I need a rational reason to think...

[JMC309]

...that the world, science, and everything around me exists and is not a string of images being fed to my brain in a vat. Can anyone provide me with one?

 

[Eudaimonist]

Can anyone provide me with one?

Oh, no... he's on to us...

Okay, puny human. This is your existence now:

Never mind that you have no evidence for this whatsoever. Not even my revelation is evidence, since I could just be a human poster trying to fool you into thinking that you are really a free and complete human. Ha ha ha ha!

The overlords are displeased with your skepticism. We were going to give you a virtual harem to do with as you pleased, but we must now act otherwise. If you want reasons to be skeptical of your skepticism, then see my recent post here. Maybe we will forgive you.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[JMC309]

OK. Give me that harem and I won't tell anyone that you actually con...wait! There are no other people to tell! You made them all up! AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAH!!!

Yes, it seems to me that the most certain thing is that we are human beings living a human life, and given the lack of evidenced alternatives, this is the way to go. What other choice is there, really, except for what is very likely a pointless and self-destructive nihilism?

Indeed. There are some things which are so foundational to us that to prove them logically make no sense. We must just act on the assumption that they exist, as life in doubt of them would be untenable for us. The scientist will happily change their mind about a natural phenomenon and the theologian will change their mind about a theological issue when presented with adequate evidence. Yet as our foundational assumptions determine so much about how, as well as what, we think, to try and argue about them is useless and impossible.

 

[DailyBlessings]

...that the world, science, and everything around me exists and is not a string of images being fed to my brain in a vat. Can anyone provide me with one?

You have no rational reason to believe that at all.

 

[quatona]

...that the world, science, and everything around me exists and is not a string of images being fed to my brain in a vat. Can anyone provide me with one?

What for do you need to think that?

 

[The Nihilist]

Why do you need a reason for that? If you assume you are a brain in a vat, you'll still get hungry, thirsty, tired, and horny. You'll still have to do the things you have to do.

 

[xr2]

Is there a good reason not to think? If you want to see this line of reasoning taken to the extreme, read the parts about the guy who runs the universe in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe by Douglas Adams.

All you can do is respond to the stimuli that you perceive in a way that makes sense to you.

 

[Nathan45]

...that the world, science, and everything around me exists and is not a string of images being fed to my brain in a vat. Can anyone provide me with one?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ockham%27s_razor

 

[DailyBlessings]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ockham's_razor

Care to explain why you think that link provides a logical response to the OP?

 

[quatona]

Care to explain why you think that link provides a logical response to the OP?

The assumption that your brain is in a vat is unparsimonous.

 

[DailyBlessings]

The assumption that your brain is in a vat is unparsimonous.

In what way, and how does that constitute a rational reason to assume that it is not the case?

 

[quatona]

In what way,

In that it makes very detailed, yet unnecessary assumptions, without any supporting evidence.
Had he said "brain in a blue vase with pink stars painted on it and a yellow ribbon tied to it, the claim would have been even more unparsimonous.

and how does that constitute a rational reason to assume that it is not the case?

It´s more like the more unparsimonous an explanation the less rational reason I have to think it is accurate.

 

[DailyBlessings]

In that it makes very detailed, yet unnecessary assumptions, without any supporting evidence.
Had he said "brain in a blue vase with pink stars painted on it and a yellow ribbon tied to it, the claim would have been even more unparsimonous.

What assumption is being made by the question "could we be brains in a vat?" You seem to be assuming that a contrary claim is the 'natural' assumption, but if we are indeed brains in a vat, presuming that our consciousness must be linked to our apparent bodies is the unnecessary (and incorrect) assumption. The brain in a vat theory perfectly and easily explains why things are the way they are, and ignorance of it leads to endless debates over the relationship of mind to body with little evidence ever being successfully advanced. If the OP were actually claiming to be able to prove that we are brains in a vat, you might somewhat have a point, unless he could present a rationale for the claim. But allowing for the possibility makes for far fewer unwarranted assumptions than denying it.

It´s more like the more unparsimonous an explanation the less rational reason I have to think it is accurate.

I've never seen this to be true. One of these days when I have the time, I think I'll write out an extensive explanation of why the "law" of parsimony is not as useful as it seems. For now, let us say that (a) the universe is usually more complicated than it appears- often reality has extra variables, such that assumptions made from the principle of parsimony are often wrong simply do to the complicated nature of events. (b) the other major failure of Occam's handy little razor is that most observers are so hopelessly grounded in the subjective that their judgment of what is and is not necessary is usually flawed. It frequently comes down to an inaccurate appraisal of what the situation would look like without any assumptions being made.

