Or you made a free will decision and we could wildly change all those factors and you could just as easily pick the same can.
There's no way to know for certain.
I don't think certainty is possible (beyond the Cartesian 'cogito ergo sum'), but I'm inclined to prefer the simpler option, particularly when it accords with our currently accepted framework of knowledge and doesn't invoke ill-defined concepts.
Like wanting a Pepsi to drink.
Sure, and?
I am unaware of the causality of many of my bodily sensations and unaware of most of the activity therein, but I have no good reason to doubt that the sensations have prior causes and that the activity is occurring. There is good evidence that modulating brain activity via techniques like transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) can lead to changes in cognitive processes, including decision-making, moral reasoning, and social judgments.
For example, studies have shown that stimulating certain areas of the brain, such as the prefrontal cortex, can alter moral decision-making. For instance, applying TMS to this region may lead individuals to make more utilitarian choices, prioritizing outcomes that maximize overall happiness, even if it means sacrificing individual rights. Brain stimulation can also affect individuals' opinions on social and political issues. Research indicates that stimulating the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex can enhance cognitive flexibility, making people more open to considering alternative viewpoints or changing their opinions based on new information.
IOW, there's good evidence that even subtle high-level moral & social judgments are the product of brain activity.
Sure....those drinks represent different values though....that's why the thought experiment only ever involves choices of 1 value.
I described how, in the absence of an obvious value distinction (preference of drink) other values, e.g. location, can become influential.
Yes ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
I'm not sure what you mean by "conscious" in this context. Your brain, deterministically is just a bunch if protein, fat, chemical signals, electrical signals, etc.
Just as you have an illusion of free will, you would also necessarily have an illusion of thinking, illusion of feeling, illusion of self, etc.
Under determinism....you're just a meat and chemical sack reacting to stimuli with electrical imulses.
Yes and no. There are plenty of examples of complex and surprising phenomena that appear when a collection of relatively simple elements interact en masse. IOW, emergent behaviours. Two in particular stumped us for centuries - fire and life. Fire was once thought to be a fundamental element until the 17th & 18th centuries when it was thought to be a chemical element (phlogiston). Finally, it was found to be a progressive chemical reaction, i.e. a process. Life was once thought to require a 'vital force' that departed at death, but it too was eventually shown to be a complex self-sustaining reaction - a process (of the same fundamental type as fire: redox).
I agree with David Chalmers that the various functions and mechanisms of the brain, such as how the it processes sensory information, how it integrates experiences, and how it produces behavior are amenable to empirical investigation and can, in principle, be explained in terms of physical processes. He calls these the 'easy' problems of consciousness (because they're amenable to empirical investigation).
In contrast, what he calls the 'Hard Problem' is why there is subjective experience at all, why there is
something it is like to be consciously aware, and why experiences have a qualitative aspect.
There's plenty of evidence supporting brain activity as the generator of subjective experience - again, modulating brain activity can alter the quality of experience in various ways, but it seems that the existence of
subjective experience is not amenable to (necessarily objective) explanation. I suspect the best we can do is to show that complex information processing systems that can process the kind of information a mammalian brain does, and in a similar way, are likely to have subjective experience. IOW, it is an emergent property of that kind of activity.
I think it's possible that we'll discover the precise physical
requirements for consciousness, if not why subjective experience has the quality it does - that may just be a brute fact of those requirements.
See above.
No offense, but until there's a unified theory of physics I'm not sure how you can possibly be certain of that.
Besides, we're trying to describe human behavior....not quantum physics.
Quantum physics is our best model of how the world works - which, IMO, makes it the first place to look.
By 'effectively deterministic' I mean in the physics sense that the stochastic uncertainty of quantum mechanics 'averages out' to be effectively deterministic at macro scales. The scaling theory describing this was pioneered by Ken Wilson, who showed how the fundamental properties and forces of a system vary depending on the scale over which they are measured, and that the laws & behaviours at different scales allow you to ignore what's happening at lower scales. It's a kind of law of emergence - a simple example is that you don't need to know the masses, positions & velocities of all the atoms in a planet to calculate its orbit; all you need is its mass and centre of gravity.
In this way, current quantum theory completely explains the everyday workings of the world at human scales - in terms of interactions of protons, neutrons, electrons and the gravitational and electromagnetic forces. There are other known forces, e.g. the strong & weak nuclear forces, but (ignoring radioactive decay) they're not relevant at macro-scales. there may be undiscovered forces, but they're too weak or short-range to be significant or we'd have discovered them already. There may be undiscovered particles but they're too rare or too light to be significant in everyday life.
Finally, we have a good indication of the degree to which 'true' (quantum) randomness influences the macro scale by the reliability & predictability of the physical world at macro-scales; e.g. electronic and biological systems - it's only when you approach atomic scales that quantum effects begin to become significant (chaotic systems are deterministic but unpredictable).
If the world is effectively deterministic and humans are part of the world, human behaviour is effectively deterministic.
This is an odd statement for someone who insists that society will have laws regardless.
