My only problem with hard determinism

[Sojourner<><]

I'm not a hard determinist, but it is worth pointing out that random quantum fluctuations play a role in hard determinism too. So it's not just the Big Bang at play.


eudaimonia,

Mark

I wouldn't bank on it... the existence of hidden variables hasn't been positively ruled out. QM might work for you, but I'm going to stick with Einstein on this one.

 

[Sojourner<><]

I could definitely be wrong here. I thought there was nothing truely random. Doesn't quantum mechanics propose that there is only true uncertainty? I read a book on this subject at one point with a chapter titled "The Uncertainty Principle, The Principle of Uncertainty, and Principle Uncertainty" (the title referred to three different things too).

This means that quantum mechanics does not negate Hard Determinism. I cannot discern if that was the point you were trying to make, but I thought I would point that out anyways.

I would agree with you here, but a lot of folks these days seem to regard QM as truth in principle, rather than a model of the principles that we can't see (yet).

 

[Washington]

2. "As if the structure of the universe at the time had been different in any way I would not only not have B&E, but probably not exist."
Imo you are necessarily running into problems if you try to grasp the concept determinism with such negative retrospective hypotheticals ("What if, hadn´t...?"). You are introducing a way of thinking that is not compastible with determinism. Things couldn´t have been different, at no point in time, and this includes the structure of the universe at that starting point you are thinking of.
I´m sometimes wondering why considerations of the "what if things were different" are so common and dear to us, why we even entertain such absurd ideas. I think the explanation is: Whatever we look at, we have a focus, a limited perspective. We understand how this necessarily leads to that, but there is always the possibility that there are aspects we haven´t considered, and thus things aren´t turning out as we would have expected. Somehow we manage to fall for the illusion that if "What if things don´t turn out as expected?" is a meaningful question then "What if things would be different than they are?" must be equally meaningful. It almost sounds the same, after all.
In real life and we can compare the different outcomes if changing only one factor and this allows for expectations. However, the universe is all there is, there is nothing to compare it to.

So it´s just the inability to imagine very long time spans?

Not the time span, but that the mass of hot hydrogen and helium atoms that were careening around happened to be careening around in just such a way that they necessarily set into motion a quite particular series of C/E events among themselves that would so shape the stars in a particular way, that would eventually go supernova to produce the heavier elements in a particular way, that would then coalesce into molecules in a particular way, that would then stick together in a particular fashion, that would form tiny bits of matter in a particular way, that would bind together into chunks in a particular way, that would slowly spin into a band that circled a star in a particular way, that would join together to form the planet Earth in a particular way, that would cool and and give birth to life in a particular way, that would evolve into pigs, chickens, and people in a particular way, which would end up as bacon and eggs on my breakfast plate. And all because billions of years ago specific hydrogen and helium atoms interacted in a particular way and no other.

It's just something I have to work on, but thanks for your input. It's very appreciated.

 

[quatona]

It is not an obvious fact that I cannot chose either a steak or a hamburger or both or neither or something else. What is an obvious fact is I can do that, or not do that as I chose.

elman, please respect that I didn´t write my post as a refutation of your "freewill" ideas, but in response to a person who already had stated that determinism is intellectually convincing him, but that he doesn´t manage to imagine it fully.
This was a conversation that was based on determinism as a premise.

You keep equivocating two different meanings of "choice", btw.
That you can choose a hamburger or a steak is as obvious as is the fact that an apple can choose to fall on the grass or on a shed.

 

[Allegory]

I just took a quick scan of this topic so I didn't fully read all the posts, but I'm not really seeing the issue with determinism here. If you accept causality, then isn't determinism a reasonable "next-step", so to speak? It's not like free will, for all intents and purposes, does not exist. In order to "destroy" free will through determinism you'd need to know the state of every event within the light cone of an event you're trying to predict, which is basically impossible unless you have the raw computing power to measure the state of the universe from the present back to the very beginning.

So I don't think determinism is such a huge logical leap to make, and perhaps determinism is a bad word for it, but it's not like the fact that you may not technically have free will should undermine your idea of free will. Nobody can truly predict what's going to happen next because in order to make such a prediction you would have to know the state of everything that could have possibly effected the event.

I guess to sum it up in one sentence, free will may not exist to an outside observer watching the universe evolve, but to the individual experiencing the universe it does. So does it matter if determinism really exists or not? We're all just actors within the universe, with no one watching the play (as far as we know)

 

[Eudaimonist]

I wouldn't bank on it... the existence of hidden variables hasn't been positively ruled out. QM might work for you, but I'm going to stick with Einstein on this one.

