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Then precisely what kind of thing are we being asked to evaluate when we consider "a square circle"?
We agree its not a concept.
But what is it?
(I have my sense of what it is, but I want to hear your sense first).
Yes, when you define God up front as a thing that must exist, then of course that contradicts a "contingent God"....The same is true for "contingent God". If you understand what "God" means and what "contingent" means then you will see that this is also a contradiction in terms, a logical impossibility. It sounds like a concept but is really inconceivable.
I'm trying to conceptualize a square circle. Cant quite do it.Why can’t it be a concept that can’t physically exist? Maybe it can only exist as a concept...
Yes, when you define God up front as a thing that must exist, then of course that contradicts a "contingent God".
But if youre trying to reason toward the necessity of God, you cant start with the necessity of God. Thats begging the question, or something.
I'm trying to conceptualize a square circle. Cant quite do it.
If I go down that route, then I end up at "I dont know if God is possible".Well this is an ontological argument. The goal is not to demonstrate that God is a necessary being. We begin with that assumption. That's how we define God. It makes sense that if God existed he would be logically necessary, so I don't think that this definition of God is extravagant.
The goal of the argument, rather, is to demonstrate the logical absurdity of saying that God possibly exists. His existence is either actual or impossible.
If I go down that route, then I end up at "I dont know if God is possible".
Yes, when you define God up front as a thing that must exist, then of course that contradicts a "contingent God".
But if youre trying to reason toward the necessity of God, you cant start with the necessity of God. Thats begging the question, or something.
To me it means the same thing as "God is possible" in common parlance, as opposed to modal-logic-speak.I think that's a fine place to end up.
It isn't, though. This is why the modal ontological argument is useful--it helps us clarify what we mean when we say that God is necessary. We mean that God is the sort of thing that could not fail to exist in any possible world. If there is a grounds of being that makes existence possible, then this is the case for any instance of contingent existence. There are not certain instances of existence that do need a ground of being and others that do not.
This alone doesn't mean that God does exist. It just means that God is a necessary being. Either he exists necessarily, i.e., in every possible world, or he does not exist at all. He is not the sort of thing that could exist in some possible worlds but not in others.
I reject this particular argument because it doesn't successfully address the question of whether the existence of God is possible or not. It does, however, help us conceptualize what we mean by the idea of necessary being. Until someone truly understands this aspect of theism, they are not talking about the same thing when they use the term "God."
Why couldnt God be an ancient powerful and benevolent creator of our universe who was born and grew up and learned profound wisdom in some other uncreated/eternal universe?...This alone doesn't mean that God does exist. It just means that God is a necessary being. Either he exists necessarily, i.e., in every possible world, or he does not exist at all. He is not the sort of thing that could exist in some possible worlds but not in others....
Why couldnt God be an ancient powerful and benevolent creator of our universe who was born and grew up and learned profound wisdom in some other uncreated/eternal universe?
Why couldnt God be an ancient powerful and benevolent creator of our universe who was born and grew up and learned profound wisdom in some other uncreated/eternal universe?
There's nothing illogical about a greater thing emerging from the actions of lesser things. I'm not saying this IS how it went, but its reasonable to consider life and human life as an emergent "greatest thing", at least in a naturalist view.If this were the case, it would be that other uncreated/eternal universe which would be more worthy of the term "God," since it is our uncreated necessary being. What we would have in this scenario is a demiurge in a pantheistic reality, not a God in the theistic sense.
There's nothing illogical about a greater thing emerging from the actions of lesser things. I'm not saying this IS how it went, but its reasonable to consider life and human life as an emergent "greatest thing", at least in a naturalist view.
That would be the position of God in my thought experiment. And not just as a demiurge, but an involved and caring intervener.
There's nothing illogical about a greater thing emerging from the actions of lesser things. I'm not saying this IS how it went, but its reasonable to consider life and human life as an emergent "greatest thing", at least in a naturalist view.
That would be the position of God in my thought experiment. And not just as a demiurge, but an involved and caring intervener.
Okay, then you're still wrong. See this from your source:Take that up with logicians. They are not my definitions. They are the technical meaning of the terms. See this helpful article from the University of San Diego. Logical Possibility
Hey Sil! But can’t necessary being create a world like a wound up clock and just let it go, almost like blowing bubbles, yet metaphorically sort of rest it’s foot & elbow on other created worlds, choose to poke & prode on some worlds but not others? Whatever that necessary existence might consist of?It isn't, though. This is why the modal ontological argument is useful--it helps us clarify what we mean when we say that God is necessary. We mean that God is the sort of thing that could not fail to exist in any possible world. If there is a grounds of being that makes existence possible, then this is the case for any instance of contingent existence. There are not certain instances of existence that do need a ground of being and others that do not.
This alone doesn't mean that God does exist. It just means that God is a necessary being. Either he exists necessarily, i.e., in every possible world, or he does not exist at all. He is not the sort of thing that could exist in some possible worlds but not in others.
I reject this particular argument because it doesn't successfully address the question of whether the existence of God is possible or not. It does, however, help us conceptualize what we mean by the idea of necessary being. Until someone truly understands this aspect of theism, they are not talking about the same thing when they use the term "God."
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