Moral Relativism

[markdw82]

I like how you put that (and your previous post as well).

 

[Eudaimonist]

Moral relativism is a view that claims moral standards are not absolute or universal, but rather emerge from social customs and other sources. Relativists consequently see moral values as applicable only within agreed or accepted cultural boundaries.

Do you agree or disagree with this view? To what extent? Why?

What do you mean by "absolute or universal"? What do you mean by "emerge from social customs and other sources"?

Are you saying that moral standards, according to moral relativism, are effectively arbitrary? That no moral standard is better, or more good, for anyone than any other, including the moral standards of the Mongol Hordes, or Nazi Germany, for instance?

 

[mepalmer3]

Lying is a survival tactic. A very crude one, but still a survival tactic. A child will lie to get out of trouble, even a child who has not been taught about lying will lie. There was a study conducted a number of years ago (Im sorry but I dont have references) where a child was placed in a chair with a toy behind them. An assistant told the child not to look at the toy then left the room. A hidden camera showed that nearly all of the children looked and 80% of the children that looked, lied about doing so.

Dis-honesty is inherant in us

That's another really interesting thing about it. IF, we more or less naturally evolve, we're purely a product of nature, there is no god, etc... and I agree that lying might be part of the survival instinct, then why do we feel wrong about it? And not only that, why does pretty much everyone feel wrong about doing it?

There seems to be 2 basic facts that are unavoidable:

1. "Human being, all over the earth, have this curious idea that they ought to behave in a certain way, and cannot really get rid of it."
2. "We do not in fact behave in that way [all of the time]. We know the law of human nature and we break it."

Mere Christianity, chapter 1.

 

[Stinker]

A child that had never had a spanking, would think they could get away with an action if they thought no one saw them do it. "He that spareth the rod hateth his son: but he that loveth him chasteneth him betimes." (Prov.13:24)

If that child had been spanked in the past for disobedience before being left alone in that room to obey a command....then that child would not have turned around and looked.



Is murder, lying, stealing, torture, etc., etc., considered morally wrong by every nation of the world? YES. But.....it depends on just what individual/s or class of people these things were committed against to determine if they were morally wrong.

This is true Moral Relativity. Notice how ugly it is.

 

[SnowBear]

"Telling the truth is a definite object morally right thing to do that all cultures agree on. Of course there are some compulsive liars that just don't seem to get it and probably all people lie at some point or another -- but overwhelmingly civilization relies on people telling the truth. And to imagine a society where lying is a morally good thing is just nonsensical.

Nazi Germany

Society would completely break down. I don't think complete moral relativity works... and I don't think there's much evidence of it as far as basic morality goes"

Nazi Germany held together quite well it was pressure form the outside that made it collapse not the necessity of lying that the average person had to engage in to survive.

 

[SnowBear]

morals that are not absolute are worthless.

If only there were absolute morals. Unfortunately no one has ever come up with one.

 

[SnowBear]

I totally agree. I mean, really, what's the point of any moral code if it can be altered and interpretted in a completely opposite manner?

What is the point of an authoritarian code that must be personally interpreted? Not every one will interpret the same “authoritarian” code in the same way, so how can it be universal?





What is the point of a moral code that cannot be applied to all people in all situations in all societies at any time past present or future?

 

[The Seeker]

Yep
Moral relativism can be translated to pointless activity:

If an activity has a point, then it is done for the sake of it i.e. independently of circumstances.
since moral relativism says morals depend on circumstances, they are not done for the sake of it i.e. it is pointless.

So if you were in the middle of the road and a car was headed towards you at 70mph, would you say "Well there's no point in moving out of the way, I wouldn't be moving for the sake of moving, I'd be doing it for the sake of not being run over"?

 

[mepalmer3]

Nazi Germany held together quite well it was pressure form the outside that made it collapse not the necessity of lying that the average person had to engage in to survive.

Even in Germany a large group of people, primarily jews, but also christians and other folks certainly didn't think that lying was moral. Just because a group "believes" that what they are doing is moral, doesn't mean that in fact that is the case.

