Is God Irish?

[Resha Caner]

I thought this was a pretty good article at PhilosophyNow about the difficulties involved with using formal logic in discussions regarding God's existence.

Is God Irish? | Issue 92 | Philosophy Now

It might be interesting to discuss the argument at the end of the article claiming that God is likely to exist ... It was, at least for me, a new twist on an old debate. The argument is presented as follows:

1.) For over a thousand years attempts have been made to establish the existence or non-existence of God logically. None have been successful. I conclude that ‘God exists’ is more likely to be logically undecidable than logically decidable.
2.) If God does not exist, I know of no reason why ‘God exists’ is more likely to be logically undecidable than logically decidable.
3.) However, if God does exist, then the ‘unknowable’ aspect of God would make ‘God exists’ more likely to be logically undecidable than logically decidable.
4.) So because ‘God exists’ is likely to be logically undecidable, I conclude that God is more likely to exist than to not exist.

 

[quatona]

I don´t agree that making a logically undecidable claim renders the claim more likely to be true if only I have declared its subject unknowable. I could easily make 5 such claims in less than two minutes - and I have no idea why anyone should even take a closer look at them.

Ad#2: If God doesn´t exist, the reason why God is logically undecidable is obvious: Because those who postulate the existence of a God typically define It as unknowable and unfalsifiable.

Like always, a proper definition of "God" would be the first step. As long as this isn´t given I wouldn´t even attempt to logically approach the question whether God exists.

 

[Resha Caner]

I don´t agree that making a logically undecidable claim renders the claim more likely to be true if only I have declared its subject unknowable. I could easily make 5 such claims in less than two minutes - and I have no idea why anyone should even take a closer look at them.

I think you have cut short the argument. It might serve better to break it down a bit more.

Ad#2: If God doesn´t exist, the reason why God is logically undecidable is obvious: Because those who postulate the existence of a God typically define It as unknowable and unfalsifiable.

Maybe some have done that, but I have not. In fact, I would claim the opposite for the first: God is knowable. As for the second (falsifiability), it might eventually come as a conclusion, but it is not part of my "definition".

Like always, a proper definition of "God" would be the first step. As long as this isn´t given I wouldn´t even attempt to logically approach the question whether God exists.

Definitions are a tricky business. Did you read the article? The problem of definitions is mentioned. While there is a kernel of truth in saying that logical decidability depends on a definition, it can become a game by both sides. The one defining can try to patch holes with the fallback of "that's not what I meant". The skeptic can make flippant statements that the definition is "meaningless", "vague", or a host of other things.

So, let us first set some common ground by noting that it is possible to successfully define a problem that, in the end, is logically undecidable. An example would be the "halting problem":
Halting problem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I would then ask what you think of the argument behind statement #1 (as separate from the subject it addresses). IOW, if a solution to a problem is sought, and a thousand years passes without any progress, does it begin to seem more likely that no solution exists? Not that the question is established to have no answer, but that it becomes more likely there is no answer?

- - -

Once we talk through the framework, if there is still value in continuing, we can come back to the topic of defining God.

 

[quatona]

I think you have cut short the argument. It might serve better to break it down a bit more.

Which part did I miss?

Maybe some have done that, but I have not. In fact, I would claim the opposite for the first: God is knowable. As for the second (falsifiability), it might eventually come as a conclusion, but it is not part of my "definition".

Colour me confused: the "unknowability aspect of God" did play an important part in your logical deduction.

Definitions are a tricky business. Did you read the article? The problem of definitions is mentioned. While there is a kernel of truth in saying that logical decidability depends on a definition, it can become a game by both sides. The one defining can try to patch holes with the fallback of "that's not what I meant". The skeptic can make flippant statements that the definition is "meaningless", "vague", or a host of other things.

Accurate, but doesn´t change the fact that without a proper definition a logical approach is obsolete.

So, let us first set some common ground by noting that it is possible to successfully define a problem that, in the end, is logically undecidable. An example would be the "halting problem":
Halting problem - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Ok.
Now I need to be explained why the predictable continuous failure to logically decide a problem that is logically undecidable suggests that one of the possible decisions is more likely. Since you have brought up the Halting problem, maybe you can do me the favour of explaining it by using this example.

