Morality without Absolute Morality

[2PhiloVoid]

The problem with claims of absolute morality is that we have to trust those who claim to have a source of absolute morality. I do not find any of them trustworthy.

That's ok. The feeling is mutual.

 

[Bradskii]

I said the capacity to reason.

If you require clarification: everyone with reason shares in the natural law, which is an expression of absolute morality.

Further clarification: first principles of morality are absolute and universal, binding on all people, so, in principle, everyone with reason has access to objective morality.

In that case I think that you're going to have to give me a couple of examples of what you mean by 'natural law' and 'first principles of morality'.

 

[doubtingmerle]

If you require clarification: everyone with reason shares in the natural law, which is an expression of absolute morality.

How do you know that natural law is an expression of absolute morality? Could it not be that "natural law" is simply a name for that which humans have discovered is necessary for society to function?

Further clarification: first principles of morality are absolute and universal, binding on all people, so, in principle, everyone with reason has access to objective morality.

Can you provide an example of a first principle of morality that is absolute and binding on all people?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Of course. I provided you with three examples of moral laws, specifically those that address killing, stealing, and false witness. However, the fact that I offered just three examples in no way implies that there is nothing more to morality than following these three examples. I was not intending in the least to claim that "the formation of domestic peace and well-being" requires "merely these alone."

That was a cheap blow. Are you even trying to understand what I say?

Yes, I am trying to understand what you are saying. And I disagree with you that I have delivered a "cheap blow." Obviously, our respective criteria for fidelity are different.

Does your absolute morality condemn cheap blows that falsely report what another person is saying?

..... please point your horns of dilemma in another direction. I'm not going to be your voluntary pin-cushion.

Well, on what basis can you declare a claimed absolute morality to be absolute? If you want to propose that a specific moral code represents moral absolutes, I would like to know your reasoning. Do you have a reason for declaring it is absolute?

Yes, when I'm using a definition of 'absolute' other than the one most people think of, I do have a reason for holding it. Otherwise, we can simply refer instead to the term, 'objective' so we don't confuse other people by what we mean in our use and connotations about the nature of a moral rule.

All that we need to know about morality can be determined using reason similar to that which I described in the opening post.

Obviously, this premise of yours is patently false. I'm surprised you think it's true. Now it's my turn to ask: are you even reading what I write and have written in my previous posts?

Can you think of a single moral principle that you believe is absolute that cannot be derived from reason?

Love your enemies ................................... ?

If your "absolute morality" cannot contribute one thing to our moral knowledge that we could not already derive from reason, what good is it?

I never said that my Ethical position will be compatible with that of your Moral Pragmatism (or with your pseudo-claim to total rationality).

Have you ever taken a class or even read a basic text-book on Ethics? Your appraisals of what is surely moral and how different Ethical frameworks work, especially where rational deliberation is central, are deficient.

 

[Hans Blaster]

That's ok. The feeling is mutual.

Who is claiming a absolute morality here?

 

[2PhiloVoid]

Who is claiming a absolute morality here?

I'm not. But Jesus is.

 

[Bradskii]

Bull. Different kinds of facts are subject to varying degrees of interpretation. So no, facts are not absolute in all cases.

A fact is an undeniable statement of reality. It is, by definition, absolute. In any case, even if that were not true then stating a fact and making a personal decision on a moral matter are not the same.

Our perspectives on what we each may think morality should be is subject to relative contexts, and my philosophy professor knew that. But that wasn't his point.

No. His point, as you pointed out, is that dumb retort to anyone who states that morality is relative. Being 'Oh, so you are absolutely sure about that (snigger, snigger). Which I actually saw a couple of days ago when Charlie Kirk thought he could raise a laugh at some student's expense when the student questioned him about relative morality. And he did. Guffaws from all his supporters in the crowd (maybe they had the same professor as you). And the student very politely pointed out the fallacy in asking the question. That morality and facts about morality are two things that are not the same. Kirk deflected.

