Ethical Reconciliation?

[quatona]

Hi y’all,

From what I can make out, the following are the main ethical trajectories in Western Philosophy:


Supernaturalism – The idea that God’s revealed commands constitute morality


Consequentialism – the idea that morality is defined by the consequences of an action


Deontology – the idea that duties arise out of a rational view of the world, and that we should perform those duties


Virtue ethics – the idea that morality is defined by what a virtuous person would do, in any given circumstances


Hedonism – a sub category of consequentialism, that thinks humans should pursue their own pleasure


Utilitarianism – another sub category of consequentialism, this time promoting the greatest good of the greatest number


Situationism – the idea that ethics depend on circumstances, and that love, ‘desiring the neighbours good’ should be the motivating force


Subjectivism or Relativism – which doesn’t think morality to be objective anyway, only a matter of opinion.

They are all strong in some senses, (I am a moral realist), and unsatisfactory in others. Have any of you tried to reconcile these agendas into a single, comprehensive, coherent system, and did it work?

No, it doesn´t work for me.
Firstly, I can´t seem to manage to believe in a god.
Secondly, even if I would believe in a god, I wouldn´t know why call god´s opinion objective. Given that god has enough power to enforce his opinion, it might be authoritative (in the "might makes right" way), but objective? No way, by any reasonable definition of the word.

 

[-Vincent-]

Well, no one has answered my question about the 'isms.

My oppinion is that moral rules are axiomatic. So like any axioms they are not subject to proof. Like the law of non-contradiction, it is an axiom, we simply understand it without proof, it doesn't seem to derive from something else. We use it because it is useful. A proof for it would be metalogic, or more properly metamathematics.

The 'isms would be meta-ethical.

 

[The Nihilist]

Fine, but then we also have to make it axiomatic that I'm the best. At everything.

 

[-Vincent-]

Fine, but then we also have to make it axiomatic that I'm the best. At everything.

Oh, by all means... coersion and everything...

 

[The Nihilist]

Ok, seriously though, the reason we don't need proof is that because we're evolutionarily predisposed not to harm other members of our tribe. We empathize with them, and when we see someone who is sad, it makes us sad.

 

[-Vincent-]

Ok, seriously though, the reason we don't need proof is that because we're evolutionarily predisposed not to harm other members of our tribe. We empathize with them, and when we see someone who is sad, it makes us sad.

Well, I agree in the local sense, but it has been suggested that empathy is a learned behaviour. And, wouldn't "evolutionarily predisposed" be based purely on a thought experiment? An imaginary justification?

 

[The Nihilist]

What? No, not at all.

 

[-Vincent-]

What? No, not at all.

Oh, of course, I should have known...

 

[Eudaimonist]

They are all strong in some senses, (I am a moral realist), and unsatisfactory in others. Have any of you tried to reconcile these agendas into a single, comprehensive, coherent system, and did it work?

I don't see how these can be reconciled. At least some of them are different in their fundamentals. It's best to make the most out of one of the approaches. Personally, I chose virtue ethics.

It is possible that a few of these things can mix to an extent. Virtue ethics can be consequentialist, for instance, if what defines a virtuous individual is skill in producing good consequences.

But you can't mix them all. You can't mix hedonism and utilitarianism, for example. They are, as you say, different subcategories off of consequentialism.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[2ndRateMind]

I don't see how these can be reconciled. At least some of them are different in their fundamentals. It's best to make the most out of one of the approaches. Personally, I chose virtue ethics.

It is possible that a few of these things can mix to an extent. Virtue ethics can be consequentialist, for instance, if what defines a virtuous individual is skill in producing good consequences.

...


eudaimonia,

Mark

Thanks, Mark.

But you can't mix them all. You can't mix hedonism and utilitarianism, for example. They are, as you say, different subcategories off of consequentialism.

OK, what if you found pleasure (as JS Mill did) in the act of promoting the greatest good of the greatest number? Seems to me that hedonism is a much stronger contender than it first appears, when you consider that it needn't be transitory physical pleasure that one seeks to maximise, but could be, for example, that lasting ease of a quiet conscience Christians seem to be referring to when they talk about 'the peace of God, which passeth all understanding....'

Best wishes, 2ndRateMind.

 

[2ndRateMind]

I would really like to know why the list of 'isms are useful. What problems do they solve?

I don't think they are necessarily meant to solve problems, just provide different perspectives on the moral maze, and so allow us to clarify our thinking, and derive alternative possibilities from which we may choose, according to our inclinations and capacities.

Best wishes, 2ndRateMind

 

[morningstar2651]

I am not very familiar with Kant, being only a neophyte philosopher. But it strikes me that the categorical imperative could work with lying. For example, one might wish it to be a universal maxim that one should lie to Gestapo officers requiring the whereabouts of hidden Jews, without doing violence to the concept.

Best wishes, 2ndRateMind.

Kant argued against that position.

 

[Jane_the_Bane]

Thanks, Mark.



OK, what if you found pleasure (as JS Mill did) in the act of promoting the greatest good of the greatest number? Seems to me that hedonism is a much stronger contender than it first appears, when you consider that it needn't be transitory physical pleasure that one seeks to maximise, but could be, for example, that lasting ease of a quiet conscience Christians seem to be referring to when they talk about 'the peace of God, which passeth all understanding....'

Best wishes, 2ndRateMind.

The funny thing about the creation of terms and categories is this:

The closer you look at them, the more the supposedly "fundamental" boundaries you've just set up to distinguish between them break down.

