Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

But, if we want to make it about romantic love, let me ask you about a scenario, loosely based on the 1970's novel/film The Stepford Wives.

And I'm reminded of a quite brilliant film with Ryan Gosling called 'Lars And The Girl'. He plays a young guy in a small town who is socially inept and crushingly lonely who sends away for a realistic female 'friend'. And introduces her as his new love. Everyone is embarressed but they realise that he needs help so they all gradually go along with it. And it turns out that he does love his new girl and people come to respect what he feels.

No spoilers, but the point is that he did fall in love with his new girl. And he couldn't help it. We can see that it's real even if at some level he might know she's not.

There were no free will decisions. He couldn't help his feelings and neither could his friends and neighbours.

 

[NotreDame]

It's quite often the case that we are unaware of what has determined out actions. In fact, we cannot know them. Do you know the almost infinite number of things that happened just over the last year that determined that you are sitting there reading this? Of course not. And that line of cause and effect branches out to a million different threads each of which branches again going back as far as you'd like to consider.

No free will doesn't mean you stop thinking about what you do. But thinking about it doesn't show that it exists either. You are still making the decisions.

Well, there's a line of cause and effect going back as far as you'd like to go. At what point you want to stop is up to you. Wherever that point is does not negate the fact that the line exists.

This is the interesting bit:


Why (and how) can you exclude yourself from the choices you make? If you are the type of person who is interested in music then you might choose to learn to play an instrument. Your interest determined that choice. And you can't will yourself to be a different person. You yourself are one of the antecedent conditions which determine your choices.

No, you assume and presume the “interest determined the choice,” and in doing so, your beg the question and the argument is circular. Interests aren’t inherently deterministic but can influence our actions, while us humans are known to not act upon our interests or do something other than our interests.

And your own phrasing is contradictory.

There logically cannot be a “might choose to learn to play an instrument” and “your interest determined that choice.” Determinism excludes a “might choose.”

This isn't a metaphysical question.

To the contrary, it is, unless you have evidence showing Determinism exists.

Determinism is how the universe operates on the macro scale (say the atomic level and upwards). Simple cause and effect.

Cause and effect is not, as you must assume, necessarily Determinism. Free will has cause and effect. John’s free will action to eat pizza was the cause for the effect of less pizza.

So, you’ll need more than rudimentary cause and effect to show determinism exists and operates.

We only have the two option: Our decisions are determined (in fact - everything, at all times, everywhere is determined). Or they are not. I can't prove that everything is because we'd need to investigate...everything. It's like saying that all swans are white. We'd need to check every single swan to prove me right. But a single black swan would prove me wrong.

First, your false dilemma just isn’t very compelling. There’s a third option you ignore that is widely known as Compatabilism/Compatabilist.

I’m intimately familiar with Popper Falsification, which is what you’ve knowingly or accidentally invoked with the swan example. However, for reasons below, the “only have two option” in relation to Popper Falsification is also a false dilemma.

Popper Falsification rests upon the premise that for any hypothesis, theory, especially scientific theory/scientific hypothesis, to have merit, veracity, must be amenable to being proven false, amenable to being disproven.

However, a black swan is to refer to a physical, tangible, object, a swan, which isn’t parallel to the metaphysical subject matter of Determinism or Free Will. The subject matter of free will, determinism, compatabilism, isn’t amenable to being proven false, disproven, because it’s a metaphysical subject that doesn’t lend or yield itself to physical, tangible evidence that we can discover, examine, see, etcetera, to deny a determining cause, free will agency, or a mixture of both as compatible. Which is precisely a salient point I made in my post.

So, by your own statement, you cannot “check every single swan” but instead you show a “single black swan” that of some act or refraining from acting is a result of Determinsim, thereby refuting all actions/inaction is a result of free will. Yet, demanding Popper Falsification of you to disprove free will is irrational because the metaphysical nature of the subject matter isn’t amenable to disproving, falsifying.

Yet, by your own logic, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, if you demand falsification of the other, then falsification can be demanded of you, to show a single instance of determinism thereby negating the other’s POV of free will.

I'd suggest that you are saying that it's impossible to prove that something - anything, wasn't determined simply because there are no examples. This isn't the equivalent of proving a negative. I'm the one making the negative claim - that something doesn't exist. One example that will show that it does will prove me wrong. And you have the whole universe for all of time so find one.

First, you are not merely making a “negative claim,” as you claim Determinism and this is an affirmative claim.

Next, you are and did demand someone prove a negative. “By giving a single example of a decision that was not determined by anything at all.” To prove a “not” is substantively different from establishing an affirmative such as X is a cause. What evidence will show a decision was “NOT determined” and by “anything at all”? That’s an irrational burden of proving a negative, to prove another cause (other than the free will agency of the subject) for the decision doesn’t exist anywhere at all is your demand.

Furthermore, your statement of “One example that will show that it does will prove me wrong. And you have the whole universe for all of time so find one” presumes what I’ve challenged, that there’s evidence we can discover, examine, see, etcetera, for free will and/or something else. I’ve stated unequivocally, the metaphysical subject matter defies proving by evidence free will, determinism, compatabilism.