If there really is no objective morality -- then when argue with someone as to whether or not something is right/wrong, we have reduced our conversation to that of discussing personal tastes. I think that slavery is wrong is reduced to I like grape juice. There really is no sense arguing with someone whether or not he actually likes grape juice. But that is what we get if there is no real objective morality for all people.

 

[David Gould]

If there really is no objective morality -- then when argue with someone as to whether or not something is right/wrong, we have reduced our conversation to that of discussing personal tastes. I think that slavery is wrong is reduced to I like grape juice. There really is no sense arguing with someone whether or not he actually likes grape juice. But that is what we get if there is no real objective morality for all people.

While in some ways I agree with you, there is a crucial part of your argument that is wrong.

People who do not like grape juice cannot be convinced by rational arguments to like grape juice.

People who think slavery is morally acceptable can be convinced by rational arguments that it is is not.


This means that while it make no sense to argue with someone over their distaste for grape juice, it makes perfect sense to argue with someone about the issue of slavery.

 

[SnowBear]

Even in Germany a large group of people, primarily jews, but also christians and other folks certainly didn't think that lying was moral. Just because a group "believes" that what they are doing is moral, doesn't mean that in fact that is the case.

What about those Christian who hid Jews (and gypsies and homosexuals) from the Nazis?



What about those that kept their families safe by lying and swearing allegiance to the government?



The point was that it was originally claimed that it is nonsensical to imagine a civilization where lying is morally good. This is not the case.

If there really is no objective morality -- then when argue with someone as to whether or not something is right/wrong, we have reduced our conversation to that of discussing personal tastes. I think that slavery is wrong is reduced to I like grape juice. There really is no sense arguing with someone whether or not he actually likes grape juice. But that is what we get if there is no real objective morality for all people.

You seem to be mistaking relativism for nihilism.

 

[mepalmer3]

What about those Christian who hid Jews (and gypsies and homosexuals) from the Nazis?

I think we can assume that those christians also believed that lying is generally morally wrong. When 2 things that are by themselves morally wrong come about, then we must decide which is of greater importance at that time. And in order to save a life, lying would generally be thought of as permissible. I think you're assuming some sort of Kant-like morality where it's absolute/universal in that it's always morally wrong to lie or it's always wrong to do some specific action regardless of the circumstances. But I'm talking about moral relativity, the idea that what is right for me may not also in fact be right for you, and that neither of our ideas is correct, it's just our opinion.

The point was that it was originally claimed that it is nonsensical to imagine a civilization where lying is morally good. This is not the case.

ok - perhaps we're getting our ideas crossed. Certainly, it's not nonsensical to think of a civilization where lying is morally permissible under certain circumstances -- such as saving someone's life. What I should have said is, it's nonsensical to imagine a civilization where lying for no apparent reason is considered morally good. Communication relies on the inherent expectation that when you ask somebody what time it is, they will tell you what they believe to be the correct time, not lie to you. Just as a matter of practicality, I have never heard of a marriage counsellor who suggests to a couple in trouble that they ought to blatanly lie to each other more often. I have never heard of a teacher who has knowingly been praised for lying to her students. The ramifications of a society that is built upon the "virtue" of dishonesty is simply nonsensical. It generally creates such a problem of mistrust that people can simply not effectively work/live together. So there's no reason to believe that a "civilization" can effectively survive built upon a virtue such as lying.

You seem to be mistaking relativism for nihilism.

I'm not rejecting or suggesting that there isn't any morality -- I'm just talking about if morality were relative to that culture or person, if it wasn't objective or absolute with regard to the circumstance. In that case, honesty isn't necessarily the true "right" thing to do, it's up to that person/culture's preference. So in my example, I took a simple moral virtue as honesty and I showed that it would be nonsensical for us to talk of a virtue of dishonesty.

To the more extreme example, Moral relativity allows for the possibility that something really horrible such as raping little kids could be considered morally good to some society. Who are we to say that's wrong for them since there is no objectively moral right/wrong. But by and large people do believe in an objective moral right/wrong and as such think that the notion of raping young kids is horribly wrong on all accounts. As soon as you draw a line and you say, "No, this could never be morally permissible by a society" then we're now talking about an objective moral law.