I think you're conflating the decision making process and its motive with epistemic relativity. If it's wrong to kill innocent children within conditions A, B, C, & D, then it's at least objective to say so regardless of whether or not someone else's moral decisions are retarded by their own individual limited comprehension. In such a case that we do have an individual who intentionally and carelessly flouts those objective conditions, then it is an absolute moral truth that he is a sociopath and not merely a subject of moral relativism.

You have to be careful about using extreme examples where all reasonable people would agree that something was wrong and then conclude that it must therefore be absolutely wrong. Again, this occurred in the Kirk video. He asked the student if he thought that some atrocity was absolutely wrong. He said that he didn't think it was. Gasps from the crowd. But he went on to explain that he thought it was very wrong indeed, but as he didn't believe in absolute morality, the question 'Is it absolutely wrong' made no sense.

If there is an absolute morality then a moral decision is either absolutely correct or not (I don't think it's reasonable to argue that some aspects of morality are absolute, and some relative. That makes no sense). So we need to look at examples which are not cut and dry where the answer is not obvious. So...you send a child to her room because she has been naughty. That's reasonable. But you keep her there for 4 hours? Is that morally acceptable? You keep her there for a week. Well, we're getting to a situation where most people would call that immoral. Add the fact that you only feed her bread and water.

At some point, if morality is absolute then there will be a point where it becomes wrong. You can't have an absolute morality where it's kinda wrong. Or nearly wrong. Or it's OK right now, but gradually becomes less acceptable. That's not absolute morality. So who decides on the length of the punishment?

In other words, there is no room on a humanly devised moral continuum for sociopaths and psychopaths.

Yes, there is. Not all sociopaths and even psychopaths are axe murdering maniacs. There is most definitely a continuum. Here's a list of 15 signs that you may have sociopathic tendencies.

15 Signs of a Sociopath: Traits & Characteristics

A sociopath is someone who displays manipulative behavior, a lack of empathy, and impulsiveness—key traits associated with a severe form of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). Sociopaths do not have a fully functional conscience and tend to be manipulative, exploitative, or even abusive...

www.choosingtherapy.com

So why don't we take an example from public life that we both know and see if that person can be included in our 'humanly devised moral continuum'. Let's take Trump. And gee, whaddya know. He seems to fulfill almost all the criteria. I might leave that with you for your consideration.

Moreover, there seem to be competing definitions for "moral relativism." The one I hold is the following:

Moral Relativism - Ethics Unwrapped

Moral Relativism asserts that moral standards are culturally-defined and therefore it may be impossible to determine what is truly right or wrong.

ethicsunwrapped.utexas.edu

I agree with it completely. And as regards the kid being sent to her room for X amount of time, I'll note that it says this:

'Moral relativism is on the opposite end of the continuum from moral absolutism, which says that there is always one right answer to any ethical question.'

 

[Bradskii]

I'm not.

But you're arguing for it. Unless you're playing the Devil's Advocate...

 

[Hans Blaster]

I'm not. But Jesus is.

He would be one that I don't trust nor recognize the moral authority of.

 

[doubtingmerle]

Yes, when I'm using a definition of 'absolute' other than the one most people think of, I do have a reason for holding it.

LOL! This is in response to my question, "On what basis can you declare a claimed absolute morality to be absolute?"

Strike one.

Care to step up to the plate again? OK, here's the pitch: "On what basis can you declare a claimed absolute morality to be absolute?"

Love your enemies ................................... ?

This is in response to my question, " Can you think of a single moral principle that you believe is absolute that cannot be derived from reason?"

According to the quickest source I have available for the definition of love I read this definition: "feel deep affection for (someone)". Seriously? There is a moral absolute that you must feel deep affection for Hitler, Stalin, and Osama Bin Laden?

Or perhaps you were looking for the second definition of love found there: "feel a deep romantic or sexual attachment to (someone)". Oh, my. It is not getting any better. So, is it indeed a moral absolute that you must feel a deep romantic or sexual attachment to Hitler?

Let's try the third definition listed there: "like or enjoy very much". Is it really a moral absolute that you must like or enjoy Hitler very much?

Please define what you mean by "love" in the statement above. If you think there is an absolute command that we need to "love" Hitler and Stalin in the way you define it, I am curious how you define it.