Which is another way of saying, you ask what you already implicitly know by your own statement, there isn’t evidence discover to prove determinism, free will, or something else. As you so astutely stated, “But bear this in mind. I can't prove I'm right.” Correct! You aren’t going to find evidence that proves Determinism.

I wouldn't reply in anything like that manner. There are no decisions that exclude determinism. Feel free to give an example if you like.

This assumes free will doesn’t exist and doesn’t apply. However, the very concept and definition of free will I have given is mutually exclusive to the definition of determinism. If free will exists, and it applies to some act, then logically determinism is excluded.

To be sure, I did not invoke an “example” and it isn’t necessary I do so, because the exclusiveness of free will is the substance of its meaning and the meaning of free will is mutually exclusive to determinism such that if free will does exist, and where it applies, then determinism is excluded. Again, I repeat, I’m not claiming either one exists.

I'll bet that Alvin didn't give you an example...

He’s provided many but I’ll let you enjoy the book to discover them. The point isn’t examples, the point is there’s as much evidence for Determinism as there is for free will, which is none to de minimis. Am I wrong?

Maybe but perhaps you can do what no one else has, provide evidence that doesn’t beg the question, that doesn’t result in a tautology, for determinism.

It's quite often the case that we are unaware of what has determined out actions. In fact, we cannot know them.

The converse is viable, “It's quite often the case that we are unaware of” free will, and “s. In fact, we cannot know them.” I couldn’t concur more, there isn’t evidence to prove or show either.

Well, there's a line of cause and effect going back as far as you'd like to go. At what point you want to stop is up to you. Wherever that point is does not negate the fact that the line exists.

So what? I’m familiar with a form of this logic but where I have encountered such logic, the advocate has additional premises and logic to account for cause and effect within free will so as to exclude free will causation. Your statements above do not do so.

Causation isn’t inherently deterministic or contradictory to free will. Free will does after all invoke causation as well. Any free will advocate, free will naturalist, free will theist, will tell you that whatever created this universe and its beings created a universe where the beings have free will. I can presume the Big Bang and all intermittent steps to John’s choice to eat pizza and that John’s choice to eat pizza was free, it was within his ability to perform the act to eat pizza or not eat pizza and consistent with the Big Bang and preceding causes and effects.

 

[Bradskii]

No, you assume and presume the “interest determined the choice,” and in doing so, your beg the question and the argument is circular. Interests aren’t inherently deterministic but can influence our actions, while us humans are known to not act upon our interests or do something other than our interests.

I haven't said 'he had an interest in music, therefore he will learn to play a musical instrument.' His interest is one of the antecedent conditions that will determine his choice.

And your own phrasing is contradictory.

There logically cannot be a “might choose to learn to play an instrument” and “your interest determined that choice.” Determinism excludes a “might choose.”

I don't know why people assume that determinism excludes decision making. It doesn't. We still choose. But the choice will be determined. That is not contradictory.

To the contrary, it is, unless you have evidence showing Determinism exists.

Every event has a cause which determined it. Period. You are free to give any example of when that has not been the case.

Cause and effect is not, as you must assume, necessarily Determinism.

It is. This was set out in the first few posts.

Free will has cause and effect. John’s free will action to eat pizza was the cause for the effect of less pizza.

John ate the pizza because..? Whatever reason you use to fill in the blank will be the cause of him deciding to eat it. Will have determined his decision.

So, you’ll need more than rudimentary cause and effect to show determinism exists and operates.

No, that's really all that's required. Can I suggest that you rad the first couple of dozen posts where that was argued.

First, your false dilemma just isn’t very compelling. There’s a third option you ignore that is widely known as Compatabilism/Compatabilist.

I've never found a coherent argument for it. I've tried, believe me.

I’m intimately familiar with Popper Falsification, which is what you’ve knowingly or accidentally invoked with the swan example. However, for reasons below, the “only have two option” in relation to Popper Falsification is also a false dilemma.

Popper Falsification rests upon the premise that for any hypothesis, theory, especially scientific theory/scientific hypothesis, to have merit, veracity, must be amenable to being proven false, amenable to being disproven.

However, a black swan is to refer to a physical, tangible, object, a swan, which isn’t parallel to the metaphysical subject matter of Determinism or Free Will.

Determinism isn't metaphysical. Very far from it. It's about as material as you can possibly get. The black swan equivalent is to show any physical event without a cause.

The subject matter of free will, determinism, compatabilism, isn’t amenable to being proven false, disproven, because it’s a metaphysical subject that doesn’t lend or yield itself to physical, tangible evidence that we can discover, examine, see, etcetera, to deny a determining cause, free will agency, or a mixture of both as compatible. Which is precisely a salient point I made in my post.

So, by your own statement, you cannot “check every single swan” but instead you show a “single black swan” that of some act or refraining from acting is a result of Determinsim, thereby refuting all actions/inaction is a result of free will. Yet, demanding Popper Falsification of you to disprove free will is irrational because the metaphysical nature of the subject matter isn’t amenable to disproving, falsifying.