 

[kedaman]

So if you were in the middle of the road and a car was headed towards you at 70mph, would you say "Well there's no point in moving out of the way, I wouldn't be moving for the sake of moving, I'd be doing it for the sake of not being run over"?

Nope, there is nothing moral about that action, but there is nothing immoral in moving out of the way.

 

[mepalmer3]

People who do not like grape juice cannot be convinced by rational arguments to like grape juice.

People who think slavery is morally acceptable can be convinced by rational arguments that it is is not.

I'm sorry... I missed this message the first time around.

Yes, you're picking up on the distinction between the 2. Despite the fact that people want to think that morality is relative, we see in cases like this that intuitively we don't believe it is -- we believe that objective morality IS in fact something people can believe in. BUT, taking the relativism approach -- he might argue that you can't in fact convince him that it is right by rational means. At some point you have to have a premise that says that we should not enslave people because it is harmful for them (and list the ways that it is harmful). The relativist may simply say that they don't believe just because something hurts someone means it's wrong. We don't get angry at the lion for killing some animal, we don't call that immoral. So I reject the notion that relativists will accept the premises necessary to logically convince them otherwise. But I do agree that it's very counter intuitive to what we really believe.

 

[Phred]

There simply is no such thing as an absolute right or wrong. At no time has humanity ever simply understood that something is right or wrong just because it IS. We define right or wrong with terms... this is wrong because it harms others... the morality being "don't harm others." Yet we justify war which clearly harms others.

Absolute means always. Always, in all circumstances, at all times, in all places, this action is right or wrong.

There just is no such thing.

.​

 

[David Gould]

I'm sorry... I missed this message the first time around.

Yes, you're picking up on the distinction between the 2. Despite the fact that people want to think that morality is relative, we see in cases like this that intuitively we don't believe it is -- we believe that objective morality IS in fact something people can believe in.

I am unclear on what yoy are saying here.

BUT, taking the relativism approach -- he might argue that you can't in fact convince him that it is right by rational means. At some point you have to have a premise that says that we should not enslave people because it is harmful for them (and list the ways that it is harmful).

No, you don't. The person you are talking to will have core values. You need to appeal to those core values. For example, you might convince him that slavery is wrong because slavery is bad for him.

The relativist may simply say that they don't believe just because something hurts someone means it's wrong. We don't get angry at the lion for killing some animal, we don't call that immoral. So I reject the notion that relativists will accept the premises necessary to logically convince them otherwise.

I am a relativist. I have changed my position on moral issues in the past based on things people have told me. So I am unclear what your argument means.

But I do agree that it's very counter intuitive to what we really believe.

What is counter-intuitive to what we really believe?

 

[mepalmer3]

While in some ways I agree with you, there is a crucial part of your argument that is wrong.

People who do not like grape juice cannot be convinced by rational arguments to like grape juice.

People who think slavery is morally acceptable can be convinced by rational arguments that it is is not.

This means that while it make no sense to argue with someone over their distaste for grape juice, it makes perfect sense to argue with someone about the issue of slavery.

I shouldn't have responded 10 minutes after waking up. Let me address this more adequately starting over.

Moral relativism states that there is no absolute right/wrong moral law (ie, morality is based upon whatever a person or society deems to be right.) What this means is that *I* get to decide for myself what is morally right and what is morally wrong.

So I may decide that murdering someone is morally acceptable to me. You may disagree if that is your moral stance. But why would you disagree if it is truly relative and left up to each individual?

When you speculate that you can use reason to get me to change my moral position, you're injecting the necessity of some moral position being of greater value than another one. In simpler terms you're saying you're moral position is somehow "more moral" than mine. But that suggests that maybe there really is a true moral right and wrong, a standard by which we can judge these 2 moral beliefs (your belief that murder is wrong and mine that murder is good because it eliminates the competition for resources).

So when we talk of relative morality, we're talking of right/wrong as a matter of personal taste. So it doesn't make sense to argue someone's personal taste with them.

