Does this follow necesarily, or could it be a category mistake, expecting the properties of objects (brains) to be identical to the properties of subjects (people)? Or in some way expecting a simple translation...
The self is not an object ordinarily speaking.
Could we be "double agents" both determined and free, depending on which perspective you look at us from?
Lets imagine the self is emergent, what then?
If the self has a sense of freedom, could that be an functional adaptation, just as feeling pleasure or pain is psychologically and adaptively useful?
If freedom is the sense than under the present circumstances we may do either A or B etc, could this sense be due to a lack of knowledge? A sort of bounded rationailty? And if we are existentially stuck within those limits, then what?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics)
The self is not an object ordinarily speaking.
Could we be "double agents" both determined and free, depending on which perspective you look at us from?
Lets imagine the self is emergent, what then?
If the self has a sense of freedom, could that be an functional adaptation, just as feeling pleasure or pain is psychologically and adaptively useful?
If freedom is the sense than under the present circumstances we may do either A or B etc, could this sense be due to a lack of knowledge? A sort of bounded rationailty? And if we are existentially stuck within those limits, then what?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics)
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