Yet, by your own logic, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, if you demand falsification of the other, then falsification can be demanded of you, to show a single instance of determinism thereby negating the other’s POV of free will.



First, you are not merely making a “negative claim,” as you claim Determinism and this is an affirmative claim.

Next, you are and did demand someone prove a negative. “By giving a single example of a decision that was not determined by anything at all.” To prove a “not” is substantively different from establishing an affirmative such as X is a cause. What evidence will show a decision was “NOT determined” and by “anything at all”? That’s an irrational burden of proving a negative, to prove another cause (other than the free will agency of the subject) for the decision doesn’t exist anywhere at all is your demand.

Furthermore, your statement of “One example that will show that it does will prove me wrong. And you have the whole universe for all of time so find one” presumes what I’ve challenged, that there’s evidence we can discover, examine, see, etcetera, for free will and/or something else. I’ve stated unequivocally, the metaphysical subject matter defies proving by evidence free will, determinism, compatabilism.

Which is another way of saying, you ask what you already implicitly know by your own statement, there isn’t evidence discover to prove determinism, free will, or something else. As you so astutely stated, “But bear this in mind. I can't prove I'm right.” Correct! You aren’t going to find evidence that proves Determinism.



This assumes free will doesn’t exist and doesn’t apply. However, the very concept and definition of free will I have given is mutually exclusive to the definition of determinism. If free will exists, and it applies to some act, then logically determinism is excluded.

To be sure, I did not invoke an “example” and it isn’t necessary I do so, because the exclusiveness of free will is the substance of its meaning and the meaning of free will is mutually exclusive to determinism such that if free will does exist, and where it applies, then determinism is excluded. Again, I repeat, I’m not claiming either one exists.



He’s provided many but I’ll let you enjoy the book to discover them. The point isn’t examples, the point is there’s as much evidence for Determinism as there is for free will, which is none to de minimis. Am I wrong?

Maybe but perhaps you can do what no one else has, provide evidence that doesn’t beg the question, that doesn’t result in a tautology, for determinism.



The converse is viable, “It's quite often the case that we are unaware of” free will, and “s. In fact, we cannot know them.” I couldn’t concur more, there isn’t evidence to prove or show either.



So what? I’m familiar with a form of this logic but where I have encountered such logic, the advocate has additional premises and logic to account for cause and effect within free will so as to exclude free will causation. Your statements above do not do so.

Causation isn’t inherently deterministic or contradictory to free will. Free will does after all invoke causation as well. Any free will advocate, free will naturalist, free will theist, will tell you that whatever created this universe and its beings created a universe where the beings have free will. I can presume the Big Bang and all intermittent steps to John’s choice to eat pizza and that John’s choice to eat pizza was free, it was within his ability to perform the act to eat pizza or not eat pizza and consistent with the Big Bang and preceding causes and effects.

 

[Bradskii]

I'm trying to write my response on my phone. The reply might be somewhat disjointed...

 

[stevevw]

No, this is what you said:

That is wrong. Please correct it.

Look at the post before that.

Stevevw said ...as there is no basis as to what is right or wrong morally. This seems to go with no free will, the same kind of logic.

You said, "Please stop saying this. It's wrong, it's been explained to you that it's wrong and nobody has suggested that they hold this view. Please cease and desist".

So obviously I am deducing your position. If as you say that statement is wrong, that "there's no basis as to what is right or wrong morally" it logically follows that you take the opposite view that "there is an objective morality beyond human views and feelings".

What other position could there be. What else I am to deduce from your own words. If morals are either objective truths or subjective determinations then you are either supporting one or the other. If you say the statement 'there is no basis (as in truth basis) for morality' then the only other position to take is to agree there is a truth basis for morality.

Like I said your assuming I am wrong. But if I am right my reply is the logical conclusion.

So to move things along I will rephrase things.

Then do you agree that there is no objective morality beyond human made determinations such as likes, dislikes, feelings and determinations ect

 

[Bradskii]

Yet, demanding Popper Falsification of you to disprove free will is irrational because the metaphysical nature of the subject matter isn’t amenable to disproving, falsifying.

See previous post.

Yet, by your own logic, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, if you demand falsification of the other, then falsification can be demanded of you, to show a single instance of determinism thereby negating the other’s POV of free will.

I'll allow you to give me the example and I'll show you what determined it. Can't be fairer than that. Use a personal example if you like and I'll ask you some relevant questions.

To prove a “not” is substantively different from establishing an affirmative such as X is a cause. What evidence will show a decision was “NOT determined” and by “anything at all”? That’s an irrational burden of proving a negative, to prove another cause..

If determinism isn't true then there must be an example. By definition. And it's not a requirement to show another cause. But to show none whatsoever.

Furthermore, your statement of “One example that will show that it does will prove me wrong. And you have the whole universe for all of time so find one” presumes what I’ve challenged, that there’s evidence we can discover, examine, see, etcetera,

If there is (and my position is that there most definitely isn't), then you have everything and anything at any time to find an example. I'm hardly restricting you in any way. I can't possibly be fairer.

