Starting today August 7th, 2024, in order to post in the Married Couples, Courting Couples, or Singles forums, you will not be allowed to post if you have your Marital status designated as private. Announcements will be made in the respective forums as well but please note that if yours is currently listed as Private, you will need to submit a ticket in the Support Area to have yours changed.
"Weren't"Tell me what tense it is lol. I wouldn't even make a point of this if it wasn't so ironic after you telling me to learn to read so many times.
What tense is it? Do you know? Can you look it up?
You prefer that the trash was taken out.
You prefer that the trash be taken out.
You prefer that the trash will be taken out.
Tense has nothing to do with the relation between subject and object.
"Weren't"
Ya gotta lotta tolerance for nonsense!Thanks for making my point.
You can also have written I don't prefer that I take out the trash.
You can write it as I'd rather never touch the trash than take out the trash.
Or I'd prefer the trash pile up to the ceiling than take it out.
And what do you think the relationship is between subject and object in the three sentences you wrote? How about the three sentences I wrote?
What's the relationship between me and the trash?
Clearly it's about my tolerance for it's presence. We don't know who is taking it out. We aren't going to leave it ambiguous....and then continue on later like it's me taking out the trash.
I gave you a preference and a moral stance toward that preference. They don't agree.
There's really no semantic wordplay that you'll get me to agree to that changes the preference or the moral.
You can't change my two statements in any way without special pleading.
And if I sit here till the end of time you'll never have any explanation for why these two statements cannot both be true. Not without refuting your morals = preferences tautology.
Because obviously they can. Obviously you're feelings and morals can conflict. Duh.
Derp.
This happens all the time, in all sorts of everyday situations of little consequence and sometimes they have huge consequences and the homosexual kid at the "pray the gay away" camp kills himself. As bad as that is, I'm sure I can spend the rest of this forum pointing other examples of emotional based preferences conflicting with a moral judgement. You're wrong.
You're obviously wrong.
You're so obviously wrong it's hard to imagine that you can't see it.
No. I said all I need to in order to make a statement of preference about a behavior and then a moral statement about the same behavior...
This isn't statement of preference for a behavior...
And another thing...
This isn't statement of preference for a behavior.
This is a statement of preference for the presence of garbage/trash.
You prefer that the trash was taken out.
You prefer that the trash be taken out.
You prefer that the trash will be taken out.
Tense has nothing to do with the relation between subject and object. Still a red herring.
M: "A moral claim is being made."
P: "A preference is being appealed to."
A1. M -> PIf we grant A1 and A2 then A3 follows, and A3 signifies a kind of logical equivalence (similar to "="). Nevertheless, I think A1 is the most important and interesting claim. It may be better represented by the idea that morality is reducible to preferences, or that all moral claims are reducible to preference-claims.
A2. P -> M
A3. M <=> P
Orel: If you make a moral claim then there is a preference underlying it.
In #285 you claim that you describe some things as morally good which you do not prefer. But Orel's responses to that claim are conclusive. Preferences always attend moral judgments. (The relevant question is whether the preferences are antecedent or consequent to the moral judgment)
As bad as that is, I'm sure I can spend the rest of this forum pointing other examples of emotional based preferences conflicting with a moral judgement.
You can also have written I don't prefer that I take out the trash.
You can write it as I'd rather never touch the trash than take out the trash.
Or I'd prefer the trash pile up to the ceiling than take it out.
Ifn it wasnt about the subjunctive
Three independent replies to #368? Keep meditating on that koan.
Note, though, that this whole topic of verb tenses is just another of Ana's sophistic red herrings.
On your theory there is no need for moral judgments and preferences to be isomorphic, or to have identical objects.
Preferences generally don't relate to behavior in the exact same way that moral judgments do, and that's just fine. Earlier in the conversation I alluded this fact at various points (emphasis added):
(A preference underlies the moral claim,
or the moral claim is reducible to preference-claims,
or an appeal to a preference accompanies moral claims.
No one, other than Ana, has claimed that preferences and moral judgments are identical, or that their objects are identical)
In my original draft of #366 I made the explicit claim that the preference can ground the moral judgment without sharing the exact same object,
but I simplified that post because Ana is having so much difficulty keeping up. In any case, the general point is that, on Orel's theory, the things which ground moral judgments need not be <statements of preference for behaviors>; they need only be preferences.
For example, there is no reason why my preference for short grass can't ground my behavioral judgment that my neighbor should mow his yard.
With all of this in mind, in the present case we are free to make the preference explicitly non-behavioral:
- p1: "I really dislike smelly garbage sitting in my house."
- p2: "I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it" (Ana's quote, #362)
- m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior" (Ana's quote, #362)
As <everyone knows>, p1 can ground m1 even in the presence of p2.
When Ana claims that p2 is somehow decisive in precluding grounding preferences such as p1, he is <clearly wrong>. To repeat myself:
Thanks. I know grammar but I don't pretend to be an expert.
As far as I can tell, his verb tense was "future conditional" and the subject ambiguous.
