Is morality objective, even without God?

[Mark Quayle]

At one point in the video the interviewer asks Singer if he agrees with Harris in denying the fact-value or is-ought distinction. Singer says that he does not agree with Harris. You seem to be saying, "You can't get a moral conclusion from a factual premise, therefore Singer is wrong." But Singer explicitly says that he is not trying to do that, so I'm not sure what your point has to do with Singer.

Since I'm still up and having fun, I'll try to field this (but answering from my POV—I can't answer for @Bradskii ). And I only mean to deal directly with the phrase, "You can't get a moral conclusion from a factual premise". I would agree with that assessment, except for in one case. If God exists, it is a factual premise from which moral conclusions can be drawn. Now, I'm not sure what YOU, or Bradskii, would mean by 'a moral conclusion', so.... oh well, it was fun.

 

[Bradskii]

At one point in the video the interviewer asks Singer if he agrees with Harris in denying the fact-value or is-ought distinction. Singer says that he does not agree with Harris. You seem to be saying, "You can't get a moral conclusion from a factual premise, therefore Singer is wrong." But Singer explicitly says that he is not trying to do that, so I'm not sure what your point has to do with Singer.

I think that their positions are very similar (if not identical). But they approach it from different directions. Harris would say that we can know that something is wrong, therefore we ought not to do it. An act can therefore be described as being objectively moral. This is what Singer said:

'...no I don't agree with Sam about that. I do think that there is a distinction between facts and values or or is and ought and in that sense I'm not a naturalist as Sam is. I'm a non-natural objectivist.

Sedgewick was a non-natural objectivist. I believe um Derek Parfit was a non-natural objectivist so this is a distinct position and it's um it's like again the truths of mathematics or logic they're not empirical truths, they're not something that we can observe in the world.

They are truths, which are truths of reason and in that sense I think they are non-natural truths and I think morality belongs with them. Or some some basic actions of morality. Not all moral judgments are in that same category'.

It would have been helpful if he'd dropped in an example at that point to clarify what he meant. But I understand from it he thinks that morality - or, as he corrected himself, 'some basic actions of morality' are objective, therefore it is wrong, therefore we ought not to do it.

I can't see that that correction that he put in puts him in disagreement with Harris. Harris says that some actions are wrong and we can know this, so he feels confident in declaring it to be objectively wrong. What Singer seems to be saying is that he is skipping the assessment of whether the act is wrong and declaring it to be objectively wrong in the first instance. I have no idea how that is possible. Surely he must use his reason to determine whether it is wrong or not in the first instance. In which case his position matches that of Harris.

 

[zippy2006]

It would have been helpful if he'd dropped in an example at that point to clarify what he meant.

His examples throughout revolve around agony. For example, see post #56.

 

[Zaha Torte]

In the video below Peter Singer equates morality/ethics with mathematics, which is a concept that I'd never considered before. Most people probably agree that mathematics is objective. It's true independent of our opinions about it. And I can see how it could be argued that morality is exactly the same. In math the understanding that 1+1=2 doesn't instantaneously lead to an understanding of Pi, because although the latter is equally true, coming to understand that it's true is a complicated process. Perhaps the same is true with morality. As with mathematics, morality may be objectively true, but understanding why it's true may be just as complicated as understanding why Pi is true. You don't instantly go from understanding that math exists, to understanding trigonometry, and you don't instantly go from understanding that morality exists, to understanding that slavery is immoral.

Thus there may be an objective morality, but as with math we're still in the process of understanding it, and the fact that we may disagree about what's moral doesn't by necessity mean that morality is subjective. It just means that we don't have a sufficient understanding of morality so as to understand why things are moral, and so instead, morality without God looks subjective, when it really isn't.

And in my opinion, having some God attempting to dictate to me what is and isn't moral will never be as gratifying as actually understanding why things are immoral without a need for that God.

There is no objective morality without God.

 

[Bradskii]

Since I'm still up and having fun, I'll try to field this (but answering from my POV—I can't answer for @Bradskii ). And I only mean to deal directly with the phrase, "You can't get a moral conclusion from a factual premise".

I'd clarify that to say that you can't get an objective moral conclusion from a factual premise. That said, I have had arguments put forward that if you knew all the details and outcomes of an act - if you were effectively omniscient, then you could determine it objectively. Well, yeah. If we could do that then we'd be God. But we're not, so we can't.

 

[partinobodycular]

There is no objective morality without God.

But then I would need you to explain how the existence of God makes morality objective.

 

[Bradskii]

Singer gives an example of an objective moral norm, "Agony is a bad thing and it is good to reduce agony".

I don't see that as having any relevance in itself to morality. You could describe it as an objective fact. But you can't determine whether an act is immoral or not just from that. You could say that shooting a gun is pleasurable and it's a good thing to increase pleasure. But add some context and then it might be a moral problem.

 

[partinobodycular]

That said, I have had arguments put forward that if you knew all the details and outcomes of an act - if you were effectively omniscient, then you could determine it objectively.

