Modal Ontological Argument from Divine Justice

[CatholicSoxFan]

For a while, I have been interested in the Modal Ontological Argument. Recently, I came across a new version of the argument which I think is better. It is featured on "Part I, Article III" of this page: The Tractatus | NewApologetics.com

Note that I also think you should explore the site I linked to at some point, because some more interesting things are said in it.

I will give an explanation of it here; if you don't understand it at first, that's fine, I didn't either. You can ask any questions you like.

The explanation (which may or may not help):

Basically there are two foundational concepts in play here:

1) The definition of "injustice". Something is unjust if it can be said to be lacking of a due good by come coherent evaluative standard. The argument attempts to make the definition of injustice as wide-open as it could possibly be. This definition does not require a belief that what is just and unjust is objective (so you don't have to argue back and forth with an atheist about objective/subjective morality), although as you will see later on the argument tries to show that God exists, ad fulfills all coherent evaluative standards.

2) The concepts of modal logic being applied to situations. The same words "possible", "necessary", "impossible", etc. are transferred to talk about situations. So something is situationally necessary if it is true about all possible situations, situationally possible if it is true about some possible situations, etc.

Once those two basic concepts are understood, two crucial axioms to understand:

1) If some property is not compatible with some other property (in the argument itself uses the example of property a being incompatible with b), then it is compatible with the negation of that property (so a would be compatible with not-b). This is true simply because property a has to be logically possible (logically impossible properties are not properties at all), and either b or not-b must be true. If you think about it, if a were incompatible with both b and not-b, a would be logically impossible. Now, one could always say that property a is impossible and that would mean it could be incompatible with both b and not-b, but that doesn't work in response to this argument, as will be seen later.

2) If it is possible that a property is situationally necessary (i.e. if that property is compatible with situational necessity), that property is situationally necessary. This is a consequence of the S5 axiom of modal logic, which is used in the standard modal ontological argument. This video is I think a good defense of the S5 system of modal logic, if you feel it needs defending: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=azHzZ2ADJkA

Once these concepts are down, there are basically three other steps to the argument that are needed- the rest of the argument logically follows:

1) The property of situational necessity is incompatible with the property of injustice.

If you remember back when I talked about the first axiom, I mentioned saying the first property is impossible as a potential escape route, but that it won't work here. The reason it won't work here is because if the property of situational necessity was impossible, that fact would itself be situationally necessary, which is obviously self-defeating. Also, there are necessary truths of mathematics and logic that are situationally necessary.

Now let's get back to the premise. Essentially, the premise says that for every unjust situation, there is a logically possible world in which it is "replaced" by a just one. So for instance, if an innocent man is unjustly found guilty in a court of law, there is a logically possible situation in which the same man is never accused. It seems that we only call things unjust in contrast to a coherent just situation.

If you still have doubts about this, here are two additional angles from which you can see this:

a) The axiom that "ought implies can". It doesn't seem that anyone can be said to have an obligation to do something if they are not able to do so.

b) The definition of injustice, used back when we talked about the "foundational concepts". Injustice is defined as something that can be said to be lacking a due good by some coherent evaluative standard. Now, if the due good cannot logically possibly exist in that situation, wouldn't that mean the standard itself is incoherent? If I were to say that "situation X is unjust because it doesn't contain square circles", that would not seem to be a coherent evaluative standard.

If you accept everything seen above, the conclusion can be reached that the property of justice is situationally necessary. This conclusion can be reached in the following way:

P1: The property of situational necessity is incompatible with the property of injustice.

P2: If some property a is incompatible with property b, it is compatible with its negation, not-b.

C1: The property of situational necessity is incompatible with the property of injustice.

P3: If a property is compatible with situational necessity, the property is situationally necessary (by the S5 axiom).

C2: The property of justice is situationally necessary.

Now, let's resume to go over the last two steps to the argument.

2) Since the property of justice is situationally necessary, either there is no sense to the concept of injustice, or there exists an infallible justice-making power.
This may sound like a false dichotomy, but think through the logic here: we have already concluded that justice is situationally necessary- that everything is just. That would mean that either nothing can logically possibly be considered unjust, or that unjust situations are transformed. Whatever transforms unjust situations must itself be a being whose existence can't be said to be an unjust situation (otherwise such a situation would itself need to be transformed, and we have an infinite regress). If you remember back to the definition of injustice from before, this means that this being cannot be said to lack any goods by any coherent evaluative standard. In other words, there would have to exist a being that than which none greater can be conceived.

3) There is a sense to the concept of injustice.
As the final step of the argument, we have one of the most indisputable premises one could come up with. Every time you say that a certain situation sucks, you are saying that that situation lacks a due good by a standard of evaluation. The only other step left in order to get to this premise is that one of those standards by which we say something is unjust is a coherent one. To deny this, not only do you have to deny that these standards are objective, you have to say there is something incoherent about them. You have to hold all of these standards hostage until you admit this premise.

By the second and third steps, the conclusion follows: There exists an infallible justice-making power.

