Mary's Room and the Private Language Argument

[quatona]

A better phrasing would be "At the moment she saw something she'd never seen before, she learned something."

Well, I am still asking: What exactly has she supposedly learned?

 

[Conscious Z]

Eh? I was following you up until that point, and then I just failed to understand what you're saying. Martha didn't and doesn't know that red looks like that. She doesn't know what red looks like.

But she knows the effect of seeing red on the brain, and therefore she would know that seeing an entirely red room was like seeing a room that was 99% red. She would know that it was unlike seeing an entirely black room. So, even from the black and white room, Martha could say "Seeing red is like that," where "that" refers to seeing other, similarly red rooms.

Hmmmm...

I may just be missing something here. From my perspective you seem to be over-complicating something that is really quite simple. Maybe it is because I am not having any trouble imagining what Mary has learned. It is completely obvious to me. So the rest of your post is trying solve/analyse a problem I don't recognise as a problem.

Or perhaps I'm just being a bit slow today.

I gave two options that I think "that" could refer to when Mary says "Red looks like that." In short-form:

1. "that" refers to Mary's qualia
2. "that" refers to the experience of seeing other, similarly red rooms

I'm saying that #2 doesn't work for Jackson because Martha, who is still behind in the black and white room, also knows all of those things. She knows that seeing a red room is like seeing a red room, and that seeing an entirely red room is somewhat like seeing a mostly red room. Similarly, she knows that seeing a red room is not like seeing a black room.

So, for Jackson, #1 has to be the case.

 

[Conscious Z]

Well, I am still asking: What exactly has she supposedly learned?

She's learned what it is like to see red. She can now meaningfully say "Seeing red is like that."

 

[quatona]

She's learned what it is like to see red.

How and when did she learn to connect the word to her experience?

 

[Conscious Z]

How and when did she learn to connect the word to her experience?

She already knew all of the words. She didn't learn anything new about communication. We can also imagine that she knew she was walking into a red room because she knew the wavelength of light being reflected in the room before she entered, so she knew it was going to be "red."

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But she knows the effect of seeing red on the brain, and therefore she would know that seeing an entirely red room was like seeing a room that was 99% red. She would know that it was unlike seeing an entirely black room. So, even from the black and white room, Martha could say "Seeing red is like that," where "that" refers to seeing other, similarly red rooms.

I'm having serious difficulties understanding what you are saying. Maybe I've missed something?

Yes, she knows the effect of seeing red on the brain, and she can reasonably assume that seeing an entirely red room is very like seeing a room that is 99% red, and that it was unlike seeing black. But she doesn't know what seeing red is like, so she doesn't know what seeing a room that is 99% red is like. I don't understand the relevance of the 99%. And the last sentence above completely loses me. Martha doesn't know what seeing other, similarly red rooms look like, so she has no referent for "that".

I don't know what seeing cromflobble looks like, but I can reasonably suppose that seeing total cromflobble is a lot like seeing near-total cromflobble. But knowledge that seeing total cromflobble is like seeing near-total cromflobble doesn't get me any closer to knowing what cromflobble looks like.

I gave two options that I think "that" could refer to when Mary says "Red looks like that." In short-form:

1. "that" refers to Mary's qualia
2. "that" refers to the experience of seeing other, similarly red rooms

I'm saying that #2 doesn't work for Jackson because Martha, who is still behind in the black and white room, also knows all of those things. She knows that seeing a red room is like seeing a red room, and that seeing an entirely red room is somewhat like seeing a mostly red room. Similarly, she knows that seeing a red room is not like seeing a black room.

So, for Jackson, #1 has to be the case.

OK. Yes, #2 is no good for Jackson and the thought experiment. "That" refers to the qualitative nature of Mary's qualia, not the qualia itself.

What matters for the argument is that qualia exist. It doesn't matter what sort of qualia. But in order to establish that qualia exist, we need to use a thought experiment which refers to some specific qualia, so we end up talking about the experience of seeing red.

