stevevw
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- Nov 4, 2013
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The first statement is false. Feelings don't equate to morality. They may feel like they do but they don't. The indivdual may subjectively feel something but that doesnt mean its morally wrong. What you feel is wrong will be different for someone else.The things we feel the most strongly about we call morals... And that proves morality is objective? That we feel more strongly about them?!
Then you are faced with the problem that each person with opposing feelings about something are both right for each person at the same time. Yet morals needs a right or wrong behaviour that is consistent for all and can be said to hold regardles of feelings.
I explained for example that feelings of empathy for example can create both moral and immoral acts. So is unreliable to determine moral right and wrong.
Those who were against slavery did not base this on feeling it was wrong. They reasoned that humans were equal based on certain inalienable rights. There was a basis for why it was wrong. Back then they thought Blacks were not human and therefore thought they were doing nothing wrong. But when the understanding and evdience was presented this could not be disputed.It doesn't make sense. If you were born back then, you wouldn't feel the way you do right now about slavery, so it would be a non-issue.
The feelings changed as a result of the fact that humans were equal and not feeling changed things. Otherwise somone having contradictory feelings to the status quo feelings doesnt stand as a way that morality changes because non-conformist would have been seen as being out of touch with the consensus feeling.
That wasnt the point. This objection to subjective morlaity is showing that it doesnt make sense to use feelings as the basis for morality ie its illogical to us gladness or preferences (feelings) for morality, for saying slavery is wrong as this matter needs an objective basis and not feelings because as they pointed out feelings for noodles or whatefer is subjective an doesnt equate to moral matters.But note that you are "glad". A feeling, and a statement that you prefer to live in today's times rather than past times. That doesn't help your case for moral objectivity.
I know its hard to do and I am not the first to say. But lets wait and see as I have posted an arguement that we need to debate first on epistemic values intertwined with moral values.If morality was objective you could support it with formal logic. I demonstrated why you can't with my proof. You attempted and failed, thereby supporting my proof.
Yeah like I said I am not good at this. But its a falalcy to say that there is no arguement.What I want to know, though, is why do you believe it's objective without knowing any objective reasoning why it's true? After realizing that what reasoning you did have was incomplete at best, why do you hold so steadfast that your position is immovable?
I thought morality was said to be an illusion based on evolution making it so. Nevertheless as far as I can see appeals to emotion have been refutedThe reason is because the illusion of objective morality is a result of the Appeal to Emotion fallacy. The most persuasive of all fallacies.
Appeal to emotion or argumentum ad passiones ("argument from passion") is an informal fallacy characterized by the manipulation of the recipient's emotions in order to win an argument, especially in the absence of factual evidence.[1] This kind of appeal to emotion is a type of red herring and encompasses several logical fallacies, including appeal to consequences, appeal to fear, appeal to flattery, appeal to pity, appeal to ridicule, appeal to spite, and wishful thinking.
Appeal to emotion - Wikipedia
The Moralistic Fallacy The most blatant way to commit the moralistic fallacy is simply to infer, from the claim that it would be morally objectionable to feel F toward X, that therefore F is not a fitting response to X. This inference is fallacious; it is belied by our dictum that an emotion can be fitting despite being wrong to feel. Such inferences can be understood as versions of a more general mistake: the thought that moral assessments of an emotion are relevant, qua moral assessments, to its fittingness.
The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotions on JSTOR
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