I would then ask what you think of the argument behind statement #1 (as separate from the subject it addresses). IOW, if a solution to a problem is sought, and a thousand years passes without any progress, does it begin to seem more likely that no solution exists? Not that the question is established to have no answer, but that it becomes more likely there is no answer?

Yes, I guess it does "begin to seem more likely".
However, without a proper definition of the problem and its subject the reason why no solution is found can simply be that it isn´t even clear what the problem is actually supposed to be.

All I am saying is that I am surprised how much effort people throughout those thousands of year have put in a pointless endeavour ("establishing the existence or non-existence of God logically"). Seeing that I wouldn´t even try to do that, in the first place - mainly because most god-concepts have God´s unknowability at their core, and therefore have already defined the impossibility to logically or otherwise establish the (non-)existence into them - I don´t see any significance in the continuing lack of success: that would have been predictable before they even started.

 

[Resha Caner]

Colour me confused: the "unknowability aspect of God" did play an important part in your logical deduction.

You'll need to point out where this plays a role, because I don't think it does. I said that God is knowable. I don't want to point fingers, but this is starting to take on the flavor of a strawman.

Which part did I miss?

...

Now I need to be explained why the predictable continuous failure to logically decide a problem that is logically undecidable suggests that one of the possible decisions is more likely. Since you have brought up the Halting problem, maybe you can do me the favour of explaining it by using this example.

It is interesting - the intonations one infers from an Internet post. I sense both dismissiveness and defensiveness in your replies. Why? Because the failure of the argument is "predictable" and I am supposed to "do you the favor" of an explanation.

Of course I can't know how much you pondered this argument before you posted, but your reply seemed to cut things short because it made little mention of the argument itself, which is what I am most interested in.

I think the beginning of the argument is pretty strong. It does get weaker as it goes along, however. In that I will agree with you. First and foremost, what I found most intriguing about the whole thing was the movement from an attempt at absolute proof to a "likely" proof. In mathematical terms it is like moving from saying "equal" (=) to "less than" (<).

All I am saying is that I am surprised how much effort people throughout those thousands of year have put in a pointless endeavour ("establishing the existence or non-existence of God logically").

I agree with you, but most likely for different reasons. And again, I will emphasize that what interests me is how this argument shifts from = to <.

However, without a proper definition of the problem and its subject the reason why no solution is found can simply be that it isn´t even clear what the problem is actually supposed to be.

Agreed. It is something we would need to tackle eventually ... if we get that far. But I'm more interested in assessing the argument than the subject of the argument. I would prefer to put this aside for now.

If you don't want to do that, then let me begin with this question. I have a friend named John, and I want to define him for you. Is it necessary for me to specify every brain state he has ever had and ever will have in order to define him?

Yes, I guess it does "begin to seem more likely".

Your emphasis made me smile. I chose that word on purpose - as an attempt to deflate any possible defensiveness about the subject that clouds a discussion of the argument.

In truth, though, it is more than an issue of "seeming". If one considers the number of possible arguments, the more plausible state is that they are finite rather than infinite. If there were, say, 10 arguments, and over the last 1000 years 8 have been tried, it is more likely the question is undecidable.

If, however, one wanted to argue that the number of arguments is infinite, that means we can't know all possible arguments, and so again, it is more likely the question is undecidable.

So, moving on to statement #2, if I could define the subject of the argument, and if by #1 we conclude it likely the existence of that subject is logically undecidable, is there, then, a logical reason to decide in favor of nonexistence? I don't think so.

 

[quatona]

You'll need to point out where this plays a role, because I don't think it does. I said that God is knowable. I don't want to point fingers, but this is starting to take on the flavor of a strawman.

Well, step #3 of the argument thrives on the "unknowability aspect of God". Without it the entire deduction breaks down.
Now, if you disagree with the premises of the argument, that´s fine - but then I can either scrutinize the argument as presented or the argument you are attempting to make (which I don´t even know about).

It is interesting - the intonations one infers from an Internet post. I sense both dismissiveness and defensiveness in your replies. Why? Because the failure of the argument is "predictable" and I am supposed to "do you the favor" of an explanation.

Yes, in another context your tendency to hear intonations from my post may be interesting (and I understand why that´s interesting to you) - but here it is not, at least not to me.

Of course I can't know how much you pondered this argument before you posted, but your reply seemed to cut things short because it made little mention of the argument itself, which is what I am most interested in.

