Mary's Room and the Private Language Argument

[Conscious Z]

In Frank Jackson's "Mary's Room" experiment, Mary is imagined to have learned something when she sees color for the first time. Subsequent philosophers, such as Michael Tye, have suggested that she did in fact gain a type of knowledge-that because she could now say things like "Red looks like that."

However, I think we need to be careful when considering what knowledge Mary may have possibly gained. One problem I see with the idea that Mary gained knowledge-that is that it could very easily lead us to assigning to Mary propositions that are incoherent. My reason for thinking this is found in Wittgenstein's private language argument. As a refresher, Wittgenstein argued that a language that is understandable by only one person is inherently impossible. For example, let's say a person designates S to refer to some sensation he has on a given day. There is no way to verify that S does in fact refer to that sensation, and therefore whatever is meant by the speaker when he or says "S" will, no matter what, be right. S has no definition aside from its association with a given sensation, and so if we were to ask "Was this sensation S?" we have no actual definition of S to compare the sensation to. Therefore, it seems as though we can't actually have meaningful conversation using S.

This seems to be a problem when attempting to directly discuss any qualitative aspect of an experience. When Mary says "Red looks like that," she is supposedly referring to the qualitative nature of what seeing red is like -- similar to saying "Seeing red is like S." Well, if we are saying that S cannot meaningfully refer, then it would seem like statements such as "Seeing red is like S" are incoherent.

Intuitively, I think "Red looks like that" is coherent. What do you guys make of this? I have long been skeptical of the idea that Mary gained additional knowledge-that, but I'm not sure this particular critique holds water.

Thoughts?

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I don't know how historically accurate this is but I heard that the handicapped man Joey Deacon communicated with a complete stranger, accidenallty really, another discbled man who understood his "waving hand and arms" as a form of communication. So maybe he had a private language? But its a famous case so its probably been discussed before.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

What I heard was there is theoretical knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance, say of "vanilla ice cream's" efects on the taste buds.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

In Frank Jackson's "Mary's Room" experiment, Mary is imagined to have learned something when she sees color for the first time. Subsequent philosophers, such as Michael Tye, have suggested that she did in fact gain a type of knowledge-that because she could now say things like "Red looks like that."

However, I think we need to be careful when considering what knowledge Mary may have possibly gained. One problem I see with the idea that Mary gained knowledge-that is that it could very easily lead us to assigning to Mary propositions that are incoherent. My reason for thinking this is found in Wittgenstein's private language argument. As a refresher, Wittgenstein argued that a language that is understandable by only one person is inherently impossible. For example, let's say a person designates S to refer to some sensation he has on a given day. There is no way to verify that S does in fact refer to that sensation, and therefore whatever is meant by the speaker when he or says "S" will, no matter what, be right. S has no definition aside from its association with a given sensation, and so if we were to ask "Was this sensation S?" we have no actual definition of S to compare the sensation to. Therefore, it seems as though we can't actually have meaningful conversation using S.

This seems to be a problem when attempting to directly discuss any qualitative aspect of an experience. When Mary says "Red looks like that," she is supposedly referring to the qualitative nature of what seeing red is like -- similar to saying "Seeing red is like S." Well, if we are saying that S cannot meaningfully refer, then it would seem like statements such as "Seeing red is like S" are incoherent.

Intuitively, I think "Red looks like that" is coherent. What do you guys make of this? I have long been skeptical of the idea that Mary gained additional knowledge-that, but I'm not sure this particular critique holds water.

Thoughts?

I was very fortunate to study Wittgenstein with Michael Morris (author of https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24137-routledge-philosophy-guidebook-to-wittgenstein-and-the-tractatus/)

In a nutshell, I think Wittgenstein was wrong. W argued (in the Investigations) that a "private ostensive definition" was impossible, but his actual argument is hard to reconstruct from the non-analytical prose of that book. Just because you can't provide a definition, does it follow that you can't know what a word means?

I think Mary does indeed gain new information, regardless of Wittgenstein's "argument". I think your intuition is correct.

