Fear and Trembling

[elman]

I think you've missed the point. The point isn't whether God asked for something crazy or not. The point is that if Abraham was ethical, he would have said no.

I agree.

 

[nadroj1985]

Hm. I do think it's utterly important that we see the extremely anti-ethical commandments by God as exceptions, rather than verging on rules (rules is actually deceiving; it implies morality).

This might just be a clarification thing, but: when you call these sorts of commandments "exceptions," do you mean merely that we shouldn't construe them as rules (I would agree), or that they don't happen very often?

 

[Received]

Both. "These sorts of commandments" are the rare ones -- they fly so far from typical or approximately typical commandments dictated by the Eternal that they truly are rarities; it is a rarity to have murder allowed, for example, or stealing from another person. I'm thinking of Million Dollar Baby: Eastwood's character had to make an action that flagrantly contradicted the ethical: that is, murder. But he did it, and it was right.

 

[nadroj1985]

I ask because of a particular way I've always read F&T. I've never thought of it as the analysis of a curious, odd situation which doesn't arise very often (not to say that this is your position -- sometimes building up a strawman can be worthwhile). I've always thought that the only way to do justice to it is to look at what Kierkegaard is doing as a small attempt to get a better idea of the structure of decision making as such. Derrida makes this point in "The Gift of Death" (which you MUST read, John). He calls the sacrifice of Isaac "the most common and everyday experience of responsibility." What he means (I think) is that responsible decision-making has an irreducible paradoxicality to it. Making decisions is not really about getting the correct amount of information and then acting -- in a sense, a decision is made for no reason. Not that there is nothing which compels or "causes" the decision (words tend to fail here), but that acting ethically is more like dancing well than it is like following a rule book. The rules end up not working -- there are too many exceptions, and its never clear whether this or that rule applies to the situation. Acting as one "should" in many ways involves a renouncing of rules, of ethics. And I think that this aspect of Abraham's situation could rightly pass for "common" and "everyday."

What say you?

 

[Received]

Derrida stole his ideas from me.

The bastard. But he's dead, and I'm 23. Who wins now, Jacques?

Oh, but maybe it would be useful to add the ol' inward/outward dichotomy to the mix: I totally agree that sacrificing Isaac would be, in an inward sense, constructed no differently than, say, choosing black socks over white ones. What differs in both of these situations is the pressure of inwardness involved in making the choice. Interestingly, the greater the choice the greater the "self" that makes it -- which we also must keep the frailty of language in mind here; it isn't the "self" that pre-exists as some ghostlike quasi-objective entity that somehow "causes" the choice; rather, the "self" is the choice, in a very real sense. The self is freedom. Thus, the greater choice, the greater the "self" (the greater the righteousness in choosing the "right" thing; the greater the defiance in choosing the wrong thing; the greater the weakness in choosing neither). The self is subjectivity that exists only on the playground of objectivity, in this case physicality ("I" exist by virtue of my body).

But, of course, outwardly is where the difference lies -- the outward has relation to the ethical. And while it's true that the ethical is also construed inwardly (you can't find it next to stop signs, or anywhere else in the world) in the sense that it's tied in with the subjectivity of humanity, the religious is outside of the ethical, just as the ethical is outside of the aesthetic. The sort of choice Abraham made was extreme in the sense that it flew in the face of the ethical the most violently; whereas most other "everyday" choices are approximate to the ethical; at the very least they don't contravene the ethical.

Oh, and Derrida's a guy I need to get into. I actually saw like three-fourths of his documentary ("Derrida"), and it was awesome -- partly awesome to see a real philosopher who history will memorize in the flesh, doing all sorts of cool philosophical stuff.

 

[nadroj1985]

Derrida stole his ideas from me.

The bastard. But he's dead, and I'm 23. Who wins now, Jacques?

Oh, but maybe it would be useful to add the ol' inward/outward dichotomy to the mix: I totally agree that sacrificing Isaac would be, in an inward sense, constructed no differently than, say, choosing black socks over white ones. What differs in both of these situations is the pressure of inwardness involved in making the choice. Interestingly, the greater the choice the greater the "self" that makes it -- which we also must keep the frailty of language in mind here; it isn't the "self" that pre-exists as some ghostlike quasi-objective entity that somehow "causes" the choice; rather, the "self" is the choice, in a very real sense. The self is freedom. Thus, the greater choice, the greater the "self" (the greater the righteousness in choosing the "right" thing; the greater the defiance in choosing the wrong thing; the greater the weakness in choosing neither). The self is subjectivity that exists only on the playground of objectivity, in this case physicality ("I" exist by virtue of my body).

But, of course, outwardly is where the difference lies -- the outward has relation to the ethical. And while it's true that the ethical is also construed inwardly (you can't find it next to stop signs, or anywhere else in the world) in the sense that it's tied in with the subjectivity of humanity, the religious is outside of the ethical, just as the ethical is outside of the aesthetic. The sort of choice Abraham made was extreme in the sense that it flew in the face of the ethical the most violently; whereas most other "everyday" choices are approximate to the ethical; at the very least they don't contravene the ethical.

Oh, and Derrida's a guy I need to get into. I actually saw like three-fourths of his documentary ("Derrida"), and it was awesome -- partly awesome to see a real philosopher who history will memorize in the flesh, doing all sorts of cool philosophical stuff.

Interesting points. I think I agree on the inward/outward distinction. Abraham's situation certainly must be regarded in some sense as odd, as a standout (but of course, it is exemplary for that very reason, which is important to keep in mind), and it makes sense to see it as standing out in the ethical realm, whereas in the realm of inwardness, it is structured like every decision.

Derrida's point, actually, is a bit more radical -- he makes a claim that all actions (or at least the ones we might call morally charged actions) involve an abrupt renouncing of the ethical, or an "irresponsibility." In choosing to help someone, for instance, I choose to help precisely that person, in exclusion to all others (the "other others" as Derrida calls them ). I "sacrifice" those that I do not help, in order to help this particular, individual other, to whom I give of myself unconditionally (and incalculably -- the point is to give without considering the consequences, without hoping that the gift be acknowledged). It's actually this act that Derrida calls the "gift of death" (donner la mort in French).

It's fascinating stuff.

And I need to see that documentary.