I still think the argument is really quite simple. The point is that while Mary is still in the b&w room, even though she knows all the physical facts about the experience of seeing red, there's still something missing. It doesn't matter what, exactly, is missing. As long as something is missing, materialism is falsified, IMO.

Perhaps we can modify the experiment to make this clearer:

Mary is in the B&W room. She has not only never seen red, but she's never seen green or blue either. Now we take into the room three coloured balls - a red one, a blue one and a green one. Does Mary know which is which? Can she point to the red ball if we ask her to? Let's say she can't. We then tell her which is which and present her with three coloured cubes. Now if we ask her to point to the red cube, and she can do it, then she must have learned something.

 

[KCfromNC]

But the argument has nothing to do with figuring out how brain function works. That's not the point of it. And if Mary doesn't see red because her brain development has been hindered due to a lack of exposure to red, again this is a side-issue and not relevant to the thought experiment. It can be "fixed" by saying that if this happens, Mary can recieve advanced brain surgery to fix the developmental problem, and then she gets to see red.

Like I said, this argument is far removed from reality that it really tells us nothing much about how things work here in our world. If technology is advanced enough to create new neural pathways, then she can use that tech to create memories of the experience of red for herself before actually experiencing it. Then when she sees red for the first time it will be just like the memories she has of it. No new knowledge needed since she already knows what it feels like to experience it before having the actual experience.

Seem far fetched? Maybe, but I'm just going with the premise of this hypothetical.

I'm not really sure what you're saying here.

I'm saying the argument presupposes that "all the physical knowledge" about vision doesn't include the experience of it. It then throws out experiencing it as some sort of convincing argument against physicalism. Seems like begging the question.

The very fact that consciousness exists at all is enough to falsify physicalism, IMO.

I'm not sure there is a claim about any non-physical processes.

There seems to be if you're using consciousness to falsify phyiscalism.

The question is whether qualia exist or not, and whether it is logically possible that they can be reduced to physical entities. (my answers: yes, and no)

My answers - who knows and who knows. My feeling is that qualia are too poorly defined to really even talk about. More importantly, when has something being logically possible been all that interesting to what happens in real life?

They do not have to be disembodied. Minds don't have to exist independently of brains. In other words, "Physicalism is false" does not equate to "disembodied minds exist."

I wasn't talking about disembodied minds, so no idea where this is coming from.

I find the term "folk psychology" meaningless and stupid personally.

Still looking for a reasonably priced place to buy some Red.

 

[KCfromNC]

Well, I am still asking: What exactly has she supposedly learned?

Depending on how her brain development worked when deprived from color for all her life, she may or may not now have a memory of a feeling of experiencing red in that particular situation.

Some people will say that's knowledge. Other people realize that we never, outside of obscure philosophical circles, say "I now have a true justified belief in the fact that I am now feeling what it is like to be hungry" so calling it an abuse of language is reasonable.

 

[KCfromNC]

She's learned what it is like to see red. She can now meaningfully say "Seeing red is like that."

Like what?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Like I said, this argument is far removed from reality that it really tells us nothing much about how things work here in our world. If technology is advanced enough to create new neural pathways, then she can use that tech to create memories of the experience of red for herself before actually experiencing it. Then when she sees red for the first time it will be just like the memories she has of it. No new knowledge needed since she already knows what it feels like to experience it before having the actual experience.

Seem far fetched? Maybe, but I'm just going with the premise of this hypothetical.

Seems absurd, not just far-fetched. it also seems like you either don'ty understand the point of the thought experiment, or are being disingenuous. You're just trying to find ways to avoid what ought to be a fairly obvious conclusion, and that is that the experience of seeing red is something completely distinct from the physical description of what is going on inside a brain. The point is that it doesn't matter how hard you look at a brain, or what it is doing, you'll not find the experience of red.

