Free will and determinism

[Bradskii]

Yes, you absolutely can.

Not only can you transcend your thoughts, you can transcend yourself, and even the universe.

You can lose yourself. It's the main idea of meditation. But you can't think about who you are without, obviously, thinking about it

To be clear, you are agreeing with the majority of my first post which stated that your position was tantamount to a denial of the existence of the self in any meaningful way.

There is a self. It's effectively your memories, from a split second ago to decades, and how you interact with them. Lose your memories and you have no idea who you are. In any sense.

How is this fundamentally different from a computer program?

It's not much different.

Would I even be responsible? Let's say I did this with two people, and one killed themselves and one didn't kill themselves. I am a common factor in what were two different outcomes. How can I be responsible for the outcomes? Isn't it the persons' own programming which is ultimately responsible?

If it is what you attempted to do then you'd be successful in one but not the other. As I said, it's possible to change. Different input, sometimes there's a different output. Some people are easy to convince of some things. Others take a lot of persuading. They are literally built differently.

As regards punishment, then trying to shoot someone and missing is the same as trying and succeeding. It'll be as I described earlier.

If this were true, then we would also have to conclude that actual guilt or innocence were irrelevant, because only the appearance of guilt or innocence would be necessary for such deterrence. As such, punishing the innocent who appear to be guilty would be preferable to not punishing the innocent, you agree?

I think you're using the terms guilty or innocent as a way of saying 'deserves retributive punishment or not'. I prefer responsible or not responsible.

 

[Mark Quayle]

You asked me in your previous post how I know what existence is, etc to justify my huge leaps in logic. Literally everything you just said, was a leap in logic based on nothing but your own assumptions about reality.

Agreed. Can you show me something that might be logically pursuable to prove me wrong? While what I said can't be proven, empiricism, at least, gives an awfully compelling argument. I noticed that you didn't respond to what I said, but to claim I too assumed, etc. What I said, while I agree it was drawn on assumptions, was directly relevant to what you claimed, besides that I mentioned your assumings.

I notice in your bio, that you are a Christian. Let me ask you this. Do you think that God makes free choices, or are his choices determined as well?

If he is God, he is not subject to any larger reality than himself. He is not under obligation to natural law nor is there anything else by which he is constrained, unless we might say, his own nature constrains him; but that is an anthropomorphism.

For example, he does not "have to" exist. That would be us trying to fit him into our heads, trying to make him subject to our way of thinking. On the contrary, existence is what it is BECAUSE God exists. God, if there is God, is the source of our existence, and he is self-existent. God is; therefore, existence is. ("In him we live and move and have our being.") God does not exist within reality, like we do, to be subject to it. Instead, he is the source of reality, or he is not God, but only a powerful entity.

So yes, his choices are entirely free, but not capricious nor even random. They are subject only to God himself, or he is not God. Note that if he is God, he does not choose from what he sees, but, rather, God choosing IS God causing. He is not like us. We have a biblical term, "election", by which some of us mean that from 'before' creation (speaking from a temporal viewpoint), God decided to create some of us for one 'noble' purpose, and the rest for another, ignoble purpose. The notion that God chose 'the elect' from a pool of possibles is to me ludicrous.

 

[o_mlly]

We feel that as being free will.

So ... now free will is an emotion? Odd that you, as one who is quite often informed emotionally rather than rationally, to claim the truth of one's feelings. OK, then like Smokey Robinson, I Second That Emotion.

Everything actually connected to the guy led him to that point. And anyone where the conditions were exactly the same would do exactly the same.

Nope. I would not have broken into your house. The burglar decides (free will) to break-in; I decide (free will) to not break-in. Reason: he is not exactly the same as me and never could be. See below for why.

Your argument seems to be that even if everything is exactly the same, there is still something called free will that is separate from all the conditions of his life.

Nope. I argued earlier in the thread that in reality nothing in the present can ever exactly replicate the past. It seems your argument relies entirely on the unreal premise that I'm wrong. If I am wrong then evidence just one such exact replication.

