God and Mathematics

[Resha Caner]

I was introduced to the idea as materialism, I am not sure there is much enough difference there to make much of a distinction.

I'm not sure that I would be purely devoted to either position though, as I am not saying that mental or abstract systems aren't real, just that they are based upon, and inseparable from their physical constructions.

I don't think there is a hard problem of consciousness as I just argued, I don't think physical systems giving rise to consciousness is any problem at all.

I understand, and you're probably right that the distinctions between the many types of monism are probably not pertinent to our discussion. Regardless of the form yours takes, I would probably have the same objection. I just wondered if you had heard some of the objections to physicalism/materialism.

I do need to clarify one thing. I think I've split a hair that may have misled you. I said I'm not promoting mind/body dualism, but my position is probably best called a dualism of some type. So, it seems you fall on the side of some kind of monism and I on the side of some kind of dualism.

I briefly gave my objection to monism earlier. I hope you would agree that if one cannot describe the thing one is talking about, one is in a pretty useless position. Then, regardless of whatever expository flourishes one puts on that description, it will inevitably involve a list of properties. I would be at a loss to think of a property that has only one state - an up without down, an on without off, etc. So, as soon as one describes a thing, one implictly identifies other things as well.

In short, if one cannot describe "material", the word is useless. Yet as soon as one describes material, one also describes what is not material - what is immaterial. That does not require these immaterial things to exist, but it certainly tells one what to look for.

So, you said the material would be objective, consistent, and sensible. As an example then, I would think that if something is random, it is not consistent. When a radioactive atom will decay is random. Therefore, I would conclude that radioactive atoms are not material.

 

[variant]

I briefly gave my objection to monism earlier. I hope you would agree that if one cannot describe the thing one is talking about, one is in a pretty useless position. Then, regardless of whatever expository flourishes one puts on that description, it will inevitably involve a list of properties. I would be at a loss to think of a property that has only one state - an up without down, an on without off, etc. So, as soon as one describes a thing, one implictly identifies other things as well.

In short, if one cannot describe "material", the word is useless. Yet as soon as one describes material, one also describes what is not material - what is immaterial. That does not require these immaterial things to exist, but it certainly tells one what to look for.

Right the problem is the defining, I think the material world is objectively indefinite and my attempts to abstract from it are necessarily by my own invention for sensibility. Thus my definition of "material" is also a definite abstraction of an indefinite unity.

Any attempt to define what exists as a unity will result in a duality. For the sake of usefulness therefore, we adopt the stance that there exist divisions. That is what minds do, that is what they are.

We need to simplify unity to grasp it. We need to abstract.

Duality thus comes from our need to describe, whether or not this is "imaginary" or "real" I think is debatable, but I am certain it comes from us having a simplified self oriented perspective.

However, again, I am not saying any sort of dualism isn't appropriate, I am not saying that mental or abstract systems aren't real, just that they are based upon, and inseparable from their physical constructions.

So, you said the material would be objective, consistent, and sensible. As an example then, I would think that if something is random, it is not consistent. When a radioactive atom will decay is random. Therefore, I would conclude that radioactive atoms are not material.

By consistent I don't mean absolutely predictable I mean it can be counted upon to act in the same way given similar circumstances.

Quantum phenomena exist as probabilities (to us anyway), which doesn't mean they are inconsistent, the probabilities are actually quite consistent.

Many of these things though have to do with the difficulties and limitations on our ability to measure what is going on.

Ideas would be a much better non material thing as they aren't required to be consistent in any sense, although, I think they exist contingently based upon material systems.

 

[Radagast]

...just that they are based upon, and inseparable from their physical constructions.

I'm the one denying that.

For one thing, some mathematical abstractions were discovered long before their uses in physics appeared.

 

[variant]

I'm the one denying that.

For one thing, some mathematical abstractions were discovered long before their uses in physics appeared.

Yes and there is no reason you can't extrapolate from the rules of a system of mathematics that you have discovered to be useful to lead your investigation into physical things.

Rational ideas lead physical discovery all the time.

Does this mean that ideas exist as independent objects?

 

[Resha Caner]

By consistent I don't mean absolutely predictable I mean it can be counted upon to act in the same way given similar circumstances.

Quantum phenomena exist as probabilities (to us anyway), which doesn't mean they are inconsistent, the probabilities are actually quite consistent.

I thought you might say that, but all it means is that you're choosing the consistencies to accept and the inconsistencies to ignore.

Any attempt to define what exists as a unity will result in a duality.

It seems to me you're saying you believe in monism but can't present it.

 

[variant]

I thought you might say that, but all it means is that you're choosing the consistencies to accept and the inconsistencies to ignore.

As long as some basic consistency is present the criterion is satisfied.