I have seen this argument for the first time here. I didn´t call the failure of the argument predictable - I called the failure of attempts to logically (dis-)prove God´s existence predictable.

I think the beginning of the argument is pretty strong. It does get weaker as it goes along, however. In that I will agree with you. First and foremost, what I found most intriguing about the whole thing was the movement from an attempt at absolute proof to a "likely" proof. In mathematical terms it is like moving from saying "equal" (=) to "less than" (<).

I´m not sure I understand at which point this argument is particularly strong.
However, a logical deduction is as weak as its weakest chain, and as such some steps in it can be brilliant - but the entire argument a mess.

I agree with you, but most likely for different reasons. And again, I will emphasize that what interests me is how this argument shifts from = to <.

As far as I can see, that´s where the argument introduces the "unknowability aspect of God" in favour of the likelihood of God´s existence. In short: Since God is unknowable the fact that we can´t logically decide his (non-)existence speaks for his existence." Of course, that´s ridiculous - but maybe I have misunderstood this argument.

On another note, I don´t even get the relevance or significance of the likelihood of God´s existence. I am by no means an expert in probability matters, but as far as I know there´s absolutely no point in calculating the likelihood of anything that´s not in the future. Daily an incredible amount of things happen the likelihood of which is incredibly low - yet they happen. The likelihood of any particular lottery draw is incredibly low (compared to it not being drawn), but I´m not at all impressed when each week one of those highly unlikely numbers are drawn. A God could be incredibly unlikely to exist, yet It may exist.

Agreed. It is something we would need to tackle eventually ... if we get that far. But I'm more interested in assessing the argument than the subject of the argument. I would prefer to put this aside for now.

That´s why I offered you to explain the argument by means of your own example: the Halting problem instead.

If you don't want to do that, then let me begin with this question. I have a friend named John, and I want to define him for you. Is it necessary for me to specify every brain state he has ever had and ever will have in order to define him?

How you need to define John depends entirely on what your reasons are why you want to define him for me.
There´s a simple way of avoiding this problem if you feel the definition of the subject doesn´t matter for the argument : We replace "God" by "rzgembo" (i.e. something both you and I have no idea what it´s supposed to be) and look how much sense the argument makes, then.

Your emphasis made me smile. I chose that word on purpose - as an attempt to deflate any possible defensiveness about the subject that clouds a discussion of the argument.

Not saying what you actually mean to say is likely to get you in trouble.

In truth, though, it is more than an issue of "seeming". If one considers the number of possible arguments, the more plausible state is that they are finite rather than infinite. If there were, say, 10 arguments, and over the last 1000 years 8 have been tried, it is more likely the question is undecidable.

If - as is my position - the definition of God is preventing any logical approach the number is 0. That´s why I said every attempt is futile, and predictably so.
But let´s assume for a moment that there is a proper definition. Let´s take your "John", and let´s assume you have at least given some basic positive information about this "John": he is human, he is male, his parents named him "John", he´s still alive.
I actually don´t know how "John´s" existence could be decided by means of logic.
Maybe I am missing something but when the existence of your friend "John" is in doubt, what you are in need of is evidence, in the first place. Logic may help interpreting the evidence, but logic is not the primary tool.

If, however, one wanted to argue that the number of arguments is infinite, that means we can't know all possible arguments, and so again, it is more likely the question is undecidable.

That the question whether rzgembo exists or not is logically undecidable is not in dispute, anyway.

So, moving on to statement #2, if I could define the subject of the argument, and if by #1 we conclude it likely the existence of that subject is logically undecidable, is there, then, a logical reason to decide in favor of nonexistence? I don't think so.

Hang on.
It wasn´t me (or anyone else) who came here and claimed that probability exercises of this sort produce a logical reason to decide in favour of non-existence.
It was you who came here and presented all that as a a logical reason to decide in favour of existence.

My position is: The entire approach is completely useless as a means to logically decide either way.

 

[Resha Caner]

Well, step #3 of the argument thrives on the "unknowability aspect of God". Without it the entire deduction breaks down.

Pardon me. A major blindspot on my part. My thoughts were focused on the word "aspect". I was not thinking in terms of total unknowability, and I thought that's what you meant.

The way I was thinking of this might better be expressed as "unapproachable via human logic". But I didn't communicate that to you at all, so I apologize.

