Meaning and Immortality

[ToHoldNothing]

Having discussed this in some detail in my "Is Immortality/Eternal Life Desirable?" thread(s), I'm thinking this would necessitate another thread entirely on the nature of value and meaning in life as related to your belief about the nature of life.

There seems to be a big tendency to believe that atheists, Buddhists, etc, must be nihilists in the extreme sense of seeing no purpose whatsoever in life, or there is the belief from outsiders that since they believe life is in a state of flux, they must believe that life is ultimately meaningless and have no real purpose to life. Part of this is related to the notion of the afterlife.

If we believe in either reincarnation in the Buddhist sense or something more like a general skepticism towards any kind of afterlife, then there is the belief that you do not survive your death. With this in mind, there is the belief that all meaning you had is gone because you are gone. But one fails to consider that meaning survives on through others, through the impact one makes in life.

I allege that it seems that those who believe in an afterlife where you survive for eternity are not actually seeking out a purpose in life, but an absolute meaning from outside themselves to solve the problem of absurdity that exists in life. Absurdity here means that there is a disjunct between our search for ultimate meaning in life and actually succeeding in finding it. The general solution is to posit God as the end all source of purpose and meaning in life. The alternatives are either to kill oneself in literal suicide as opposed to philosophical suicide in positing the existence of God to solve the problem of searching for ultimate purpose in life, or you accept absurdity and persist on in seeking out your own purpose.

In this sense, when someone asks if I'm a nihilist because I'm an atheist or Buddhist, I would answer yes and no. Yes, in the existential sense; everyone seeks out their own individual meanings in life, but there is no ultimate overriding purpose for everyone. I strongly believe this is the case, since it would seem more nihilistic to believe everyone has a determined purpose chosen for them before them are born or apart from their own search for purpose. If that were the case, all our independence, autonomy and volition would be for naught unless we somehow managed to conform to the actual purpose our lives had outside of our choices.

But I am not a nihilist in many of the other senses, such as ethical, metaphysical or epistemological. I might be skeptical towards them at times, but I don't disbelieve that we have ethics, metaphysics and epistemology of sorts to order life. And I don't believe we can never find purpose, I merely deny that we can find a purpose that applies equally to every person.


The basic question I ask is whether one can say you believe there can be any meaning in life if you live forever in any sense where your consciousness and body persist on into infinity?

 

[Received]

I allege that it seems that those who believe in an afterlife where you survive for eternity are not actually seeking out a purpose in life, but an absolute meaning from outside themselves to solve the problem of absurdity that exists in life. Absurdity here means that there is a disjunct between our search for ultimate meaning in life and actually succeeding in finding it. The general solution is to posit God as the end all source of purpose and meaning in life. The alternatives are either to kill oneself in literal suicide as opposed to philosophical suicide in positing the existence of God to solve the problem of searching for ultimate purpose in life, or you accept absurdity and persist on in seeking out your own purpose.

This is an outstanding thought, but I wonder if the vast majority of people who, as Nietzsche would say, bring nihilism to this life by wishing for an afterlife where they'll really live have given the meaning thing a real palpable shot, or are even conscious of it. Too many live within the category of Heidegger's "the they" to really get a solid sense of particularity that would allow personal meaning for their own lives. That is, they're too busy being swept along by tradition, society, culture, or whatever else to really ask "what's really meaningful and relevant for me?"

I think wishing for an afterlife (in place of really living this one) is more an intuitively based sense of desperation that there must be something good about life, but I can't find it now, so it's gotta be in another world.

I've also found Alan Watts' words beautifully relevant:

"Tomorrow and plans for tomorrow can have no significance at all unless you are in full contact with the reality of the present, since it is in the present and only in the present that you live. There is no other reality than present reality, so that, even if one were to live for endless ages, to live for the future would be to miss the point everlastingly."

 

[ToHoldNothing]

This is an outstanding thought, but I wonder if the vast majority of people who, as Nietzsche would say, bring nihilism to this life by wishing for an afterlife where they'll really live have given the meaning thing a real palpable shot, or are even conscious of it. Too many live within the category of Heidegger's "the they" to really get a solid sense of particularity that would allow personal meaning for their own lives. That is, they're too busy being swept along by tradition, society, culture, or whatever else to really ask "what's really meaningful and relevant for me?"