However, proving it is another matter...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't know how historically accurate this is but I heard that the handicapped man Joey Deacon communicated with a complete stranger, accidenallty really, another discbled man who understood his "waving hand and arms" as a form of communication. So maybe he had a private language? But its a famous case so its probably been discussed before.

Ha! How often is Joey Deacon mentioned on the internet? Never, as far as I can remember. I grew up in a small town in Surrey, England, called "Caterham". Joey Deacon lived in the mental hospital in Caterham.

This isn't an example of a Wittgensteinian private language though. A linguist could learn to translate it into English, and provide English definitions. It's just a form of sign language.

 

[quatona]

Hi, I am not sure I understand what exactly you are asking (this may be due to the fact that I´m not familiar with that experiment).
So my apologies in advance if my reply is besides the point.

In Frank Jackson's "Mary's Room" experiment, Mary is imagined to have learned something when she sees color for the first time.

It seems to me that there are two steps involved here
1. Seeing color for the first time.
2. Learning an English word.
Which step is referred to here?
In my conviction the acquirition of language means social learning (as opposed to gaining knowledge about the world).

Subsequent philosophers, such as Michael Tye, have suggested that she did in fact gain a type of knowledge-that because she could now say things like "Red looks like that."

I wouldn´t call that knowledge (about the world) but rather acquirition of a social skill.

However, I think we need to be careful when considering what knowledge Mary may have possibly gained. One problem I see with the idea that Mary gained knowledge-that is that it could very easily lead us to assigning to Mary propositions that are incoherent. My reason for thinking this is found in Wittgenstein's private language argument. As a refresher, Wittgenstein argued that a language that is understandable by only one person is inherently impossible. For example, let's say a person designates S to refer to some sensation he has on a given day. There is no way to verify that S does in fact refer to that sensation, and therefore whatever is meant by the speaker when he or says "S" will, no matter what, be right. S has no definition aside from its association with a given sensation, and so if we were to ask "Was this sensation S?" we have no actual definition of S to compare the sensation to. Therefore, it seems as though we can't actually have meaningful conversation using S.

I do not get the equation "is impossible - doesn´t enable a meaningful conversation", to begin with.
I think there can be a meaningful conversation - the only question is: What is it that can be communicated (and what can´t)? I am left to believe that the conversation can be meaningful in terms of learning how another person uses language.
I generally think that this is a common problem we find in philosophical discussions: We are assuming/pretending to talk about the world, but actually exchange but statements about our use of words. In short, self-reference of language.

This seems to be a problem when attempting to directly discuss any qualitative aspect of an experience. When Mary says "Red looks like that," she is supposedly referring to the qualitative nature of what seeing red is like -- similar to saying "Seeing red is like S."

In my understanding, both statements have it backwards. The statement I translate them into is: "What I see here I have learnded to call red."

Intuitively, I think "Red looks like that" is coherent. What do you guys make of this?

I don´t think that a person´s intention when making a statement involving colours typically is to make a statement about the abstraction, in the first place (unless they are philosophers, maybe). They don´t mean to say "red looks like this" but "this looks red", and ultimately they are saying "my word for this is 'red'".

 

[KCfromNC]

In Frank Jackson's "Mary's Room" experiment, Mary is imagined to have learned something when she sees color for the first time.

That's the biggest problem with this argument - that it is based purely in our imagination. We simply have no way to know how brains will behave if you deprive them of certain normal inputs during their development. So any conclusions one makes from this argument are simply going to be restatements of whatever faith one had going in. Perhaps the deficits in development would mean she'd not actually see red objects as red even if they were put in front of her? No way to know, which makes this argument pretty useless as a way of figuring out how brain function actually works.

The other problem is the subtle equivocation set up in the argument. It switches between "knowledge from book learning" and "complete and total omnipotence on a particular subject" depending on the needs of the argument at the time. It tries to equate the former with all that can be known physically about a system, but there's no reason to presume this is true unless you already agree with the conclusion. It's a problem common to other "consciousness is magic" arguments - the subtle appeal to the idea that there must be more to consciousness slipped in without explicitly stating it.