I don't really have an opinion on this one. I personally would prefer the existence of hidden variables, but I think nature should tell us what is really going on.

I can't help but be reminded of:

Einstein: God doesn't play dice with the universe.
QM people: Don't tell God what to do!


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Diavolos]

it is obviously impossible.

also determinism cant explain the origin of the universe from nothing nor can it explain freewill.

Plate tectonics can't explain why I like ice cream, but that's not a mark against it. Determinism isn't required to explain "the origins of the universe", and secondly, if determinism is true, is probable that "freewill" is utter nonsense, so why would it need to explain it? That's like pointing out that if materialism can't explain ghosts. Of course it can't; one of its postulates is that ghosts don't exist! Likewise, determinism is usually presented in such a way that it is incompatible with freewill and therefore denies its existence.

 

[elman]

elman, please respect that I didn´t write my post as a refutation of your "freewill" ideas, but in response to a person who already had stated that determinism is intellectually convincing him, but that he doesn´t manage to imagine it fully.
This was a conversation that was based on determinism as a premise.

You keep equivocating two different meanings of "choice", btw.
That you can choose a hamburger or a steak is as obvious as is the fact that an apple can choose to fall on the grass or on a shed.

We must not be working with the same term for obvious either. I don't see it as obvious that an apple or a rock makes any choice at all, but it is obvious that I do.

 

[quatona]

We must not be working with the same term for obvious either. I don't see it as obvious that an apple or a rock makes any choice at all, but it is obvious that I do.

Whatever.
"It´s obvious" does not an argument make.

 

[Received]

I'm enthralled and appalled at both hard determinism and libertarianism for different reasons (soft determinism is nonsense, in my opinion): for the one because it's a really neat concept that that universe truly is a unity, but also because of the absolute necessity that works against my involuntary little itch for freedom; for the other because freedom allows for dignity and real particularity, but responsibility is a daunting task, much less incredibly hard to calculate (if not impossible).

 

[Diavolos]

soft determinism is nonsense, in my opinion

Why is soft determinism nonsense?

 

[Washington]

I'm enthralled and appalled at both hard determinism and libertarianism for different reasons (soft determinism is nonsense, in my opinion): for the one because it's a really neat concept that that universe truly is a unity, but also because of the absolute necessity that works against my involuntary little itch for freedom; for the other because freedom allows for dignity and real particularity, but responsibility is a daunting task, much less incredibly hard to calculate (if not impossible).

If I understand what you've said, and I'm not sure I do, the sticking point is that involuntary little itches don't determine reality. And just because the idea of unfettered dignity and responsibility is very appealing, it does not give them substance.

 

[Genre]

Why is soft determinism nonsense?

I have yet to see a convincing argument for the idea that determinism and freewill can coexist. That is not to say, however, that there is not one.

 

[Received]

Soft determinism seems to be a complete revamping of freedom; it seems to say that freedom is freedom according to a deterministic model, therefore freedom exists -- which is true for determinism; insofar as liberatianism is concerned, if by "freedom" you mean something that cannot transcend the deterministic process, you don't mean "freedom" in the sense that libertarians understand it. It's a problem of definition, really.

 

[Washington]

Soft determinism seems to be a complete revamping of freedom; it seems to say that freedom is freedom according to a deterministic model, therefore freedom exists -- which is true for determinism; insofar as liberatianism is concerned, if by "freedom" you mean something that cannot transcend the deterministic process, you don't mean "freedom" in the sense that libertarians understand it. It's a problem of definition, really.

Run on sentences are so hard to plow through.

Anyway.
Soft determinism agrees with the hard determinist's contention that all effects, human actions included, are determined by causation. But, the soft determinist will allow for the notion of a "free" act IF that notion ONLY means the act was uncoerced. It's hardly an important distinction in the free will V. determinism issue, but does serve to distinguish between coerced and uncoerced acts; for whatever that's worth. That said, some free willers see this as a solution to the "free will problem" in that they see it as a means to assign moral responsibility. Typically called compatabilism, a dishonest and self-deluding notion, it's nothing that effects the strength of determinism.

 

[Diavolos]

Typically called compatabilism, a dishonest and self-deluding notion, it's nothing that effects the strength of determinism.