For example, the Titanic sank as a result of at least two coincidental flaws, each of which would have been enough to cause the sinking of the ship by itself. Occam's razor would lead you to accept whichever reason you surmised first, since the other is not neccessary to explain why the ship sank. Yet in actuality, both occurred and neither could be wholly assigned the guilt. Both of the problems I pointed out are present in the example: the situation is more complex than it initially appeared, and because of this the observer is apt to make an incorrect assumption about what the simplest explanation actually is.

And it's not just that human error is possible- I've found it in most cases I've encountered where people claim parsimony in defense of their explanation of an event.

 

[quatona]

What assumption is being made by the question "could we be brains in a vat?"

The mere question "could we?" isn´t making any assumptions.
The idea that we are brains in a what, however, is the very assumption I am referring to.

You seem to be assuming that a contrary claim is the 'natural' assumption,

I merely seem to. I don´t even know what you mean by "contrary claim" - apart from "we are not exactly brains in a vat".

but if we are indeed brains in a vat, presuming that our consciousness must be linked to our apparent bodies is the unnecessary (and incorrect) assumption.

Since I haven´t argued that our consciousness must be linked to our apparent bodies, I must conclude that you are arguing against points I don´t even try to make.

The brain in a vat theory perfectly and easily explains why things are the way they are, and ignorance of it leads to endless debates over the relationship of mind to body with little evidence ever being successfully advanced.

The microscopic kidneys - thinking they were brains - in a matchbox theory would explain it as perfectly and easily.

If the OP were actually claiming to be able to prove that we are brains in a vat, you might somewhat have a point, unless he could present a rationale for the claim. But allowing for the possibility makes for far fewer unwarranted assumptions than denying it.

Since the only assumption of that kind you came up with was neither mine nor necessary for not thinking we are brains in a what, I surely wonder which assumptions these might be.

I've never seen this to be true. One of these days when I have the time, I think I'll write out an extensive explanation of why the "law" of parsimony is not as useful as it seems. For now, let us say that (a) the universe is usually more complicated than it appears- often reality has extra variables, such that assumptions made from the principle of parsimony are often wrong simply do to the complicated nature of events. (b) the other major failure of Occam's handy little razor is that most observers are so hopelessly grounded in the subjective that their judgment of what is and is not necessary is usually flawed. It frequently comes down to an inaccurate appraisal of what the situation would look like without any assumptions being made.

For example, the Titanic sank as a result of at least two coincidental flaws, each of which would have been enough to cause the sinking of the ship by itself. Occam's razor would lead you to accept whichever reason you surmised first, since the other is not neccessary to explain why the ship sank. Yet in actuality, both occurred and neither could be wholly assigned the guilt. Both of the problems I pointed out are present in the example: the situation is more complex than it initially appeared, and because of this the observer is apt to make an incorrect assumption about what the simplest explanation actually is.

And it's not just that human error is possible- I've found it in most cases I've encountered where people claim parsimony in defense of their explanation of an event.

I think you misunderstand the idea of parsimony and Occam´s Razor. It is not saying that things always turn out to be as simple as possible, but that adding unnecessary assumptions without need does not make for a good explanation (for something that hasn´t been explained yet). It doesn´t make any statement about the result, but about which approach is reasonable.
If you could explain why my theory that we are kidneys in a blue vase with pink stars and yellow ribbons that perceive themselves as brains is less convincing than "brains in a vat", I might understand your point better. The only reason I can think of to consider it less convincing is: because it is less parsimonous.

 

[TeddyKGB]

...that the world, science, and everything around me exists and is not a string of images being fed to my brain in a vat. Can anyone provide me with one?

Daniel Dennett argues that the computing power necessary to model a temporal universe - essentially requiring a 'redraw' every Planck-time - would require a machine roughly as large and complex as a universe.

 

[DailyBlessings]

The mere question "could we?" isn´t making any assumptions.

The OP requested a rational reason to believe that he is NOT a brain in a vat. The link to Occam's Razor was put forward without explanation, but presumably to provide the OP with said rationale. If you are agreeing with the use of the razor in this case, it seems to me that you are agreeing that it can be rightly used negate the claim about the vat. Unless you are suggesting that simply by asking for a reason to disbelieve the claim, the OP is actually assuming that the claim is true, which seems unlikely. Asking whether something is possible is a very different animal than claiming that it is or is not.

I think you misunderstand the idea of parsimony and Occam´s Razor. It is not saying that things always turn out to be as simple as possible, but that adding unnecessary assumptions without need does not make for a good explanation (for something that hasn´t been explained yet). It doesn´t make any statement about the result, but about which approach is reasonable.

