Is Moral Neutrality a Myth?

[zippy2006]

It seems to me that a lot of folks who are critical of morality envision themselves as standing on the sidelines, watching a game they have no interest in, and making jokes to one another about how silly the players are. We could call the game “Moral inquiry” or “Moral reasoning.”

In this thread I am questioning the idea of whether the sidelines exist. It seems to me that everyone is a player in the game of moral reasoning, and there are no sidelines. What do you think? Is moral neutrality possible?


Rather than give my own arguments, I am going to let a quote from Alasdair MacIntyre do the work of the OP. This quote comes from his 2019 keynote lecture at a Notre Dame ethics conference, “Moral Relativisms Reconsidered.” I think it will be sufficient to get the thread off the ground, although I will also anticipate an objection in post #2. Comments about other parts of the lecture are also welcome.

Prior to this quote MacIntyre is talking about the question of trying to determine which competing moral system is correct, including very recent forms of pluralistic relativism. He goes on:

---------------

One answer to this question that has to be rejected is this: that just because we now have to make a choice between rival sets of standards that are to govern our moral choices, we are condemned to making a higher order choice that cannot itself be governed by standards. Judging from within a morality, it may be said we appeal to standards by what Harmon calls a frame of reference. But when judging between alternative moralities we can only make a criterionless choice of a frame of reference—a conclusion that was argued for by Sartre a long time ago. Are we then condemned to be existentialists? I think not. For it’s never true that we are compelled to make criterionless choices of this kind. Why not?

Every rational agent has—cannot but have—some conception of her or his good. Perhaps inchoate, inadequately spelled out, indeterminate to varying degrees, but every such agent confronted by the claims upon her or him of some particular morality has it in them to ask, “Would it be for my good to live like this?”, and the answers elicited by this question will vary from agent to agent, and from morality to morality.

Note now something oft not noticed about relativists and by relativists. They are agents who have suppressed in themselves, for the moment at least, any inclination to ask this question. And the self who they envisage has committed to no particular morality--as able from a standpoint external to all moral commitments to compare and contrast moralities, to choose between them—is an imaginary self. For every actual self, in virtue of its conception of its good, is already inclined in one direction rather than another.

This myth of the morally neutral self is a powerful and recurring one in modern intellectual and academic life. It gives one more expression to the characteristically modern conception of the self as autonomous, as recognizing no authority external to itself, and it’s often presented in disguised form in versions of the claim that the social sciences—sciences that study human agency in its institutionalized forms—can only be objective if they are value free, value neutral. It's a presupposition of all those who, in presenting some version of relativism from some non-relativistic standpoint, take that standpoint to guarantee their own objectivity and neutrality. But it's a myth. Any agent confronted by the incompatible claims of rival moralities has the resources to ask, first, what reasons do I have for deciding that it would be best for me to acknowledge the authority of this set of claims rather than that, and secondly, if they can identify no sufficient reasons for arriving at such a decision, to ask what it is they must first learn in order to be able to make such a choice. What skills must they acquire, what qualities of character must they develop, if they are to know how to deliberate and to make choices in a relevant way? To these questions the most interesting answer is Aristotle’s…

-Moral Relativisms Reconsidered - 22:40-26:40, Emphasis Mine​

 

[zippy2006]

Objection: I believe in subjective morality, not objective morality

Answer to Objection: I think MacIntyre’s central point still holds. The “subjectivist” is still a player in the game, and therefore they must still ask themselves which morality is best; which way of living is best. They are not on the sidelines of the game of moral reasoning and moral inquiry.

Second—and this part is already tangential and secondary to the OP—if some account of morality is subjectively satisfying, then why would it not be objectively satisfying? If you can rationally apply some morality to yourself, then what prevents that morality from being applied to others?

 

[Sabertooth]

The closest that I can envision is moral uncertainty.
All phenomena can, ultimately, be classified as God-honoring or not God-honoring,
but no human on this side of eternity can claim to have an infallible clarity to distinguish between the two.

Paul wrote,
"For now we see in a mirror, dimly,

but then face to face.​

Now I know in part,

but then I shall know just as I also am known." 1 Corinthians 13:12 NKJV​

 

[Quid est Veritas?]