I'm saying the argument presupposes that "all the physical knowledge" about vision doesn't include the experience of it.

And you think that is unreasonable? This is where I struggle to understand how otherwise-rational materialists/skeptics can possibly convince themselves of their own position without a little warning going off: "oops, I'm saying something silly here...need to go back and rethink..."

Brains are lumps of squidgy meat made of cells with complex connections, within which there are extremely complex electro-chemical processes occurring. I am indeed working on the assumption that nowhere within this lump of meat, or these complex processes, is there any experience of red.

It then throws out experiencing it as some sort of convincing argument against physicalism. Seems like begging the question.

"Begging the question" means "assuming one's conclusion". I have not done this. This is a thought experiment, not a syllogism, so there aren't any premises. And in any valid argument, the conclusion "lurks" in the premises anyway - otherwise it wouldn't be valid.

The question here is this: is it reasonable to start out with an assumption that the physical processes I've described above include the experience of seeing red, or whether it is reasonable to assume they don't. It is you who is making the non-sensical initial assumption, not me. You are trying to get people to believe it is possible that the experience of seeing red might just be a physical property of brain tissue, and I am starting from the assumption that this is a load of old poppycock.

And you know what? It's a load of old poppycock, being proposed for the sole reason that otherwise you'd have to accept the conclusion of an argument that you do not want to accept. Cart before horse.

My answers - who knows and who knows. My feeling is that qualia are too poorly defined to really even talk about. More importantly, when has something being logically possible been all that interesting to what happens in real life?

For physicalist and scientistic people, this issue is crucial to understanding the true nature of reality. It is the gaping hole in their belief system, and just about the only time when they find themselves in a position of having to defend a load of old poppycock in order to avoid having to reconsider the foundation of that belief system. In most cases, the reasoning (either conscious or sub-conscious) goes like this: "everything else about my worldview fits together and makes sense, without there being any need for anything spooky, magic or inexplicable. This one problem does seem like a bit of a humdinger, but there must be some sort of physicalist/scientific explanation, it's just that we can't work it out yet."

What it would take to get your average physicalist to admit the gaping hole is, in fact, a gaping hole, I do not know.

But sure...the experience of red might just be a physical property of brain tissue! (and Stonehenge might have been built by three-headed flying-saucer-people from the Andromeda Galaxy, why not?)

 

[KCfromNC]

Seems absurd, not just far-fetched. it also seems like you either don'ty understand the point of the thought experiment, or are being disingenuous. You're just trying to find ways to avoid what ought to be a fairly obvious conclusion, and that is that the experience of seeing red is something completely distinct from the physical description of what is going on inside a brain. The point is that it doesn't matter how hard you look at a brain, or what it is doing, you'll not find the experience of red.

Sure, that's an assumption required by the thought experiment. Strangely enough, it is also part of the conclusion. That's not particularly convincing.

And you think that is unreasonable?

Hey, you're the one offering up a scenario where we can rewire people's brains at will. I don't think rewiring memories is that far fetched in such a hypothetical world.

Brains are lumps of squidgy meat made of cells with complex connections, within which there are extremely complex electro-chemical processes occurring. I am indeed working on the assumption that nowhere within this lump of meat, or these complex processes, is there any experience of red.

Then why does disrupting that lump of mean make the experiences change or go away completely?

The question here is this: is it reasonable to start out with an assumption that the physical processes I've described above include the experience of seeing red, or whether it is reasonable to assume they don't. It is you who is making the non-sensical initial assumption, not me. You are trying to get people to believe it is possible that the experience of seeing red might just be a physical property of brain tissue, and I am starting from the assumption that this is a load of old poppycock.

And you know what? It's a load of old poppycock, being proposed for the sole reason that otherwise you'd have to accept the conclusion of an argument that you do not want to accept. Cart before horse.