Wishing for an afterlife would be philosophical suicide and value nihilism in that you see no purpose in the present life, only in the future life.

Existential and individual meaning is more important, I agree, especially related to Kierkegaard's statement that "subjectivity is truth". In that sense, the individual subject's experience and determining meaning is more significant than objective truths that we can agree on like gravity or evolution.

I think wishing for an afterlife (in place of really living this one) is more an intuitively based sense of desperation that there must be something good about life, but I can't find it now, so it's gotta be in another world.

In short it is a reflection of psychosis that is inconsistent with reality in its harshness.

I've also found Alan Watts' words beautifully relevant:

"Tomorrow and plans for tomorrow can have no significance at all unless you are in full contact with the reality of the present, since it is in the present and only in the present that you live. There is no other reality than present reality, so that, even if one were to live for endless ages, to live for the future would be to miss the point everlastingly."

If you picked Alan Watts because he's a Buddhist of sorts, then it's appropriate. It's very Zen in the experience and focus on the present and rejecting the idea of living forever as having any significance.

 

[Received]

I didn't necessarily pick him because he's a Buddhist of sorts (and I'd emphasize the "of sorts" given his morally shadowy later life), but because his statement is true even in a Christian existential sense. Kierkegaard was down with the present, but only insofar as it was fused with the future. And I think that's a very subtle distinction: living in the present as the present, living in the present toward the future (i.e., through applying oneself to meaning), and living in the future. I imagine Buddhism and the East emphasizes the first, existentialism the second, and "value nihilism" (as you put it nicely) the third.

Of course, it isn't quite devoid of values, because holding dear a future afterlife is a type of value; the problem is that outside of terrifying circumstances (where hope for a future life can allow one to push on), it's a very hollow value. It doesn't amplify our full existence, our engagement with the world, our being-in-the-world; it works, essentially, through thought, and thereby divides the wisher from the world. You can only value the idea of a future world during the times you're thinking about it. But the world goes on, and we need more than just thinking.

I also wouldn't say (as it seems like I implied) that wishing for a future life is inherently nihilistic. It's only nihilistic if it takes the place of living for the present. It may be factually wrong, but it definitely can complement a full life.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

Only if living for the future is distinguishable from living in the future as a general concept. Just because you live "in the present" for the future doesn't mean your overall focus is still on something less substantial and more based on wishful thinking. If you just accept the notion of Jesus that the kingdom of heaven is within you and therefore in the present, then Christianity and Buddhism begin to align more than before.

Anytime I think of the future, it is very tentative and has little to no conclusiveness because there are always going to be changes to it, since I can't plan how things will go. I might get my computer tomorrow, but I might have to wait another weekend and get it on Monday, which would throw a wrench in the works, because we're having company. But can I do anything about it? Not really, since I've bothered the tech support enough and they're doing their job as quickly and efficiently as they can given the other stuff they have to do with other comps.

I would agree that it isn't value nihilism absolutely, but moreso nihilism in a particular context directed towards a value theory that sees the value of things in their transiency, which is a Buddhist, Shinto and Daoist sort of aesthetics, from what I understand. It stands in contrast to much Western aesthetics where things' permanence is more valued, along with symmetry for another example.

 

[Mling]

I have a lot of trouble with self-motivation--I work best when there is a looming deadline. I think, if I were to live forever, I would waste my eternal life. Counting down years gives me a sense of urgency, and pushes me to figure out what I want to do, and how to give my life meaning.

 

[Received]

Right. What I'm trying to point out is that living for the future versus living for the future as a general concept can be understood as living for the future in a sense where the present touches the future (and beyond this has realistic possibilities for actualizing), rather than where the present and future are divided by duration or abstraction. As a general rule, the more significant a future activity is for me in terms of how its possibilities could influence my life now, the less of a danger of nihilism I have in valuing it in the future.

The future is tentative and uncertain, definitely. But when speaking of meaning, I'm speaking of a future that is intuitively grasped as a type of commandment in religious terms (which Kierkegaard called "the eternal", although it obviously isn't exclusively understood in religious language by far), which when fulfilled (a recurring an constant process, given that meaning in general is constituted by many meanings) results in (or sustains) happiness. This intuitively grasped future isn't the same as the uncertain objective future. It's the subjective truth you quoted Kierkegaard about earlier. It's a future that's relevant in the sense that something cognitively internal (my meaning) projects itself upon the world, and this process of actualizing this cognitively internal meaning is in the future in that in order to fulfill the process, I must engage myself in the world as well. If I have the meaning to study up for finals, the command itself is present in my mind, but the actualization of meaning involves going out and picking up a book and studying it. This is a future based activity, different than the future of the objective world as we commonly understand it.