A neutral stance cannot exist because neutral actions do not exist. Any action is a choice to either support one or the other in a dispute say, and by choosing not to support either, you are in effect choosing to aid the stronger party. Similarly, by choosing to not consider morality, you are choosing to potentiate a certain outcome regardless. If I do nothing against child trafficking say, I am in effect potentiating its continuation.

Another way to look at it, is the modern bugbear of environmentalism. I could stop using plastic cutlery, or choose to ignore the issue - in which case, I am of necessity still choosing sides. Ignoring the case of what the real morality is, or only a subjective cultural variant, you are still inadvertently going one way or the other. Any action you do, either wilful or in ommission, will have a moral sphere - whether you yourself place any weight to that consideration or not.

 

[partinobodycular]

A neutral stance cannot exist because neutral actions do not exist. Any action is a choice to either support one or the other in a dispute say, and by choosing not to support either, you are in effect choosing to aid the stronger party. Similarly, by choosing to not consider morality, you are choosing to potentiate a certain outcome regardless. If I do nothing against child trafficking say, I am in effect potentiating its continuation.

Another way to look at it, is the modern bugbear of environmentalism. I could stop using plastic cutlery, or choose to ignore the issue - in which case, I am of necessity still choosing sides. Ignoring the case of what the real morality is, or only a subjective cultural variant, you are still inadvertently going one way or the other. Any action you do, either wilful or in ommission, will have a moral sphere - whether you yourself place any weight to that consideration or not.

So you're anti-Catholic then...good to know.

 

[The Narrow Way]

It seems to me that a lot of folks who are critical of morality envision themselves as standing on the sidelines, watching a game they have no interest in, and making jokes to one another about how silly the players are. We could call the game “Moral inquiry” or “Moral reasoning.”

In this thread I am questioning the idea of whether the sidelines exist. It seems to me that everyone is a player in the game of moral reasoning, and there are no sidelines. What do you think? Is moral neutrality possible?


Rather than give my own arguments, I am going to let a quote from Alasdair MacIntyre do the work of the OP. This quote comes from his 2019 keynote lecture at a Notre Dame ethics conference, “Moral Relativisms Reconsidered.” I think it will be sufficient to get the thread off the ground, although I will also anticipate an objection in post #2. Comments about other parts of the lecture are also welcome.

Prior to this quote MacIntyre is talking about the question of trying to determine which competing moral system is correct, including very recent forms of pluralistic relativism. He goes on:

---------------

One answer to this question that has to be rejected is this: that just because we now have to make a choice between rival sets of standards that are to govern our moral choices, we are condemned to making a higher order choice that cannot itself be governed by standards. Judging from within a morality, it may be said we appeal to standards by what Harmon calls a frame of reference. But when judging between alternative moralities we can only make a criterionless choice of a frame of reference—a conclusion that was argued for by Sartre a long time ago. Are we then condemned to be existentialists? I think not. For it’s never true that we are compelled to make criterionless choices of this kind. Why not?

Every rational agent has—cannot but have—some conception of her or his good. Perhaps inchoate, inadequately spelled out, indeterminate to varying degrees, but every such agent confronted by the claims upon her or him of some particular morality has it in them to ask, “Would it be for my good to live like this?”, and the answers elicited by this question will vary from agent to agent, and from morality to morality.

Note now something oft not noticed about relativists and by relativists. They are agents who have suppressed in themselves, for the moment at least, any inclination to ask this question. And the self who they envisage has committed to no particular morality--as able from a standpoint external to all moral commitments to compare and contrast moralities, to choose between them—is an imaginary self. For every actual self, in virtue of its conception of its good, is already inclined in one direction rather than another.

This myth of the morally neutral self is a powerful and recurring one in modern intellectual and academic life. It gives one more expression to the characteristically modern conception of the self as autonomous, as recognizing no authority external to itself, and it’s often presented in disguised form in versions of the claim that the social sciences—sciences that study human agency in its institutionalized forms—can only be objective if they are value free, value neutral. It's a presupposition of all those who, in presenting some version of relativism from some non-relativistic standpoint, take that standpoint to guarantee their own objectivity and neutrality. But it's a myth. Any agent confronted by the incompatible claims of rival moralities has the resources to ask, first, what reasons do I have for deciding that it would be best for me to acknowledge the authority of this set of claims rather than that, and secondly, if they can identify no sufficient reasons for arriving at such a decision, to ask what it is they must first learn in order to be able to make such a choice. What skills must they acquire, what qualities of character must they develop, if they are to know how to deliberate and to make choices in a relevant way? To these questions the most interesting answer is Aristotle’s…

-Moral Relativisms Reconsidered - 22:40-26:40, Emphasis Mine​

There is NO FENCE (NO NEUTRALITY) when it comes to MORALITY. You are either on ONE SIDE or THE OTHER.