 

[Colo Millz]

In that case I think that you're going to have to give me a couple of examples of what you mean by 'natural law' and 'first principles of morality'.

Do not murder (innocent life must be preserved).

Do not commit adultery (marriage and family must be protected).

Do not steal (justice and social living require respecting property).

Honor parents (family is natural and foundational).

Worship God (humans are naturally inclined to recognize and honor the divine).

Tell the truth (speech is for communication and community).

 

[Colo Millz]

How do you know that natural law is an expression of absolute morality? Could it not be that "natural law" is simply a name for that which humans have discovered is necessary for society to function?

Can you provide an example of a first principle of morality that is absolute and binding on all people?

That was Hume's view - that morality was pragmatic, not absolute, and consists of rules that emerge through circumstances. That is, if the circumstances change, then so do the rules.

IMHO the principle disadvantages of such a view are that it becomes inevitably relativistic, that is, morality becomes relative to context and therefore, female circumcision is not necessarily bad in an objective sense since well, that's just your, like, opinion, man.

There is also a danger that functionalism in morality will degenerate into a power-based morality. Might makes right. The norm simply becomes what the strong man says it is. Under this view the "moral system" of Nazi Germany worked perfectly adequately for that society at that point in time.

If you want a single absolute moral principle, the classic example — from Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae (I-II, q.18; q.94) — is:

It is always wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being.

 

[Bradskii]

Do not murder (innocent life must be preserved).

Do not commit adultery (marriage and family must be protected).

I'll skip these two as murder is a legal term which by definition renders it wrong. And I'm not going to argue for any examples of when adultery could be considered acceptable.

Do not steal (justice and social living require respecting property).

I just overheard my neighbour saying that he was going to shoot his family. So I jumped the fence, searched his bedroom and stole his gun. Phew...tragedy averted!

Honor parents (family is natural and foundational).

A young girl is beaten and raped on a regular basis by her father. Are you saying that she should still exhibit respect and pride for him?

Worship God (humans are naturally inclined to recognize and honor the divine).

Should I worship a god in which I don't believe? I think I'd be contradicting your next moral position.

Tell the truth (speech is for communication and community).

Oh, c'mon. Too easy. 'Tell me, is the Jewish family hiding in your house?'

 

[Colo Millz]

Let's take my weakest example first, which may be the last one.

I am not a strict deontologist. Therefore, unlike Kant, I would indeed lie when asked by the Nazis if Anne Frank was hiding in my attic.

But does that necessarily tell us that "tell the truth" is no longer an absolute principle of morality?

No, it merely means that the rule is not absolutely "binding" in every instance, and instead is a type of prima facie absolute. These principles in other words bind strongly but can be overridden by higher obligations. In this instance the stronger obligation would be not to permit murder, perhaps, or at least protecting innocent life.

Now, in fact Aquinas is stricter on this than you might expect. He is more like Kant in this regard and argues that lying is always wrong, even in cases like hiding someone from murderers.

But I don't believe we have to follow him in that.

So in cases where there is a hierarchy of moral principles, the higher beats out the lower. “Tell the truth” is still an absolute principle, but a prima facie principle, one that can be overridden by a more binding principle, like protecting innocent life.

 

[Bradskii]

That was Hume's view - that morality was pragmatic, not absolute, and consists of rules that emerge through circumstances. That is, if the circumstances change, then so do the rules.

It seems nonsensical to suggest that if the circumstances change then you ignore that fact. Decisions that we make are literally based on context. How could they not be? How is it possible to exclude context?

IMHO the principle disadvantages of such a view are that it becomes inevitably relativistic, that is, morality becomes relative to context and therefore, female circumcision is not necessarily bad in an objective sense since well, that's just your, like, opinion, man.

No, no and NO again. Relative morality DOES NOT mean that you have to accept moral actions by others. This is another oft touted fallacy. I think it's wrong. You think it's wrong. But we're not having a vote on this.

There is also a danger of functionalism in morality from degenerating into a power-based morality. Might makes right. The norm simply becomes what the strong man says it is. Under this view the "moral system" of Nazi Germany worked perfectly adequately for that society at that point in time.

