Explain Freewill

[mepalmer3]

Actually, I can think of one prediction of determinism right off the top of my head: a strong correlation will be found between childhood conditions and future behavior. Also, a strong correlation will be found between genetic variations and behavior. Do I even have to assert that this is the case? Surely you are aware of it.

It's pretty inconsistent though. Even in cases where it looks like there is no hope for some chap, that he's going to become a drug-dealing alcoholic just like his friends and family. The prediction is very clearly that the fellow would do like everyone is telling him to be. When he doesn't do that, it seems to fail that test of determinism.

Incorrect. Naturalism is the default view until sufficient reason has been established that supports the existence of supernatural realities that effect the physical world. You don't assume that there are supernatural realities until you see evidence of them. If someone told you they could fly, would you believe them without ever asking for a demonstration? I should hope not.

You mentioned this in another article. I'll post another topic on it. but I question wether or not naturalism is the default view that people should take. It starts off with a smaller set of possibilities, which I question as to whether or not is the correct thing to do. but again, i'll open another topic on this. It also relies I think on the principle of empirical verifiability, which is an unsound theory.

By the very nature of choice, every choice you make is made because of a greater reason to make it than any other. Nobody chooses something when they could have chosen something for a better reason.

See I think I see people making quite a few decisions that don't seem to have any good reasoning. My prediction of people always choosing the best choice (even with as poor reasoning as we generally have) is that society would be spiraling upwards and we would be continously improving. but that's not the case. So this determinism fails this test.

But regardless. I've mentioned that I don't think some of your premises are true. You haven't proven them to me. But regardless of the philosophical argument you gave, I've just been simply saying this isn't science. It isn't a theory, if it's a hypothesis, then it's the very weakest form. And it's unsupported as far as observations and predictions go. In fact it appears to be not supported.

 

[elman]

A nice expression of the difference between choice and free will, which shows determinism in its religious and moral aspect:

I may refuse money of mine own strength, but to put away love unto riches out of mine heart can I not do of mine own strength...Wherefore of a man's own strength is the law never fulfilled, we must have there unto God's favour and his spirit, purchased by Christ's blood.
Nevertheless when I say a man may do many things outwardly clean against his heart, we must understand that man is but driven by divers appetites, and the greatest appetite overcometh the less and carrieth the man away violently away with her.

Tyndale, preface to Romans (1534)

I cannot see a difference between choice and free will. I can chose to be greedy or I can chose to not be greedy. That is both refusing money of mine own strenth and putting away the love of riches in my heart. That I continue to be tempted perhaps more than the next man does not determing my actions.

 

[Socrastein]

It's pretty inconsistent though. Even in cases where it looks like there is no hope for some chap, that he's going to become a drug-dealing alcoholic just like his friends and family. The prediction is very clearly that the fellow would do like everyone is telling him to be. When he doesn't do that, it seems to fail that test of determinism.

It only fails if you think its supposed to be absolute - however, as we still are trying to understand the relationship between genes and environment, we can only make probability assessments: and so far they are pretty accurate. Are you aware of how accurate psychoanalysis can be in the hands of a skilled professional? After a day or two of analyzing your behavior patterns they can accurately conclude what your childhood was like - whether your parents were nurturing or abusive, whether they divorced and what your approximate age was at the time, etc. Even small instances of such speak volumes against 'free will'.

See I think I see people making quite a few decisions that don't seem to have any good reasoning. My prediction of people always choosing the best choice (even with as poor reasoning as we generally have) is that society would be spiraling upwards and we would be continously improving. but that's not the case. So this determinism fails this test.

My emphasis added, of course.

What YOU think is the best choice for someone else has NOTHING to do with what they percieve to be the best choice. Again, the irrelevence of your argument does not refute my statement.

I've mentioned that I don't think some of your premises are true. You haven't proven them to me.

They are logical conclusions, that is proof in itself. If you disagree, try actually refuting them - so far all your attempts have been horribly in vain.

But regardless of the philosophical argument you gave, I've just been simply saying this isn't science.

If you disregard my syllogism, then you give me no other choice but to conclude that it is indeed sound, that there is thusly no free will, and that you are tacitly aggreeing with this by failing to argue against it. Whether or not its science has no effect on the logical validity of my original argument. You do not realize it seems that that is the biggest threat to your belief in free will, not my belief in naturalism. Even if you believe in the supernatural, and even if I believed with you, that does not affect the fact that my argument soundly proves that free will is nonsensical.