Which is another way of saying, you ask what you already implicitly know by your own statement, there isn’t evidence discover to prove determinism, free will, or something else. As you so astutely stated, “But bear this in mind. I can't prove I'm right.” Correct! You aren’t going to find evidence that proves Determinism.

Correct. Just like you can't prove a scientific theory correct but only prove it wrong.

This assumes free will doesn’t exist and doesn’t apply. However, the very concept and definition of free will I have given is mutually exclusive to the definition of determinism. If free will exists, and it applies to some act, then logically determinism is excluded.

To be sure, I did not invoke an “example” and it isn’t necessary I do so...

Yes it is. Just saying it doesn't make it so. I want to see your workings. I want to see what you mean by using an example. 'Free will exists, therefore determinism doesn't' won't do. But is exactly what you say here:

... because the exclusiveness of free will is the substance of its meaning and the meaning of free will is mutually exclusive to determinism such that if free will does exist, and where it applies, then determinism is excluded.

Well you know that's wrong because you've brought up compatibilism. But examples anyway please.

He’s provided many but I’ll let you enjoy the book to discover them. The point isn’t examples, the point is there’s as much evidence for Determinism as there is for free will, which is none to de minimis. Am I wrong?

Yes.

Every. Single. Event. Has. Been. Determined.

There's the claim right there. The evidence is all you have ever seen or experienced.

Now that's pretty compelling no?

The converse is viable, “It's quite often the case that we are unaware of” free will, and “s. In fact, we cannot know them.” I couldn’t concur more, there isn’t evidence to prove or show either.

Sorry, I couldn't parse that. But if you mean that we are unaware of that which determines our decisions, then yes. Most definitely.

Causation isn’t inherently deterministic or contradictory to free will. Free will does after all invoke causation as well. Any free will advocate, free will naturalist, free will theist, will tell you that whatever created this universe and its beings created a universe where the beings have free will.

That's a religious position. I appreciate that you might hold to it, but his isn't a religious discussion.

I can presume the Big Bang and all intermittent steps to John’s choice to eat pizza and that John’s choice to eat pizza was free, it was within his ability to perform the act to eat pizza or not eat pizza and consistent with the Big Bang and preceding causes and effects.

That's just saying 'Well, free will obviously exists'. If I had a dollar for every time someone has said a variation of that in this thread...

 

[Bradskii]

Look at the post before that.

Stevevw said ...as there is no basis as to what is right or wrong morally. This seems to go with no free will, the same kind of logic.

You said, "Please stop saying this. It's wrong, it's been explained to you that it's wrong and nobody has suggested that they hold this view. Please cease and desist".

So obviously I am deducing your position. If as you say that statement is wrong, that "there's no basis as to what is right or wrong morally" it logically follows that you take the opposite view that "there is an objective morality beyond human views and feelings".

What other position could there be. What else I am to deduce from your own words. If morals are either objective truths or subjective determinations then you are either supporting one or the other. If you say the statement 'there is no basis (as in truth basis) for morality' then the only other position to take is to agree there is a truth basis for morality.

Like I said your assuming I am wrong. But if I am right my reply is the logical conclusion.

So move things along I will rephrase the question or deduced conclusion.

Then do you agree that there is no objective morality beyond human made determinations such as likes, dislikes, feelings and determinations ect

My position has been crystal clear. You posted something which said the complete opposite. Please correct it.

 

[stevevw]

I would have preferred to have one or more of the points I raised addressed. Especially the ones that are relevant to free will. Such as: Can you make a free will decision to love someone?

Yep, try sacrificing your life for another whether thats with your own wants or your life without agonising over it and having to go against the grain as to how you feel or prefer.

Thats because love is not just a feeling but a conscious commitment. LOve based on feelings alone fizz out and thats why feelings alone cannot account for love. In some ways you could put love, true love as in sacrificial love in the same category as free will, morality and consciousness. They seem to transcend determinism in real ways that matter to us.

 

[stevevw]

My position has been crystal clear. You posted something which said the complete opposite. Please correct it.

I honestly do not know your position on this. You have not made it crystal clear to me. I know you don't believe in God, free will and consciousness beyond the physical brain.

I suspect you moral position is something like feelings and preferences determine morality or that we can use say human wellbeing as an objective basis. Or something like that perhaps rational thinking as the basis. This is the usual position people take if they reject objective moral truths beyond human subjective determinations.

So I am not even sure how I could correct this. Perhaps say 'No you don't believe in objective moral truths beyond human determinations'. Is that better.

But it still doesn't explain your position. So its no crystal clear.

 

[Bradskii]

Yep, try sacrificing your life for another...

Say I did. It would obviously be because I preferred to do it. I would have made a decision to do it. What do you think might have determined that decision?

 

[Ana the Ist]

I don't think certainty is possible (beyond the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum'), but I'm inclined to prefer the simpler option, particularly when it accords with our currently accepted framework of knowledge and doesn't invoke ill-defined concepts.


Sure, and?