I can't help but notice that despite the bluster there's no actual argument here as to why experiences can't be a physical process in an physical brain. Guess I'm just supposed to take it on faith. But if I do, then what's the point of the argument since I've already assumed the conclusions it is trying to reach?

For physicalist and scientistic people, this issue is crucial to understanding the true nature of reality. It is the gaping hole in their belief system, and just about the only time when they find themselves in a position of having to defend a load of old poppycock in order to avoid having to reconsider the foundation of that belief system. In most cases, the reasoning (either conscious or sub-conscious) goes like this: "everything else about my worldview fits together and makes sense, without there being any need for anything spooky, magic or inexplicable. This one problem does seem like a bit of a humdinger, but there must be some sort of physicalist/scientific explanation, it's just that we can't work it out yet."

What it would take to get your average physicalist to admit the gaping hole is, in fact, a gaping hole, I do not know.

But sure...the experience of red might just be a physical property of brain tissue! (and Stonehenge might have been built by three-headed flying-saucer-people from the Andromeda Galaxy, why not?)

Cool, so at least you've moved from poppycock to it being conceivable and a logical possibility. That's progress, I guess.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Then why does disrupting that lump of mean make the experiences change or go away completely?

If I had a pound for every time I've seen a materialist make this mistake, I'd be able to buy a new car.

Yes, when we damage brains, there is a corresponding damage to the contents of consciousness. The materialists naturally conclude from this that consciousness must be part of a brain, or at least reducible to a brain. But this is to confuse sufficient and necessary conditions.

I can provide an analogy to make clear what the problem is.

Imagine we've got an old-fashioned reel of film, a movie projector, and a blank screen. We then note that if we damage the reel of film and run it through the projector, there is corresponding damage to the picture on the movie screen.

Now let's look at your argument again:

Me:

[Brains are lumps of squidgy meat made of cells with complex connections, within which there are extremely complex electro-chemical processes occurring. I am indeed working on the assumption that nowhere within this lump of meat, or these complex processes, is there any experience of red.]

[Reels of film are long, thin strips of plastic, with a series of still semi-transparent still photographs on them. I am indeed working on the assumption that nowhere on that reel of film is a moving picture on the movie screen.]

You:

[Then why does disrupting that lump of mean make the experiences change or go away completely?]

[Then why does disrupting the reel of film make the moving picture change or go away completely?]

The link correspondence in both cases is one of neccessity, but not sufficiency. Reels of film are neccesary conditions for moving pictures on the screen, but they are not sufficient. Similarly, the correspondence you note between brain damage and "conscious damage" does seem to suggest (strongly) that brains are required for consciousness - at least for consciousness anything like human consciousness anyway - but it does not suggest or demonstrate that brains are sufficient.

To put this another way: it does look like brains are crucial for (human-like) consciousness, and it is highly probable that all of the complexity and information required for consciousness originates in the brain. BUT this does not solve our problem - we're no closer to explaining why consciousness exists in the first place, just like examining the reel of film in every detail would not bring us any closer to explaining how it gets turned into the moving image on the screen. Something is missing from the explanation. In the case of the film/image, the missing thing is the projector (including the lamp). The key question here is this: what is missing in the explanation of consciousness?

I can't help but notice that despite the bluster there's no actual argument here as to why experiences can't be a physical process in an physical brain.

"I can't help but notice that despite the bluster, there's no actual argument as to why a moving picture on a movie screen can't be a process in a reel of film."

 

[zippy2006]

Intuitively, I think "Red looks like that" is coherent. What do you guys make of this? I have long been skeptical of the idea that Mary gained additional knowledge-that, but I'm not sure this particular critique holds water.

She's learned what it is like to see red. She can now meaningfully say "Seeing red is like that."

I have only limited experience with Wittgenstein, but I think it would be helpful to go a bit further than knowledge of one's own experience, although that certainly also holds.

It seems to me that she has gained knowledge of 1) the existence of color (and the existence of red), 2) the coloredness (and redness) of a particular object, 3) her own experience of perceiving red. Yet many people--and most children--will not actually notice (3), which consists primarily of sense knowledge.