So the answer to the question is simple - she learns different things through the physical process of experiencing a certain physical input than she did from others. Our brains learn some things some ways and other things other ways. No surprise there. Don't know that it says anything about that process being non-physical as claimed in the argument, though.

Intuitively, I think "Red looks like that" is coherent.

Where can I go to look at a Red and find out for myself? And assuming I've never seen one, can you tell me specifically what they look like? I'm not familiar with where to find disembodied Reds floating out in the universe, but maybe I haven't searched Amazon hard enough. Do they offer free shipping on them for Prime members?

I find this sort of folk psychology description of brain function a real weakness of the philosophy of mind, personally.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I think there can be a meaningful conversation - the only question is: What is it that can be communicated (and what can´t)? I am left to believe that the conversation can be meaningful in terms of learning how another person uses language.

I generally think that this is a common problem we find in philosophical discussions: We are assuming/pretending to talk about the world, but actually exchange but statements about our use of words. In short, self-reference of language.

What matters here is really what is known, rather than what can be communicated. The purpose of the thought experiment is to prevent materialists from denying the existence of qualia, as part of an argument designed to falsify materialism. So whether or not Mary can communicate her new knowlesge is beside the point. So long as she learns something new, the thought experiment has served its purpose.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's the biggest problem with this argument - that it is based purely in our imagination. We simply have no way to know how brains will behave if you deprive them of certain normal inputs during their development. So any conclusions one makes from this argument are simply going to be restatements of whatever faith one had going in. Perhaps the deficits in development would mean she'd not actually see red objects as red even if they were put in front of her? No way to know, which makes this argument pretty useless as a way of figuring out how brain function actually works.

But the argument has nothing to do with figuring out how brain function works. That's not the point of it. And if Mary doesn't see red because her brain development has been hindered due to a lack of exposure to red, again this is a side-issue and not relevant to the thought experiment. It can be "fixed" by saying that if this happens, Mary can recieve advanced brain surgery to fix the developmental problem, and then she gets to see red.

It's a problem common to other "consciousness is magic" arguments - the subtle appeal to the idea that there must be more to consciousness slipped in without explicitly stating it.

I'm not really sure what you're saying here. The very fact that consciousness exists at all is enough to falsify physicalism, IMO. Whether or not it is "magic", whatever that means, is another question.

So the answer to the question is simple - she learns different things through the physical process of experiencing a certain physical input than she did from others. Our brains learn some things some ways and other things other ways. No surprise there. Don't know that it says anything about that process being non-physical as claimed in the argument, though.

I'm not sure there is a claim about any non-physical processes. The question is whether qualia exist or not, and whether it is logically possible that they can be reduced to physical entities. (my answers: yes, and no)

Where can I go to look at a Red and find out for myself? And assuming I've never seen one, can you tell me specifically what they look like? I'm not familiar with where to find disembodied Reds floating out in the universe...

They do not have to be disembodied. Minds don't have to exist independently of brains. In other words, "Physicalism is false" does not equate to "disembodied minds exist."

I find this sort of folk psychology description of brain function a real weakness of the philosophy of mind, personally.

I find the term "folk psychology" meaningless and stupid personally.

 

[quatona]

What matters here is really what is known, rather than what can be communicated.

"Is known" by whom?, "is communicated" by whom?
I am totally unclear what exactly it is that she´s supposed to (or not supposed) to have learned at which point of the process.

The purpose of the thought experiment is to prevent materialists from denying the existence of qualia, as part of an argument designed to falsify materialism.

I tend to be suspicious of experiments that serve such purposes.

So whether or not Mary can communicate her new knowlesge is beside the point.

Ok.

So long as she learns something new, the thought experiment has served its purpose.

So what is it she supposedly has learned, when did that happen, and how did that happen?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

"Is known" by whom?, "is communicated" by whom?

