Exact copy

[GrowingSmaller]

Is the sentence "i am an exact copy of myself in a parallel, replica world" capable of being said without contradiction? or could it be self awareness of ones true identity? Are there any things that can be normally stated that would become paradoxical under this scenario? If there are 100 copies how many me's are there? Could talking to oneself take on a new meaning?

 

[Davian]

 

[Paradoxum]

Well it wouldn't be you, just someone exactly like you.

 

[Crandaddy]

Is the sentence "i am an exact copy of myself in a parallel, replica world" capable of being said without contradiction? or could it be self awareness of ones true identity? Are there any things that can be normally stated that would become paradoxical under this scenario? If there are 100 copies how many me's are there? Could talking to oneself take on a new meaning?

I am (identical to) myself. I might be a copy of someone else, or someone else might be a copy of me, but I can't be a copy of myself.

As I see it, for any two objects A and B, in order for B to be a copy of A, it is necessary for A and B to be really separate (or at least separable), and for there to be some universal U that inheres in both of them. Since I am not really separable from myself, it follows that I cannot be a copy of myself. This would be true for you and everyone else, as well.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I think therefore we are? We think therefore i am? This does not sound right. I think a keyword in the concept is "another" me. Which implies other. But that is metaphysical, to do with substantial other. But there may be a substantial other where given mental access to their internal states of mind i could not cognitively distinguish the other from self. There are not 'metaphysical doubles' (because otherness implies difference), but 'epistemic doubles' (because differences may not be noticed or appear significant).

 

[bricklayer]

There exists ideas that have been actualized; these have being.
There are ideas that have not been actualized but have the potential to be.
There are ideas that cannot be actualized; they have no potentiality apart from the realm of ideas.

I have no grounds for the hypothesis of multiverse as to universe; however, I have no reasoning that can preclude its potentiality.

It is my experience that it is best to tailor the specificity of my answer to the specificity of its question; therefore, perhaps.

 

[Crandaddy]

I think therefore we are? We think therefore i am? This does not sound right. I think a keyword in the concept is "another" me. Which implies other. But that is metaphysical, to do with substantial other. But there may be a substantial other where given mental access to their internal states of mind i could not cognitively distinguish the other from self. There are not 'metaphysical doubles' (because otherness implies difference), but 'epistemic doubles' (because differences may not be noticed or appear significant).

I don't see how it's possible to confuse oneself with someone else, if that's what you're suggesting. Now, maybe I'm not the same person I was yesterday (for example). Maybe when I go to sleep, one person “dies” and another is “born” upon waking the next day who has the exact same memories, personality, etc. In short, personal identity across time is indeed an interesting philosophical issue, but what seems to me clear as day is that I exist and that I am identical to myself right now. You really can't get more epistemically basic than this (seems to me).

 

[Eudaimonist]

Well it wouldn't be you, just someone exactly like you.

It could be either, depending just on what "you" means.

But I personally think that the commonsensical "you" is probably best here, and there is only one "you".


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I had the idea that maybe my "self awareness" was actually made indistinguishable (in epistenic practice not metaphysical theory) from the awareness of a series of epistemic doubles in many replica worlds. there are multiple potential timelines running through my epistemic self and i in not sure which one i am on. Perhaps there is on way for finite man to know. And practically, so what? Unless you enjoy the practice of thinking.

 

[Paradoxum]

It could be either, depending just on what "you" means.

But I personally think that the commonsensical "you" is probably best here, and there is only one "you".


eudaimonia,

Mark

Well that is true, you could mean different things.

 

[GrowingSmaller]

I see it like this: im driving the car but i cant see the number plate.