It seems to me you're saying you believe in monism but can't present it.

I'm saying monism can't be presented abstractly. We have plenty of experience with material though even if it is properly indirect.

 

[Resha Caner]

As long as some basic consistency is present.

That still sounds arbitrary.

I'm saying monism can't be presented abstractly. We have plenty of experience with material though even if it is properly indirect.

I'd be happy to let you present it any way you choose.

 

[variant]

That still sounds arbitrary.

Sounds arbitrary? If I think all independent objects are physical in nature what am I arbitrating?

I'd be happy to let you present it any way you choose.

I can only present abstractions, it's not a matter of choice.

 

[Resha Caner]

Sounds arbitrary? If I think all independent objects are physical in nature what am I arbitrating?

Per the underlined phrase, note definition #1 at dictionary.com:
Arbitrary | Define Arbitrary at Dictionary.com

arbitrary: 1. subject to individual will or judgment without restriction; contingent solely upon one's discretion

I can only present abstractions, it's not a matter of choice.

Yet you believe it for some reason. I guess I'm not grasping why you believe in a material monism that can only be presented as a dualism.

 

[variant]

Per the underlined phrase, note definition #1 at dictionary.com:
Arbitrary | Define Arbitrary at Dictionary.com

arbitrary: 1. subject to individual will or judgment without restriction; contingent solely upon one's discretion

I don't think I have any discretion in the matter. Having consistency was one of my criterion and radiation does have some, that's how we are both talking about it as if it is a specific thing, it is also pretty objective and quite detectable.

If anything lacks one of the criterion in totality it is not going to pass the test.

I don't think the definition is perfect because I don't believe in perfect definitions for unities, for the same reason you don't.

Yet you believe it for some reason. I guess I'm not grasping why you believe in a material monism that can only be presented as a dualism.

Because I believe presentations are necessarily simplifications.

I think dualism exists in how we think about objective reality rather than there actually being a kind of objective differing kinds of substances.

I can only define "the universe" as a unity as well but it doesn't make me doubt it's objective existence either just how well I can grasp it as a concept.

The best I can do for you on differentiation is to call the alternative kinds of things "imaginary"

Those things that lack objectiveness, sensibility and consistency.

 

[Resha Caner]

The best I can do for you on differentiation is to call the alternative kinds of things "imaginary"

Those things that lack objectiveness, sensibility and consistency.

Yes, so please give me an example of something that lacks consistency.

I tried to offer an example. If randomness is not a lack of consistency, I don't know what is ... and I still think your boundary arbitrary. For the purposes of science, dealing with a collections of atoms is done to obtain the predictability of the probability distribution. It's not done to deny that individual atoms are unpredictable. So, a collection of atoms may be an example of consistency, but that makes a single atom an example of inconsistency. The system of atoms, then, is material, but the single atom is immaterial. I happen to think that is how it will always be - that whatever one calls material will be made of immaterial constituents. To try to drive the definition of material all the way down the infinite chain of turtles seems to me a fallacy of modifying the definition every time something comes up that doesn't suit some unspoken desire.

That's what never seems to surface in these discussions. Why do people so tenaciously hold to some undefined need to call everything material? What harm is done if some other class of substance is identified?

I'm not saying you're being dishonest with me, but it just feels like you're not telling me everything - that I'm not getting the real reason why you want to put everything in this single category of material. Why is the word "material" so special that it must be a unity?

I need an example of something that you would consider as lacking consistency. Otherwise, we're just talking in circles. You've given me nothing to explain why you hold these beliefs.

 

[variant]

Yes, so please give me an example of something that lacks consistency.

Abstractions for instance. I don't have an example of an inconsistent substance because I think such things are insubstantial, and that "things" are made out of material as their medium.

I certainly don't think I can make conscious systems out of an immaterial medium that lacks any consistency (your original question), I really don't think that is possible. I am saying that the substance of the universe comes out of it's consistency.

I tried to offer an example. If randomness is not a lack of consistency, I don't know what is ... and I still think your boundary arbitrary.

Radiation isn't entirely random though it exists along a known probability has known effects and some of it's basis for existing is known.

For the purposes of science, dealing with a collections of atoms is done to obtain the predictability of the probability distribution. It's not done to deny that individual atoms are unpredictable. So, a collection of atoms may be an example of consistency, but that makes a single atom an example of inconsistency. The system of atoms, then, is material, but the single atom is immaterial. I happen to think that is how it will always be - that whatever one calls material will be made of immaterial constituents. To try to drive the definition of material all the way down the infinite chain of turtles seems to me a fallacy of modifying the definition every time something comes up that doesn't suit some unspoken desire.