I am unaware of the causality of many of my bodily sensations and unaware of most of the activity therein, but I have no good reason to doubt that the sensations have prior causes and that the activity is occurring. There is good evidence that modulating brain activity via techniques like transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) can lead to changes in cognitive processes, including decision-making, moral reasoning, and social judgments.

For example, studies have shown that stimulating certain areas of the brain, such as the prefrontal cortex, can alter moral decision-making. For instance, applying TMS to this region may lead individuals to make more utilitarian choices, prioritizing outcomes that maximize overall happiness, even if it means sacrificing individual rights. Brain stimulation can also affect individuals' opinions on social and political issues. Research indicates that stimulating the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex can enhance cognitive flexibility, making people more open to considering alternative viewpoints or changing their opinions based on new information.

IOW, there's good evidence that even subtle high-level moral & social judgments are the product of brain activity.


I described how, in the absence of an obvious value distinction (preference of drink) other values, e.g. location, can become influential.


Yes ¯\_(ツ)_/¯


Yes and no. There are plenty of examples of complex and surprising phenomena that appear when a collection of relatively simple elements interact en masse. IOW, emergent behaviours. Two in particular stumped us for centuries - fire and life. Fire was once thought to be a fundamental element until the 17th & 18th centuries when it was thought to be a chemical element (phlogiston). Finally, it was found to be a progressive chemical reaction, i.e. a process. Life was once thought to require a 'vital force' that departed at death, but it too was eventually shown to be a complex self-sustaining reaction - a process (of the same fundamental type as fire: redox).

I agree with David Chalmers that the various functions and mechanisms of the brain, such as how the it processes sensory information, how it integrates experiences, and how it produces behavior are amenable to empirical investigation and can, in principle, be explained in terms of physical processes. He calls these the 'easy' problems of consciousness (because they're amenable to empirical investigation).

In contrast, what he calls the 'Hard Problem' is why there is subjective experience at all, why there is something it is like to be consciously aware, and why experiences have a qualitative aspect.

There's plenty of evidence supporting brain activity as the generator of subjective experience - again, modulating brain activity can alter the quality of experience in various ways, but it seems that the existence of subjective experience is not amenable to (necessarily objective) explanation. I suspect the best we can do is to show that complex information processing systems that can process the kind of information a mammalian brain does, and in a similar way, are likely to have subjective experience. IOW, it is an emergent property of that kind of activity.

I think it's possible that we'll discover the precise physical requirements for consciousness, if not why subjective experience has the quality it does - that may just be a brute fact of those requirements.


See above.


Quantum physics is our best model of how the world works - which, IMO, makes it the first place to look.

By 'effectively deterministic' I mean in the physics sense that the stochastic uncertainty of quantum mechanics 'averages out' to be effectively deterministic at macro scales. The scaling theory describing this was pioneered by Ken Wilson, who showed how the fundamental properties and forces of a system vary depending on the scale over which they are measured, and that the laws & behaviours at different scales allow you to ignore what's happening at lower scales. It's a kind of law of emergence - a simple example is that you don't need to know the masses, positions & velocities of all the atoms in a planet to calculate its orbit; all you need is its mass and centre of gravity.

In this way, current quantum theory completely explains the everyday workings of the world at human scales - in terms of interactions of protons, neutrons, electrons and the gravitational and electromagnetic forces. There are other known forces, e.g. the strong & weak nuclear forces, but (ignoring radioactive decay) they're not relevant at macro-scales. there may be undiscovered forces, but they're too weak or short-range to be significant or we'd have discovered them already. There may be undiscovered particles but they're too rare or too light to be significant in everyday life.

Finally, we have a good indication of the degree to which 'true' (quantum) randomness influences the macro scale by the reliability & predictability of the physical world at macro-scales; e.g. electronic and biological systems - it's only when you approach atomic scales that quantum effects begin to become significant (chaotic systems are deterministic but unpredictable).

If the world is effectively deterministic and humans are part of the world, human behaviour is effectively deterministic.


The justice system determines how laws should be applied and what the consequences of breaching them should be. Those consequences will vary according to how particular breaches and those that breach them are viewed. We already apply the concept of 'mitigating circumstances' for some, I'm suggesting this would apply to all. Sentencing would be along the lines of assessing reparations and how best to rehabilitate the offender and/or protect society in future.

ISTM that a humane and enlightened society would take this approach regardless of belief in free will - causing suffering to someone purely for the emotional satisfaction of others should, IMO, be discouraged, not least for pragmatic reasons. It is well-established that positive reinforcement is a more effective way to change behaviour than negative reinforcement - the carrot trumps the stick. Acknowledging a lack of free will provides additional pragmatic and logical grounds for this approach.


I don't recall claiming what you suggest, but I think the disturbance I sometimes feel is the conflict between the feelings and the rational explanation; an analogy might be the disturbing feeling when you're in a traffic jam in the middle lane of a motorway and you stop, but the lanes either side crawl forward which makes you feel you're rolling backwards...

I don't feel morally superior, I think those who believe in free will are (understandably) mistaken, and that a lack of that belief would provide a compelling reason to revise the way the law is administered to be more humane and effective for all concerned.


