Language Thread

[juvenissun]

Logic and philosophy do take that into account. For instance by pointing out that equivocation is a logical fallacy and a big no-no.

It is not enough to just point it out. It has to be dealt with.

How do you handle the statement: "it is black, and yet is not black"? Just saying it is wrong is not enough. It could be right.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

If I may butt in, I think it doesn't lead anywhere to argue wether a contradictionary statement has "meaning" or not, becaue "meaning" is not a very percise term. Everyone understands it to mean something slightly different.

I can agree with that.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Cool and interesting link. Thank you!

It pretty much confirms my thoughts about the issue. This "explosion" is what I was describing as the collapse of logic: everything can mean anything. And since the primary premise and purpose of logic is distinguishability (is that even a word?), the fact that everything means everything comes down to "everything means nothing".
This "explosion" also allows for the conclusion that true things are false, and thereby throws your criterion "truth apt" out of the window.

That could be the case but only if you regard a contradiction as true. But if you dont (ie you regard it as false) then these things don't follow.

It allows for "illogicality can be logical" and therefore throws logic out the window.
It is the destruction of the very formal system it employs (no matter whether you call it "collapse" or "explosion" into meaninglessness not only of the symbols used explicitly in the contradiction but also of any symbols of the formal system employed).

My view is that if we were defining the use of A and as in "A is not A" thasn we would be in such trouble. But we are not defining the use of the term, or the initial meaning, we are already downstream of that. I will try and find a reference for whaty I mean if I can remember to, I have a book on Wittgenstein that mentions something like this IIRC.

On another note: Under "Addressing the principle" you find a great variety of approaches of dealing with this problem - and this variety demonstrates that your approach based on the definition you prefer is just one of several philosophical ways.

I can accept that, I think at least it is a disputed area .

And just because it caught my eye: Under "see also" you will find

• Law of noncontradiction – no proposition can be both true and not true

Who said it could? A in a contradiction eg "it is reaining" AND "it is not raining" then the truth value of the compound is regarded as false, not both true and false.

which is puts a huge question mark behind the definition of "proposition" you have offered: "This is black" cannot be true and not true ("this is not black"), and therefore (according to the the above definition "black can be non-black" is not a proposition).

I dont think that follows. It can assert contradictory things without us being compelled to accept those things at face value. For instanvce in a court room I may assert I was drunk but in full control of my senses, a contradiction. Now I think the jugde will have no trouble understanding what I have said, but he will not be compelled to regard it as both true and false. He will regard the whole os false, because both statements cannot be true at the same time, and for a conjunction to be true the elements in it must all be true.

 

[Lord Emsworth]

It is not enough to just point it out. It has to be dealt with.

How do you handle the statement: "it is black, and yet is not black"? Just saying it is wrong is not enough. It could be right.

Only if they are homonyms, i.e. have the same spelling and pronounciation but different meaning.

And I have the impression that you are too caught up with the morphological structure of a word. You need to look towards the meaning.

 

[KCfromNC]

That could be the case but only if you regard a contradiction as true. But if you dont (ie you regard it as false) then these things don't follow.

Interesting you address the meaning of "A is notA" by assuming that it must be either have meaning or not. But the whole point of the discussion is that a statement might be true and false simultaneously, if we follow the idea that A is notA is meaningful. So not only might his conclusion either follow or not, it is meaningful to say that it does both simultaneously. But you don't say that - you tell us it has to be one or the other.

Seems like the idea is so crippling to meaningful discussion that you have to disregard it even to talk about it in the first place.

For instanvce in a court room I may assert I was drunk but in full control of my senses, a contradiction.

No, a contradiction would be to say that you were drunk and not drunk at the same time. Saying you were A and B isn't a contradiction. Saying you were A and notA is. Big difference.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Interesting you address the meaning of "A is notA" by assuming that it must be either have meaning or not.

It is presumed it you accept the LEM (law of excluded middle).

But the whole point of the discussion is that a statement might be true and false simultaneously, if we follow the idea that A is notA is meaningful.

I do not see how that follows actually. Maybe you would like to present an argument where the conclusion actually follows from premises. Please don't interpret this as me being ruse, I think it is standard practice in good philosophy and ought to be respected rather than frowned upon.