And it's unsupported as far as observations and predictions go. In fact it appears to be not supported.

Its still supported, since your 'refutations' of my arguments have all been invalid so far. And you STILL ignore my original argument, the strongest argument I've so far given, and you STILL refuse to define free will in any meaningful way!

 

[mepalmer3]

They are logical conclusions, that is proof in itself. If you disagree, try actually refuting them - so far all your attempts have been horribly in vain.

I think it was this thread or another on free will. You admitted that your logic required naturalism being true. It really isn't that interesting of an argument when you start off with a premise that's harder to defend than the conclusion. It's like me starting off saying "The Christian God is real".

 

[Socrastein]

I think it was this thread or another on free will. You admitted that your logic required naturalism being true.

Show me where: if I ever said such a thing, it was a slip up, because my argument certainly does not require naturalism - if it did, that would be one of its premises, naturally.

 

[mepalmer3]

I think it was this thread or another on free will. You admitted that your logic required naturalism being true.

Show me where: if I ever said such a thing, it was a slip up, because my argument certainly does not require naturalism - if it did, that would be one of its premises, naturally.

Ok.

Naturalism would actually be the logically default position, and only is to be abandoned when we see proof that there is something more than the physical reality at work. There is no such evidence, and every day we are explaining more and more "mysteries" as mere consequences of the physical world. You're right to say that my argument rests on the assumption of naturalism, but you're wrong to think that that's an invalid or unwarranted assumption.

The truth is there is an a priori assumption that there is no soul/mind/will that's spiritual -- naturalism, as you said, is a premise, even if you don't come out and state it.

And when we get to assuming that, then you've then moved into unsound territory. You're making statements about absolute truth.

The principle of empirical verifiability says that there are only 2 kinds of meaningful propositions:

1) those that are true by definition
2) those that are empiricially verifiable.

Since the principle of empirical verifiability itself is neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable, it cannot be meaningful.

And that's the basic mistake your making in assuming naturalism.

 

[Socrastein]

Naturalism would actually be the logically default position, and only is to be abandoned when we see proof that there is something more than the physical reality at work. There is no such evidence, and every day we are explaining more and more "mysteries" as mere consequences of the physical world. You're right to say that my argument rests on the assumption of naturalism, but you're wrong to think that that's an invalid or unwarranted assumption.

I said this in response to you saying that my argument from neuroscience assumed naturalism. So I was saying that my argument pertaining to scientific evidence relies on naturalism to adequetely explain our conciousness.

However, like I said, I never conceded that my logic, my syllogism, required an assumption of naturalism, for it most certainly does not.

The truth is there is an a priori assumption that there is no soul/mind/will that's spiritual -- naturalism, as you said, is a premise, even if you don't come out and state it.

I never said it was a premise of my syllogism, and it is NOT - the argument stands on its own: this is obvious to anyone who has but an elementary understanding of logical arguments.

And when we get to assuming that, then you've then moved into unsound territory. You're making statements about absolute truth.

Nonsense. When I assume naturalism, I'm making statements about rationality - as I already explained to you, logically we should not believe in the existence of anything until we are given proof of it - I have proof of the natural world, seeing as how I exist within it and experience it and can test it; however, you have given no proof or even valid evidence of a supernatural world. So the rational position is naturalism, until evidence otherwise is presented. I am not assuming naturalism, I am basing that position on evidence for it - you are the one assuming supernaturalism, because you believe it and posit it without any credible evidence.

The principle of empirical verifiability says that there are only 2 kinds of meaningful propositions:

1) those that are true by definition
2) those that are empiricially verifiable.

Since the principle of empirical verifiability itself is neither true by definition nor empirically verifiable, it cannot be meaningful.

And that's the basic mistake your making in assuming naturalism.

How can I be making that mistake, if I never even mentioned the phrase "Principle of empirical verifiability"? Anyway, one need only contest that "Meaningful proposition" is defined by those terms, so the principle IS in fact very meaningful itself. Truth by definition (A square has 4 sides) is complete tautology and impossible to refute without redefining the english language. Further, what other evidence can there by aside from emperical? Emperical evidence is gathered in the natural world, and we exist in the natural world. We cannot access and set up tests in the supernatural world, now can we? If we cannot, then there is no such thing as evidence that isn't emperical - if it isn't emperical, it isn't evidence - or at least it isn't evidence that we can ever access. So it seems that the principle of emperical verifiability is true by the very definition of meaningful proposition, because anything outside of our experience (non-emperical) is meaningless, obviously.