Yes, in another context your tendency to hear intonations from my post may be interesting (and I understand why that´s interesting to you) - but here it is not, at least not to me.

Admittedly this is a digression, but I thought it necessary to keep the conversation from spinning out of control. I also thought it might be of particular interest to you - how what you say is perceived by others. You've always seemed to have an interest in communication. But, OK. I'll move on.

However, a logical deduction is as weak as its weakest chain, and as such some steps in it can be brilliant - but the entire argument a mess.

True. Still, I found it interesting.

As far as I can see, that´s where the argument introduces the "unknowability aspect of God" in favour of the likelihood of God´s existence. In short: Since God is unknowable the fact that we can´t logically decide his (non-)existence speaks for his existence." Of course, that´s ridiculous - but maybe I have misunderstood this argument.

Yes, statement 3 is the weakness, but not totally ridiculous.

How you need to define John depends entirely on what your reasons are why you want to define him for me.

This is exactly where I was headed. I'm glad you realize that. It makes such things easier.

Not saying what you actually mean to say is likely to get you in trouble.

I wrote that as a concession. I didn't think it was necessary to argue it in more detail. However, since you emphasized the word, I decided I needed to point out more.

Hang on.
It wasn´t me (or anyone else) who came here and claimed that probability exercises of this sort produce a logical reason to decide in favour of non-existence.
It was you who came here and presented all that as a a logical reason to decide in favour of existence.

My position is: The entire approach is completely useless as a means to logically decide either way.

OK.

If - as is my position - the definition of God is preventing any logical approach the number is 0. That´s why I said every attempt is futile, and predictably so.

So you're assuming the definitions we would use will cause this problem before they've even been established? Hmm.

But let´s assume for a moment that there is a proper definition. Let´s take your "John", and let´s assume you have at least given some basic positive information about this "John": he is human, he is male, his parents named him "John", he´s still alive.
I actually don´t know how "John´s" existence could be decided by means of logic.
Maybe I am missing something but when the existence of your friend "John" is in doubt, what you are in need of is evidence, in the first place. Logic may help interpreting the evidence, but logic is not the primary tool.

A good point. I suppose I would need an example where logic played a role in determining existence before the argument would have any traction. I don't think I have any way around that one. IMO it's this that finally makes the argument crumble, not the definition thing you started with. So, thanks for putting that aside and pointing this out.

That begs a new question, though. Do definitions do anything except classify what we already assume to exist?

 

[quatona]

So you're assuming the definitions we would use will cause this problem before they've even been established? Hmm.

Not really. As I´ve said before: even though the term "God" isn´t copyrighted and everyone can use it freely as they wish, there are some common elements to the classical definitions. I am assuming that those "thousand years" of discussion mentioned in the argument dealt with those god concepts (maybe, though, the argument you presented isn´t talking about thousand years of attempts to logically decide the existence of such a "God" but a completely different "God" of a fringe definition. That´s possible, but that would be important to know for valuating the argument. That´s why I am insisting that it´s important to have a definition.)

Or, IOW: What I have been assuming is that those "thousand years of..." are referring to those very discussions that I - as someone reasonably well versed in the traditional occidental philosophies and theologies - am fairly familiar with. (It´s possible that the argument actually refers to e.g. some age old discussions within an African tribe concerning the existence of some Raingod or something. That would surely make a difference for the appropriate way to approach the argument. However, I find it a bit discomforting when at the same time you refuse clarification but accuse me of making assumptions. It´s not like I would like to make assumptions - but in lack of clarification I am left with going my best guesses).

Many of those core aspects of (classical occidental) god concepts are
1. ex-negativo (there can´t be evidence for God by our standards - emphasis on faith, God is beyond time and space, God is non-physical, God is mysterious, unintelligible by the human mind etc. etc.), and at the same time
2. are postulating the subject to be "supernatural".
(in which 1 and 2 can´t seem to always be kept entirely apart)
These definitions are picturing an in many ways exceptional entity that excludes its existence from being decided by the means to our disposal. To pick an extreme, for clarification (not saying that this is necessarily part of those classical god definitions): Once I have defined a subject to be "beyond logic" it should be obvious that the definition itself renders a logical approach obsolete.