As was explained before, this justice-making power must be that than which none greater can be conceived.

 

[Crandaddy]

It seems to me that modality is the way that properties inhere in propositions/substances/states of affairs, rather than being a property itself. Notice that “being situationally necessary” would not be compatible with any contingent proposition/substance/state of affairs, which, by the argument's reasoning, would make every contingent proposition/substance/state of affairs compatible with “being situationally necessary." Ultimately, it seems this would entail that every contingent proposition/substance/state of affairs is necessary, which surely can't be the case.

 

[variant]

I do enjoy watching people try to logic God into existence by pure brute thought.

1) The definition of "injustice". Something is unjust if it can be said to be lacking of a due good by come coherent evaluative standard. The argument attempts to make the definition of injustice as wide-open as it could possibly be. This definition does not require a belief that what is just and unjust is objective (so you don't have to argue back and forth with an atheist about objective/subjective morality), although as you will see later on the argument tries to show that God exists, ad fulfills all coherent evaluative standards.

Justice has to be very carefully defined up front, not "wide open" because it is entirely possible that Justice is subjective, and thus the rest of the argument falls entirely flat.

If you introduce a broad concept of justice and then switch it out for a very specific justice later in the argument then you blunder into an equivocation fallacy.

So your first task is to define justice so that we know what is just and unjust in every possible situation like math a system that can actually be argued to have situationally necessity. In essence we need a coherent standard of justice that always works in every situation like the definition in premise 1 says.

You may very well indeed need a God for a completely coherent system of justice but that is neither here nor there we don't have one at present so the argument fails.

Also would this argument work equally well for math?

 

[quatona]

When seeing a modal logic argument for the existence of something I always feel like watching a David Copperfield show.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

As was explained before, this justice-making power must be that than which none greater can be conceived.

I am conceiving of a power whose justice system does not rely on the dogmas of vicarious redemption, blood debt and infinite punishment for finite crimes, all of which destroy the entire concept of justice.

There. I have conceived of a justice-making power greater than Yahweh.

That was easy. Anything else?

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

I do enjoy watching people try to logic God into existence by pure brute thought.

Also known as imagination.

 

[dumpsterdiver45]

The snide comments probably mean those folks either don't know how or are too lazy (or both) to respond intelligently.

As for me, the whole modal thing is above my paygrade. I do see one thing, though; it looks to me--using my keen detective skills--that T. Aquinas wrote that paper in the link you provided. Problem is, he is reported to have died....though I don't know that a death certificate was ever reported to have been produced.

 

[Eight Foot Manchild]

The snide comments probably mean those folks either don't know how or are too lazy (or both) to respond intelligently.

As for me, the whole modal thing is above my paygrade.

Oh, I see. You don't know enough about the modal ontological argument to comment on it, but you somehow know enough to call the criticisms of it lazy and unintelligent. I suppose that makes sense to you somehow.

 

[variant]

Oh, I see. You don't know enough about the modal ontological argument to comment on it, but you somehow know enough to call the criticisms of it lazy and unintelligent. I suppose that makes sense to you somehow.

Lazy is sometimes quite good, we should take as little time as possible in dismissing arguments that are ridiculously complicated for the purpose of hiding their flaws.

The question here is does the idea of justice in a broad sense justify the conclusion that there must be a God to enforce it?

The answer is no.

The problem? Justice is just an idea. Showing that it is a necessary component of the universe or that injustice is impossible or whatever else this argument is trying to hack at is foolish at best, and at worst deceptive.

I really would like to see a proper use of modal logic to come to a proper conclusion one of these days, because from what I can tell, all it is ever used for is cloaking specious arguments in fancy mathematically derived language.

In essence this is high class obfuscation.

 

[Crandaddy]

As for me, the whole modal thing is above my paygrade. I do see one thing, though; it looks to me--using my keen detective skills--that T. Aquinas wrote that paper in the link you provided. Problem is, he is reported to have died....though I don't know that a death certificate was ever reported to have been produced.

Aquinas didn't write it, but it is written using the scholastic dialectic style that he used. Aquinas had a preference for cosmological arguments over ontological ones (and rightly so, in my opinion).

Lazy is sometimes quite good, we should take as little time as possible in dismissing arguments that are ridiculously complicated for the purpose of hiding their flaws.

Sure, go for it -- as long as you can clearly identify their flaws and point them out for everyone to see.

The question here is does the idea of justice in a broad sense justify the conclusion that there must be a God to enforce it?

The answer is no.

The problem? Justice is just an idea. Showing that it is a necessary component of the universe or that injustice is impossible or whatever else this argument is trying to hack at is foolish at best, and at worst deceptive.

Every such argument that might ever be conceived is either foolish or deceptive? You aren't seriously suggesting that, are you?


While we're at it, why don't we have your conclusive demonstration that justice is “just an idea.” I would very much like to see it.

I really would like to see a proper use of modal logic to come to a proper conclusion one of these days, because from what I can tell, all it is ever used for is cloaking specious arguments in fancy mathematically derived language.