I gave two options that I think "that" could refer to when Mary says "Red looks like that." In short-form:

1. "that" refers to Mary's qualia
2. "that" refers to the experience of seeing other, similarly red rooms

What's wrong with the obvious, pre-Kantian answer that everyone actually means when they use such language: the object itself?

 

[KCfromNC]

If I had a pound for every time I've seen a materialist make this mistake, I'd be able to buy a new car.

Yes, when we damage brains, there is a corresponding damage to the contents of consciousness. The materialists naturally conclude from this that consciousness must be part of a brain, or at least reducible to a brain. But this is to confuse sufficient and necessary conditions.

I can provide an analogy to make clear what the problem is.

Imagine we've got an old-fashioned reel of film, a movie projector, and a blank screen. We then note that if we damage the reel of film and run it through the projector, there is corresponding damage to the picture on the movie screen.

Now let's look at your argument again:

Me:

[Brains are lumps of squidgy meat made of cells with complex connections, within which there are extremely complex electro-chemical processes occurring. I am indeed working on the assumption that nowhere within this lump of meat, or these complex processes, is there any experience of red.]

[Reels of film are long, thin strips of plastic, with a series of still semi-transparent still photographs on them. I am indeed working on the assumption that nowhere on that reel of film is a moving picture on the movie screen.]

You:

[Then why does disrupting that lump of mean make the experiences change or go away completely?]

[Then why does disrupting the reel of film make the moving picture change or go away completely?]

The link correspondence in both cases is one of neccessity, but not sufficiency. Reels of film are neccesary conditions for moving pictures on the screen, but they are not sufficient. Similarly, the correspondence you note between brain damage and "conscious damage" does seem to suggest (strongly) that brains are required for consciousness - at least for consciousness anything like human consciousness anyway - but it does not suggest or demonstrate that brains are sufficient.

So what's missing?

BUT this does not solve our problem - we're no closer to explaining why consciousness exists in the first place

Why are you assuming teleology here?

just like examining the reel of film in every detail would not bring us any closer to explaining how it gets turned into the moving image on the screen. Something is missing from the explanation. In the case of the film/image, the missing thing is the projector (including the lamp). The key question here is this: what is missing in the explanation of consciousness?

Yes, exactly. With film, we know that there is more to the process. With consciousness, what evidence do you have that there's more than material processes going on?

"I can't help but notice that despite the bluster, there's no actual argument as to why a moving picture on a movie screen can't be a process in a reel of film."

For this to be analogous, all you have to do is point out the supernatural components that we can observe as part of consciousness. We can all see the non-film parts of the projection system in action, so the analogy would require you to produce similar objective evidence of the non-naturalistic components of consciousness for the analogy to hold.

 

[KCfromNC]

I have only limited experience with Wittgenstein, but I think it would be helpful to go a bit further than knowledge of one's own experience, although that certainly also holds.

It seems to me that she has gained knowledge of 1) the existence of color (and the existence of red), 2) the coloredness (and redness) of a particular object

She would have known both of these already. Or at least for 2) if you're talking about the color of a specific object she could discover it using a machine which measured the wavelength of reflected light and compared it against the wavelength of light from objects commonly identified as red.

3) her own experience of perceiving red. Yet many people--and most children--will not actually notice (3), which consists primarily of sense knowledge.

Good you're drawing a distinction between "sense knowledge" ie. having a feeling with the more commonly used meaning of knowledge.

What's wrong with the obvious, pre-Kantian answer that everyone actually means when they use such language: the object itself?

I was trying to get at this by asking for a way to order red not attached to any object but no one took me up on it. People don't experience red. They experience things have various propertied which our visual processing classifies based on a number of categories. Trying to reduce it to a single experience of a disembodied abstract red isn't how reality works.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So what's missing?