Of course, given the fact that everyone can use "God" as they see fit (and in case the definition used would be irrelevant for the discussion of the argument presented), I don´t quite understand why there were thousand years of failed attempts to establish "God´s" existence.
I could do it in a heartbeat.
I could define "God" as this pencil lieing there in front of me, and I would have all evidence for "God´s" existence on my side.
Or, to pick a more realistic example, I could define "God" as the "first cause", and even if the universe were uncreated, popped into existence out of nothing, had no cause, created itself, has existed forever (or whatever other scenario without a supernatural entity can be fathomed), I could still conclude that the universe is the first cause = "God". That´s a very simple way of defining a "God" into existence That is logically necessary.

OTOH, certain god concepts can easily be decided to point to a non-existent entity (and have been so during these thousand years of discussion) by logic alone: they are self-contradictory.

Thus, premise #1 is questionable in many ways.

Bottom lines:
1. If the definition doesn´t matter, there isn´t any problem to decide that God exists.
2. If, as is a core premise of the argument as presented, there have been thousand years of exhaustive but unsuccessful discussion of the problem, we must assume that they must have been based on (a) somehow defined concept(s) - or else these discussions couldn´t even have taken place. The nature of the discussions and their result (or lack of a conclusive result, in this case) necessarily have to do with the nature of this definition (these definitions). Therefore alluding to the fact that there have been exhaustive discussions but at the same time refusing to take a closer look on the definitions that shaped the discussions and therefore the results would render the argument inconsistent.

Anyway, the problem with #3 (introducing the "unknowability" aspect of God in order to establish that the inability to decide God´s existence is somewhat evidence for this unknowable God) is perfectly illustrated by this old joke:

Two men meet.
A: What are you chewing?
B: Apple pips.
A: Why the heck are you chewing them - they are disgusting.
B: Yes, but they keep the lions away.
A: But...but there aren´t any lions.
B: See?

A good point. I suppose I would need an example where logic played a role in determining existence before the argument would have any traction. I don't think I have any way around that one. IMO it's this that finally makes the argument crumble, not the definition thing you started with. So, thanks for putting that aside and pointing this out.

I think the two are intertwined. When/if "God" is defined as having no evidence by our standards (and, as far as I can see, this is a common definition trait of all "supernatural" concepts), this definition makes it logically impossible to even try to approach the question with logic because according to the definition there can be no evidence to deal with logically.

That begs a new question, though. Do definitions do anything except classify what we already assume to exist?

Not quite sure what this has to do with anything, but it´s an interesting question nonetheless. I have never pondered it.
My first thought would be:
Yes, sure we can define a word to signify something that we don´t assume to exist. E.g. I could define "prufatosk" as a "pink elephant with wheels" without assuming that such an entity exists.
However, I don´t see much need for anyone to do that - except maybe for artistic purposes. Or for mind games. Or for purposes of fraud ("I can offer you a house in Paris right on the beach of the Pacific".)
Or, IOW: Yes, our classifications can - knowingly,intentionally, purposefully - contain empty classes.

 

[Resha Caner]

As far as I'm concerned, discussion of the argument in the OP is over. You have pointed out a flaw that I agree is fatal to that argument. For me there was value in uncovering that. I still think there are some intriguing parts to it, but I'll need time to mull them over before I can decide if they're of any use.

Still, if you're interested in continuing the discussion of definitions, we can do that. Before I get to that, a few comments.

Not quite sure what this has to do with anything, but it´s an interesting question nonetheless. I have never pondered it.

I'm happy to hear I've introduced you to something new. Though the question came from a synergy of my thoughts and yours, that may be a first for our discussions.

Yes, sure we can define a word to signify something that we don´t assume to exist ... However, I don´t see much need for anyone to do that ...

Yes, I was speaking in the context of our philosophical discussions. So I agree there would be no point to inventing a definition for something we don't believe to exist. As such, this is another benefit this conversation has brought me - the realization that definitions are a posteriori. Not that the idea is completely new to me, but the way in which this diminishes the relevance of logic to discussions of existence is new.

What I have been assuming is that those "thousand years of..." are referring to those very discussions that I - as someone reasonably well versed in the traditional occidental philosophies and theologies - am fairly familiar with.

Mmm. I know you're well read, and I realize that what I know of God is not the majority view when all the religions of the world are considered, but it's not an obscure or fringe view by any means. As such, it always surprises me how many people here at CF are not familiar with it and/or don't understand it.