I understand that - it's my main point. If what feels like a choice is actually inevitable, and we're not really choosing to do harm, punishment for the harm we do only makes sense as a deterrent, and the evidence suggests that, in general, the threat of punishment is not a particularly effective deterrent.


Opening the door on the left is not the same as opening the door on the right - they're different doors, so they require different actions to open. The decision you make to open one door rather than another, whether consciously deliberated or 'on the spur of the moment' has a preceding causal sequence you may or may not be aware of, possible examples of which I described previously.


I was describing the alternative - a door could be chosen at random, but otherwise there would be a reason, a determining cause, for one door to be chosen over the other, even when the individual was not aware of any preference. Ultimately, there is some evidence for various neurological 'tie-breaker' mechanisms the brain has for avoiding low-level decision paralysis.


The cause of them having to choose a door is always the same (escape), but the reasons for their choice (conscious or subconscious) of one door rather than the other may not the same if the individual has changed between visits (which they inevitably will have, even if you somehow wipe their memory of the room).

The only guarantee that they will choose the same door again is if all the circumstances are identical, including the individual - which is impossible because things change over time, particularly complex processors of experience like brains. For example, the experienced outcome of opening a door (pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant) creates a subconscious association between opening that door and the outcome, which could influence the choice next time, even if they don't remember the room or the doors.


I would accept it - clearly, their goal in that situation would be to leave the room. But in order to leave the room they would have to plan and decide on a course of action, i.e. choose a door (a sub-goal). There would be conscious or unconscious considerations leading to them choosing a door.


Maybe an analogy will help clarify my point - If my ultimate goal is to retire comfortably well-off (leave the room), I just have to save enough money (open a door). But in order to save enough money, I need to plan and decide how often to save, how much to save, where to save it, e.g. what kind of investments, etc (choose door). These are decisions that have prior causes - I may have heard it's better to save little and often, or I may choose to drop a lump sum into a prime investment I read about, and so on. Similarly, as I already described, the individual will have conscious or subconscious reasons, in the two-door room, for choosing one door over another, even if there's no indication where they lead, or if they're both open and obviously lead to the same place.


See above.


I'm not absolutely certain, but, to cut a long story short, given the quality & quantity of evidence in support and notable lack of evidence against, my credence is very high.

The reason for the door choice isn't necessarily extraneous, although it will probably ultimately be the product of prior experiences, i.e. extraneous influences.

I still don't really know what you mean by a 'free will choice', if it doesn't involve any of what I've described. Can you describe what your thought process might be, in the two-door room, concerning which door to choose in order to escape?

You wrote one of those replies so lengthy any response goes over the character limit.

I can split my response into 2 parts. I can also significantly shorten my response by you acknowledging that...

1. I'm not arguing for a spirit or soul or supernatural cause for free will. Free will is already defined without any supernatural cause. A possibility of choosing differently between at least 2 options. Simple enough.

2. You seem to think the evidence for determinism is overwhelming....yet when asked what could prove or disprove it, we need a time machine and a highly controlled situation with extremely limited options lol. You also seem to think that there's "overwhelming evidence" for determinism...yet I haven't seen any...it seems like the evidence for or against would require time machines and highly controlled circumstances. Ergo, no evidence for determinism exists. Do you understand that? If not, what possible evidence of determinism exists?

3. Weird off-topic nonsense like "the justice system" gets brought up whenever the illusion of morality is mentioned. Why? I can't think of any philosopher who both thinks determinism is true and morals are real and not merely an illusion in much the same way as free will is. Why does this keep happening? Is this really a discussion about the justice system wrapped in a bad misunderstanding about determinism? Laws and morals are not the same....in fact, most of the determinist's here seem to think breaking laws regarding immigration doesn't make everyone breaking them evil or immoral monsters. As another poster put it "laws are necessary for society to function" and yes....immigration laws exist for that reason. People are furious in Chicago because they are paying more money for less public services due to "sanctuary city laws" and the moral character of the people who are draining their economy doesn't seem to matter. We can all probably think of hundreds of laws that don't change our moral views of anyone. These things may occasionally overlap or seem similar in certain ways, but they aren't the same or even related. Murder isn't illegal because it's immoral...in some places, hundreds or thousands of girls or women will be killed by their brothers or fathers or husband's to restore the family "honor"....and it's seen as both moral and illegal. It's hard to have a functional society without a law against murder....but that doesn't mean morals and laws are connected. You have parts of big cities looted regularly...and it's defended morally. At the same time, big stores are leaving those places permanently and it's decried as immoral though it's totally legal. Laws and the justice system itself will never be a part of an argument for determinism because determinists can't hold any real moral values anymore than they can make real free will decisions. Do you agree and we can skip this in my full reply? Or are you struggling with the concept for some reason? You don't have any morals....just an illusion of morality. You may want people to consider their lack of agency when determining prison sentences....but you should consider your lack of morality before suggesting anyone do or not do anything.