An explanation of how the information contained in a brain is turned into the subjective experience of consciousness.

First you accept this is a question that requires an answer, then we can explore the possible answers. If you're like most materialists, then you're expecting me to provide an answer that you can reject out of hand, without having acknowledged that the question does, in fact, require an answer, and that you don't have any answer at all.

Why are you assuming teleology here?

Why do you think I am assuming teleology

Yes, exactly. With film, we know that there is more to the process. With consciousness, what evidence do you have that there's more than material processes going on?

You are not following the argument. You implied/argued that because when we damage a brain, there is corresponding damage to consciousness, it suggests that consciousness is reducible (or is) just brain activity. I responded to this by demonstrating that this correspondence only establishes brains as a necessary condition for consciousness, and not the sufficient condition you needed for your initial claim to stand up. So it falls down. The fact that brain damage causes consciousness damage is not, in fact, any use as a means of refuting the idea that consciousness is more than just brain activity.

For this to be analogous, all you have to do is point out the supernatural components that we can observe as part of consciousness.

Nope. I have to do no such thing. We have a brain, and brain activity. And we have consciousness. And it is clear that damaging brains leads to corresponding damage to consciousness. I do not have to also come up with impossible-to-provide scientific evidence for the existence of the missing component. All I have to do is force you to acknowledge that brain activity is not, in fact, consciousness. When you have accepted the reality of what we do know about, then, and only then, will you be ready to discuss the things you don't know about.

We can all see the non-film parts of the projection system in action, so the analogy would require you to produce similar objective evidence of the non-naturalistic components of consciousness for the analogy to hold.

Nope. Why should I be able to provide objective evidence of non-naturalistic things? Can you think of any other non-naturalistic things it is possible to provide objective evidence for? Cos I can't. Why should this be any different?

I repeat: FIRST you acknowledge the problem you're pretending doesn't exist. THEN we'll talk about possible solutions.

A multiple choice question for you: What is the relationship between consciousness and brain activity?

A) Consciousness doesn't exist. So there is no relationship. There is just brain activity.

B) Consciousness is brain activity. There is no relationship apart from identity. Consciousness is identical to brain activity, regardless of the fact that they have completely different properties and bear not the slightest resemblance to each other.

C) Consciousness is not brain activity, but it is produced by brain activity, like breasts produce milk.

D) Consciousness is not brain activity, but it is produced by brain acticity, but not like breasts produce milk. It's some other sort of "production".

E) Consciousness is not brain activity, but is dependent on brain activity, and therefore partly produced by it, but something else must be required, or we have an explanatory gap.

F) I haven't got a clue what consciousness is or where it comes from or why it exists.

G) None of the above: please specify.

 

[KCfromNC]

An explanation of how the information contained in a brain is turned into the subjective experience of consciousness.

First you accept this is a question that requires an answer, then we can explore the possible answers. If you're like most materialists, then you're expecting me to provide an answer that you can reject out of hand, without having acknowledged that the question does, in fact, require an answer, and that you don't have any answer at all.

I'm not claiming I have a complete answer to any particular question. I'm just saying I see no reason that the answer must be supernatural. And you're not providing any reason for me to change my mind.

Why do you think I am assuming teleology

Because by the way you wrote it, you seemed to be saying that consciousness was the end result of some inevitable plan.

You are not following the argument. You implied/argued that because when we damage a brain, there is corresponding damage to consciousness, it suggests that consciousness is reducible (or is) just brain activity. I responded to this by demonstrating that this correspondence only establishes brains as a necessary condition for consciousness, and not the sufficient condition you needed for your initial claim to stand up.

Hey, at least I have some evidence that there's a natural component to consciousness. Let me know when there's something similar for claims of a supernatural one.

The fact that brain damage causes consciousness damage is not, in fact, any use as a means of refuting the idea that consciousness is more than just brain activity.

