Silmarien
Existentialist
- Feb 24, 2017
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In reading through your response here, Sil--and since I'm just not that familiar with Craig's overall set of arguments for this or that notion of Cosmological sensibilities ('cuz I start with Lee Smolin rather than with WLC), not to mention the Kalaam argument specifically-- I began to imagine and wonder as to just what WLC would say to us [you? ] at this point, taking your criticisms, or something very much akin to your criticisms, in tow.
And in pondering this over, I think I've found something that helps me visualize what Craig would say to those of us who think his Kalaam is a bunch of hooey. In the following video, Craig explains that he thinks the Kalaam is a 'deductive' argument which is to be presented within certain strictures of a valid deductive process, and he maintains the assumption in his argumentation that we should have a preference for an A-theory of time as opposed to a B-theory of time. This he seems to outline in the first 8 or 9 minutes of the video below. I haven't watched the rest of it, but I will...so don't shoot the messenger, at least not yet.
There wouldn't happen to be a transcript anywhere, would there?
The other problem with Craig is his insistence on the A-Theory of Time. I don't have a preference for it, and frankly think it's wrong, so anything that follows isn't going to be terribly interesting or useful to me.
Thats where I'm at with Kalam.
But it goes further. Not only are the premises undecidable. But even if true, the dont necessarily indicate anything like a god being.
I find it an appallingly bad argument.
In fact I'm starting to think that all attempts at rigorous theological argument are doomed by the necessity to assert strong premises regarding the unknown.
You know, I used to agree with you, but I think a lot of it depends on how we conceptualize "known" and "unknown," where we draw lines, and what sort of knowledge we think we have access to.
I take the opposite approach to a lot of people here. I think we have direct, intuitive knowledge of Being Itself, in the theological sense, but I would deny that we truly "know" anything about physical reality. And I mean that for real: I've toyed around with forms of Platonic idealism in the past, doubting whether matter genuinely exists. If you're in that territory, the known and the unknown switch places, the ontological argument comes alive, and everything changes.
I think the real value in the various arguments is just the way that really delving into them helps to clarify the way you think about things. Strangely enough, I was finally fully won over because of a line of thought based on an objection to a theistic argument rather than because of the actual arguments.
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