Is a person who derives pleasure from helping others altruistic or not?
Is contributing to the welfare of the community you live in selfish if it inevitably means that your own situation is improved by it as well?

Say, you belong to the upper echelons of society, and invest large sums into giving slum dwellers an education - and thus, supply them with a reasonable chance to better their lot. At first glance, it doesn't seem to benefit yourself at all: you lose money, which you might otherwise have spent gratifying more immediate desires, such as a new yacht or a bigger swimming pool.
Yet as a result of your "charity", crime rates plummet, the slums shrink, and a whole generation of formerly hopeless and disenfranchised poor is no longer bound to its fate. You have to pay less to keep your property shielded against criminal intruders, you may sleep safely at night, knowing that no hardened gangster will try to murder you to pay for his next fix.

So, was your charitable donation altruistic, or was it not?
Does acting for the benefit of your own community mean that you go against your own interests, or does it not?

 

[Eudaimonist]

OK, what if you found pleasure (as JS Mill did) in the act of promoting the greatest good of the greatest number?

I doubt that such a philosophical approach could be sustained, since there is no reason why one would necessarily find pleasure in this. It might work that way for J.S. Mill, but for few others.

And you'd still have to ask yourself: is action X good because you find pleasure in it, or is action X good because it maximizes pleasure/good for everybody in a utilitarian fashion? What makes X good? This matters as far as ethics is concerned.



eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Eudaimonist]

The closer you look at them, the more the supposedly "fundamental" boundaries you've just set up to distinguish between them break down.

Not break down. Merely overlap slightly.

The fundamentals are still different in ways that make them distinct from each other, so that it would be a mistake to confuse one for the other. They simply aren't different in every respect.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Jane_the_Bane]

Not break down. Merely overlap slightly.

The fundamentals are still different in ways that make them distinct from each other, so that it would be a mistake to confuse one for the other. They simply aren't different in every respect.


eudaimonia,

Mark

Ah, and there I disagree with you, if only partially. Language (and that includes all terms and definitions) relies on artificial dichotomies, culturally constructed boundaries that separate one thing from another. In fact, that's how meaning is constructed in the first place.

Of course, a rock is not a tree, a plant is not an animal, slavery is not freedom, and greed is not charity. They'd be different even if we did not have the linguistic means to express said difference.
Yet in abstract matters that extend well into the ideological sphere (and pretty much all philosophical and ethical discussions would fall into that group), we're dealing with abstract dichotomies. Dichotomies that are at best tangentially tied to any physical reality, dichotomies that depend upon a certain ideological/religious/cultural background in order to be understood.

Most people believe that they have a pretty clear idea of what constitutes egotism and what constituted altruism - and for the most part, they'd not only feel that these two are not even remotely overlapping, they'd also readily condemn the first and praise the second without hesitation. (Unless they embrace very specific, marginal ideologies, that is.)

The thing is, though: the more you insist on the hard, unwavering dichotomy, and the more effort you put into separating the one from the other; in short, the more you try to move matters into the abstract realm, the more you will find that these terms do not correspond to what is there any longer.

 

[2ndRateMind]

And you'd still have to ask yourself: is action X good because you find pleasure in it, or is action X good because it maximizes pleasure/good for everybody in a utilitarian fashion? What makes X good? This matters as far as ethics is concerned.

I don't see why one can't have both: an action may be good because I find pleasure in it, and because it maximises the utility of the greatest number. An action that I don't find pleasure in may be less good, despite it's benficial utility calculus, and an action that I do find pleasure in but that has no utility for the greatest number at all may be less good still. Or, so it seems to me.

Best wishes 2ndRateMind.

 

[Eudaimonist]

I don't see why one can't have both: an action may be good because I find pleasure in it, and because it maximises the utility of the greatest number.

You can't have both because you are providing two mutually-exclusive understandings of what makes something good, even if they seem on the surface to be the same. Choose one. It may be that the other will conform to one's standard of the good, but this will be an accident.

To put this another way, an action may be good because it maximizes utility. If you also find pleasure in maximizing utility, that may be good, but why? Not because of the pleasure, but because of the utility. How can you evaluate the goodness of something with two different standards?

Consider what happens when these conflict. Which action do you select when they do conflict? When pleasure tells you to do X, and utility tells you to do Y, which do you choose? How do you choose? And how do you prioritize your values?


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[Eudaimonist]

Ah, and there I disagree with you, if only partially.

Disagreement with you is always interesting, and this is a good issue to discuss. I'll try to get back to you soon.


eudaimonia,

Mark

 

[2ndRateMind]

You can't have both because you are providing two mutually-exclusive understandings of what makes something good, even if they seem on the surface to be the same. Choose one. It may be that the other will conform to one's standard of the good, but this will be an accident.

Hey Mark, I'm not going to choose. At least, not at this early stage in the thread.

EF Schumacher, who wrote 'Small is Beautiful', once noted our tendency in the west to think in terms of either/or, and contrasted it with the eastern tendency to think in terms of both/and.

You can have two reasons that something is good, and those reasons can be equally significant, or one can be less significant than another. If we are to reconcile the various ethical traditions - the purpose of this thread - then I think we need be prepared to think in these terms.

And, of course, this is precisely what we do, when confronted by everyday moral dilemmas. We select the perspective best suited to our purposes, but we do not presume that all other perspectives are useless in all cases. Unless we are a fundamentalist, of some description.

Best wishes, 2ndRateMind