By Mary, and by extension, by everybody.

I am totally unclear what exactly it is that she´s supposed to (or not supposed) to have learned at which point of the process.

She learns what red looks like and the moment she sees red for the first time.

I tend to be suspicious of experiments that serve such purposes.

I presume you are a materialist then?

So what is it she supposedly has learned, when did that happen, and how did that happen?

[/quote]

She learned what red looks like (or what it looks like to her), it happened when she saw it for the first time, and it happened in the same way it always happens when a human sees in colour. It's just that she was denied access to that colour until that point.

 

[quatona]

By Mary, and by extension, by everybody.

Ok.

She learns what red looks like and the moment she sees red for the first time.

Thanks for elaborating. That makes no sense to me at all.

I presume you are a materialist then?

No, I don´t think I am.
I´m suspicious because an experiment with a predetermined result and purpose is not an experiment.

She learned what red looks like (or what it looks like to her), it happened when she saw it for the first time, and it happened in the same way it always happens when a human sees in colour. It's just that she was denied access to that colour until that point.

This almost sounds like she had a concept of "red" all the time and just needed to learn what it looks like. I find that notion borderline absurd.
I´d say she´s seen something she´s never seen before. That´s all.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Thanks for elaborating. That makes no sense to me at all.

What doesn't make sense about it?

I´m suspicious because an experiment with a predetermined result and purpose is not an experiment.

It's a thought experiment, not an experiment.

This almost sounds like she had a concept of "red" all the time and just needed to learn what it looks like.

Yes.

I´d say she´s seen something she´s never seen before. That´s all.

That's enough for the thought experiment to work.

 

[quatona]

What doesn't make sense about it?

The idea that an experience met a concept that already existed in her mind.

It's a thought experiment, not an experiment.

Ah, a thought experiment isn´t an experiment....I guess that´s why it´s called "experiment".

That's enough for the thought experiment to work.

"At the moment she saw something she´d never seen before she saw something she´d never seen before" is a mere tautology.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ah, a thought experiment isn´t an experiment....I guess that´s why it´s called "experiment".

Is a "thought crime" a crime, just because it has the word "crime" in its name?

"At the moment she saw something she´d never seen before she saw something she´d never seen before" is a mere tautology.

Nothing safer than a tautology... :-D

 

[TillICollapse]

I would say Mary has gained knowledge. Without defining qualia extensively but in a very loose way, I suppose in a very basic way in this context, knowledge would be linking qualia to a referent. The attempt to communicate this knowledge is arguably an attempt to use a social construct tool (language) to convey private qualia. The language used in communication doesn't define the qualia, rather one could argue the language is defined by the qualia and the referent and agreed upon socially.

I think Mary's Room essentially addresses whether or not qualia in itself is "knowledge". I might say it is the most basic form of "knowledge". I may also say it is the most basic form of communication ... with oneself. To communicate such experience with another via a common language doesn't diminish the experience, but it doesn't necessarily reproduce the same experience in the other person either in a manner that can be definitively verified.

 

[Conscious Z]

I was very fortunate to study Wittgenstein with Michael Morris (author of https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24137-routledge-philosophy-guidebook-to-wittgenstein-and-the-tractatus/)

In a nutshell, I think Wittgenstein was wrong. W argued (in the Investigations) that a "private ostensive definition" was impossible, but his actual argument is hard to reconstruct from the non-analytical prose of that book. Just because you can't provide a definition, does it follow that you can't know what a word means?

I think Mary does indeed gain new information, regardless of Wittgenstein's "argument". I think your intuition is correct.

However, proving it is another matter...

Excellent response. Thank you. Doing some research on this issue, I saw that David Papineau has written a paper that takes a similar stance. I'm going to link to the Google search because the first result is the paper, but it is in Microsoft Word format: https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=david papineau private language wittgenstein

In that paper, he says that he does think phenomenal concepts are a problem for PLA, and that the best conclusion is that there might be something wrong with PLA. Of course, Papineau is not a materialist, so the PLA would present problems for his view if it held in this instance.