 

[o_mlly]

He used his supposedly free will to act according to his inclinations of the moment. Caused!

? "He used" informs us that he is the agent, the efficient cause, and his free will is the formal cause of his moral acts.

In the end, therefore, what a person chooses is an effect of those preferences and inclinations, which are effects of other causes, themselves also effects of other causes. And so on, all the way back.

Exactly where do one's "preferences and inclinations" exist? Answer: in the soul of the person (the locus of reason (conscience) and free will). The determinist is determined to take the person out of the equation but cannot.

The determinist argument fails for two reasons: 1) No two persons are exactly the same physically (DNA) and 2) The past can never be replicated exactly.

 

[eleos1954]

Well...that's not addressing the proposition. That's just saying 'we have free will'.

So something changed to prompt that decision. Conditions altered. And you changed as a result. No problem. But...if nothing changed, then... you'd carry on as before. It's life that changes us. Not the other way around.

well ... my stance is ... because our unconsciousness will always obey our conscience decisions our free will is always in tact.

also, because unconsciousness or conscience decisions can be made (and often are) according to emotions ... since our emotions can be due to physical things going on ... can't say that we will make the same unconscious decisions all the time.

 

[Mark Quayle]

So ... now free will is an emotion? Odd that you, as one who is quite often informed emotionally rather than rationally, to claim the truth of one's feelings. OK, then like Smokey Robinson, I Second That Emotion.

That's a bit of a strawman. @Bradskii didn't say that free will is an emotion, nor did he imply that. What he said does not reduce to that. To mock his ideas this way is a bit, er, dishonest, IMHO.

What one perceives as free will is the result of what it feels like to one; "seems like" would be another way to put it. And that feeling is a result of a human temporal self-deterministic worldview.

 

[Bradskii]

Nope. I would not have broken into your house.

As you are? No. Your situation is different to the other guy.

The burglar decides (free will) to break-in; I decide (free will) to not break-in. Reason: he is not exactly the same as me and never could be.

He makes a decision to break in. You decide not to. His life has led him to this point. Yours has not.

Nope. I argued earlier in the thread that in reality nothing in the present can ever exactly replicate the past. It seems your argument relies entirely on the unreal premise that I'm wrong. If I am wrong then evidence just one such exact replication.

Why do so many people have this problem with hypotheticals? Do I need to tether a donkey and stack hay to discuss Buridan's ass? Hunt down Davidson's Swampman to debate identity? Actually decapitate someone so we can ponder the implicactions of a brain in a vat? Of course we can't exactly replicate events down to the last molecule. It's a thought experiment. If you had exactly the same DNA and upbringing as the burglar then you'd have made the same decisions as he has.

If that's too hard for you to contemplate then I can't help. I don't care if you don't agree with the conclusion - although I will want to know why. But to say 'it couldn't happen' is facile.

 

[Bradskii]

well ... my stance is ... because our unconsciousness will always obey our conscience decisions our free will is always in tact.

That is patently incorrect. Mostly we let our subconscious do its own thing. But it doesn't necessarily align with our conscious determinations. Ever felt drawn to doing something and then consciously find yourself overriding the desire - 'Hey, what am I doing? That's a bad idea!'

...unconsciousness or conscience decisions can be made (and often are) according to emotions ... since our emotions can be due to physical things going on ... can't say that we will make the same unconscious decisions all the time.

That's right. Conditions which you can't control determine outcome.

 

[Bradskii]

That's a bit of a strawman. @Bradskii didn't say that free will is an emotion, nor did he imply that. What he said does not reduce to that. To mock his ideas this way is a bit, er, dishonest, IMHO.

If English was his second language I would have thought it was just a simple misinterpretation and would have explained it. I don't like using emoticons but an eye roll might have been justified.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Mark Quayle said:
He used his supposedly free will to act according to his inclinations of the moment. Caused!

? "He used" informs us that he is the agent, the efficient cause, and his free will is the formal cause of his moral acts.

Ok. So what? —Honest question. Sounds to me like you posit a red herring, but I will give you the benefit of the doubt. Apparently there is something you think your statement implies that I should have picked up on. I do not.