So not only might his conclusion either follow or not, it is meaningful to say that it does both simultaneously. But you don't say that - you tell us it has to be one or the other.

In ordinary logic at least, things are either true or flase, not both.

Seems like the idea is so crippling to meaningful discussion that you have to disregard it even to talk about it in the first place.

Like I said, please instead of merely staing your conclusions try and argue a point logically.

No, a contradiction would be to say that you were drunk and not drunk at the same time. Saying you were A and B isn't a contradiction. Saying you were A and notA is. Big difference.

It would be a contradiction in that being drunk can imply not being in control of one's senses.

 

[quatona]

That could be the case but only if you regard a contradiction as true. But if you dont (ie you regard it as false) then these things don't follow.

Merely false premises aren´t a problem for the system of logic. A merely false premise doesn´t explode or collapse the system. "A is not A" is beyond false - it is meaningless - which is reflected by the fact that accepting it for a premise will explode the system into meaninglessness.

What I´m trying to get at is that "A is nonA" is not false (in the way at least one of two contradiciting parts must be false) - it isn´t even an option provisioned for in the system of logic because it denies its most basic axiom. It is not merely false - it is impossible.

Not quite a perfect analogy but maybe it helps:
Demanding a penalty in soccer can be false (in that the situation in question didn´t call for a penalty, according to the rules), whereas demanding a penalty in chess is beyond false - there simply is no such thing as a penalty in chess. Demanding a penalty would be meaningless within the system "chess".

My view is that if we were defining the use of A and as in "A is not A" thasn we would be in such trouble. But we are not defining the use of the term, or the initial meaning, we are already downstream of that.

I´m afraid I don´t understand what you are saying here. Could you please reword it for me?
I will try and find a reference for whaty I mean if I can remember to, I have a book on Wittgenstein that mentions something like this IIRC.

I dont think that follows. It can assert contradictory things without us being compelled to accept those things at face value. For instanvce in a court room I may assert I was drunk but in full control of my senses, a contradiction.

Again, this is not an example for what we are discussing here. It´s not a situation where one of the parts is the exact negation of the other. A statement of the sort we are discussing here would be "I was drunk and I was not drunk."

 

[quatona]

Language isn't exact like that, but rather always depends on context and association.

Taking this for the essential message of your interesting post, I agree.

Sometimes, like in art, we love language for its lack of imprecision.

I guess it is always a good idea to come to an agreement what we are striving for when using language. E.g. if in a given situation one person wants to minimize the imprecision, whereas the conversation partner enjoys this very imprecision, the communication will fail.

 

[sandwiches]

Again, this is not an example for what we are discussing here. It´s not a situation where one of the parts is the exact negation of the other. A statement of the sort we are discussing here would be "I was drunk and I was not drunk."

Yea, what I'm curious about is what GS would think a phrase like "I am here and I am not here" means. What meaning do get from that, without equivocating.

 

[quatona]

Yea, what I'm curious about is what GS would think a phrase like "I am here and I am not here" means. What meaning do get from that, without equivocating.

Well, if I have reason to assume that the person using this phrase is not attempting to use precise language (but poetic, metaphorical language) I can interprete it meaningfully. Interestingly one of the things I often tell my students is that it is "important to be where you are" (trying to say: "it is important to keep your awareness to the situation you are in and not let your mind wander"), which implies that you can not be where you are.

Of course, this knowingly and purposely employs an equivocation of two different meanings of "being here" (and it also is made under the assumption that the person opposite is aware of that), and such an equivocation is - rightfully - not admitted in formal logic.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Quatona I looked into this book (A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Blackwell Publishers) on Wittgenstein, at the entry on contradictions:

"Contradiction:

For Wittgenstein, a contradiction like 'p.-p' (thats p and not-p btw) is on par with a tautology like -(p.-p) in that it is not nonsensical but senseless, because it says nothing...

...What logicians are afraid of are not contradictions per se, which have a legitimate role in reductio ad absurdum arguments, but violations of this rule (...which prohibits expressions like p.-p...) for example failure to withdraw a postulate which implies a contradiction."​

​

Then it goes on to compare a contradiction to an illegal move in chess, like you have done.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Yea, what I'm curious about is what GS would think a phrase like "I am here and I am not here" means. What meaning do get from that, without equivocating.