Compatibalism is neither dishonest nor especially "self-deluding"; compatibilists acknowledge determinism, and simultaneously affirm a form of free will, true, but the distinctions they draw isn't "self-deluding". Compatibilists like Daniel Dennett probably understand the implications of determinism better than you or I, they simply don't think the idea of "free will" that people commonly have is the appropriate way of conceiving of it. Some even deny that freedom can apply to the will, like Leibniz. Nor is it dishonest, since, while their position itself can be somewhat fuzzy, that they do not deny determinism is evident.

Our inabiltiy to understand their positions or our belief that they are contradictory or unconvincing doesn't mean that they are dishonest, it just means that either their position is unclear or incoherent, or our understanding isn't sufficient. They're not trying to delude themselves or anyone else with any sort of malicious intent or need to believe free will exists; they readily acknowledge that our "conventional" notion of it does NOT exist.

Plus, I happen to find compabitalism more interesting than determinism, since it has more to say about the will, behavior, and how choices are made.

 

[Washington]

Compatibalism is neither dishonest nor especially "self-deluding"; compatibilists acknowledge determinism, and simultaneously affirm a form of free will, true, but the distinctions they draw isn't "self-deluding". Compatibilists like Daniel Dennett probably understand the implications of determinism better than you or I, they simply don't think the idea of "free will" that people commonly have is the appropriate way of conceiving of it. Some even deny that freedom can apply to the will, like Leibniz. Nor is it dishonest, since, while their position itself can be somewhat fuzzy, that they do not deny determinism is evident.

Our inabiltiy to understand their positions or our belief that they are contradictory or unconvincing doesn't mean that they are dishonest, it just means that either their position is unclear or incoherent, or our understanding isn't sufficient. They're not trying to delude themselves or anyone else with any sort of malicious intent or need to believe free will exists; they readily acknowledge that our "conventional" notion of it does NOT exist.

Plus, I happen to find compabitalism more interesting than determinism, since it has more to say about the will, behavior, and how choices are made.

Good for you, but what do you think compatabilism says about the will?

About behavior?

And how choices are made?

 

[Received]

Run on sentences are so hard to plow through.

Come come. A wee semicolon that peripherally violates the law that independent clauses can be separated by them if they have similar ideas isn't so hard. 'Twould be hard if there was no semicolon; and technically, independent clauses without punctuation is what constitutes the definition of a run-on.

Anyway.
Soft determinism agrees with the hard determinist's contention that all effects, human actions included, are determined by causation. But, the soft determinist will allow for the notion of a "free" act IF that notion ONLY means the act was uncoerced. It's hardly an important distinction in the free will V. determinism issue, but does serve to distinguish between coerced and uncoerced acts; for whatever that's worth. That said, some free willers see this as a solution to the "free will problem" in that they see it as a means to assign moral responsibility. Typically called compatabilism, a dishonest and self-deluding notion, it's nothing that effects the strength of determinism.

Put it this way: determinism and libertarianism are correlative; there is no middle ground. This is because if an act CAN be uncoerced, it ain't determinism that we're ascribing to. The soft determinist's understanding is bet-hedging; it's upholding libertarianism while keeping the determinist title. IF an act can be uncoerced, it is libertarianism, and as such determinism has nothing to do with the equation. This doesn't negate the possibility of determinism as it is understood non-subjectively; but insofar as the subject is concerned (and this is where the question of determinism comes in), there is no possibility for a sometimes determined, sometimes free act. If the subject is free, ALL of his actions are free; if the subject isn't free, ALL of them are determined. If he is free and there is a deterministic element to the universe, they don't apply to *him*, though they may apply to a very fundamental constituent in who he is (i.e., his brain).

 

[elman]

Whatever.
"It´s obvious" does not an argument make.

When I can see something is true, i.e. I can make choices, then it becomes abvious that telling me I cannot make choices or that the choices I make are not made by me, but forced on me is incorrect.

 

[Diavolos]

Good for you, but what do you think compatabilism says about the will?

About behavior?

And how choices are made?

Depends on the type of compatibilism. People who simply say "there is no free will" and leave it at that are going to miss out on a lot of interesting things about brain function and may dismiss outright what many philosophers have had to say about the will simply because free will in these philosopher's discussions is different from what they want it to always mean. A reductionist determinism that insists all brain function can be described in mechanistic terms and insists that because it is determined at this level it may ignore important features at higher levels of social interaction and such. What I am saying is that we don't want to be, as Dennett called it, "greedy reductionists":

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greedy_reductionism

Not that it will, of course. I do think brain function could be described in purely molecular terms but that doesn't mean that things like love or anger lose their meaning - insisting that love is "just" a certain coordinated electrochemical phenomena in the brain, for instance, would be an example of what I am saying we should be wary of.