 

[SkyWriting]

It seems to me that a lot of folks who are critical of morality envision themselves as standing on the sidelines, watching a game they have no interest in, and making jokes to one another about how silly the players are. We could call the game “Moral inquiry” or “Moral reasoning.”

In this thread I am questioning the idea of whether the sidelines exist. It seems to me that everyone is a player in the game of moral reasoning, and there are no sidelines. What do you think? Is moral neutrality possible?


Rather than give my own arguments, I am going to let a quote from Alasdair MacIntyre do the work of the OP. This quote comes from his 2019 keynote lecture at a Notre Dame ethics conference, “Moral Relativisms Reconsidered.” I think it will be sufficient to get the thread off the ground, although I will also anticipate an objection in post #2. Comments about other parts of the lecture are also welcome.

Prior to this quote MacIntyre is talking about the question of trying to determine which competing moral system is correct, including very recent forms of pluralistic relativism. He goes on:

---------------

One answer to this question that has to be rejected is this: that just because we now have to make a choice between rival sets of standards that are to govern our moral choices, we are condemned to making a higher order choice that cannot itself be governed by standards. Judging from within a morality, it may be said we appeal to standards by what Harmon calls a frame of reference. But when judging between alternative moralities we can only make a criterionless choice of a frame of reference—a conclusion that was argued for by Sartre a long time ago. Are we then condemned to be existentialists? I think not. For it’s never true that we are compelled to make criterionless choices of this kind. Why not?

Every rational agent has—cannot but have—some conception of her or his good. Perhaps inchoate, inadequately spelled out, indeterminate to varying degrees, but every such agent confronted by the claims upon her or him of some particular morality has it in them to ask, “Would it be for my good to live like this?”, and the answers elicited by this question will vary from agent to agent, and from morality to morality.

Note now something oft not noticed about relativists and by relativists. They are agents who have suppressed in themselves, for the moment at least, any inclination to ask this question. And the self who they envisage has committed to no particular morality--as able from a standpoint external to all moral commitments to compare and contrast moralities, to choose between them—is an imaginary self. For every actual self, in virtue of its conception of its good, is already inclined in one direction rather than another.

This myth of the morally neutral self is a powerful and recurring one in modern intellectual and academic life. It gives one more expression to the characteristically modern conception of the self as autonomous, as recognizing no authority external to itself, and it’s often presented in disguised form in versions of the claim that the social sciences—sciences that study human agency in its institutionalized forms—can only be objective if they are value free, value neutral. It's a presupposition of all those who, in presenting some version of relativism from some non-relativistic standpoint, take that standpoint to guarantee their own objectivity and neutrality. But it's a myth. Any agent confronted by the incompatible claims of rival moralities has the resources to ask, first, what reasons do I have for deciding that it would be best for me to acknowledge the authority of this set of claims rather than that, and secondly, if they can identify no sufficient reasons for arriving at such a decision, to ask what it is they must first learn in order to be able to make such a choice. What skills must they acquire, what qualities of character must they develop, if they are to know how to deliberate and to make choices in a relevant way? To these questions the most interesting answer is Aristotle’s…

-Moral Relativisms Reconsidered - 22:40-26:40, Emphasis Mine​

The game is to create moral decisions for yourself and allow society to create moral decisions that apply to others. So one is fully vested in their own morality but only partially vested in public morality. So we play the game of judging ourselves, but (joyfully) allow the public to adopt a separate set of standards for the public.

Hebrews 13:17
Obey your leaders and submit to them, for they are keeping watch over your souls, as those who will have to give an account. Let them do this with joy and not with groaning, for that would be of no advantage to you.

 

[Tinker Grey]

To repeat myself from other threads, I think the question of objective vs subjective comes with too much baggage to be useful. Maybe it's just the terms.