Like I said over and over, my position of naturalism is the logically valid one until there is evidence to the contrary. You have NOT shown ANY valid evidence to the contrary, or given any logical arguments for supernaturalism, and so your belief in supernaturalism is INVALID. So until you can prove your position, stop squandering by trying to accuse me of unjustly assuming naturalism.

And I am STILL waiting for you to give a definition of free will that:

A) Avoids the inherent contradictions that are pointed out in my opening post
B) Differentiates itself from a causally determined choice
C) Doesn't appeal to ignorance through the fact that the brain/environment interaction is a long way from being fully understood

And I am STILL waiting for you to refute my syllogistic argument against free will that I made days ago and you have yet to make any sort of valid attack on.

If you do not address these two things in your next response, I will no doubt take that as a tacit assent to your inability to refute my argument, and I will conclude that these ridiculous games and straw men you are resorting to are all you have in the realm of arguments.

 

[iwishiwerejesus]

Everyone may have different opinions, decisions, outlooks, and thoughts. That is what free will is. The will to choose what is moral and what is not. If you read the bible and take it to heart, the main points of your morality will come into play.

We have the free will to believe in god or not to. We have the will to go to church, to be spiritual without church, choose our religion that brings us closest to god and how we want to live our lives. No sense in creating robots. What would be the point of a creator who has robots worshiping him?

God even gave man reason. However, it is with that reason (with that free will) if you use it against him or for him.

 

[Socrastein]

Iwish:

Your post was nothing but 6 lines of pure, unsupported conjecture. Could you actually elaborate on your definition of "free will" and avoid the pit falls it inherently possesses? I have described them thoroughly throughout this thread.

 

[mepalmer3]

Like I said over and over, my position of naturalism is the logically valid one until there is evidence to the contrary. You have NOT shown ANY valid evidence to the contrary, or given any logical arguments for supernaturalism, and so your belief in supernaturalism is INVALID. So until you can prove your position, stop squandering by trying to accuse me of unjustly assuming naturalism.

If naturalism is true, if there is no god, then I have no reason to believe that there is such a thing as a soul, a mind, free will. So it's just not a particularly interesting thing to debate whether or not "free will" exists if an underlying premise almost by definition excludes it from being possible.

And I am STILL waiting for you to give a definition of free will that:

A) Avoids the inherent contradictions that are pointed out in my opening post
B) Differentiates itself from a causally determined choice
C) Doesn't appeal to ignorance through the fact that the brain/environment interaction is a long way from being fully understood

And I am STILL waiting for you to refute my syllogistic argument against free will that I made days ago and you have yet to make any sort of valid attack on.

I don't think your syllogism is sound. I don't think it's logical either. I'll look it over the next few days and then probably post some questions on it. You keep bringing this syllogism up, so I'm assuming you believe it carries a great deal of weight. So I'll be happy to knock on it some.

If you do not address these two things in your next response, I will no doubt take that as a tacit assent to your inability to refute my argument, and I will conclude that these ridiculous games and straw men you are resorting to are all you have in the realm of arguments.

Doh... well shoot. I didn't address the syllogism in this message, rather I said I would address it more fully in my next message. Does this then mean that in truth that I am unable to refute your argument? Or would you like to tell me what fallacy you just committed?

 

[David Gould]

Mepalmer,

In what way does the existence of a deity and the soul make free will a possibility where naturalism does not? What are the key differences as you see them that make free will impossible under naturalism and possible under supernaturalism?