But even then you would need to explain why one particular outcome is any more moral than any other outcome. On top of which you would need a basis upon which to base that determination, and then you would need to explain why that basis is any more relevant than any other basis.

 

[Bradskii]

There is no objective morality without God.

So how do we know what is moral in all circumstances? And what if you and I have different answers to that question. How do we know who is right?

 

[zippy2006]

I don't see that as having any relevance in itself to morality. You could describe it as an objective fact. But you can't determine whether an act is immoral or not just from that.

Why not? You see a being who is in agony, you have the ability to reduce the agony, therefore you should do so. See how easy that was?

 

[Bradskii]

Why not? You see a being who is in agony, you have the ability to reduce the agony, therefore you should do so. See how easy that was?

What if it's the guy who has the codes for the bomb which will destroy your city, including your family? It's then a variation of the trolley problem. Is it morally acceptable to cause one person pain to prevent him causing death and pain to millions?

Which raises another question. Can you decide that something is most definitely immoral, but nevertheless acceptable?

 

[zippy2006]

What if it's the guy who has the codes for the bomb which will destroy your city, including your family?

Singer literally addresses this scenario. Did you really watch the video?

 

[Mark Quayle]

But then I would need you to explain how the existence of God makes morality objective.

That would depend on your definition of 'God'.

 

[Bradskii]

Singer literally addresses this scenario. Did you really watch the video?

Well, yeah. But I thought I'd ask a general question to see what others, including you, might think. Me? I'd keep causing him agony until he gave me what I wanted. Then I'd treat his injuries as best I could.

 

[Zaha Torte]

But then I would need you to explain how the existence of God makes morality objective.

If there is no Intelligent Mind or Authority in regard to Morality which is above Man's - then all mortality is subjective.

 

[Zaha Torte]

So how do we know what is moral in all circumstances? And what if you and I have different answers to that question. How do we know who is right?

Not every situation is black and white - yet that which agrees with God's Word.

 

[Bradskii]

Not every situation is black and white - yet that which agrees with God's Word.

We need to know what the grey areas. And those will always include what appears to be a very specific command. I keep going back to this example, but it's not getting much of a response: Honour your father and mother. It doesn't get much clearer. But in all circumstances? So who decides when the circumstances dictate that you shouldn't?

 

[zippy2006]

What if it's the guy who has the codes for the bomb which will destroy your city, including your family?

What if it's not? Or do you think that everyone who is in agony has codes to a bomb that will destroy the city?

You claimed that, "But you can't determine whether an act is immoral or not just from that." I gave an example of an act where one reduces agony. You then substituted a different act, which includes a bomb. Do you see your non sequitur?

• Bradskii: There aren't any objective moral norms.
• Zippy: Singer gives an example of one, "Agony is a bad thing and it is good to reduce agony."
• Bradskii: But you can't determine whether an act is immoral or not just from that.
• Zippy: Why not? You see a being who is in agony, you have the ability to reduce the agony, therefore you should do so.
• Bradskii: But what if he has codes to a bomb?

Here is the non sequitur brought out explicitly:

• Bradskii: We cannot determine whether an act is immoral given that moral norm.
• Zippy: Suppose you see someone in agony. For example, someone has a toothache and you have acetaminophen. The norm says you should give him some.
• Bradskii: But what if [insert exception here].
• Zippy: Then we have a new case. The question wasn't whether the norm will suffice for every case, but rather whether the norm will suffice for some cases. When you say, "But you can't determine whether an act is immoral or not just from that," you are saying that there are no cases where the action can be determined. That's clearly wrong. There are acts for which the norm suffices, even if it does not suffice for each and every act.

 

[Bradskii]

Then we have a new case. The question wasn't whether the norm will suffice for every case, but rather whether the norm will suffice for some cases. When you say, "But you can't determine whether an act is immoral or not just from that," you are saying that there are no cases where the action can be determined. That's clearly wrong. There are acts for which the norm suffices, even if it does not suffice for each and every act.

OK, I see what you mean. I could have worded it better. Allow me another shot at that.

"But you can't determine whether an act is immoral or not just from that...and when I say 'not just from that' I mean that you need details of the act to which it relates. You need the context of the act to be able to decide whether '"Agony is a bad thing and it is good to reduce agony" is applicable in the particular case.

When you have the details then you, personally, can decide. I might decide differently. But it'll be our call. So if you say '"Agony is a bad thing and it is good to reduce agony" is a good moral rule, I'd say it's not even associated with morality. If it does, if it relates to, for example, torturing someone, then if we have the details then we can decide. Otherwise, if you make a general statement about reducing pain if possible then I'd say 'Well, yeah, it's generally a good idea'.

 

[Zaha Torte]

We need to know what the grey areas. And those will always include what appears to be a very specific command. I keep going back to this example, but it's not getting much of a response: Honour your father and mother. It doesn't get much clearer. But in all circumstances? So who decides when the circumstances dictate that you shouldn't?

We should always honor our parents - even if they do things we do not agree with.