In short, I am a Confessional Lutheran. That means I take the Book of Concord to be the truest exposition of the Bible. Of course I think myself to be in communion with the one and only true God. But, even if we begin to partition out those who disagree with the Lutheran Confessions, I think I am in step with one of the major theological schools of the world. If you want to claim Christianity is not true to OT Judiasm but was invented in the A.D. era; if you want to claim the Reformation was not a return to the origins of Christianity, but a new invention of the post-Scholastic/Thomist era; if you want to emphasize that Luther was only one of several Reformation influences - each with a unique position ... even then I think Confessional Lutheranism is an important strain.

This is not the first time I've said this, but I guess I can't expect you to remember that about me. It's just that what you listed as common to most definitions of god is not really part of the Lutheran Confessions. Yes, we may use some of the terms you mentioned (e.g. faith), but not in the same way that you mentioned them.

So, I can give you 2 simple Lutheran concepts to begin a discussion of the definition of God.

1) A god, in general, is that from which we expect all good, and to which we turn in distress.

2) Jesus Christ is God.

 

[WonderBeat]

I'm Italian.

 

[quatona]

As far as I'm concerned, discussion of the argument in the OP is over. You have pointed out a flaw that I agree is fatal to that argument. For me there was value in uncovering that. I still think there are some intriguing parts to it, but I'll need time to mull them over before I can decide if they're of any use.

Ok.

Still, if you're interested in continuing the discussion of definitions, we can do that. Before I get to that, a few comments.

To this point in this thread, the discussion of definitions interested me only insofar as it affected the argument in the OP.
Anyway, there are many aspects about definitions that make for an interesting discussion, so I´m open to it - time permitting.

I'm happy to hear I've introduced you to something new. Though the question came from a synergy of my thoughts and yours, that may be a first for our discussions.

Yes, I was speaking in the context of our philosophical discussions. So I agree there would be no point to inventing a definition for something we don't believe to exist. As such, this is another benefit this conversation has brought me - the realization that definitions are a posteriori. Not that the idea is completely new to me, but the way in which this diminishes the relevance of logic to discussions of existence is new.

Could you please clarify this a bit more for me? Definitions are a posteriori what? If you mean a posteriori conceptualization I think I agree with that.

Mmm. I know you're well read, and I realize that what I know of God is not the majority view when all the religions of the world are considered, but it's not an obscure or fringe view by any means. As such, it always surprises me how many people here at CF are not familiar with it and/or don't understand it.

In short, I am a Confessional Lutheran. That means I take the Book of Concord to be the truest exposition of the Bible. Of course I think myself to be in communion with the one and only true God. But, even if we begin to partition out those who disagree with the Lutheran Confessions, I think I am in step with one of the major theological schools of the world. If you want to claim Christianity is not true to OT Judiasm but was invented in the A.D. era; if you want to claim the Reformation was not a return to the origins of Christianity, but a new invention of the post-Scholastic/Thomist era; if you want to emphasize that Luther was only one of several Reformation influences - each with a unique position ... even then I think Confessional Lutheranism is an important strain.

This is not the first time I've said this, but I guess I can't expect you to remember that about me. It's just that what you listed as common to most definitions of god is not really part of the Lutheran Confessions. Yes, we may use some of the terms you mentioned (e.g. faith), but not in the same way that you mentioned them.

So, I can give you 2 simple Lutheran concepts to begin a discussion of the definition of God.

1) A god, in general, is that from which we expect all good, and to which we turn in distress.

2) Jesus Christ is God.

Thanks - in general that´s quite helpful to know (although I can´t promise I won´t forget it again eventually, seeing how many different beliefs are represented here by posters on CF.

However, initially it was neither my intention to critcize the diversity in beliefs among Christians nor to learn about your personal god concept and discuss it with you.
The actual point was: Those thousand years of trying to establish the (non-)existence of God were actually a whole lot of discussions of various god concepts: i.e. what the presented argument would us believe to be thousand years of discussion of one problem have actually been a lot of discussions of many different problems (depending on the god concept they were dealing with). This, in my opinion, is a major flaw of the argument already in #1.
If I may use your above presented god concept for illustration: some of the most important lines of reasoning (like cosmological argument, ontological argument, problem of evil etc. etc.) throughout those 1000 years did not even address/affect this particular concept. E.g. even if the cosmological argument could have been established as logically waterproof it still wouldn´t support the existence of a god as defined in your two statements. Likewise, even if the PoE argument could have been established as logically waterproof, it wouldn´t logically disprove the existence of an entity that you expect all good from nor the idea that this being is Jesus Christ.