 

[Hands Open]

To all the people out there arguing for free will, let me help you sleep a little easier. Determinism is a theory, and not a law. As it is, at present, it's nearly impossible to specifically test to certainty. Also at present it's main tennant rests on probablility. But as we see in quantum physics we have no laws dictating where an electron will be at any given moment, only probabilitys. The arguement then follows if one electron can run amuck then why not anything else? The problem so far is that determinism rests on the idea that there is a reason for everything which, if we could find it out, we could determine the future choices of people, but if we have something acting outside of any given law then by definition Determinism is on thin ice.... kinda. Here's a good definition for it: "There are discoverable causal laws such that, given sufficient (but not godlike) powers of calculation, a man who knows all that is happening within a certain sphere at a certain time can predict all that will happen at the center of the sphere during the time that it takes light to travel from the circumference of the sphere to the center(allowing him all his senses to gather information, and seeing as nothing moves faster than light, allowing nothing from outside to interfere). I know that this might sound rather complicated but in all honesty it's not a simple matter. And if anyone wants to know how this definition is found please ask away. Determinism is by the way an ideal that science lives by, and it cannot be regared, unless on some a priori ground, as being certainly true or certainly false. BUT, at present it is highly probable. So for those of you who wish to retain your shred of hope, I have granted it to you here. Just be aware that there may come a day when we do find a law that will abolish the supposed freedom of the electron thereby settling this debate once and for all. In my mind the only reason this debate has carried on so long is not because of any other equally probable theory but simply the lack of a test for determinism that gives us certain results as opposed to probable ones. In this, all are logically entitled to withhold judgement until that certainty is found, but in doing so you do not by default get your free will back as the agrument for that is sufficiently weak.. You are then simply left with out a reason why.

 

[David Gould]

Hmmm. Indeterminism helps the case for free will not at all.

1.) Events are either caused or uncaused (deterministic or indeterministic)
2.) If an event is caused it is not free.
3.) If an event is uncaused it is not willed.
4.) Therefore, free will cannot exist.

 

[Hands Open]

Hmmm. Indeterminism helps the case for free will not at all.

Thankfully I was in no way arguing for it. Only pointing out there are still some issues that need to get ironed out in determinism. It's easier for people to retain their delusions when things arn't certain. But my point is that even though not certain, determinism is to be taken seriously and that ignoring it comes at a price. Still, that choice is one that can still be made. as you would recall, I said that you don't get your idea of free will back. You simply go without.

 

[David Gould]

Oh, I understand that you were not arguing for it. But you were suggesting that while determinism has significant evidence it might not be true, and that might offer a way out - albeit a very limited one - for those arguing for free will. My point is that indeterminism does not help the argument for free will, either. The universe is deterministic or indeterministic: either way, free will is impossible.

 

[Socrastein]

If naturalism is true, if there is no god, then I have no reason to believe that there is such a thing as a soul, a mind, free will. So it's just not a particularly interesting thing to debate whether or not "free will" exists if an underlying premise almost by definition excludes it from being possible.

It would be interesting if you actually showed evidence/arguments that suggest that naturalism is not true. And, once again, you accuse me of making naturalism one of the premises of my main argument, when in fact it is not one.

I don't think your syllogism is sound. I don't think it's logical either. I'll look it over the next few days and then probably post some questions on it. You keep bringing this syllogism up, so I'm assuming you believe it carries a great deal of weight. So I'll be happy to knock on it some.

I assure you, it is perfectly valid, and can be assumed sound until you or someone else shows otherwise. You obviously aren't very knowledgeable in the field of logic constructing deductive arguments, so perhaps if I make my argument even simpler you will see the validity of it.

1. Every choice is made for a reason (If we choose for no reason at all, that would hardly be a choice at all but rather random happenings)

A vs ~A
A

2. Every reason for a choice must either have its own reason caused by another choice (I chose to ate the cake because I was hungry and I was hungry because I decided not to eat breakfast earlier) or be a factor outside the control of the choosing being.

If A then (B vs ~B)

3. If every reason for which we make a choice is the result of other reasons that were consequence of choice, then we get an infinite regress of choices which is not only logically absurd but also observably false.

~(B)

4. If there can be no infinite regress of reasons that are choice-caused, then there must be reasons for which we do things that we have no control over, i.e. our genetic makeup, environmental factors, physical conditions of our body, etc.

~B

Conclusion: Therefore, our choices are actually determined and any concept of "free-will" is contradictory and logically non-sensical.

Conclusion: A therefore ~B

A = Every choice is made for a reason
~A = Every choice is random
B = Every choice is the result of infinite other choices
~B = Choices eventually result from non-choices

1. A vs ~A
2. A
3. If A then (B vs ~B)
4. ~(B)
5. ~B

C. A therefore ~B (Modus Ponens from 3, 4, and 5)

Every choice is made for a reason, and not every reason can be another choice, therefore choices eventually result from non-choices.

Or in other words, every choice can be causally traced back to a non-choice reason, which means that there is no "free will", only casually determined choices.

