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Hello I am Prince a Trinitarian and you may ask why cause conceptually Jesus and Holy Spirit arent regarded majestically equal to God thats false Revelation 21:4 and John 20:28 and Jude 1-8 and Hebrews 1:1-8, the Holy Spirit the Spirit who proceeded from the Father and Sent through the Son Psalm 104:30, the next advocate regarded as the Hypostasis(person) who will always be with us since Christ ascension now since we got that out the way now lets first define what the trinity is
ONE: There is one God.
THREE: The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons.
FATHERSOURCE: The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps with
the Son, perhaps not).
EQUALITY: The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater
than any of the others
now begins with the relation of God,
Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.
The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
since we explain the relations now lets explain the trinity.
14. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit (collectively)
The Father ≠ the Son
The Father ≠ the Holy Spirit
The Holy Spirit ≠ the Son
This is a consistent set of propositions that adheres to the classical laws of identity as
long as proposition 14 is read collectively, not distributively. This set of propositions is
consistent with the creedal summary statements ONE and THREE. It is when conceptualized as
God that He is one, undivided in substance. It is when conceptualized as the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit that the Persons are three, not confounded with each other.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
Now since we got a logical explanation of 3=1 we now will get to law of identity argument.
Parthood: x<y=df∃zz(zz,xCy)
Proper Parthood: x<<y=df x<y&x≠y
Overlap: xOy =df ∃z(z<x&z<y)
Disjointness: xDy =df ∼xOy
Each of these mereological predicates is entailed by (CAI): xxCy =df xx=y. Claiming that
the bricks = the wall is true only if the wall is (classically) identical with one of the bricks, i.e.
with b1, or with b2… or with bn, makes the critical error of understanding identity distributively,
not collectively. CAI understands identity collectively and explains the truth-conditions for
hybrid identity statements of the form ‘xx=y’ as being satisfied iff xx (collectively) is identical
with y.
Adopting a language that includes irreducibly plural terms, which refer to objects
collectively, as opposed to only distributively, removes the bizarre need for the wall to be
identical with any particular brick, which clearly it is not. Suppose that o1, o2…, on are the parts
of a composite object O. A merely singular language construes identity distributively:
(Merely Singular Language reading) o1 =O &o2 =O & … & on = O.
In contrast, CAI accepts the claim that the parts taken collectively are identical to the
whole:
(CAI Plural Language reading) o1,o2, …, on = O
t modal properties that seemingly distinguish parts from wholes are really just two different ways of conceptualizing what is in fact identical. The only difference is that instead of the identity claim in question being a one-one relation it is many-one (Lego bricks [collectively] = Lego wall). The CAI theorist can block MODAL by denying that modal predicates such as could have survived being scattered apply to the Lego bricks but do not apply to the Lego wall based on counterpart theory and a different manner of conceptualizing the same portion of reality.
CAI can provide coherent truth-conditions for numerically hybrid identity statements, namely when the value, v, of xx is identical with the value of y—‘xx=y’ is satisfied iff v(xx) is identical with v(y).
Thanks for hearing a 16 year old explain the trinity God bless
and if you don't believe the Holy trinity please explain why
sources: Summa Theologica Index
Trinity and Economy in Thomas Aquinas — Southern Equip
https://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf
ONE: There is one God.
THREE: The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are distinct divine persons.
FATHERSOURCE: The Father is the source of the Son and the Holy Spirit (perhaps with
the Son, perhaps not).
EQUALITY: The three persons in the Trinity are ontologically equal; none is greater
than any of the others
now begins with the relation of God,
Relationship is not predicated of God according to its proper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper meaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but only as denoting regard to another. it was not to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in Himself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of relation to another.
The relation signified by the term "the same" is a logical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing; because such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by reason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some two aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are called the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically. Thus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity, not in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance is not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation of identity.
Therefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas in creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are contained under the divine order, and their very nature entails dependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in one and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.
since we explain the relations now lets explain the trinity.
14. God = the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit (collectively)
The Father ≠ the Son
The Father ≠ the Holy Spirit
The Holy Spirit ≠ the Son
This is a consistent set of propositions that adheres to the classical laws of identity as
long as proposition 14 is read collectively, not distributively. This set of propositions is
consistent with the creedal summary statements ONE and THREE. It is when conceptualized as
God that He is one, undivided in substance. It is when conceptualized as the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit that the Persons are three, not confounded with each other.
To perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of the nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is the nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident; which commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for the essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is the proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart from that of "relation," as in quantity and quality, even the true idea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for quantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the disposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken from its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to something outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations formally as such, in that aspect they are said to be "assistant," and not intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect which affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something else; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in a subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree considered relation in the former mode only.
Now whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered as transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no accident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as relation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really existing in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way distinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to something else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to its opposite term.
Thus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the same as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility; as in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not expressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God relation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and the same.
Now since we got a logical explanation of 3=1 we now will get to law of identity argument.
Parthood: x<y=df∃zz(zz,xCy)
Proper Parthood: x<<y=df x<y&x≠y
Overlap: xOy =df ∃z(z<x&z<y)
Disjointness: xDy =df ∼xOy
Each of these mereological predicates is entailed by (CAI): xxCy =df xx=y. Claiming that
the bricks = the wall is true only if the wall is (classically) identical with one of the bricks, i.e.
with b1, or with b2… or with bn, makes the critical error of understanding identity distributively,
not collectively. CAI understands identity collectively and explains the truth-conditions for
hybrid identity statements of the form ‘xx=y’ as being satisfied iff xx (collectively) is identical
with y.
Adopting a language that includes irreducibly plural terms, which refer to objects
collectively, as opposed to only distributively, removes the bizarre need for the wall to be
identical with any particular brick, which clearly it is not. Suppose that o1, o2…, on are the parts
of a composite object O. A merely singular language construes identity distributively:
(Merely Singular Language reading) o1 =O &o2 =O & … & on = O.
In contrast, CAI accepts the claim that the parts taken collectively are identical to the
whole:
(CAI Plural Language reading) o1,o2, …, on = O
t modal properties that seemingly distinguish parts from wholes are really just two different ways of conceptualizing what is in fact identical. The only difference is that instead of the identity claim in question being a one-one relation it is many-one (Lego bricks [collectively] = Lego wall). The CAI theorist can block MODAL by denying that modal predicates such as could have survived being scattered apply to the Lego bricks but do not apply to the Lego wall based on counterpart theory and a different manner of conceptualizing the same portion of reality.
CAI can provide coherent truth-conditions for numerically hybrid identity statements, namely when the value, v, of xx is identical with the value of y—‘xx=y’ is satisfied iff v(xx) is identical with v(y).
Thanks for hearing a 16 year old explain the trinity God bless
and if you don't believe the Holy trinity please explain why sources: Summa Theologica Index
Trinity and Economy in Thomas Aquinas — Southern Equip
https://www.identityblog.com/stories/2005/05/13/TheLawsOfIdentity.pdf
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