that way. The break down in your reasoning is the assumtion that I must do something if there is a reason to do it. You reason backwards in that you assume if I decide something there must have been a reason that forced me to do that. Reasons support a decision, but they do not force it.

 

[FishFace]

So consciousness is physical? Am I my consciousness? If so my consciousness is making decisions---therefore I am making decisions.

1) Do you agree with the causal argument?
2) If your consciousness is making the decisions, then yes, you are making the decisions, but that does nothing to prevent something else make you make the decisions.

When I turn on a light switch, obviously, I make the light come on. But one can just as accurately say that electricity flowing round the wires made the light come on - and I made the electricity flow round the wires. Clearly, the lighting circuit had no choice in turning the light on - because it was entirely determined by your flicking the switch.
Likewise, while it is accurate to say that your consciousness makes your decision, it is still true that your consciousness is not a closed system (especially if you accept the causal argument) and is affected by external causes. Those external causes can equally be said to make your decision.

 

[FishFace]

No there is another possiblity. My reasons for my choice is not what made the choice. I made the choice. I could have made it against all reasons and have done that. I have made choices that all reasons would have said don't do it that way. The break down in your reasoning is the assumtion that I must do something if there is a reason to do it. You reason backwards in that you assume if I decide something there must have been a reason that forced me to do that. Reasons support a decision, but they do not force it.

Then replace "reason" with "cause" and run the argument again.
Your decision had a cause. That cause was either internal or external. If the cause was external, your decision was determined by something other than you. For the timeline on which we're talking, causes always have causes. You can't have an infinitude of causes inside you since you haven't existed forever, so at some point there must be an external cause.
Hence, your decision was externally determined.