If we say a species is a social species, then we are saying that that species has evolved a survival strategy that entails cooperation between members of the species. If we say a species is not a social species, then cooperation (except for procreation as much as there may be cooperation) is not part of the way that species survives.

For a social species, members of that species interact. There appear to the observer to be patterns. (I'd say laws but that word is fraught. The laws of physics describe, not proscribe. So, lets not bring that word into it.) These patterns are repeatable, for the most part. We can make predictions about the behavior of species members. And we will be often wrong. This is because an individual inherently balances its own advantages with those of its tribe/society. This means, of course, the individual will act outside the patterns that the species.

So we have 2 moralities: 1) societal, and 2) individual. These sometimes mesh, sometimes not. I think these conversations sometimes stall because we carelessly (I did say 'we') flip between the two. Someone brings up rape (an individual's choice against societal condemnation) and the next brings up slavery, an example of how a society might evolve its morality. Note of course that an evolved society doesn't entail improvement. Cave fish evolved non-functioning eyes. Are they better or worse than seeing fish? It's a nonsense question.

There are societal expectations and the individual's response to them. We can discuss whether a society's expectations and allowances are moral and we can discuss whether an individual has any justification for violating those expectations. (I notice now that @SkyWriting said something similar in post #7.)

When I want to violate societal norms, I will attempt to justify my actions/desires with the members of my society. If I prevail, then society evolves. If I fail, I either comply or find a society that will or already does accept my desires.

Our judgement of past societies is tricky. Of course, I think 1850s USA was bad for allowing slavery. But, of course I would think so. I'm part of a society that has evolved away from that position. So were my parents. So were my grandparents. How could I do anything but condemn slavery. But were I to have been born then with this exact genetic makeup in Alabama, I, no doubt, would think that slavery was perfectly moral. How could I otherwise. I'd like to think, because I'm me here and now, that that version of me would be against slavery regardless. But I have to think that that is a fantasy. Donald Miller in Blue Like Jazz (I can't find the passage right now) recounts a discussion a friend and he were having about travesties in the Congo(?), people chopping arms off of other people and the like. The question arose as to whether they could carry out such actions. Donald came to the conclusion that he could, whether he could imagine it or not. To think otherwise would be think that you are somehow better than other humans. We are, fundamentally, humans and we do human things. Some things humans do are found to be horrible by other humans. The reason we don't go around chopping people's arms off is because we are here and now and not there and then.

I submit that we feel like morality might be objective because we are evolved to cooperate. It feels like a compulsion to cooperate even when we don't want to. We instinctively do this without considering a system of morality. It's out of our immediate control. However, it's not so strong a compulsion that we don't sometimes choose not to.

The question of import is not whether there is objective morality, but rather how we determine the best course of action. Whether there is an objective morality or not, we still evaluate the situation we're in and make a decision. So how do we make a decision? Well saying morality is objective (or subjective) doesn't answer that question. To be fair, I'd wager 99.9999% percent of decisions we make, we make without a thought to a system of morality. We just do what we do instinctively. The evaluation comes later as a post hoc rationalization of the actions we already took. We rarely have time to write a treatise on the actions we are about to take, derive a conclusion, and then act.

This is not useless however. It is part of a feedback loop (positive?) that plays a role in our next instinctive reactions.

The above essay was inspired by "objectively satisfying". What would that even mean? Meh.

On topic: It seems to me that there are acts that impact no one but one's self and there are acts that affect others. Acts that are taken with the knowledge that one's action may impact others are moral acts. As such, I'd have to agree that moral neutrality is a myth. (Saying an act that has no impact on others is morally neutral is nonsense. It's not a moral act at all.)

 

[SkyWriting]

The above essay was inspired by "objectively satisfying". What would that even mean? Meh.

Stimulating is when your heartbeat increases and "satisfying" is when it slows back down.

 

[SkyWriting]

Of course, I think 1850s USA was bad for allowing slavery. But, of course I would think so. I'm part of a society that has evolved away from that position. So were my parents. So were my grandparents. How could I do anything but condemn slavery.

Well....blacks might.
Also slavery was objected to in Alabama while it was happening. So...
the argument that people cannot object to the majority view is........

 

[Tinker Grey]

So...
the argument that people cannot object to the majority view is........

I didn't argue that, so ...