I understand that politics, particularly on the left, has dressed itself up in morality a lot....but it's not really my fault or anyone else's if someone buys into the idea that your politics make you a moral person. The same people today who believe their politics are morally good while the oppositional politics are morally bad also thought that we shouldn't judge people based on race just 10 years ago...because it was so immoral to do so. Now those people think you're immoral if race isn't the first thing you consider in all sorts of situations lol.

4. Everything you wrote about the brain is unnecessary. I'm not sure why you brought it up. Did you imagine I was suggesting our brains aren't involved in choices? I'm not saying that at all....it seems like they need to be involved in choices. Are you saying our brains are simple input=output machines? Seems like we would have had AI long ago if that were the case. The best we have so far are some AIs capable of simple problem solving that is done by accessing huge data sets. It's an issue of novelty that seems outside the reach of all AI.

If you can understand and agree with those points (or even some of them) you'll reduce the size of my reply considerably.

 

[Bradskii]

There are no objective moral truths. There are subjective moral truths so your point doesn't stand.


This was post 1783 and there have been half a dozen after that restating it and correcting you.

I honestly do not know your position on this.

Yes, you did. Please correct that earlier post.

 

[Ana the Ist]

I would have preferred to have one or more of the points I raised addressed. Especially the ones that are relevant to free will. Such as: Can you make a free will decision to love someone?

Love is a pretty abstract concept defined many different ways by many different people....and as no one person's meaning is necessary for anyone else's, it doesn't really matter....but I'd say yes. This seems to happen all the time during adoptions...I've got no reason to doubt it. Even more impressive, I myself have had sex with women I didn't really find attractive or even like.

This still has nothing to do with morals.



This still has nothing to do with morals.

 

[stevevw]

Say I did. It would obviously be because I preferred to do it. I would have made a decision to do it. What do you think might have determined that decision?

Well first assuming the person obviously wanted to do it is wrong. Or that this was the motivating factor. That eliminates a whole of of other considerations that are involved. Including overcoming the want to not do it.

According to the same logic evolution every cell in our body wants to survive. So we have a basic conflict with not wanting to survive.

So something more than feelings of want are at play. A greater meaning to love than just wants and feelings to overcome them and sacrifice ones self. Which suggests something that transcends any mechanical causes.

I liken the example of 'Red' experience. No amount of physical and mechanical causes can account for a 'Red' experience. Yet its a real experience that gives us knowledge about reality that the mechanical schema can't.

There are many such phenomenal experiences we have that tells us something about ourselves and reality that we form our beliefs and selves on that the material reductive mechanisms cannot explain.

So its not just about the mechanical and deterministic processes but there seems to be another dimension to us, to Self that the deterministic picture cannot capture and only assumes is deterministic.

At the very least even if there was no real phenomenal experiences beyond materialism, material reductionism has a category problem, an explanation gap it cannot account for with these experiences. So its an inadequate and invalid basis for believing in Hard Determinism.

 

[stevevw]

Yes, you did. Please correct that earlier post.

OK so I will correct the statement and agree with the position you take which is "There are no objective moral truths. There are subjective moral truths".

Can you see the problem here even just with that statement. It contradicts itself. Thats why I am confused.

What your forgetting is that your position was being contested. So though you believe that its the case its not necessarily the case beyond your personal beliefs. Your assuming that.

So when I say I don't know your position clearly is because its incoherent so I was assuming you must have some way to ground morality besides subjective determinations. Or some other position that was not objective morality but not quite subjective either. So its not clear by logical reasoning.

That is what I was contesting in the first place. You can't defeat an arguement with your personal assumption and belief about morality.

Which supports what I was saying about how feelings, beliefs and subjective determinations are impossible when it comes to morality. Because morality demands a moral truth that is independent of you or I.

 

[Bradskii]

Well first assuming the person obviously wanted to do it is wrong. Or that this was the motivating factor. That eliminates a whole of of other considerations that are involved. Including overcoming the want to not do it.

I have no idea what that means.

According to the same logic evolution every cell in our body wants to survive. So we have a basic conflict with not wanting to survive.

Obviously.

So something more than feelings of want are at play.

I'm obviously doing it without being coerced. So It's something I feel I must do even if I'm not going to enjoy it. So give me one or more specific reasons why you think I might. I don't want theories or metaphysical wanderings. And I don't want to give you my reasons because you might think that I'm stacking the deck.

So any reason at all. Any specific reason.

 

[Bradskii]

So when I say I don't know your position clearly is because its incoherent...

You didn't say that you didn't understand it cleary enough. You said that you didn't know what it was. Period. That was quite clearly wrong.

...so I was assuming you must have some way to ground morality besides subjective determinations. Or some other position that was not objective morality but not quite subjective either.

I really don't care. I gave my position clearly and specifically. And I'm not interested in arguing for my position because this is a thread about free will. Not the differences between objective and subjective morality. Take that discussion elsewhere.

 

[stevevw]

I have no idea what that means.

well if you wanted to sacrifice you life for someone or some higher principle I don't think in reality we want or prefer that. We would prefer not to die or get hurt. We would want to live how we want to live and not give up those wants for someone else.