In essence this is high class obfuscation.

And I really would like to see a demonstration of a modal argument that comes to a “proper conclusion” so I can know what the hell you're talking about. Or if that's too much, at least explain to me -- in precise terms -- how a modal argument might come to a “proper conclusion,” as it's not entirely clear to me what you mean by this.

 

[variant]

.
Sure, go for it -- as long as you can clearly identify their flaws and point them out for everyone to see.

Ah but I already have.

We need a specific definition of justice for the argument to work (rather than the obvious equivocation), and we would need to show that it applies consistently and coherently in every situation where we would need it in the universe, and further, that the universe requires that specific definition justice.

If justice has subjective elements this will not work as it will break down in coherence as a standard...

The definition of Justice as used in this argument isn't even coherent in and of itself.

By this argument every state of affairs is JUSTICE, which may be consistent but it is also quite incoherent.

What does it mean for the holocaust to be justice?

Every such argument that might ever be conceived is either foolish or deceptive? You aren't seriously suggesting that, are you?

I have suggested that the use of modal argument for the existence of God have definitely been sheer obfuscation in my experience, this one is no different.

While we're at it, why don't we have your conclusive demonstration that justice is “just an idea.” I would very much like to see it.

We know that Justice is an idea (the argument treats it as a conception so this must be a point of agreement) what we don't know is that it is situationally necessary (like math) as this argument tries to put forward.

So, it's not me who has something to prove here, we need to know if Justice as defined by this argument (as nebulous as the argument defines it) is indeed required.

The assertion that Justice is indeed an objective requirement of the universe is unsupported by this hogwash.

Specifically argument the second premise labeled 2, it may not be possible that Justice is situationally necessary, which is obviously true if it isn't an objective truth but rather a subjective idea.

This is highly questionable:

b) The definition of injustice, used back when we talked about the "foundational concepts". Injustice is defined as something that can be said to be lacking a due good by some coherent evaluative standard. Now, if the due good cannot logically possibly exist in that situation, wouldn't that mean the standard itself is incoherent? If I were to say that "situation X is unjust because it doesn't contain square circles", that would not seem to be a coherent evaluative standard.

This is some weird word play right here even using the arguments definitions. To say something is unjust is to say IT is unjust using a standard that is coherent, not that good couldn't logically possibly exist in the situation but that it doesn't (it's a statement of fact).

Simply having injustice is not logically incoherent at all...

And I really would like to see a demonstration of a modal argument that comes to a “proper conclusion” so I can know what the hell you're talking about. Or if that's too much, at least explain to me -- in precise terms -- how a modal argument might come to a “proper conclusion,” as it's not entirely clear to me what you mean by this.

I'm just looking for a use of this type argument that isn't obvious puerile silliness wrapped in a facade of fancy language.

Haven't found it yet. This example is actually worse than usual by quite a long shot.

 

[variant]

I actually went to the source of this and read the argument in it's original form and it occurred to me:

Source:
http://newapologetics.com/the-tractatus

Axiom 2: The property of “being situationally necessary” is not compatible with the property “being an unjust situation.” [For any instance of injustice, there is a logically possible situation in which a just state of affairs replaces the unjust one. For example, if a guilty man is unjustly acquitted, there is a logically possible situation in which he is found guilty. If an innocent man is unjustly condemned, there is a logically possible situation in which he is never accused. A given situation is unjust only in contrast to a logically possible just version of that situation.]

This is a big fat problem right here.

Lets rewrite this as:

Counter Axiom 2: The property of “being situationally necessary” is not compatible with the property “being a just situation.” [For any instance of justice, there is a logically possible situation in which a unjust state of affairs replaces the just one. For example, if a innocent man is justly acquitted, there is a logically possible situation in which he is found guilty. If an guilty man is justly condemned, there is a logically possible situation in which he is never accused. A given situation is just only in contrast to a logically possible unjust version of that situation.]

This presents absolutely no problems by the very same reasoning as the argument only reversed. Just situations necessarily imply unjust situations just as unjust situations imply just ones.

Soooo, this means that:

If the property of “being situationally necessary” is not compatible with another given property, then it is compatible with the complement of that property. [from Axiom 1]

Or in the OP

P2: If some property a is incompatible with property b, it is compatible with its negation, not-b.

This is incorrect.

Situational necessity is only a trait of very specific things (like math and logic), so the negation of it being compatible for one thing does not imply that it is necessary for the negation of that thing.

So, this argument is based on a basic contradiction. First the arguer states that ~A is incompatible with situational necessity (property B) by pointing to there being a dichotomy between A vs. ~A, and then turns around and says that if ~A is incompatible with property B then A must be compatible with it.

This is obviously untrue because the very same dichotomy that showed ~A incompatible with property B also applies to A.

 

[KCfromNC]

When seeing a modal logic argument for the existence of something I always feel like watching a David Copperfield show.

Yep. Lots of words wasted to say that one can imagine a made up world where something is possible. Typically those kinds of stories do better with the budget split more towards the special effects side of things.