Doh... well shoot. I didn't address the syllogism in this message, rather I said I would address it more fully in my next message. Does this then mean that in truth that I am unable to refute your argument? Or would you like to tell me what fallacy you just committed?

It means that you would rather waste my time with a vacuous post than give me an argument. You specifically said that my post isn't logical, but you couldn't give single reason why - you said you had to look it over before you addressed it. What else does that mean but "I think you're wrong but I don't even know why yet". Yes, I would say that that surely does show that you are unable to refute my argument.

 

[Madcoil]

1. Every choice is made for a reason (If we choose for no reason at all, that would hardly be a choice at all but rather random happenings)

My every choice is made for only one reason. MY reason. And sometimes I have reason to choose one thing, but I choose another. And sometimes I just do things out of the blue, choosing for example to throw rocks at small animals and climb rocks. Most people who's been 3-14 years have chosen to do something for absolutely no reason. Why should lack of a reason make any choice less then the choice it is?

2. Every reason for a choice must either have its own reason caused by another choice (I chose to ate the cake because I was hungry and I was hungry because I decided not to eat breakfast earlier) or be a factor outside the control of the choosing being.

And yet when you are hungry, and there is a meal in front of you, you are set in front of a wide variety of choices. The two most urgent ones here being 1. Eat or 2. Don't eat.

3. If every reason for which we make a choice is the result of other reasons that were consequence of choice, then we get an infinite regress of choices which is not only logically absurd but also observably false.

It doesn't need to be an infinite regress of choices.

4. If there can be no infinite regress of reasons that are choice-caused, then there must be reasons for which we do things that we have no control over, i.e. our genetic makeup, environmental factors, physical conditions of our body, etc.

Everyone must eat to stay alive. Yet some choose not to eat and starve themselves to death or near death. Gandhi did this. For a cause, yes, but of his own volition. I fail to see how this is caused by genetic makeup, environmental factors or physical conditions of the body etc.

 

[Socrastein]

Madcoil, I would address your arguments but I don't see any. I see unsubstantiated conjecture that assumes we have free will to argue for free will. The only thing I see worth addressing is this:

"Why should lack of a reason make any choice less then the choice it is?"

By definition, if something happens without a cause it is random. If there is no cause/reason for a choice, that choice is random, and a random choice isn't even a choice at all.

 

[Hands Open]

Oh, I understand that you were not arguing for it. But you were suggesting that while determinism has significant evidence it might not be true, and that might offer a way out - albeit a very limited one - for those arguing for free will. My point is that indeterminism does not help the argument for free will, either. The universe is deterministic or indeterministic: either way, free will is impossible.

Again I'm not suggesting that free will is logically possible. But think of it this way. Your sister just died. You know that even though you wish that she hadn't died it's true. But the cause of death is uncertain. You hope that she didn't die a horrible death but in her sleep. For many it isn't the fact that they've lost something but what they've lost it to. In the end we're dealing with people here. For many the knowledge of a loss of a loved one (to continue the analagy) is not something that you simply throw upon them. Likewise you cannot simply pull the rug out from under peoples most sacred beliefs and then get upset when they don't simply accept it and move on. As people we're not like that. Go back again and read my article. You'll find that my purpose is to slowly ease people into the idea and not drop it on them like a ton of bricks. With knowledge comes responsability. I'm not trying to make a new generation of therapy goers here. So although everything you say is logically true, getting someone to simply accept it the way you do now is not such a simple matter. You will find that we share the same goal but are reaching it by different paths.

 

[Madcoil]

Madcoil, I would address your arguments but I don't see any. I see unsubstantiated conjecture that assumes we have free will to argue for free will.

You see potato.
Why do we push buttons that say: "Don't push this button."?

The only thing I see worth addressing is this:
"Why should lack of a reason make any choice less then the choice it is?"

By definition, if something happens without a cause it is random. If there is no cause/reason for a choice, that choice is random, and a random choice isn't even a choice at all.

Why not? I believe this is the question I was asking... Why is a random choice not a choice at all?



Oh, and why don't you, uh, substantiate me with an example of the "random choice no choice", where the random choice is not a choice?



Oh, and is this what you're saying? It's what I've gathered from your statements so far:
1. A choice that is made randomly is not a choice.
2. A choice that is made for a reason (ie: not randomly) is not a choice.