Mark Quayle said:
In the end, therefore, what a person chooses is an effect of those preferences and inclinations, which are effects of other causes, themselves also effects of other causes. And so on, all the way back.

Exactly where do one's "preferences and inclinations" exist? Answer: in the soul of the person (the locus of reason (conscience) and free will). The determinist is determined to take the person out of the equation but cannot.

How is the determinist determined to take the person out of the equation? For my part, I have no such intentions.

The determinist argument fails for two reasons: 1) No two persons are exactly the same physically (DNA) and 2) The past can never be replicated exactly.

Ok, HOW do those "two reasons: 1) No two persons are exactly the same physically (DNA) and 2) The past can never be replicated exactly." demonstrate that the determinist argument fails? In answering, don't try to show the two points valid, unless you mean something by them that I don't —I agree entirely with both. It seems that you think them to imply something that I'm not seeing.

 

[Bradskii]

? "He used" informs us that he is the agent, the efficient cause, and his free will is the formal cause of his moral acts.

The person who makes a decision is always the agent. Rather obviously. So if I go to the gym instead of the pub it's me making the call. Can you tell me what might have determined that course of action?

Exactly where do one's "preferences and inclinations" exist?

If it's an existing preference, then in your memory. You do something that feels good and the event is stored in memory. Obviously. And the next opportunity you have to decide whether to do it again, you remember your past experience.

If it's a new course of action then everything that I Iisted earlier will come into play when you make a decision.

The determinist argument fails for two reasons: 1) No two persons are exactly the same physically (DNA) and 2) The past can never be replicated exactly.

The argument isn't that 'the past can be replicated and two people could be exactly the same, therefore determinism'. It's weird that you wrote that. You just seem to have a problem with hypotheticals.

IF the past could be repeated (not when) then why would you make a different decision? There were reasons why you did it the first time. Why wouldn't they be valid the next?

 

[o_mlly]

That's a bit of a strawman. @Bradskii didn't say that free will is an emotion, nor did he imply that. What he said does not reduce to that. To mock his ideas this way is a bit, er, dishonest, IMHO.

What one perceives as free will is the result of what it feels like to one; "seems like" would be another way to put it. And that feeling is a result of a human temporal self-deterministic worldview.

That's a bit muddled ... well, no, it's a lot muddled. As one who is only acting as Bradski's apologist, let's see what comes out of the horse's mouth. I'm sure he'll have something to post. Yes, yes .... here it is:

The person who makes a decision is always the agent. Rather obviously. So if I go to the gym instead of the pub it's me making the call. Can you tell me what might have determined that course of action?

You did, as the self-governing agent of your own acts.

You just seem to have a problem with hypotheticals.

No, only with those hypotheticals that are based solely on one's imagination that one attempts to sell to others without any testable evidence.

 

[o_mlly]

... but I will give you the benefit of the doubt ...

Really? Do you not see your internal contradiction? The determinist believes that he cannot will any other way. If you are to be consistent then you would post only in the passive voice: "I am willed by things I do not control or fully understand ..." Yes, that is nonsense.

Ok, HOW do those "two reasons: 1) No two persons are exactly the same physically (DNA) and 2) The past can never be replicated exactly." demonstrate that the determinist argument fails?

The premises of the determinists arguments are: "1) if one is exactly the same as another ... 2) If in the future the exact same conditions reoccur ...". Neither is falsifiable because neither is testable.

 

[Bradskii]

You did, as the self-governing agent of your own acts.

No, I'm the one making the decision. I can't be the reason for making it. What was the cause of me making my decision.

 

[2PhiloVoid]

All decisions we make are determined by existing and prior influences. There has been an effectively infinite chain of events which has resulted in me sitting here writing this sentence. They have all led to this point. From the major events - I was born at a specific time and place, to the minor ones - it's raining today, to the seemingly inconsequential - I broke a string on my guitar last night.

There is no way that existence cannot be described other than determined.