 

[Resha Caner]

To this point in this thread, the discussion of definitions interested me only insofar as it affected the argument in the OP.

Then maybe we don't have anywhere to go with this.

Could you please clarify this a bit more for me? Definitions are a posteriori what? If you mean a posteriori conceptualization I think I agree with that.

I was thinking a posteriori perception, but I suppose that perception must pass through conceptualization before it becomes a definition.

The actual point was: Those thousand years of trying to establish the (non-)existence of God were actually a whole lot of discussions of various god concepts: i.e. what the presented argument would us believe to be thousand years of discussion of one problem have actually been a lot of discussions of many different problems (depending on the god concept they were dealing with). This, in my opinion, is a major flaw of the argument already in #1.

Yes, I understand that is your position, but I disagree with it. This is where I think you begin to take unfair advantage of some of the vagueness involved in definitions. It is as if I wanted to discuss dogs and you asked for a definition. Then, after I give it, you say, "Oh, but you've described a poodle. That doesn't include terriers, so this a discussion of many types of animals, not just one type called 'dog'."

Or further yet, you made an earlier comment about how there are not many arguments for God, but zero. The point of statement #1 was that the many arguments had failed. You seem to conflate a failed argument with it being a nonexistent argument. Again, not true. This is a question that has come up in the philosophy of science: Since the Ptolemaic system was replaced by the Copernican one, does that mean Ptolemy was not a scientist? Since Einstein showed the flaws in the Newtonian system, does that mean Newton was not a scientist? No, it does not mean that. Since the word "scientist" was not coined until the 19th century, does that mean people prior to that term cannot be called scientists? No, it does not mean that. All it means is that one must be careful with context.

Therefore, the fact that some arguments may differ from mine, or may not apply to the definitions I've given doesn't make them irrelevant to statement #1.

So, based on what you said you wanted to discuss, where do we go from here? I'm not really prepared for it, but do you want to change the argument to see if it can be improved? For example, I agree we have to throw out the idea of a formally logical decidability of existence. What, then, would we substitute for the basis of existence? You mentioned evidence - though I suspect you have a particular type in mind rather than the more general use of that word.

 

[quatona]

I was thinking a posteriori perception, but I suppose that perception must pass through conceptualization before it becomes a definition.

It´s good then that I´ve asked because it turns out that I would have prematurely agreed with you.
I do not at all agree that definitions are necessarily a posteriori perception.
E.g. an architect can conceptualize a certain building he wants to create and define e.g. the word "Empire State Building" to denote this building that doesn´t exist and therefore has not been perceived.
Also, we know of definitions of "God" that contain unperceivability of their subject. Here, too, we have a definition without prior perception.

Yes, I understand that is your position, but I disagree with it. This is where I think you begin to take unfair advantage of some of the vagueness involved in definitions. It is as if I wanted to discuss dogs and you asked for a definition. Then, after I give it, you say, "Oh, but you've described a poodle. That doesn't include terriers, so this a discussion of many types of animals, not just one type called 'dog'."

If I am not entirely mistaken, one of the agreed upon defining factors of the subject of those thousand years of failed attempts to logically (dis-)prove its existence was: unique, singular. IOW monotheistic god concepts. Thus, your analogy to the possible problems in a discussion about a class of beings is completely besides the issue.
Just another case of my point being supported: If we want to make conclusions from the fact that approaching a certain problem logically (here: thousand years of...) has failed we need to analyse the reasons why it has failed.
One possible reason is: There was no proper definition. Or: There was no agreed upon definition, in the first place (different concepts were discussed simultaneously -> people were talking past each other). Or: Agreed upon components of the definition rendered the approach obsolete right from the start (extreme case: if part of the definition is "the subject is beyond logic" the problem is not approachable by means of logic, by virtue of the definition of the subject).
Personally, I think all three problems apply to those "thousand years of...". However, at this point I don´t want to convince you that they do.