 

[Received]

I have a lot of trouble with self-motivation--I work best when there is a looming deadline. I think, if I were to live forever, I would waste my eternal life. Counting down years gives me a sense of urgency, and pushes me to figure out what I want to do, and how to give my life meaning.

It's one or the other depending on my state of mind. I mean, even if you lived forever, and meaning is what gives you happiness, you'd still be everlastingly missing out on happiness by not engaging yourself with meaning. On the other hand, the realization that I'm going to die gives me the shock needed to enjoy life while I still have it -- which means, again, engaging with my personal meaning.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

I have a lot of trouble with self-motivation--I work best when there is a looming deadline. I think, if I were to live forever, I would waste my eternal life. Counting down years gives me a sense of urgency, and pushes me to figure out what I want to do, and how to give my life meaning.

That's a natural teleological motivation all humans have, unless they're especially spontaneous and imaginative. But looking towards an ultimate end, an eschaton, is what I argue is more psychologically and value destructive because after that, it seems like you don't have any more meaning so to speak. It's reasonable to see an end of things we have observed ends to, but it isn't reasonable to look towards an end no human may ever see.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

Right. What I'm trying to point out is that living for the future versus living for the future as a general concept can be understood as living for the future in a sense where the present touches the future (and beyond this has realistic possibilities for actualizing), rather than where the present and future are divided by duration or abstraction. As a general rule, the more significant a future activity is for me in terms of how its possibilities could influence my life now, the less of a danger of nihilism I have in valuing it in the future.

The present, past and future are linked, to use Augustine's perspective he presented in the Confessions (ironic, huh?). Time in terms of past, present and future are all related by the passage, passing and eventual passage of moments in relation to each other. Valuing something for the future shouldn't be an attachment, though. There should be flexibility, but I imagine you agree on that. We shouldn't let our own expectations color reality too much, right?

The future is tentative and uncertain, definitely. But when speaking of meaning, I'm speaking of a future that is intuitively grasped as a type of commandment in religious terms (which Kierkegaard called "the eternal", although it obviously isn't exclusively understood in religious language by far), which when fulfilled (a recurring an constant process, given that meaning in general is constituted by many meanings) results in (or sustains) happiness. This intuitively grasped future isn't the same as the uncertain objective future.

This kind of future doesn't necessarily require the theological or religious trappings, however. Or at the very least, it doesn't need the appearance of the supernatural or even general hierophany to justify the search for meaning in an atheistic existentialist perspective, which exists much more prominently in scholarship, from what I understand.

It's the subjective truth you quoted Kierkegaard about earlier. It's a future that's relevant in the sense that something cognitively internal (my meaning) projects itself upon the world, and this process of actualizing this cognitively internal meaning is in the future in that in order to fulfill the process, I must engage myself in the world as well. If I have the meaning to study up for finals, the command itself is present in my mind, but the actualization of meaning involves going out and picking up a book and studying it. This is a future based activity, different than the future of the objective world as we commonly understand it

We're talking about a certain kind of teleological or goal minded thinking. Teleocentric thinking is trickier. Sometimes it's best to just act without consciously thinking about the goal, if there is one.

 

[Received]

The present, past and future are linked, to use Augustine's perspective he presented in the Confessions (ironic, huh?). Time in terms of past, present and future are all related by the passage, passing and eventual passage of moments in relation to each other. Valuing something for the future shouldn't be an attachment, though. There should be flexibility, but I imagine you agree on that. We shouldn't let our own expectations color reality too much, right?

I don't know if they're properly expectations, and it's an interesting point about attachments. Could personal meaning ever become an attachment? I think if we answer this from either the East to existential or existential to East, we're clashing incommensurable philosophies against each other. If meaning is the stuff that builds up our happiness, then of course we could never go too far to have it as an attachment (if we hold down one momentary meaning too much, we've lost the meaning in the moment by idolizing it, which means this thing that was once a meaning isn't a meaning, and other meanings have flowered up around us that we're rejecting for our idolatry); but if we're not meant to follow any (innate or not) sense of meaning (which I consider fitting with a Buddhist view), then sure it's easy to see how meaning could be formed as an attachment.