It means "I am here and I am not here". Or, "I am at the present location and also not at the present location". To me that means something, which is why we can interpret it as a contradiction, which is a specific class of statement.

 

[KCfromNC]

It is presumed it you accept the LEM (law of excluded middle).

In a discussion about the validity of A=notA, that would be assuming your conclusions.

Like I said, you know that A=notA isn't meaningful and you can't even prevent yourself from presuming it even when you're trying to convince us of the exact opposite.

In ordinary logic at least, things are either true or flase, not both.
Like I said, please instead of merely staing your conclusions try and argue a point logically.

Should I use ordinary logic, or can I ignore the law of non-contradiction like you're selectively doing?

It would be a contradiction in that being drunk can imply not being in control of one's senses.

Sometimes. Other times not. You'll have to show logically how these premises lead to a contradiction. But you're going to have a hard time deducing anything of the sort from "sometimes drunk people are in control, other times not".

 

[GrowingSmaller]

KC I am still waiting for logical arguments rather than mere statements of opinion. You ought to be jumping for joy that philosophy is at least being asked to attemp to justify itself reasonably, with a "Me first!" attitude, rather than avoiding the request.

The term "analytic philosophy" can refer to:

• A general philosophical tradition[3][4] characterized by an emphasis on clarity and argument (often achieved via modern formal logic and analysis of language) and a respect for the natural sciences.[5][6][7]

 

[quatona]

Quatona I looked into this book (A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Blackwell Publishers) on Wittgenstein, at the entry on contradictions:

"Contradiction:

For Wittgenstein, a contradiction like 'p.-p' (thats p and not-p btw) is on par with a tautology like -(p.-p) in that it is not nonsensical but senseless, because it says nothing...

...What logicians are afraid of are not contradictions per se, which have a legitimate role in reductio ad absurdum arguments, but violations of this rule (...which prohibits expressions like p.-p...) for example failure to withdraw a postulate which implies a contradiction."​

Then it goes on to compare a contradiction to an illegal move in chess, like you have done.

Thanks for the info, GS.
Not that I would appeal to an authority or something, but it´s great to learn that I´m not alone with these thoughts (and Wittgenstein sure was a sharp guy).

 

[KCfromNC]

KC I am still waiting for logical arguments rather than mere statements of opinion.

But does this imply you're not also not-waiting? If A is notA is meaningful, the fact you're waiting for an answer doesn't rule out the fact that I've already answered so there's no implication that I need to add more to what I've written.

But if you reject the idea that A is notA to force me to give an answer, you accept that what I was saying is true and I also have no reason to answer.

Seems like my alleged non-answer is one in itself.

 

[sandwiches]

It means "I am here and I am not here". Or, "I am at the present location and also not at the present location". To me that means something, which is why we can interpret it as a contradiction, which is a specific class of statement.

You keep telling me what it is, not what it means. I am asking what the message that is being conveyed is. What the MEANING of the sentence is. It's kinda like me asking you what your truck is carrying and you tell me that it's a 2005 F150 pickup truck.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

Well what criterion are you after to acknowledge meaning. If it doesnt mean what it says, or if a rewording is not enough, what standard must be met?

 

[Tinker Grey]

Correspondence to that which is imaginable? I can imagine a unicorn and other imaginary creatures. (Whole 'nother topic: Is it possible to imagine something completely brand new, without a real referent?)

I cannot imagine, however, a square circle nor a being while omniscient being both able and unable simultaneously.

 

[sandwiches]

Well what criterion are you after to acknowledge meaning. If it doesnt mean what it says, or if a rewording is not enough, what standard must be met?

To me, understanding is the criterion. Without understanding from the reader or listener, the phrase is meaningless. If I say "alea iacta est," it has no meaning unless you understand Latin. If I say "gihsju ajarabi," this most likely has no meaning to anyone as it is gibberish I just made up. Even less extreme would be to say "I just Christmas tree my car." What does that mean? I understand the individual words but the sentence as a whole is meaningless under the common usage of those words.

I'm really surprised that we're having to explain how to tell if something has a meaning. I'm sure that if you ask your wife if she paid the electric bill and she answers "I paid it completely and I didn't pay it at all," you won't simply nod in understanding because you understood the individual words or phrases. The whole sentence is meaningless. You either pay the bills or you don't. I'm sure you'd ask what she means.