All I want to demonstrate is: The reasons why "thousand years of..." have failed can simply lie with the definition. That´s where we should look first before jumping to conclusions about the implications of the failure.

But back to the dogs and poodles. I´m not sure why you ignored the part of my post in which I pointed out that certain "Gods" can and have been logically proven to exist, while others can and have been disproven. Yet, the summary of those "thousand years" in #1 is: it failed. This strongly suggests that the very simple reason for the overall failure lies with the fact that people were disussing different concepts simultaneously. IOW: Poodles have been proven to exist, German Shepherds have been disproven to exist, however the question whether "TheDog" exists is still considered undecided. What does that tell us? Definition problems.

Or further yet, you made an earlier comment about how there are not many arguments for God, but zero. The point of statement #1 was that the many arguments had failed. You seem to conflate a failed argument with it being a nonexistent argument.

I don´t know why you ask this now but I´m glad you ask, anyway so I can clarify.
But let´s first look at the context, and what I actually wrote:
In response to your statement:
If one considers the number of possible arguments, the more plausible state is that they are finite rather than infinite. If there were, say, 10 arguments, and over the last 1000 years 8 have been tried, it is more likely the question is undecidable.
I wrote:
If - as is my position - the definition of God is preventing any logical approach the number is 0.

Of course in my response I was talking about valid arguments.
The possible number of invalid arguments is - no matter what the question, problem or subject - always infinite.

This is a question that has come up in the philosophy of science: Since the Ptolemaic system was replaced by the Copernican one, does that mean Ptolemy was not a scientist? Since Einstein showed the flaws in the Newtonian system, does that mean Newton was not a scientist? No, it does not mean that. Since the word "scientist" was not coined until the 19th century, does that mean people prior to that term cannot be called scientists? No, it does not mean that. All it means is that one must be careful with context.

No idea what all this has to do with anything - but I agree completely and consider this paragraph to support my point: The problem described here is created by definition problems.

Therefore, the fact that some arguments may differ from mine, or may not apply to the definitions I've given doesn't make them irrelevant to statement #1.

The problem I am pointing out is not that arguments differ from yours, but that large parts of those "thousand years" have not been spent to logically prove or disprove "God" as you define it. That´s why - although in these "thousand years" certain god concepts were indeed logically decided upon (positively or negatively) - you still consider the question undecided: They weren´t congruent with your god concepts.

So, based on what you said you wanted to discuss, where do we go from here? I'm not really prepared for it, but do you want to change the argument to see if it can be improved?

The argument in the OP? I don´t see much use in trying to improve it. IMO it´s a trainwreck for so many reasons that it would be better to completely forget about it.

For example, I agree we have to throw out the idea of a formally logical decidability of existence.

Well, I have given you examples of a formal logical decidability of existence.

I think the first step to improve the entire discussion would be for you to acknowledge that due to the fact that the subject is defined as being exceptional in many ways, analogies from our world are predictably misleading.

What, then, would we substitute for the basis of existence?

Depends on the definition of the subject in question.
I don´t think that e.g. the existence of a poodle and the existence of "The supernatural, invisible, non-physical Poodle" can be approached by the same methods and standards.
While I acknowledge that defining something to be "supernatural" gives you the advantage of it being disprovable (neither by means of evidence nor by means of logic) you better not forget the other side of the coin: It also isn´t provable. That would be one of the reasons I said: The very attempt that #1 alludes failed predictably.

You mentioned evidence - though I suspect you have a particular type in mind rather than the more general use of that word.

IIRC I brought up evidence in response to your question how to approach the question whether your friend John exists. Yes, in this case I have particular types of evidence in mind.
However, when e.g. "supernatural" and "evidence" are mentioned in the same phrase my mind tends to become completely empty. Actually, "supernatural" alone already creates huge empty spaces in my mind.

 

[Steve Petersen]

His servants, the monks of Dublin created Guiness, so I would say YES, God is Irish.

 

[Resha Caner]

quatona,

The conversation seems to have lost its way and become merely a series of clarifications. I agree with some of what you've said, and still disagree with other parts of it. I think that's the sum of it.

 

[quatona]

quatona,

The conversation seems to have lost its way and become merely a series of clarifications. I agree with some of what you've said, and still disagree with other parts of it. I think that's the sum of it.

Glad I could help at least a bit.