See above. You don't have to accept it as being right. That, believe it or not, is what makes it relative. You make the decision.

It is always wrong to intentionally kill an innocent human being.

Many would agree. A lot would not. Think Dresden, the Blitz, Hiroshima, Vietnam...I'd think that realising that many would sacrifice the few to save the many would at least cast some doubt in your mind as to whether that dictum is absolute.

 

[Bradskii]

Let's take my weakest example first, which may be the last one.

I am not a strict deontologist. Therefore, unlike Kant, I would indeed lie when asked by the Nazis if Anne Frank was hiding in my attic.

But does that necessarily tell us that "tell the truth" is no longer an absolute principle of morality?

Yes. Because it depends on context.

Look, if anyone was given the commandment 'Do not lie' then the very first question would be 'What circumstances are we talking about here?' And you cannot give an absolute answer without considering the circumstances. Which would be all but infinite. You have to be very specific about when it's acceptable or not. 'Do not lie' is as vague as 'Do not kill'. It's an example of a moral position that I would have used myself to prove to you that morality is subjective.

No, it merely means that the rule is not absolutely "binding" in every instance...

Which makes it relative to the circumstances. That's my argument. Not yours.

Now, in fact Aquinas is stricter on this than you might expect. He is more like Kant in this regard and argues that lying is always wrong, even in cases like hiding someone from murderers.

Which shows that both believe it's an absolute moral position. Anyone who disagrees with them and says that in some circumstances it's morally correct to lie, as we both did, is arguing against them. Is arguing for a relative morality.

But I don't believe we have to follow him in that.

So in cases where there is a hierarchy of moral principles, the higher beats out the lower. “Tell the truth” is still an absolute principle, but a prima facie principle, one that can be overridden by a more binding principle, like protecting innocent life.

It's not an absolute moral principle. It's a guide. A decision on which is, as you said, relative to the circumstances.

 

[Colo Millz]

... I'd think that realising that many would sacrifice the few to save the many would at least cast some doubt in your mind as to whether that dictum is absolute.

The classic modern example of what your talking about is the trolley thought experiment.

We have all heard it:

A runaway trolley is about to kill 5 people tied to the tracks. You can pull a lever to divert it onto another track, where it will kill 1 person. Question: Do you pull the lever?

The utilitarian/consequentialist response is yes, pull the lever, the Kantian/deontologist response is no, do not pull the lever.

I think when properly understood Aquinas' response is a good middle ground to the problem - he might permit pulling the lever since the act is neutral (pulling a lever is not intrinsically evil), the bad effect is only a side effect, not the intended means (since the intent is to save 5, not to kill 1) and there is proportionality (saving 5 outweighs the loss of 1).

Modern Thomists sometimes distinguish this response from that of a different thought experiment - instead of a lever, you have to push a large fat man off a platform to stop the trolley and thereby save the 5.

Here, the man's death is the direct means to stopping the trolley. Since that is the case, this is therefore always wrong since, unlike the lever example, it involves directly intending the death of an innocent.

For consequentialism, it's still ok. 1 versus 5 still operates in the fat man example also, so it's ok to push the man onto the tracks.

So as you are pointing out, the consequentialist versus deontologist debate is based on extreme positions where one side says outcomes matter more than principles, the other side says principles matter more than outcomes, etc.

But the real point is that the grownups know that outcomes versus principles are in tension, and have to be balanced somehow.

The real points of difference are where to draw that line in particular cases.

 

[Colo Millz]

... It's a guide.

If you prefer.

But then why should we trust one guide from another unless there is some appeal to an objective rationale?

 

[Bradskii]

The real points of difference are where to draw that line in particular cases.

Yes. There is no 'correct' position. Just ones that are relative to your own viewpoint.

 

[Bradskii]

If you prefer.

But then why should we trust one guide from another unless there is some appeal to an objective rationale?

The guide is just that: a guide. You should use it to make decisions dependent on the circumstances. The facts of the matter. You shouldn't use it as a rule book.