Our measurements of radiation happening in a known probability distribution for a given atom configuration would lead to the proposition that their basic mechanism isn't entirely random, that there are rules governing when the atom emits radiation.

Random is just another word for "unpredictable", and to be able to absolutely prove that all the substance of universe is made up entirely of inherently consistent things would be to have a full theory of everything.

Since knowledge, especially theoretical knowledge is based upon abstraction which is a simplification of global reality a complete theory is therefore would be known to be impossible.

We know there are physical limits on observation if Heisenberg is to be believed, thus we are always going to see some part of the universe as random regardless of if there are rules governing every thing.

Basically you are just requiring me to know everything to discount objectively immaterial things (and by "immaterial things" we mean "pure randomness" here because we are working with my own admittedly imperfect definition), even if we don't have the first clue how to conceptualize them, deal with them ect.

You're right I can't prove a negative. What is my reason for believing that objective things can be inherently inconsistent or even contradictory?

Why should I make the metaphysical leap here to think that consciousness can be made out of out of something that I would define as immaterial? Or that anything can draw substance from something that is fundamentally inconsistent? How would I go about this?

Our ability to conceptualize "the random" is just as poor as conceptualizing unity (if not worse since there are no rules to simplify or abstract from it) so I don't see an advantage here.

With a unity we at least have the option of dividing it up and making general observations and rules.

That's what never seems to surface in these discussions. Why do people so tenaciously hold to some undefined need to call everything material? What harm is done if some other class of substance is identified?

I'm not saying you're being dishonest with me, but it just feels like you're not telling me everything - that I'm not getting the real reason why you want to put everything in this single category of material. Why is the word "material" so special that it must be a unity?

I need an example of something that you would consider as lacking consistency. Otherwise, we're just talking in circles. You've given me nothing to explain why you hold these beliefs.

We are talking in circles because of course you are asking for an example of something substantial I don't think exists as a substance.

Next you can ask me to draw you a square circle and reverse digest my food by sticking it in my anus.

 

[Resha Caner]

I'm sorry if I'm frustrating you. Maybe we've reached the end. If so, and you see no point in continuing, that's OK.

But maybe I've not been clear about what I'm asking. So if you're willing to continue, let me try a different approach. First, I'll summarize what I think I've heard as briefly as I can:

variant: I'm a monist.
Caner: I'm a dualist. Show me a mono-thing.
variant: I can't.
Caner: Then why do you believe monism?
variant: ----------

So, to get at answering the above question, I'll propose two additoinal questions:

1) What convinces you something external is real?
For example, my answer would be: I sense it.

2) Is this only an issue of definitions?
2a) If you asked me what makes a good pet, my answer would be: dogs. Were you to then ask, "Well what about cats, birds, or fish?" If I continued to insist, "No, only dogs make good pets," that is merely an issue of my preferences. Because of those preferences, as far as I'm concerned, the definition of "good pet" only has one answer: dog. Were I more flexible - if I found a bird I really like - I might be willing to later amend my answer.

If someone asks me, "Why are dogs the only good pets?", I can list the behaviors of dogs that are not possessed by cats, birds, and fish. That doesn't justify my choice. It only explains it. But at least I can give a list of reasons.

2b) That is different than being asked the question, "Which is your left hand?" If I show the questioner my left hand and they ask, "Why is that your left hand?" the only answer is, "Because it was defined that way." They can ask me all day long for explanations or evidence or whatever, but I can't give it. Left is defined to be a certain thing, and that's the end of it.

2c) It is also different than being asked, "What is the speed of light?" When I answer and someone then asks, "Why is the speed of light 3E8 m/s in a vacuum?" I can show them the measurements that establish the value and the mathematics of relativity that establish the speed of light as constant. In this case it is not a matter of preference or definition. I might prefer a different speed for light. I might define a different speed for light. It will make no difference. The speed remains 3E8 m/s, and I can provide measurements and mathematics to support that.

So, in answering my questions, "What is matter?" and "What is an example of consistency?", in what manner are you trying to answer that question? Is it a), b), c), or something else?

 

[variant]

I'm sorry if I'm frustrating you. Maybe we've reached the end. If so, and you see no point in continuing, that's OK.

No need to apologize, I'm also frustrated because I am probably not explaining myself very well here, I started typing a reply but it doesn't seem to me to be making my points clearly.

I think I need a bit of time to think it over and I don't really have time to go into detail on this now as I am going on vacation in a few days and have to make preparations.

I'll try to pick it up when I get back.

 

[ebia]

If you don't wish to discuss or demonstrate what you feel is obvious to everyone it is still merely an appeal to authority.

One of the interesting things about mathematics that that things that are "obvious to everyone" not infrequently turn out to be provably wrong.