 

[zippy2006]

A neutral stance cannot exist because neutral actions do not exist. Any action is a choice to either support one or the other in a dispute say, and by choosing not to support either, you are in effect choosing to aid the stronger party. Similarly, by choosing to not consider morality, you are choosing to potentiate a certain outcome regardless. If I do nothing against child trafficking say, I am in effect potentiating its continuation.

Another way to look at it, is the modern bugbear of environmentalism. I could stop using plastic cutlery, or choose to ignore the issue - in which case, I am of necessity still choosing sides. Ignoring the case of what the real morality is, or only a subjective cultural variant, you are still inadvertently going one way or the other. Any action you do, either wilful or in ommission, will have a moral sphere - whether you yourself place any weight to that consideration or not.

Thanks for this Quid. You make an excellent point.

I think some people see morality as a theoretical game one plays, rather than something that is inevitably present in day to day actions.

 

[SkyWriting]

So were my parents. So were my grandparents. How could I do anything but condemn slavery. But were I to have been born then with this exact genetic makeup in Alabama, I, no doubt, would think that slavery was perfectly moral.

Not the case. Many people did object to slavery despite their exact genetic makeup that forced them to support slavery.

 

[SkyWriting]

I submit that we feel like morality might be objective because we are evolved to cooperate. It feels like a compulsion to cooperate even when we don't want to. We instinctively do this without considering a system of morality. It's out of our immediate control. However, it's not so strong a compulsion that we don't sometimes choose not to.

That is correct. We have evolved to cooperate with others and ignore our own reasoning and "go with the flow" instead. But it's not an absolute mindset, just a tendency that can be changed if needed.

There are two factors that combine into one, motivation and accessibility. We can give an example of "motivation" being your spouse and "accessibility" being "the ability to paint the outside of the house".

With no desire to please your spouse, it doesn't get painted.
If you can't climb a ladder, it doesn't get painted.

So change only happens when the combination of the two is high enough to cross the ACTION threshold.

 

[zippy2006]

Thanks Tinker.

On topic: It seems to me that there are acts that impact no one but one's self and there are acts that affect others. Acts that are taken with the knowledge that one's action may impact others are moral acts. As such, I'd have to agree that moral neutrality is a myth. (Saying an act that has no impact on others is morally neutral is nonsense. It's not a moral act at all.)

Okay, that's a fair distinction and many philosophers would agree that morality is primarily about our relations with others.


The rest of your post seems to be a reply to part of post #2. Let me pick out a few pieces:

Our judgement of past societies is tricky. Of course, I think 1850s USA was bad for allowing slavery. But, of course I would think so. I'm part of a society that has evolved away from that position. So were my parents. So were my grandparents. How could I do anything but condemn slavery. But were I to have been born then with this exact genetic makeup in Alabama, I, no doubt, would think that slavery was perfectly moral. How could I otherwise. I'd like to think, because I'm me here and now, that that version of me would be against slavery regardless. But I have to think that that is a fantasy. Donald Miller in Blue Like Jazz (I can't find the passage right now) recounts a discussion a friend and he were having about travesties in the Congo(?), people chopping arms off of other people and the like. The question arose as to whether they could carry out such actions. Donald came to the conclusion that he could, whether he could imagine it or not. To think otherwise would be think that you are somehow better than other humans. We are, fundamentally, humans and we do human things. Some things humans do are found to be horrible by other humans. The reason we don't go around chopping people's arms off is because we are here and now and not there and then.

So you are looking at two societies. In one society slavery is prohibited and in the other it is accepted. You are saying that if you were a member of the first society you would be against slavery, and if you were a member of the second society you would accept slavery. I take it that this is an attempt at a morally neutral stance from a theoretical vantage point.

But is it possible to be neutral in this way? If you came across an instance of slavery in the 21st century, wouldn't you be forced to make a moral decision about how to react? And wouldn't that moral decision depend in part on whether you believe slavery is wrong in a way that transcends cultural considerations? After all, if you think to yourself, "I only believe slavery to be wrong because I am a 21st century American," you will come to a potentially very different decision than if you think to yourself, "I believe slavery to be wrong regardless of the time period in which one lives."

Further, given that it is logically possible that you could encounter this instance of slavery, isn't it also true that you currently possess the moral apparatus that would be employed in forming the would-be moral decision that the encounter prompts? You already have a moral stance towards that situation, although you would be capable of reevaluating this stance once the situation arises concretely. A simple question would be: What would you do in that situation?