No, the complete lack of a reason to assume supernatural involvement is more than enough reason to reject it. Not to mention the complete failure of supernatural "explanations" to have ever provided any value in any situation in the past.

Nope. I have to do no such thing. We have a brain, and brain activity. And we have consciousness. And it is clear that damaging brains leads to corresponding damage to consciousness. I do not have to also come up with impossible-to-provide scientific evidence for the existence of the missing component. All I have to do is force you to acknowledge that brain activity is not, in fact, consciousness.

Why? I'm not claiming that all brain activity is consciousness. Just that it is one of the many physical processes the brain does. No matter what philosophy of mind creative writing exercises come up with, the evidence all points one way.

When you have accepted the reality of what we do know about, then, and only then, will you be ready to discuss the things you don't know about.

We don't know lots of stuff. That's not an argument for a supernatural component to that stuff.

Nope. Why should I be able to provide objective evidence of non-naturalistic things?

I don't know. You're the one who believes in them. Don't you have any reason for this belief, or is it just something you take on faith?

Can you think of any other non-naturalistic things it is possible to provide objective evidence for?

I'm not proposing them as an explanation, so this isn't my problem.

I repeat: FIRST you acknowledge the problem you're pretending doesn't exist.

Sure. The problem is that we're not omniscient. Explain how imagining unevidenced supernatural processes helps in any way.

A multiple choice question for you: What is the relationship between consciousness and brain activity?

None of the above. Consciousness is one of the things the brain does.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

None of the above. Consciousness is one of the things the brain does.

OK, let me just get this absolutely clear. This sounds like my option:

B) Consciousness is brain activity. There is no relationship apart from identity. Consciousness is identical to brain activity, regardless of the fact that they have completely different properties and bear not the slightest resemblance to each other

Except you are adding the proviso that not all brain activity is consciousness (because some things the brain does have nothing to do with consciousness). Is that correct?

"Consciousness is one of the things that brain does" and "consciousness is one sort of brain activity" would appear to mean exactly the same thing, right?

And they both suffer from the same problem: they involve a claim that two things that, on the face of it, have absolutely no properties in common, are "actually" identical, somehow....

How is this any different to claiming that the moving picture on the movie screen in my example, "is" (or "is a subset of") the reel of film? In both cases we have two things that seem to be connected, but are very different, and we're claiming they "are" the same thing regardless of their differing properties.

I'll go back and address the rest of your post when you've confirmed the above.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh, and while you're at it, perhaps you'd like to think about whether there are any other examples - any at all - from science or the "normal" world, where we have two apparently very different entities (X and Y) with completely different sets of properties, but people can expect get away with saying "X is Y" or "X is a subset of Y", without rationalists lambasting them for talking complete and utter, unadulterated, first-class bull-excrement?

Because there aren't any. Funny, that.

 

[KCfromNC]

OK, let me just get this absolutely clear. This sounds like my option:

B) Consciousness is brain activity. There is no relationship apart from identity. Consciousness is identical to brain activity, regardless of the fact that they have completely different properties and bear not the slightest resemblance to each other

Except you are adding the proviso that not all brain activity is consciousness (because some things the brain does have nothing to do with consciousness). Is that correct?

No. I gave my own answer since yours didn't accurately represent my views. For example, I don't think this is accurate "regardless of the fact that they have completely different properties and bear not the slightest resemblance to each other", since it isn't a fact.

"Consciousness is one of the things that brain does" and "consciousness is one sort of brain activity" would appear to mean exactly the same thing, right?

And they both suffer from the same problem: they involve a claim that two things that, on the face of it, have absolutely no properties in common, are "actually" identical, somehow....

The have things in common. For example, stopping brain activity stops consciousness.

How is this any different to claiming that the moving picture on the movie screen in my example, "is" (or "is a subset of") the reel of film?

Because we know there's more involved in projecting movies via a projector and screen. We don't have any indication that there's anything more than brain activity at work with consciousness.