So its not a straight forward love = wants. There is a conflict between wants and feelings and a higher principle. The fact we anguish over it and its hard to do shows its not just about going with feelings. Those feelings have to be overcome, the fear, the voice telling you No don't do it.

Obviously.

Your only confirming what I said earlier.

I'm obviously doing it without being coerced. So It's something I feel I must do even if I'm not going to enjoy it. So give me one or more specific reasons why you think I might. I don't want theories or metaphysical wanderings. And I don't want to give you my reasons because you might think that I'm stacking the deck.

Thats exactly the case. Stacking the deck with unsupported assumptions. Your assumption is there is no free will. But that takes a certain metaphical belief. I am sorry but its true and you can't exclude that.

So already you have set the criteria as our epistemic beliefs on one side which is the material reductionist side. All other possibilities are dismissed under this criteria. So even if there is some indeterministc aspect of reality it doesn't have a chance of being realised because you have excluded it as a priori.

So its hard to give you any reason without you already reducing it to material cause and effect. Even if that is not the case. Just like with love and sacrifice or alturism. The mantra is already out there which is rationalise everything back to particles, genes, chemicals and electrical signals. Even if you have to tie yourself in a pretzel to do so. Which breaches Occams Razor.

Perhaps thats the fundemental problem and conflict with issues like free will, morality and consciousness. People are coming at it from completely different metaphysical outlooks which will never be resolved.

So any reason at all. Any specific reason.

Philosophers have gone over this already and I expect you have heard of them. The most common used to rationalise alturism for example is there is some sort of feedback benefit from such behaviour. Or our natural instinct to protect auch as a mother saving her child.

But that does'nt explain many situations where people sacrifice themselves for love or a greater cause than themselves. Thats the problem. Like natural selection it sounds good. Its logical. But it doesn't fit the reality.

I think it is better that you give a reason and I show how this reason is inadequate for explaining whats actually happening. Otherwise everything I say you are going to dismiss it.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Well, I think maybe it became bad maybe, and was a part of our social evolution, etc, which is why I mentioned it being possible for us to go back to something like that right now maybe, etc, or being set many, many years back possibly, and that I think we could be a tipping point right now regarding that maybe? Not saying we will or we won't, but just that if we don't get past this point right now, and get past this point right, and survivably, I do think it could be a possibility maybe, etc.

I can't follow what you're saying here.

Is it possible to reword it once it's a little bit more fleshed out?

No they don't, and they oftentimes don't agree, especially not all globally, etc.. And I'm actually wondering if it's just a human construct, etc, and that without humans, or other humans, then there might not be a such thing as morality maybe?

Exactly, they don't agree...neither geographically or temporally. Even within peer groups, pick any two people and they definitely disagree on the morality of some behavior.

You actually have reached the thought experiment starting point for my view of morality. Put yourself in a Matt Damon The Martian type solo on a planet situation....no one will ever meet you or communicate with you ever again nor even know you are there. You're alone, forever, but capable of survival.

Can you think of any moral or immoral behaviors you can possibly engage in?

I think if you believe that a god is judging you...perhaps there's a few....but without a God, I can't think of any.

Morality specifically describes behavior between sentient animals or more specifically, people. I wouldn't even say you have real moral systems with 2 people....since consent seems the only barrier to anything.

I'd rather not describe it further though...I don't think it's something I want to convince anyone of.

But, no, they oftentimes don't agree, etc, but I think it's all a part of our working out of such a thing called "social evolution", and I think that's the reason for all the many disagreements and conflicts surrounding it generally, etc.

Well...that and resources...but sure, people typically don't want to say "let's get rid of these people so we can have more stuff" so moral and cultural issues become front and center.

And that it's maybe headed somewhere, or has an ultimate destination point to where we one day might all agree, etc.

Seems unlikely. Seems more likely we would disagree if for no other reason than to disagree.

But I also think that is in very great danger right now currently, etc. We could go backwards instead of forwards right now, etc.

Take Care/God Bless.

Unsure what this means.

 

[Ana the Ist]

Very, very rarely is there ever no substantive value difference for us humans between two or more different choices or possibilities, etc, but even if there wasn't, or was none, etc, then those choices still have causes that are all determined/predetermined by prior causes before them, etc, and there is no escaping that fact really.

I'm not arguing that we make choices without any preceding causal reason.

I'm saying that I see no logical or rational reason why a cause can only ever result in one possible outcome.

If you want to leave the two door room....both doors potentially fulfill the reason/cause. It may be fun to imagine that another cause must exist for each choice....but while that seems unlikely for 2 possible choices, it's generally silly and bizarre magical thinking to imagine if we scales the room up to 100 doors we now have hundreds of unseen unknown causes for each door that don't exist for other doors.

At 2 determinism seems unlikely. At 100 it sounds outright goofy cookoo bonkers.

And you could theoretically trace all of those back to the very beginning, or the very first cause of all, and everything, etc.

Take Care/God Bless.

Oh? Why wouldn't these reasons extend infinitely into the past?