I understand this. I'm pointing out that this isn't actually a rational way to go about the contemplative life, because it misleads more often than it actually helps. There are a number of reasons why using Occam's razor is likely to lead to errors.

If you could explain why my theory that we are kidneys in a blue vase with pink stars and yellow ribbons that perceive themselves as brains is less convincing than "brains in a vat", I might understand your point better. The only reason I can think of to consider it less convincing is: because it is less parsimonous.

I don't see that your explanation is any more or less likely to be true than the one we are discussing.

 

[quatona]

The OP requested a rational reason to believe that he is NOT a brain in a vat. The link to Occam's Razor was put forward without explanation, but presumably to provide the OP with said rationale. If you are agreeing with the use of the razor in this case, it seems to me that you are agreeing that it can be rightly used negate the claim about the vat. Unless you are suggesting that simply by asking for a reason to disbelieve the claim, the OP is actually assuming that the claim is true, which seems unlikely. Asking whether something is possible is a very different animal than claiming that it is or is not.

Indeed I didn´t mean to give an explanation why it is impossible, but why it is not reasonable to believe in such an unparsimonous assumption.
Since the OP did not ask for a reason "not to believe that..." but for a "reason to believe we are not..." you do have a point.
Hard a-vat-ism vs. soft a-vat-ism, basically.

I understand this. I'm pointing out that this isn't actually a rational way to go about the contemplative life, because it misleads more often than it actually helps.

I´m not sure what you mean when saying "contemplative life", so I can´t even try to investigate your claim.

There are a number of reasons why using Occam's razor is likely to lead to errors.

Well, nobody says that Occam´s Razor can not lead to errors.

I don't see that your explanation is any more or less likely to be true than the one we are discussing.

Since there can only be one accurate explanation "likeliness of truth" isn´t the issue here.
Occam´s Razor is about the starting point rather than the result.
If you think that my explanation is a rational as the one cited in the OP, there are billions of other wild guesses as to "what we are" that are equally rational.

 

[DailyBlessings]

I´m not sure what you mean when saying "contemplative life", so I can´t even try to investigate your claim.

That's my way of saying "thinking." Forgive my seminary-trained obscurity of phrasing.

Well, nobody says that Occam´s Razor can not lead to errors.

Indeed, but if it is especially prone to error, and I think it is, than it is not rational to use it as a starting point at all. It would be more rational not to rely on a model that tends to lead to mistakes.

Since there can only be one accurate explanation "likeliness of truth" isn´t the issue here.

I'll agree to this point.

Occam´s Razor is about the starting point rather than the result.
If you think that my explanation is a rational as the one cited in the OP, there are billions of other wild guesses as to "what we are" that are equally rational.

Probably a near infinite number, bounded only by our capacity to imagine new scenarios to consider. But if there is no rational reason to prejudice one over another, why would you? I'm content to let questions stand until I have sufficient cause to dismiss them.

 

[Received]

Nope. But whether the world as you know it is merely the result of neurological stimulation, or the dream of God, or a really real external place that you interpret, why should it matter? 'Sides, the only world that matters is the world that we project (or, perhaps better, projects us). The basis of this world doesn't really matter, and if it did, what can we do about it?

 

[quatona]

That's my way of saying "thinking." Forgive my seminary-trained obscurity of phrasing.

Indeed, but if it is especially prone to error, and I think it is, than it is not rational to use it as a starting point at all. It would be more rational not to rely on a model that tends to lead to mistakes.

Would it be asked too much to anticipate a bit of your book and give an explanation why it is *especially prone* to errors (as opposed to just giving some examples where it would have lead to errors)?
I am not convinced it is. I tend to think that we apply it with very good results countless times a day, and even in your Titanic example it would not have been a particularly good idea to start from wild unparsimonous guesses. If only for the reason that there are too many of them. I suspect that what they did was starting from the most simple explanations and adding further assumptions whenever the simple ones could not explain what happened - and apparently ended up with the correct one.

I'll agree to this point.

Probably a near infinite number, bounded only by our capacity to imagine new scenarios to consider. But if there is no rational reason to prejudice one over another, why would you?

Oh, I didn´t suggest prejudicing one over another. I haven´t even given an alternative explanation (except those that I gave for the purposes of reductio ad absurdum, that is).
Yet, I would for example prefer a more general explanation over an unnecessarily detailed one. There are ways to question the accuracy of our perception without already deciding that we must be "brains in a vat", but include this possibility. The implications would be by and large the same, without the added details.

I'm content to let questions stand until I have sufficient cause to dismiss them.

Oh, no problem. Let them stand.
I just have little inclination to occupy myself with the consideration of an infinite number of hypothetical detailed scenarios when the hypothetical details add no significant relevance.