Underlying all this is the fact that your claim about moral relativism (morality determined by culture) is itself a moral claim, and moral claims such as this one will have an impact on your concrete decisions in life. Maybe you agree with this?

The question of import is not whether there is objective morality, but rather how we determine the best course of action. Whether there is an objective morality or not, we still evaluate the situation we're in and make a decision. So how do we make a decision? Well saying morality is objective (or subjective) doesn't answer that question. To be fair, I'd wager 99.9999% percent of decisions we make, we make without a thought to a system of morality. We just do what we do instinctively. The evaluation comes later as a post hoc rationalization of the actions we already took. We rarely have time to write a treatise on the actions we are about to take, derive a conclusion, and then act.

This is not useless however. It is part of a feedback loop (positive?) that plays a role in our next instinctive reactions.

The above essay was inspired by "objectively satisfying". What would that even mean? Meh.

I agree that we must "still evaluate the situation we're in and make a decision." My point in post #2 was that humans use reason to make decisions, and since reason applies to all humans equally, the decision must then be objective. Namely, if another person were placed in the exact same situation that you were placed in, then the rational considerations you used to make your decision would also equally apply to their decision.

 

[Tinker Grey]

Thanks Tinker.

You're welcome.

The rest of your post seems to be a reply to part of post #2. Let me pick out a few pieces:

So you are looking at two societies. In one society slavery is prohibited and in the other it is accepted. You are saying that if you were a member of the first society you would be against slavery, and if you were a member of the second society you would accept slavery. I take it that this is an attempt at a morally neutral stance from a theoretical vantage point.

No. It's an acknowledgement that I would react differently to different situations.

But is it possible to be neutral in this way? If you came across an instance of slavery in the 21st century, wouldn't you be forced to make a moral decision about how to react? And wouldn't that moral decision depend in part on whether you believe slavery is wrong in a way that transcends cultural considerations? After all, if you think to yourself, "I only believe slavery to be wrong because I am a 21st century American," you will come to a potentially very different decision than if you think to yourself, "I believe slavery to be wrong regardless of the time period in which one lives."

No. It depends on the fact that I think it is wrong and I have reasons to whether my interlocutor agrees or not. I think I'm right. I think I have reasons to think so. If I'm engaged with a person who disagrees, then my task, assuming I have that sort of relationship with the person, is to convince them of my position.

Further, given that it is logically possible that you could encounter this instance of slavery, isn't it also true that you currently possess the moral apparatus that would be employed in forming the would-be moral decision that the encounter prompts? You already have a moral stance towards that situation, although you would be capable of reevaluating this stance once the situation arises concretely. A simple question would be: What would you do in that situation?

I don't understand the question. I think it relates to my comment above, the last sentence above this block.

Underlying all this is the fact that your claim about moral relativism (morality determined by culture) is itself a moral claim, and moral claims such as this one will have an impact on your concrete decisions in life. Maybe you agree with this?

It's not a claim about what is moral. It is a claim about moral systems. It is a moral claim to say "stealing is wrong". "Moral systems are X" is not a moral claim.

I agree that we must "still evaluate the situation we're in and make a decision." My point in post #2 was that humans use reason to make decisions, and since reason applies to all humans equally, the decision must then be objective. Namely, if another person were placed in the exact same situation that you were placed in, then the rational considerations you used to make your decision would also equally apply to their decision.

The reasons people use are different. Consequently, it is not improbable the conclusions will differ. The conclusions are a function of subjective evaluation. I would like to think that the reasons I used to arrive at a conclusion would influence someone to arrive at the same conclusion. After all, here and now I think I'm right about X and I want them to agree because I think it is best for all involved. The truth is, though, that it is quite possible that I'm mad or they're mad or we're both mad or whatever. The only way to be sure that some other person would come to the same conclusion based on the same facts and on the same reasoning is that if that some other person was actually me.

We can wish all we want that that we'd all come to the same conclusions given the same knowledge of the same facts, but one only need look at the world to see it isn't so.

People make decisions that benefit themselves, sometimes benefits society, sometimes both, sometimes neither. This is what it is to be human. People make decisions all the time that they defend against our criticisms. I don't see how it's possible to conclude anything other than morality is amorphous.