But I wouldn't properly call them expectations. You expect something out there. Meaning is something "in here" that you're going to plant out there.

This kind of future doesn't necessarily require the theological or religious trappings, however. Or at the very least, it doesn't need the appearance of the supernatural or even general hierophany to justify the search for meaning in an atheistic existentialist perspective, which exists much more prominently in scholarship, from what I understand.

Definitely, ever since Sartre for sure, but there are theistic beginnings in Pascal and Kierkegaard. No argument, though, that existentialism is a primarily atheistic philosophy. My estimation is that Christians are too dumb to build up a popular gathering for their own brand of existentialism.

We're talking about a certain kind of teleological or goal minded thinking. Teleocentric thinking is trickier. Sometimes it's best to just act without consciously thinking about the goal, if there is one.

Yeah, but not consciously thinking about the goal doesn't mean that the goal isn't there. And so long as the goal's there, we're still acting teleocentrically. I, for one, think teleology is inherent to consciousness. The moment you really (through meditation or whatever) try to just be, without any attempts to stimulate yourself through changing your perception, then you're at the point where consciousness of the external world dies away, leaving you with your inner world, or dissolving entirely into nonexistence -- which, you may say, is another way of saying you're becoming one with everything.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

I don't know if they're properly expectations, and it's an interesting point about attachments. Could personal meaning ever become an attachment? I think if we answer this from either the East to existential or existential to East, we're clashing incommensurable philosophies against each other. If meaning is the stuff that builds up our happiness, then of course we could never go too far to have it as an attachment (if we hold down one momentary meaning too much, we've lost the meaning in the moment by idolizing it, which means this thing that was once a meaning isn't a meaning, and other meanings have flowered up around us that we're rejecting for our idolatry); but if we're not meant to follow any (innate or not) sense of meaning (which I consider fitting with a Buddhist view), then sure it's easy to see how meaning could be formed as an attachment.

Meaning as a possession with substance and an essence is what Buddhism would say doesn't exist. You find meaning, no doubt, it just is transient, like a flash of lightning

But I wouldn't properly call them expectations. You expect something out there. Meaning is something "in here" that you're going to plant out there.

If meaning is something you discover instead of wanting, then there is a difference there, yes. If you expect meaning, you've become attached to it as a substance instead of an experience

Definitely, ever since Sartre for sure, but there are theistic beginnings in Pascal and Kierkegaard. No argument, though, that existentialism is a primarily atheistic philosophy. My estimation is that Christians are too dumb to build up a popular gathering for their own brand of existentialism.

Christians are threatened by the individual and subjective implications of existentialism. They prefer a cowering community of conformists, seems to me. Christians also seem to prefer Greek philosophy much more than existentialism at all, lol.

Yeah, but not consciously thinking about the goal doesn't mean that the goal isn't there. And so long as the goal's there, we're still acting teleocentrically. I, for one, think teleology is inherent to consciousness. The moment you really (through meditation or whatever) try to just be, without any attempts to stimulate yourself through changing your perception, then you're at the point where consciousness of the external world dies away, leaving you with your inner world, or dissolving entirely into nonexistence -- which, you may say, is another way of saying you're becoming one with everything

We're acting teleologically when we recognize that goals are basic, we act teleocentrically when we make goals the only thing we find meaning in. It's a matter of degree of attachment again.

You're saying the "goal" of nirvana is part of Buddhism? Or did I misunderstand that part? I wouldn't say my goal is assimilation with everything, but if it is the case, I accept it as what nirvana might be, since it's intertwined with samsara in some way actually, from what I understand

 

[Eudaimonist]

The basic question I ask is whether one can say you believe there can be any meaning in life if you live forever in any sense where your consciousness and body persist on into infinity?

I don't see how that is possible, at least from my meta-ethical perspective.

Non-existence provides an objective alternative to existence that gives goal-directed actions purpose and meaning. If you can never not exist, why perform action A instead of action B? Nothing really matters at that point to your existence, because your existence is guaranteed no matter what you do. Sure, you might desire A over B, but you can't say that A is better for you than B in any non-subjective way.

