But my point here is that evolution doesn't 'care' whether or not your beliefs are true. All it 'cares' about is that your ancestors' behaviors were conducive to survival and reproduction. From an evolutionary perspective, all that matters is the usefulness of beliefs--i.e. that they get the organisms that hold them to behave so as to survive and propagate their genes.
As for such epistemically foundational beliefs as the law of identity, it is certainly true that we can't begin to imagine what a 'mind' would be like that did not hold them, but all this serves to show is that our minds are hardwired to think that way. It does not show that we ought to believe them because they're true. In order for it to be the case that a belief ought to be held because it is true, it must be the case that our minds are for the production of true beliefs, in that forming true beliefs is their proper function. If naturalistic evolution is responsible for forming our minds, then our minds cannot be for the production of true beliefs, but rather merely for accomplishing behaviors that are conducive to our survival and reproduction. That our beliefs might also just happen to be true would be nothing more than a fortuitous coincidence.
No, we do form our true beliefs by perceiving the world around us with our senses, and a functioning brain is necessary in order to do this.
By set of prior beliefs I'm referring to premises from which a conclusion is drawn. But leave that aside. The salient point is that in order for us to 'see' that propositions (as e.g. 2+2=4) are true, it is necessary that truth enter the causal picture. You know that e.g. 2+2=4 is true because you can just 'see' that it's true, but this requires two things:
(1) that the proposition that 2+2=4 actually be true, and
(2) that its being true be what causes you to form the belief that 2+2=4 is true.
The point to see here is that in order for minds to be truly rational--in order for them to properly form and think according to true beliefs--it is necessary that propositions cause beliefs to form by virtue of their being true, and not by virtue any other properties they might have (e.g. their exhibiting certain non-alethic patterns, or their causing certain feelings). But I submit that this requires that they be entertained by a mind whose proper function is to form true beliefs, and that this proper function be assumed as axiomatic in order for rational thought to even get off the ground. Thus, it is because we assume as axiomatic that our minds ought to form the belief that 2+2=4 is true that we might say that we just 'see,' or 'recognize,' that it's true. And by the same token, we would say of some mind that did not form the belief that 2+2=4 is true by virtue of 'seeing' its truth that that mind is not functioning properly.
Even beliefs, such as the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction, that form our epistemic bedrock and whose negation is incoherent are still, technically, beliefs. Whether or not we can properly be said to know them depends on whether or not they're actually true, as the truth of a belief is pretty much universally accepted as a necessary condition for that belief's counting as knowledge. But there are certain beliefs that we just have to accept on a sort of faith if we're to have any hope of knowing anything at all, and one of these beliefs, I believe, is that the proper function of our minds is to give us true (or at least mostly true) beliefs. I don't think it's possible to go about justifying this belief, as any attempt to justify it would have to assume the very thing that it would be trying to demonstrate, viz. the reliability of our rational faculties for producing true beliefs. Nor do I think that naturalistic evolution can select for minds whose proper functionality is to form true beliefs, for (as I've said previously) evolution only 'cares' about utility toward an organism's survival and reproduction, and it would select for true beliefs only if such beliefs were useful to accomplish behaviors requisite thereto.
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