He could have done that on purpose, or on accident, but making the subject unambiguous could be accomplished by the addition of "by subject" at the end of his sentence.
zippy, I promise you, I tried to limit the number of responses.
I'm trying my hardest to consider your viewpoint.
No...it's not. I don't know if you made the subject ambiguous because you think it helps your argument. It doesn't.
I can concede that regardless of my previous two statements....I take out the trash twice daily.
(This is all hypothetical, I don't actually discuss myself in moral arguments)
Is there some reason why all three statements cannot be true? No.
I never made p1 and you don't get to assume it.With all of this in mind, in the present case we are free to make the preference explicitly non-behavioral:
This is just another strawman. Nothing about Orel's position requires him to commit to the view that says we have zero preferences which are contrary to our moral judgments, or that carrying out moral acts is always easy and ideal.
If you actually wanted to contradict Orel's theory in the manner you are attempting, you would have to assert that there is some moral judgment with zero accompanying preferences that could be thought to ground it. For example, you might say:
- p3: "I prefer that no one ever take out any trash, anywhere"
Do you really want to say that? Are p3 and m1 even compatible?
- m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior"
When you said, "I hate taking out the trash and prefer when someone else does it," you were already making qualifications in order to preserve the truth that you prefer the trash be taken out.
We could make this more clear with the statement, "I am willing to take out the trash, but I hate doing so and prefer when someone else does it."
Where's that option on the survey then?
The one where preferences and morals aren't connected at all?
I only see two options.
You're telling me that you don't need to connect preferences to morals in any way for this "theory"?
Or did you just toss out an argument that has nothing to do with mine....and accuse me of strawmanning first in hopes that I don't point it out.
To be clear, you're agreeing now that a preference for a behavior and a moral judgement of the behavior can have opposite values?
That's a completely different judgment. It's not even remotely similar to the one I made.
It's disambiguated to everyone in every possible circumstance. Nobody makes moral judgements that way unless they writing religious doctrines. This was presented to atheists.
Do you want to play that game though? Fine.
Let's imagine I'm the last person alive.
Fill in that scenario with your statement above and proceed with that as my argument. I'll hold that position.
No. But apparently you're trying to insist a moral judgement is axiomatic. I would imagine then you'll appeal to some horrific behavior which can never be admitted approval of and claim victory.
Nope. I simply prefer that if someone is taking out the trash, it is not me.
You can't magically get around this with ambiguity about who does it. It's included in the preference statement.
No....not my argument.
Where's that option on the survey then?
To be clear, you're agreeing now that a preference for a behavior and a moral judgement of the behavior can have opposite values?
That's a completely different judgment. It's not even remotely similar to the one I made.If you actually wanted to contradict Orel's theory in the manner you are attempting, you would have to assert that there is some moral judgment with zero accompanying preferences that could be thought to ground it. For example, you might say:
Do you really want to say that? Are p3 and m1 even compatible?
- p3: "I prefer that no one ever take out any trash, anywhere"
- m1: "I see taking out the trash as morally good behavior"
I think we can boil it down to you prefer the trash be taken out regardless of who does it, so long as it’s not you. That’s still a preference for the trash to be taken out, if not only to remove the stench lol.
I don't really understand your difficulty with the word "preference" in option #1.
What are you talking about, man? Go back and read post #366. No, actually read it this time. In that post I explained in detail why one can have conflicting desires and preferences.
Heck, everything I've said to you in the last two days is premised on the idea that your contrary preference does not invalidate the moral claim (and therefore both can be true). It feels as if you're not following the conversation at all.
These strawmen you are presenting are just so absurd. Do you actually think that Orel or I hold the position that moral acts are always perfectly easy to carry out,
and that there is never any internal reason we might struggle to carry out such acts? Where are you getting this stuff!?
And that's a good thing, because the preference you presented is absolutely irrelevant to the topic.
Riddle me this: If preferences have nothing to do with morals, then how could the preferences contained in p3 make the moral claim m1 impossible?
I don't really understand your difficulty with the word "preference" in option #1.
What are you talking about, man? Go back and read post #366. No, actually read it this time. In that post I explained in detail why one can have conflicting desires and preferences. Heck, everything I've said to you in the last two days is premised on the idea that your contrary preference does not invalidate the moral claim (and therefore both can be true). It feels as if you're not following the conversation at all.
These strawmen you are presenting are just so absurd. Do you actually think that Orel or I hold the position that moral acts are always perfectly easy to carry out, and that there is never any internal reason we might struggle to carry out such acts? Where are you getting this stuff!?
And that's a good thing, because the preference you presented is absolutely irrelevant to the topic.
Riddle me this: If preferences have nothing to do with morals, then how could the preferences contained in p3 make the moral claim m1 impossible?
Those are assumptions that you have to add to my position...
What is your argument for why Orel's theory is incorrect? Feel free to define Orel's theory according to option (2) in the poll, or according to A1 from <this post>.
Tense has nothing to do with the relation between subject and object. Still a red herring.
Thanks for confirming that was a red herring all along.And...
Thanks for confirming that was a red herring all along.
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?
We use cookies and similar technologies for the following purposes:
Do you accept cookies and these technologies?