I still have difficulty imagining what it is that Mary has "learned," though. Obviously, I believe she had a novel experience. However, I'm not sure she can actually create any propositions that she couldn't before. Let's imagine that Mary's sister Martha was also a super scientist, but that Martha stayed behind in the black and white room while Mary went out into the world to see color. Let's say that Mary's first visit into the world was into a room that was all red. What would we say that Mary now knows that Martha doesn't? There are several possibilities, but it seems the most common response would be that she now knows that Red looks like that, or more specifically, A red room looks like that. But what does "that" refer to? To me, this is the critical issue here, and I think there are two options:

1. "that" refers to Mary's qualia upon seeing the room. This may be true, but this would be a totally unique type of proposition, and this was the very thing Wittgenstein was saying was impossible. Of course, if the PLA doesn't hold water, then this might not be a concern. However, it still feels peculiar, and I'll explain why in #2.

2. "that" refers to some imaginary corollary experience that someone who has seen similar rooms might understand. This would be similar to me saying "Frog legs sort of taste like chicken." While I'm making certain assumptions about what the experience of tasting chicken was like for another person (specifically, that it was what it was like when I've tasted chicken), this seems to be more similar to how we actually communicate in real life, which is why I think this is more likely than #1. So when Mary says "The red room looks like that," her proposition is obviously meaningful to anyone who has seen red and seen a room. Yet, the problem is that Martha also knows red looked like that. Because of her knowledge of neuroscience and the science of color, Martha would know that a person seeing an entirely red room would have a similar experience as a person seeing a mostly red room -- she doesn't need to leave the black and white room to find that out. Thus, that isn't new knowledge for Mary.

So, for Jackson's experiment to be meaningful, it has to be option #1. If it is option #1, however, I think it's harder to say that Mary has gained knowledge-that. I saw Michael Tye at a conference once, and I asked him if he thought his "knowledge by acquaintance" that he attributes to Mary is knowledge-that. He said it was, and he said that linguists are in strong agreement that knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge-that, and it can be thought of as Mary being able to say "Red looks like that," and anyone who has seen that would be able to make sense of the proposition. No sense can be made, however, if that refers to Mary's qualia.

 

[Conscious Z]

What I heard was there is theoretical knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance, say of "vanilla ice cream's" efects on the taste buds.

Yes, Michael Tye has argued that Mary gains "knowledge by acquaintance." However, see the end of my above post to Elephant -- Tye also holds that "knowledge by acquaintance" is a form of knowledge-that.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Yet, the problem is that Martha also knows red looked like that. Because of her knowledge of neuroscience and the science of color, Martha would know that a person seeing an entirely red room would have a similar experience as a person seeing a mostly red room -- she doesn't need to leave the black and white room to find that out.

Eh? I was following you up until that point, and then I just failed to understand what you're saying. Martha didn't and doesn't know that red looks like that. She doesn't know what red looks like.

So, for Jackson's experiment to be meaningful, it has to be option #1. If it is option #1, however, I think it's harder to say that Mary has gained knowledge-that. I saw Michael Tye at a conference once, and I asked him if he thought his "knowledge by acquaintance" that he attributes to Mary is knowledge-that. He said it was, and he said that linguists are in strong agreement that knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge-that, and it can be thought of as Mary being able to say "Red looks like that," and anyone who has seen that would be able to make sense of the proposition. No sense can be made, however, if that refers to Mary's qualia.

Hmmmm...

I may just be missing something here. From my perspective you seem to be over-complicating something that is really quite simple. Maybe it is because I am not having any trouble imagining what Mary has learned. It is completely obvious to me. So the rest of your post is trying solve/analyse a problem I don't recognise as a problem.

Or perhaps I'm just being a bit slow today.

 

[Conscious Z]

"At the moment she saw something she´d never seen before she saw something she´d never seen before" is a mere tautology.

A better phrasing would be "At the moment she saw something she'd never seen before, she learned something."