So, I find comfort in my finite existence, because it is the only one that can have non-arbitrary purpose and meaning.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Received]

Meaning as a possession with substance and an essence is what Buddhism would say doesn't exist. You find meaning, no doubt, it just is transient, like a flash of lightning

And thus, because it's a possession, it has the potential for attachment? Interesting, although I disagree. I think the flash-of-lightening nature of meaning is what makes it precisely impossible to become attached to. You can become attached to some grand meaning, like communists are attached to overthrowing the state, or lovers are attached to making all sorts of sappy plans; but I'm talking about meaning in the day-to-day moment, and the second you start idolizing a certain meaning of the moment, you're missing the other meaning demands of the moment.

Incommensurability, likely.

Christians are threatened by the individual and subjective implications of existentialism. They prefer a cowering community of conformists, seems to me. Christians also seem to prefer Greek philosophy much more than existentialism at all, lol.

Oh, definitely. Greek philosophy is very comfortable, particularly Platonism (the Aristotelean, Thomist crowds of Christians are actually pretty impressive), where you can become enwrapped in the forms of another world in sacrificing the (imperfect) goodness of this one. Sounds familiar. But I wouldn't say it's limited to Christians, or any group. Even philosophers suffer from becoming "the one" (to again use Heidegger's term).

We're acting teleologically when we recognize that goals are basic, we act teleocentrically when we make goals the only thing we find meaning in. It's a matter of degree of attachment again.

Gotcha. I wonder if this breaks well with the distinction between subjective and objective meaning? Subjective meaning is the world where meaning is tied up with our goals -- it's the stuff that matters most. Objective meaning is the making-intelligible of everything around us -- there's a guitar, a nice sunset, a pretty girl. This type of meaning is by no means useless, although I would say it's inferior in the sense that it's the details we pass in driving to our destination. They make the ride prettier, more lush; but the drive and the goal (or more particularly, the drive-toward-the-goal) is what matters most. IMO.

You're saying the "goal" of nirvana is part of Buddhism? Or did I misunderstand that part? I wouldn't say my goal is assimilation with everything, but if it is the case, I accept it as what nirvana might be, since it's intertwined with samsara in some way actually, from what I understand

Not sure if I intended to say that, but I think nirvana is a negative goal of Buddhism, if that' even intelligible. As the morphology implies, it's the "blowing out" -- and that's a purely negative realization, not at all similar to a positive realization or goal, such as "let's go to Kentucky".

 

[Received]

Non-existence provides an objective alternative to existence that gives goal-directed actions purpose and meaning. If you can never not exist, why perform action A instead of action B? Nothing really matters at that point to your existence, because your existence is guaranteed no matter what you do. Sure, you might desire A over B, but you can't say that A is better for you than B in any non-subjective way.

I would say you choose A over B if A actually increased the quality of your life, finite or not. Just because your entire life goes on forever doesn't mean you can't undergo an infinite number of living deaths.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

And thus, because it's a possession, it has the potential for attachment? Interesting, although I disagree. I think the flash-of-lightening nature of meaning is what makes it precisely impossible to become attached to. You can become attached to some grand meaning, like communists are attached to overthrowing the state, or lovers are attached to making all sorts of sappy plans; but I'm talking about meaning in the day-to-day moment, and the second you start idolizing a certain meaning of the moment, you're missing the other meaning demands of the moment.

With anatta, or non-self, in Buddhism, we have the problem that we cannot truly possess anything because it is not "ours"/"mine". Of course,this also reflects phenomenology in Buddhism, so a more pertinent mark of existence for non attachment is anicca or impermanence.

You refer to particular meaning, which can still be attached to in the Buddhist sense in that you are possessive of it. The delusional nature of believing that things will last forever or should last forever is where we get the notions of attachment. But then attachment can exist in the inverse with aversion to things and being attached to that hatred and avoidance.

Incommensurability, likely.

So every meaning is so unique it can't be compared with other meanings in day to day life? Interesting, but potentially dangerous in trying to find ultimate meaning of sorts even in those everyday meanings. Can we completely separate those searches for ultimate and everyday meaning?

Oh, definitely. Greek philosophy is very comfortable, particularly Platonism (the Aristotelean, Thomist crowds of Christians are actually pretty impressive), where you can become enwrapped in the forms of another world in sacrificing the (imperfect) goodness of this one. Sounds familiar. But I wouldn't say it's limited to Christians, or any group. Even philosophers suffer from becoming "the one" (to again use Heidegger's term).