 

[partinobodycular]

In this thread I am questioning the idea of whether the sidelines exist. It seems to me that everyone is a player in the game of moral reasoning, and there are no sidelines. What do you think? Is moral neutrality possible?

But what makes an action a matter of morality in the first place?

For many people the question of having bacon and eggs for breakfast has nothing to do with morality. But for a vegan or a Jew it may have a great deal to do with morality.

Who or what determines whether an action even falls into the category of being moral or not?

Does the mere fact that a vegan believes that eating meat is a morally reprehensible act mean that I can't be morally neutral on the question? Am I forced to take a stance on the morality of something simply due to what someone else believes?

 

[zippy2006]

No. It depends on the fact that I think it is wrong and I have reasons to whether my interlocutor agrees or not. I think I'm right. I think I have reasons to think so. If I'm engaged with a person who disagrees, then my task, assuming I have that sort of relationship with the person, is to convince them of my position.

Okay, fair enough.

It's not a claim about what is moral. It is a claim about moral systems. It is a moral claim to say "stealing is wrong". "Moral systems are X" is not a moral claim.

Have you ever heard Etienne Gilson's saying, "Metaphysics always buries its undertakers?" Well it's much the same with morality. To pass a judgment on a moral system is to implicate oneself in moral claims, even if that is not one's intention.

Let me just paraphrase MacIntyre, since he talks about this right before the OP quote at 21:31. He talks about David Wong, a pluralistic relativist, who in critiquing all morality on the basis of relativism has at the same time implicitly set up a (relativistic) moral system of his own.

For example, if someone says that all moral systems are culturally defined, then they have at the same time subscribed themselves to the moral norms of their own culture. The only alternative would be for them to claim that they have no morality (which is impossible) or that their morality transcends their culture (which contradicts their own claim about moral systems being culturally defined). In this way overarching judgments about moral systems tend to be at the same time moral judgments which alter the speaker's moral landscape.

The reasons people use are different. Consequently, it is not improbable the conclusions will differ. The conclusions are a function of subjective evaluation. I would like to think that the reasons I used to arrive at a conclusion would influence someone to arrive at the same conclusion. After all, here and now I think I'm right about X and I want them to agree because I think it is best for all involved. The truth is, though, that it is quite possible that I'm mad or they're mad or we're both mad or whatever. The only way to be sure that some other person would come to the same conclusion based on the same facts and on the same reasoning is that if that some other person was actually me.

We can wish all we want that that we'd all come to the same conclusions given the same knowledge of the same facts, but one only need look at the world to see it isn't so.

People make decisions that benefit themselves, sometimes benefits society, sometimes both, sometimes neither. This is what it is to be human. People make decisions all the time that they defend against our criticisms. I don't see how it's possible to conclude anything other than morality is amorphous.

Here you provide all sorts of reasons for believing that your morality is objective:

• You think you're right and you want them to agree.
• The reason you wouldn't agree with someone is because you or they are "mad" (i.e. irrational).
• Decisions elicit criticisms and defense. If nothing objective were at stake, rational criticism and rational defense would both be absurd.

 

[zippy2006]

But what makes an action a matter of morality in the first place?

For many people the question of having bacon and eggs for breakfast has nothing to do with morality. But for a vegan or a Jew it may have a great deal to do with morality.

Who or what determines whether an action even falls into the category of being moral or not?

In the thread Is there Objective Morality? I asked respondents to define what they mean by morality, and the answers were all on the same page. Here is the definition I gave, "A set of guidelines for how one should or should not behave."

Does the mere fact that a vegan believes that eating meat is a morally reprehensible act mean that I can't be morally neutral on the question? Am I forced to take a stance on the morality of something simply due to what someone else believes?

If you think that eating meat is permissible then you aren't morally neutral. The vegan thinks it is prohibited and you think it is permissible. You are both following your own guidelines for behavior. You are both following your own morality.

 

[partinobodycular]

If you think that eating meat is permissible then you aren't morally neutral. The vegan thinks it is prohibited and you think it is permissible. You are both following your own guidelines for behavior. You are both following your own morality.

But this still doesn't answer the question. What makes an action a matter of morality in the first place?

Do animals make moral choices? Or are they morally neutral, not considering an action's morality at all?