The question is then not whether we make decisions that affect the trajectory of future events - I obviously decided to do this rather than something else. But if free will is defined as the ability to make decisions that are not determined by prior events and we could rerun the last hour exactly as it happened and make a different decision, then something actually needs to be different. But rerunning it exactly as it happened means that nothing is different.

So free will cannot be compatible with determinism. And if existence is deterministic then free will is an illusion.

There goes my existentialism ....

 

[o_mlly]

I'm the one making the decision.

OK.

I can't be the reason for making it.

Why not?

Externalities may influence but they do not determine one's acts. Even though influenced, one can, and often does, deviate from the received values, opinions, morals, etc. of others. "My parents, teachers and others told me to never steal but I just wanted that thing soooo badly ... I hated him sooo much ..."

What was the cause of me making my decision.

Ultimately? You.

 

[Mark Quayle]

Mark Quayle said:
... but I will give you the benefit of the doubt ...

Really? Do you not see your internal contradiction? The determinist believes that he cannot will any other way. If you are to be consistent then you would post only in the passive voice: "I am willed by things I do not control or fully understand ..." Yes, that is nonsense.

My goodness! that is an awkward way to put it! You want me to say, "I am willed by things I do not control or fully understand to give you the benefit of the doubt"!? I do not dispute that we have a will, and that we always use it. Whether I understand it or not is immaterial. That I do not control my will is your shorthand for the nearly infinite regression of causation: "I am caused to control my will as I do, and I am caused to rebel against that influence..." and so on.

If the will is caused to will as it does, there is no need to mention that fact in referencing the will. That is what the will is, and why it does. You may as well say that to reference the sun accurately, one must describe what it is made of and the processes by which it shines.

Mark Quayle said:
Ok, HOW do those "two reasons: 1) No two persons are exactly the same physically (DNA) and 2) The past can never be replicated exactly." demonstrate that the determinist argument fails?

The premises of the determinists arguments are: "1) if one is exactly the same as another ... 2) If in the future the exact same conditions reoccur ...". Neither is falsifiable because neither is testable.

No. Those are not the premises of the determinists arguments.

The premises are the veracity of the law of causation and its pervasiveness.

 

[partinobodycular]

That I do not control my will is your shorthand for the nearly infinite regression of causation: "I am caused to control my will as I do, and I am caused to rebel against that influence..." and so on.

It's the age old conundrum... man's will can never supersede God's will, thus everything happens in the way that God wills it to happen.

How someone can maintain a belief in free will given such a claim, is beyond me. But then again, they would seem to have no choice. Now there's a quintessential Catch-22... 'men freely will what God wills them to will'.

 

[o_mlly]

My goodness! that is an awkward way to put it! You want me to say, "I am willed by things I do not control or fully understand to give you the benefit of the doubt"!? I do not dispute that we have a will, and that we always use it. Whether I understand it or not is immaterial. That I do not control my will is your shorthand for the nearly infinite regression of causation: "I am caused to control my will as I do, and I am caused to rebel against that influence..." and so on.

If the will is caused to will as it does, there is no need to mention that fact in referencing the will. That is what the will is, and why it does. You may as well say that to reference the sun accurately, one must describe what it is made of and the processes by which it shines.

Sorry, but the above just appears to me to be word salad. Why don't you start by concisely stating your position on free will and give a principled argument in support.

Those are not the premises of the determinists arguments.

Those are the premises of the OP. He responded to the post where I challenged the testability of his premises but he did not give a reply to my challenge. I'm patient.

The premises are the veracity of the law of causation and its pervasiveness.

The laws of causation do not determine either the inclusion or exclusion of free will in the moral agent. At issue is what are the causes, ie., the agent himself, or the only the aggregate of prior events that may have or have not happened to him.

 

[durangodawood]

So far the determinists are winning the argument.

"Decisions" are made for reasons. At any moment you entirely inherit those reasons. You cant go back and re-write different reasons for yourself that would compel a different outcome.

Unless..... there some other influence at play that operates outside this causal chain. Thats what I believe. But its a belief waiting for demonstrable evidence. And so my belief doesnt win the debate.