But again, as you pointed out, we do inherently want and feel compelled to argue with people about morality. We do feel very strongly about things being morally wrong. We feel the desire to argue with people. We try to convince them that what they are doing is wrong. It's a very different attitude than if we try to convince someone that in fact they do not like grape juice. It's logical that we inherently believe that there is in fact a true standard, a real right/wrong that we are all under the law of.

I'm sorry I only spend a few minutes on that on my first response. There are a number of problems with relative morality I believe. I'll post a much more thorough argument against it in the days to come.

 

[David Gould]

I shouldn't have responded 10 minutes after waking up. Let me address this more adequately starting over.

Moral relativism states that there is no absolute right/wrong moral law (ie, morality is based upon whatever a person or society deems to be right.) What this means is that *I* get to decide for myself what is morally right and what is morally wrong.

So I may decide that murdering someone is morally acceptable to me. You may disagree if that is your moral stance. But why would you disagree if it is truly relative and left up to each individual?

I disagree because I do not agree with you. Think of it this way: is it in my interests to convince you that murdering me is wrong? You betcha it is.

When you speculate that you can use reason to get me to change my moral position, you're injecting the necessity of some moral position being of greater value than another one. In simpler terms you're saying you're moral position is somehow "more moral" than mine. But that suggests that maybe there really is a true moral right and wrong, a standard by which we can judge these 2 moral beliefs (your belief that murder is wrong and mine that murder is good because it eliminates the competition for resources).

No, I am not saying anything of the sort. It is simply that everyone has core values upon which they build their moral system. By appealing to those core values you can change the moral system.

For example, someone may have a a core value that Germany must be protected from all threats, no matter what. They are then convinced that the Jews pose a threat to Germany. And from there they are convinced that the Jews must be killed. To alter the final conclusion it is necessary to provide a rational argument that demonstrates that Jews do not pose a threat to Germany.

There is no requirement for me to argue that not killing Jews is inherently better than killing Jews. Instead, I pose the argument in the context of my opposition's own core values - core values which are subjective.

So when we talk of relative morality, we're talking of right/wrong as a matter of personal taste. So it doesn't make sense to argue someone's personal taste with them.

It does if the personal taste is based on a rational thought process. You just need to find the core values. You are correct in that you will be unable to rationally argue against the core values, however. But this is rarely a problem as core values also have different weightings. Thus, all you need to do is use a person's core values against one another.

But again, as you pointed out, we do inherently want and feel compelled to argue with people about morality. We do feel very strongly about things being morally wrong. We feel the desire to argue with people. We try to convince them that what they are doing is wrong. It's a very different attitude than if we try to convince someone that in fact they do not like grape juice. It's logical that we inherently believe that there is in fact a true standard, a real right/wrong that we are all under the law of.

That is not so. As I suggested in the murder example, self-interest at the very least propels us to argue for things that are in our own self-interest. If we take this a step further and look at core values in terms of grape juice, we come up with, 'Drinking grape juice gives me pleasure,' and 'People not being killed gives me pleasure.' Thus, to gain pleasure we try to convince people to do the things that give us pleasure.

In other words, we cannot change the fact that we are born with or acquire certain likes and dislikes. But we can try to change what other people do - by appealing to their likes and dislikes.

I'm sorry I only spend a few minutes on that on my first response. There are a number of problems with relative morality I believe. I'll post a much more thorough argument against it in the days to come.

Fair enough. To give you a hand, the way I think about morality is in these terms (thanks, Zoot): killing people is wrong-to-me (in other words, I think it is wrong for me to do it and I also think it is wrong for it to be done at all). What this means is that I feel bad about killing.

 

[The Seeker]

Nope, there is nothing moral about that action, but there is nothing immoral in moving out of the way.

But didn't you just say yourself that:

If an activity has a point, then it is done for the sake of it i.e. independently of circumstances.

 

[k]

It seems a bit ironic that moral relativism puts forth there are no universal laws concerning morality when the view itself is claiming a presupposed institution of universalism. The fact it is presupposed tells me there are universal laws, like Life. Life is universal; every living being wants to retain life. Therefore, murder is wrong. Is there any living being that wishes death?