That sounds more Gnostic than Greek in the Aristotelian sense. Platonism lends itself to Gnosticism more, I suppose. Philosophers in general range across a wide spectrum. Chinese philosophy is different in that it focuses more on practicality and how things work to be useful as opposed to strictly being true in an ultimate sense, if I understand it even a bit. This makes it pretty different from Greek philosophy.

Gotcha. I wonder if this breaks well with the distinction between subjective and objective meaning? Subjective meaning is the world where meaning is tied up with our goals -- it's the stuff that matters most. Objective meaning is the making-intelligible of everything around us -- there's a guitar, a nice sunset, a pretty girl. This type of meaning is by no means useless, although I would say it's inferior in the sense that it's the details we pass in driving to our destination. They make the ride prettier, more lush; but the drive and the goal (or more particularly, the drive-toward-the-goal) is what matters most. IMO.

Reminds me of conventional and ultimate truth in Buddhist's two truth "doctrine". Of course, conventional truth is only so similar to subjective truth, since the goal is not strictly just about the individual subject, since the subject can be mistaken in their thought processes, etc. But ultimate meaning has an interesting parallel to objective meaning in that it is mind independent in some sense. Things go about their business even if you are attached to them. Flowers bloom and die, people are born and pass away in time, etc. In that sense, objective truth is the harshness of reality and subjective truth is how we approach that harshness.

Not sure if I intended to say that, but I think nirvana is a negative goal of Buddhism, if that' even intelligible. As the morphology implies, it's the "blowing out" -- and that's a purely negative realization, not at all similar to a positive realization or goal, such as "let's go to Kentucky".

Blowing out negative things is not the same as blowing out all things. Buddhism doesn't want to negate existence in any ultimate sense,but only negate craving, attachment, greed,delusion, ignorance, etc. In that sense, nirvana is a negation of negative qualities we possess instead of the common understanding of insensibility and making oneself a ascetic, since Buddha himself opposed that sort of training and practice, since he practiced it himself very seriously for a while, and found no real fulfillment in it.

 

[ToHoldNothing]

I would say you choose A over B if A actually increased the quality of your life, finite or not. Just because your entire life goes on forever doesn't mean you can't undergo an infinite number of living deaths.

If anything, that only seems to defend the claim of reincarnation or rebirth over the idea of persistent immortality and eternal existence in a steady state of sorts, which heaven is pretty commonly described to me as in one way or another.

 

[Eudaimonist]

I would say you choose A over B if A actually increased the quality of your life, finite or not. Just because your entire life goes on forever doesn't mean you can't undergo an infinite number of living deaths.

Okay, let's consider that idea. There's a chance you are right. But let's see.

Why would a "living death" be harmful for you if you can't die? One might not desire such an experience, but can we say that a "living death" is bad for you in a way that transcends simply not wanting to undergo such an experience?


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Received]

"Living death" was a figurative expression, by which I mean basically anything negative. To stand with the "death is needed for life meaning" crowd, this would mean that being a serial killer or drunk isn't qualitatively different than being a righteous activist or loving father. It all would depend on whether or not a literal or existential death is perceived by the individual before an experience has real value. And that's the absurd part from my perspective: I've had a few extremely useful moments where I realized "hey, I'll be getting old one day, I need to step up or my life will pass me by," but the vast majority of times that I motivated myself to do something was because the goals I had in mind were valuable in themselves.

It's interesting speaking to you about it, Mark, because I'd be interested in hearing what Aristotle had to say about this 20th century existentialist idea. He considered happiness to be equivalent with the beautiful, and the beautiful is chosen for its own sake. Aristotle held that death was bad because it prevented us from attaining the good, which is the opposite of saying that death is good because it allows us to find motivation to attain it.

 

[Nooj]

Definitely, ever since Sartre for sure, but there are theistic beginnings in Pascal and Kierkegaard. No argument, though, that existentialism is a primarily atheistic philosophy. My estimation is that Christians are too dumb to build up a popular gathering for their own brand of existentialism.

I think that's a bit of a disservice to Christians. If Christians are in any way human, they're going to be attracted to existentialism. They just need to be introduced to it. Or rather, reintroduced to it, because Christianity may have been and can be again an existentialist faith. Are they dumb or are they just ignorant?