If society will have laws regardless....then the justice system will do exactly the same thing independent of any belief in free will.
The justice system determines how laws should be applied and what the consequences of breaching them should be. Those consequences will vary according to how particular breaches and those that breach them are viewed. We already apply the concept of 'mitigating circumstances' for some, I'm suggesting this would apply to all. Sentencing would be along the lines of assessing reparations and how best to rehabilitate the offender and/or protect society in future.
ISTM that a humane and enlightened society would take this approach regardless of belief in free will - causing suffering to someone purely for the emotional satisfaction of others should, IMO, be discouraged, not least for pragmatic reasons. It is well-established that positive reinforcement is a more effective way to change behaviour than negative reinforcement - the carrot trumps the stick. Acknowledging a lack of free will provides additional pragmatic and logical grounds for this approach.
Also, while you claimed that there's no ego driven sense of satisfaction causing you to claim to believe in determinism.....and that it's actually "sometimes a little disturbing"....your above statement indicates a sort of sense of moral superiority over those who believe in "free will" because they're doing "harm".
I don't recall claiming what you suggest, but I think the disturbance I sometimes feel is the conflict between the feelings and the rational explanation; an analogy might be the disturbing feeling when you're in a traffic jam in the middle lane of a motorway and you stop, but the lanes either side crawl forward which makes you feel you're rolling backwards...
I don't feel morally superior, I think those who believe in free will are (understandably) mistaken, and that a lack of that belief would provide a compelling reason to revise the way the law is administered to be more humane and effective for all concerned.
If all of this is deterministic....then we're not choosing to do harm lol.
I still don't understand why this is so difficult to understand.
I understand that - it's my main point. If what feels like a choice is actually inevitable, and we're not really choosing to do harm, punishment for the harm we do only makes sense as a deterrent, and the evidence suggests that, in general, the threat of punishment is not a particularly effective deterrent.
Why would there need to be different causes if the cause for opening the door on the left is the same as opening the door on the right?
It's the same cause...you'll just need to make a free will decision.
Opening the door on the left is not the same as opening the door on the right - they're different doors, so they require different actions to open. The decision you make to open one door rather than another, whether consciously deliberated or 'on the spur of the moment' has a preceding causal sequence you may or may not be aware of, possible examples of which I described previously.
I didn't say it was uncaused.
I was describing the alternative - a door could be chosen at random, but otherwise there would be a reason, a determining cause, for one door to be chosen over the other, even when the individual was not aware of any preference. Ultimately, there is some evidence for various neurological 'tie-breaker' mechanisms the brain has for avoiding low-level decision paralysis.
If you want to go with that....I'm fine with it. No matter how many times we drop our hypothetical memory erased person in the room....they'll still face the same cause, still have to make a free will decision.
The cause of them having to choose a door is always the same (escape), but the reasons for their choice (conscious or subconscious) of one door rather than the other may not the same if the individual has changed between visits (which they inevitably will have, even if you somehow wipe their memory of the room).
The only guarantee that they will choose the same door again is if all the circumstances are identical, including the individual - which is impossible because things change over time, particularly complex processors of experience like brains. For example, the experienced outcome of opening a door (pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant) creates a subconscious association between opening that door and the outcome, which could influence the choice next time, even if they don't remember the room or the doors.
If we ask said person why they chose the door they chose...and they reply "because I wanted to leave the room"....why wouldn't you accept it?
I would accept it - clearly, their goal in that situation would be to leave the room. But in order to leave the room they would have to plan and decide on a course of action, i.e. choose a door (a sub-goal). There would be conscious or unconscious considerations leading to them choosing a door.
Each door holds the potential value of fulfilling the cause and letting them leave the room.
It's only your personal desire to hang onto this really tenuous idea of determinism that requires some additional cause to be imagined for the specific door they choose.
In reality, it seems either door will succeed at resolving the cause/reason.
Maybe an analogy will help clarify my point - If my ultimate goal is to retire comfortably well-off (leave the room), I just have to save enough money (open a door). But in order to save enough money, I need to plan and decide how often to save, how much to save, where to save it, e.g. what kind of investments, etc (choose door). These are decisions that have prior causes - I may have heard it's better to save little and often, or I may choose to drop a lump sum into a prime investment I read about, and so on. Similarly, as I already described, the individual will have conscious or subconscious reasons, in the two-door room, for choosing one door over another, even if there's no indication where they lead, or if they're both open and obviously lead to the same place.
They are aware of the reason, they wanted to leave the room, that's the reason.
See above.
Which is why your absolute certainty that some extraneous reason/cause must be had for the specific door chosen is odd.
I'm not
absolutely certain, but, to cut a long story short, given the quality & quantity of evidence in support and notable lack of evidence against, my credence is very high.
The reason for the door choice isn't necessarily extraneous, although it will probably ultimately be the product of prior experiences, i.e. extraneous influences.
I still don't really know what you mean by a 'free will choice', if it doesn't involve any of what I've described. Can you describe what your thought process might be, in the two-door room, concerning which door to choose in order to escape?